The Incidence and Effectiveness of Prior Actions in Imf-Supported Programs

26 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2006

See all articles by Alun H. Thomas

Alun H. Thomas

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - European Department

Uma Ramakrishnan

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Policy Development and Review Department

Date Written: September 2006

Abstract

Prior actions are measures that need to be implemented prior to Board approval of an IMF-supported program. This paper examines whether such prior actions can signal a willingness to implement reforms, especially when the member's track record is weak. We find some support for this signaling role, particularly for programs supported by the General Resources Account (GRA). Controlling for the member's previous track record, prior actions are associated with greater compliance with other structural conditions, suggesting their possible use as a screening device. Moreover, prior actions set at program approval serve as a useful screening device and strengthen the macroeconomic targets set out in the IMF-supported program. The results also reveal a demonstrable screening effect on growth over the medium term, since the growth impact of the ratio of prior actions at the outset versus the rest of the program is significantly positive while the total number of prior actions is not statistically significant.

Keywords: Conditionality, prior actions, signaling, commitment, implementation

JEL Classification: E61, F33, F34

Suggested Citation

Thomas, Alun and Ramakrishnan, Uma, The Incidence and Effectiveness of Prior Actions in Imf-Supported Programs (September 2006). IMF Working Paper No. 06/213, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=941275

Alun Thomas (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - European Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Uma Ramakrishnan

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Policy Development and Review Department ( email )

700 19th St. NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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