An Empirical Study of the Incidence of Insider Trading in China

32 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2007

See all articles by (Robin) Hui Huang

(Robin) Hui Huang

Chinese University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law; 华东政法大学(East China University of Political Sicence and Law); University of New South Wales - Faculty of Law

Date Written: May 12, 2007

Abstract

China has followed the international trend to regulate insider trading, but the enforcement of its insider trading regulation, as evidenced by prosecutions, is far from satisfying. In order to improve the efficacy of insider trading regulation, it is necessary first to understand the nature and extent of the underlying problem. Based on the reported insider trading cases and relevant empirical studies, including qualitative research through interviews, this paper has investigated the nature and extent of insider trading in China. It is submitted that insider trading is presently quite serious in China, exhibiting distinctive features in terms of likely insiders, types of insider trading, likely situations where insider trading occurs and so on. It is hoped that these findings will provide useful information for the future reform of China's insider trading regulation.

Keywords: empirical study, insider trading, China

Suggested Citation

Huang, (Robin) Hui, An Empirical Study of the Incidence of Insider Trading in China (May 12, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=993341 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.993341

(Robin) Hui Huang (Contact Author)

Chinese University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law ( email )

Shatin, New Territories
Hong Kong
852-39431805 (Phone)
852-29942505 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.cuhk.edu.hk/app/people/prof-robin-huang/

华东政法大学(East China University of Political Sicence and Law) ( email )

1575 Wanhangdu Rd.
Changning, Shanghai 200042
China

University of New South Wales - Faculty of Law ( email )

Sydney, New South Wales 2052
Australia
61-2-9385 9649 (Phone)
61-2-9385 1175 (Fax)

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