Stratified or Comprehensive? The Economic Efficiency of School Design

42 Pages Posted: 23 May 2001

See all articles by Giorgio Brunello

Giorgio Brunello

University of Padua - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Massimo Giannini

University of Rome Tor Vergata

Date Written: April 2001

Abstract

We study the efficiency of secondary school design by focusing on the degree of differentiation between vocational and general education. Using a simple model of endogenous job composition, we analyze the interaction between relative demand and relative supply of skills and characterize efficient school design when the government runs schools and cares about total net output. We show that neither a comprehensive nor a stratified system unambiguously dominates the other system in terms of efficiency for all possible values of the underlying parameters. Since comprehensive systems generate more equal labor market outcomes, it follows that the relationship between efficiency and equity in secondary education is not necessarily a trade off. We also show that net output maximizing government policy is not always supported by majority voting. When schools are stratified, majority voting could increase the elitist nature of general schools by rising the admission standard above efficient levels. At the same time, and depending on the values of the underlying parameters, efficient stratified schools could be voted down in favor of less efficient comprehensive schools.

JEL Classification: I20

Suggested Citation

Brunello, Giorgio and Giannini, Massimo, Stratified or Comprehensive? The Economic Efficiency of School Design (April 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=270179 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.270179

Giorgio Brunello (Contact Author)

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

via Del Santo 33
35121 Padova
Italy
+39 049 827 4223 (Phone)
+39 049 827 4221 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Massimo Giannini

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Via del Politecnico 1
Rome, Rome 00133
Italy
+39-6-72592405 (Phone)
+39-6-7233050 (Fax)

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