Takeover Bids Vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

47 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2003 Last revised: 10 Dec 2018

See all articles by Lucian A. Bebchuk

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Oliver Hart

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: 2001

Abstract

This paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in publicly traded corporations with dispersed ownership. Specifically, we analyze and compare three mechanisms: (1) proxy fights (voting only); (2) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination of proxy fights and takeover bids in which shareholders vote on acquisition offers. We first show how proxy fights unaccompanied by an acquisition offer suffer from substantial shortcomings that limit the use of such contests in practice. We then argue that combining voting with acquisition offers is superior not only to proxy fights alone but also to takeover bids alone. Finally, we show that, when acquisition offers are in the form of cash or the acquirer's existing securities, voting shareholders can infer from the pre-vote market trading which outcome would be best in light of all the available public information. Our analysis has implications for the ongoing debates in the US over poison pills and in Europe over the new EEC directive on takeovers.

Keywords: Corporate governance, corporate control, takeovers, proxy contests, mergers and acquisitions

JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Hart, Oliver D., Takeover Bids Vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control (2001). European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 04/2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 336, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=290584 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.290584

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

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Oliver D. Hart

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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1000 Brussels
Belgium

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