Agency Implications of Equity Market Timing
52 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2012 Last revised: 27 Apr 2015
Date Written: Dec 29, 2012
Abstract
We develop a rational expectations model to examine the conflicts of interest between different groups of shareholders in firms' market timing decisions. We show that current shareholders benefit from share repurchase timing, whereas future shareholders prefer issuance timing. Using a new empirical measure that captures the additional returns to shareholders from equity sales and stock repurchases, we document that managers of large firms time the market primarily through stock repurchases and are rewarded with higher compensation when they beat the market. In contrast, managers of small firms appear to cater more to future shareholders in their market timing decisions.
Keywords: agency, market timing, repurchase
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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