Bank-Tax Conformity for Corporate Income: An Introduction to the Issues

45 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2005 Last revised: 29 Sep 2022

See all articles by Michelle Hanlon

Michelle Hanlon

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Terry J. Shevlin

University of California-Irvine; University of California-Irvine

Date Written: January 2005

Abstract

This paper discusses the issues surrounding the proposals to conform financial accounting income and taxable income. The two incomes diverged in the late 1990s with financial accounting income becoming increasingly greater than taxable income through the year 2000. While the cause of this divergence is not known for certain, many suspect that it is the result of earnings management for financial accounting and/or the tax sheltering of corporate income. Our paper outlines the potential costs and benefits of one of the proposed "fixes" to the divergence: the conforming of the two incomes into one measure. We review relevant research that sheds light on the issues surrounding conformity both in the U.S. as well as evidence from other countries that have more closely aligned book and taxable incomes. The extant empirical literature reveals that it is unlikely that conforming the incomes will reduce the amount of tax sheltering by corporations and that having only one measure of income will result in a loss of information to the capital markets.

Suggested Citation

Hanlon, Michelle and Shevlin, Terry J. and Shevlin, Terry J., Bank-Tax Conformity for Corporate Income: An Introduction to the Issues (January 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11067, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=652985

Michelle Hanlon (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

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Terry J. Shevlin

University of California-Irvine ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States
949-824-6149 (Phone)

University of California-Irvine ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA California 92697-3125
United States
2065509891 (Phone)

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