Do Financial Analysts Restrain Insiders' Informational Advantage?

Panayides, Marios A.; Ellul, Andrew

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1344032

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Do Financial Analysts Restrain Insiders' Informational Advantage?

EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper

70 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2009 Last revised: 12 May 2014

See all articles by Marios A. Panayides

Marios A. Panayides

University of Cyprus - Department of Accounting and Finance; University of Oklahoma

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

There are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 15, 2009

Abstract

We investigate the competitive relationship between financial analysts and firm insiders for price-sensitive information. We identify the influence of this competition on trade dynamics by empirically examining the impact of complete analysts’ coverage termination on stocks’ liquidity, price discovery and insider trading. Termination leads to a deterioration in liquidity and price efficiency, an increase in information asymmetries, and higher profitability of insider trades. Importantly, the magnitude of these effects depends on insiders’ presence. Institutional investors alleviate, but do not eliminate, the effects of coverage termination. Overall, this evidence indicates that analysts contribute to market quality through competition with insiders.

Keywords: Sell-side research, Insiders, Insider Trading, Information Asymmetries, Liquidity

JEL Classification: D14, G24, D82

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Panayides, Marios A. and Panayides, Marios A. and Ellul, Andrew, Do Financial Analysts Restrain Insiders' Informational Advantage? (February 15, 2009). EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1344032 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1344032