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Robert G. Hansen's
Scholarly Papers
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Aggregate Statistics |
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Downloads
263 |
Total
Citations
2 |
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1.
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Stewart J. Schwab
Cornell Law School Randall S. Thomas
Vanderbilt University - School of Law Robert G. Hansen
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
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03 May 01
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03 Apr 02
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263
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Abstract:
This paper documents and explains the amazing growth of the largest firms in law, accounting, and investment banking. Scholars to date have used various supply-side theories to explain the growth, and have generally examined only one industry at a time. We give the first demand-side explanation of firm growth, and show how the explanation is similar for firms in all "project" industries. We show that law plays an important role in determining industry structure.
Among the areas we cover are the growth of Multi-Disciplinary Practice firms. We argue that the issues surrounding MDPs can best be understood by looking more broadly at the forces driving project industries. We also explain the driving forces behind the breakup of the Big Five accounting firms, the consolidation of the investment banking industry and the heretofore unexamined divergent growth patterns of the law firms in the plaintiffs' securities litigation field.
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2.
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Robert G. Hansen
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
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12 Feb 01
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09 Apr 01
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Abstract:
Auctions of companies are conducted in ways that contradict received auction theory. The major puzzles are: (1) sellers restrict the number of bidders; (2) sellers restrict the number of bidders; (3) bidders are screened by an initial round of non-binding bids; and (4) bidders offer - and sellers sometimes accept - preemptive bids. Puzzles (1), (2), and (4) are explained by assuming that some information concerning the company can, if released, reduce the value of the company. Puzzle (3) is explained as a way for sellers to select the highest-valued bidders; equilibrium is maintained by using the initial bids to set a reserve price for the final bidding round.
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3.
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Robert G. Hansen
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth John R. Lott Jr.
University of Maryland Foundation, University of Maryland
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25 Jun 98
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02 Apr 08
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Abstract:
If shareholders own diversified portfolios, and if companies impose externalities on one another, shareholders do not want value maximization to be corporate policy. Instead, shareholders want companies to maximize portfolio values. This occurs when firms internalize between-firm externalities. Any kind of externality, pecuniary or nonpecuniary, vertical or horizontal, suffices. What matters is simply that one company's actions affect another's value. Thus, besides the traditional benefit of risk reduction, portfolio diversification offers additional benefits to shareholders through helping internalize externalities. This paper documents the extent of diversification and cross-ownership of stocks among companies where these externalities are likely to be large and provides a capital market test of how merger offers vary with the extent of cross-ownership.
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