• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
This article examines the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark Second Amendment decision in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), and the scope of the constitutional right to defensive arms that Heller recognizes.

I begin by discussing how Heller refined and altered the sketchy Second Amendment framework bequeathed by United States v. Miller (1939), in order to adopt a broad individual right to arms focused upon personal defense. In particular, I argue, Heller departs from Miller's understanding of the relationship between the Second Amendment right to arms and the civic purposes (deterring tyranny, military readiness, etc.) that are indicated by the Amendment's prefatory clause. Heller recognizes what might be called a nineteenth-century right to arms, one whose clearest prior expression is found in state judicial decisions and other sources from the century following the American founding.

I consider the pros and cons of Heller's personal purpose-centered conception of the right to arms, and its implications for future issues such as Second Amendment incorporation and concealed carry reform. Finally, I consider at length one of the most important adjudicative problems likely to arise under Heller: how to determine which types of novel or contemporary "arms" are protected by the Second Amendment. I argue that courts should rely as much as possible on verifiable, external sources of evidence on this matter, especially the revealed judgments of private citizens and police departments about which arms are worth obtaining today for defense.

NOTE (3/15/09): The previously posted draft version has been replaced by this version, which reflects the final pre-publication galleys.

District of Columbia v. Heller, Second Amendment, originalism, incorporation, right to arms, self-defense, defensive weapons, concealed carry, assault weapons

Abstract:
This article describes important recent developments in normative law and economics, and the difficulties they create for the project of efficiency-based legal reform. After long proceeding without a well articulated moral justification for using economic decision procedures to choose legal rules, scholars have lately begun to devote serious attention to developing a philosophically attractive definition of well-being. At the same time, the empirical side of law and economics is also being enriched with an improved understanding of the complexities of individuals' decision-making behavior.

That is where the problems begin. Scholars may have better, more plausible conceptions of well-being in hand, but it is not at all clear how to develop practical techniques for measuring and comparing individuals' gains and losses in well-being, so defined. And at the practical end, behavioral research suggests that the range of individual preferences that economic analysis must accommodate is broader and more complex than was previously assumed. We detail a variety of psychological studies that suggest that individuals often hold law-related preferences: direct preferences about the content and fairness of their legal system. These preferences defy market valuation, yet we argue that they cannot be ignored. Most intriguingly, studies suggest that in some cases people hold a preference that legal decisions should not be made on an economic basis. We describe such anti-utilitarian preferences, collecting evidence of their strength and permanence.

In the final part of the article, we offer predictions about the future development of law and economics, in light of its growing theoretical sophistication and the evidence of law-related preferences. The most likely outcomes are: (1) scholars advocating various forms of paternalism, whether by excluding citizens from participation in the legal system or by discounting some types of individual preferences from consideration in choosing policies; or (2) a limited implementation of economic techniques, applying them strongly in some areas of the law but not in others. We discuss the relative strengths and failures of each proposed approach, and offer suggestions for future empirical work. We conclude by giving a tentative answer to the question that titles the article.

Law and economics, welfare, cost benefit analysis, utilitarianism, behavioral economics, juries, preferences, fairness, paternalism, legal theory, wealth maximization, Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks