Explaining Preferences for Control Rights in Strategic Alliances: A Property Rights and Capabilities Perspective Approach

46 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2012 Last revised: 6 Mar 2023

See all articles by Carolin Häussler

Carolin Häussler

University of Passau

Matthew John Higgins

University of Utah - Department of Entrepreneurship & Strategy; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Date Written: September 2012

Abstract

Increases in alliance activity between research-intensive firms and incumbents is puzzling since it is challenging to contract upon highly uncertain R&D activities. Our paper extends prior research by exploring the relationship between firm capabilities and preferences for control rights. This link is important because the allocation of control rights has been shown to influence alliance outcomes. Using data based on a survey of biotechnology firms, we find that both current and future capabilities provide strong explanatory power for understanding preferences for control rights. Our results allow us to integrate aspects of the capabilities perspective into the property rights framework.

Suggested Citation

Haeussler, Carolin and Higgins, Matthew John, Explaining Preferences for Control Rights in Strategic Alliances: A Property Rights and Capabilities Perspective Approach (September 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w18364, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2143551

Carolin Haeussler (Contact Author)

University of Passau ( email )

Innstrasse 27
Passau, 94032
Germany

Matthew John Higgins

University of Utah - Department of Entrepreneurship & Strategy ( email )

1655 East Campus Center Dr.
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

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