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Abstract:
The costs of debt crises are not invariant to the foreign debt instrument composition: bank loans or bonds. The lending boom of the 1990s witnessed considerable variation over time and across countries in the debt instrument used by emerging market (EM) borrowers. This article tests how macroeconomic fundamentals affect the composition of international debt instruments used by EM borrowers. Analysis of micro-level data using an ordered probability model shows that macroeconomic fundamentals explain a significant share of variation in the ratio of bonds to loans for private borrowers, but not for the sovereigns.

Abstract:
The costs of debt crises are not invariant to the foreign debt instrument composition: bank loans or bonds. The lending boom of the 1990s witnessed considerable variation over time and across countries in the debt instrument used by emerging market (EM) borrowers. This paper tests how macroeconomic fundamentals affect the composition of international debt instruments used by EM borrowers. Analysis of micro-level data using ordered probability model shows that macroeconomic fundamentals explain a significant share of variation in the ratio of bonds to loans for private borrowers, but not for the sovereigns.

Emerging Markets, Foreign Debt, Debt Composition, Country Risk

Abstract:
This paper uses survival analysis to investigate the timing of a firm's decision to issue for the first time in the public bond market. We find that firms that are more creditworthy and have higher demand for external funds issue their first public bond earlier. We also find that issuing private bonds or taking out syndicated loans is associated with a faster entry to the public bond market. According to our results, the relationships that firms develop with investment banks in connection with their private bond issues and syndicated loans further speed up their entry to the public bond market. Finally, we find that a firm's reputation has a "U-shaped" effect on the timing of a firm's bond IPO. Consistent with Diamond's (1991) reputational theory, firms that establish a track record of high creditworthiness as well as those that establish a track record of low creditworthiness enter the public bond market earlier than firms with intermediate reputation.

bond financing, reputation, bank relationships, duration analysis

Abstract:
This paper uses duration analysis to investigate the timing of firms' decision to first access the public bond market. We find that, consistent with Diamond's (1991) model, reputation has a non-monotonic effect on the timing of firms' first public bond issue: firms with the highest and lowest reputation enter the public bond market earlier than firms with intermediate reputation. We also find that, controlling for reputation, issuing a private bond or taking out a syndicated loan speeds up firms' entry to the public bond market. Among the firms that issue private bonds, those that select as an underwriter for their first public bond issue a bank that bought their prior private placements are able to access the public bond market faster than those which do not capitalize on these relationships. In contrast, the relationships that firms develop with banks when they borrow in the syndicated loan market do not affect the timing of their access to the public bond market. Finally, our results show that entry in the public bond market is important in that it lowers the cost of raising external funding subsequently in both the private bond market and the syndicated loan market.

bond financing, reputation, bank relationships, duration analysis

Abstract:
We review previous literature on productivity spillovers of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China and conduct our own analysis using a cross--section of firm data. We find that the evidence of FDI spillovers on the productivity of Chinese domestic firms is mixed, with many positive results largely due to aggregation bias or failure to control for endogeneity of FDI. Attempting over 2500 specifications which take into account forward and backward linkages, we find no evidence of systematic positive productivity spillovers from FDI. We do, however, find robust evidence that Chinese private firms tend to invest less in innovation in the presence of FDI. Combined with our previous findings that domestic private firms tend to be more involved in providing inputs and intermediary goods for foreign firms (Hale and Long, 2006), these results suggest a more passive role played by domestic firms in the global division of labor than envisioned by the Chinese government.

FDI spillovers, institutions, SOE, privatization, China

Abstract:
Theory suggests that banks' private information lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since new information about a firm is revealed at the time of its bond IPO, it follows that banks will be forced to adjust their loan interest rates downwards after firms undertake their bond IPO. We test this hypothesis and find that firms are able to borrow at lower interest rates after their bond IPO. Importantly, firms that get their first credit rating at the time of their bond IPO benefit from larger interest rate savings than those that already had a credit rating. These findings provide support for the hypothesis that banks price their informational monopoly. We also find that it is costly for firms to enter the public bond market.

informational rents, loan spreads, Bond IPOs, bond spreads, bank relationships

Abstract:
Modern corporate finance theory argues that although bank monitoring is beneficial to borrowers, it also allows banks banks to use the private information they gain through monitoring to "hold-up" borrowers for higher interest rates. In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for this information hold-up cost. Since new information about a firm's creditworthiness is revealed at the time of its first issue in the public bond market, it follows that after firms undertake their bond IPO, banks with an exploitable information advantage will be forced to adjust their loan interest rates downwards, particularly for firms that are revealed to be safe. Our findings show that firms are able to borrow from banks at lower interest rates after they issue for the first time in the public bond market and that the magnitude of these savings is larger for safer firms. We further find that among safe firms, those that get their first credit rating at the time of their bond IPO benefit from larger interest rate savings than those that already had a credit rating when they entered the bond market. Since more information is revealed at the time of the bond IPO on the former firms and since this information will increase competition from uninformed banks, these findings provide support for the hypothesis that banks price their informational monopoly.

Finally, we find that while entering the public bond market may reduce these informational rents, it is costly to firms because they have to pay higher underwriting costs on their IPO bonds. Moreover, IPO bonds are subject to more underpricing than subsequent bonds when they first trade in the secondary bond market.

Informational rents, loan spreads, bond IPOs, bond spreads, bank relationships

Abstract:
We propose a model of rating agencies that is an application of global game theory in which heterogeneous investors act strategically. The model allows us to explore the impact of the introduction of a rating agency on financial markets. Our model suggests that the addition of the rating agency affects the probability of default and the magnitude of the response of capital flows to changes in fundamentals in a non-trivial way, and that introducing a rating agency can bring multiple equilibria to a market that otherwise would have the unique equilibrium.

credit rating, rating agency, sovereign debt, global game

Abstract:
Using firm-level data, we find that the presence of foreign firms in China is positively associated with the performance of domestically owned private firms but is negatively associated with the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In particular, we find: (1) the presence of foreign direct investment (FDI) is associated with larger differences in the wages and the quality of skilled workers between SOEs and private firms; and, (2) FDI presence is positively associated with private firms' sales to foreign firms and foreign consumers, but not with the sales of SOEs. We argue that these differences could be due to the fact that private firms have more flexible wage and personnel policies, which allows them to attract talent that facilitates positive FDI spillovers.

FDI spillovers, institutions, SOE, privatization, China

Abstract:
We review previous literature on productivity spillovers of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China and conduct our own analysis using a firm-level data set from a World Bank survey. We find that the evidence of FDI spillovers on the productivity of Chinese domestic firms is mixed, with many positive results largely due to aggregation bias or failure to control for endogeneity of FDI. Attempting over 2500 specifications which take into account forward and backward linkages, we fail to find evidence of systematic positive productivity spillovers from FDI.

FDI, spillovers, forward-backward linkages, China

Abstract:
Currency crises of the past decade highlighted the importance of balance-sheet effects of currency crises. In credit-constrained markets such effects may lead to further declines in credit. Controlling for a host of fundamentals, we find a systematic decline in foreign credit to emerging market private firms of about 25% in the first year following currency crises, which we define as large changes in real value of the currency. This decline is especially large in the first five months, lessens in the second year and disappears entirely by the third year. We identify the effects of currency crises on the demand and supply of credit and find that the decline in the supply of credit is persistent and contributes to about 8% decline in credit for the first two years, while the 35% decline in demand lasts only five months.

currency crises, credit rationing, balance--sheet effects, credit constraints, original sin

Abstract:
In a Tobin's q model with productivity and liquidity shocks, we study the mechanism through which strong creditor protection increases the level and lowers the volatility of stock market prices. There are two channels at work: (1) the Tobin's q value under a credit crunch regime increases with creditor protection; and, (2) the probability of a credit crunch falls for given stochastic processes of underlying shocks when creditor protection improves.

We test these predictions by using cross-country panel regressions of the stock market price level and volatility, in 40 countries, over the period from 1984 to 2004, at annual frequency. We create indicators for liquidity shocks based on quantity and price measures. Estimated probabilities of big shocks to liquidity are used as forecasts of credit crunch. We find broad empirical support for the hypothesis that creditor protection increases the stock market price level and reduces its volatility directly and via its negative effect on the probability of credit crunch. Our empirical findings are robust to multiple specifications.

Abstract:
We argue that, through its effect on aggregate demand and country risk premia, sovereign debt restructuring can adversely affect the private sector's access to foreign capital markets. Using fixed effect analysis, we estimate that sovereign debt rescheduling episodes are indeed systematically accompanied by a decline in foreign credit to emerging market private firms, both during debt renegotiations and for over two years after the agreements are reached. This decline is large (over 20%), statistically significant, and robust when we control for a host of fundamentals. We find that this effect is different for financial sector firms, for exporters, and for nonfinancial firms in the non-exporting sector. We also find that the effect depends on the type of debt rescheduling agreement.

sovereign debt, default, credit rationing, credit constraints

Abstract:
We establish an empirical regularity that a weak creditor protection index is associated with high stock price volatility. Using a standard Tobin Q model we demonstrate two distinct mechanisms that are responsible for increased volatility: credit guarantees and weak creditor protection that tightens credit constraints. In a panel of OECD and non OECD countries we attempt to identify the effects of these distinct mechanisms on stock price volatility while taking explicit account of events of financial crises. We find that both mechanisms are responsible for the stock price volatility in the data.

Credit guarantees, credit constraints, credit growth volatility, stock price volatility

Abstract:
We find an empirical regularity that stronger creditor protection reduces the volatility of stock market prices. We analyze two distinct mechanisms that characterize equity price volatility: government guarantees and creditor protection. Using a Tobin q model, we demonstrate that weak creditor protection that gives rise to government guarantees and tightens credit constraints, increases stock price volatility. Empirically, accounting for the probability of financial crises, we find that government guarantees and weak institutions that tighten credit constraints increase aggregated stock price volatility.

Abstract:
We make use of micro-level data for over 45,000 private bond issues by over 5000 firms from 22 countries in 1990-2006 to analyze the impact that the launch of the EMU had on their currency denomination. The use of the micro data allows us to isolate the "euro effect" on new and seasoned bond issuers while conditioning on individual issue characteristics. To our knowledge, ours is the first systematic analysis of this topic at the micro level. We find that the impact on new issuers is larger than on seasoned issuers and that most of the increase in the euro-denominated bond issuance by seasoned borrowers was along the "extensive" margin, i.e. borrowers switching currency denomination of their issues. Insofar as new entrants to the bond market will define the overall currency composition in the long run, these results imply that aggregate studies might be underestimating the euro effect. We also find that to a large extent the increase in euro issuance was "at the expense" of U.S. dollar issuance, suggesting that euro competes with the U.S. dollar as a currency of choice for international - financial transactions.

bond markets, monetary union, currency risk, original sin, liquidity

Abstract:
This paper addresses how creditor protection affects the volatility of stock market prices. Credit protection reduces the probability of oscillations between binding and non-binding states of the credit constraint; thereby lowering the rate of return variance. We test this prediction of a Tobin's q model, by using cross-country panel regression on stock price volatility in 40 countries over the period from 1984 to 2004. Estimated probabilities of a liquidity crisis are used as a proxy for the probability that credit constraints are binding. We find support for the hypothesis that institutions that help reduce the probability of oscillations between binding and non-binding states of the credit constraint also reduce asset price volatility.

Abstract:
Over the years, U.S. banks have increasingly relied on the bond market to finance their business. This creates the potential for a link between the bond market and the corporate sector whereby borrowers, including those that do not rely on bond funding, become exposed to the conditions in the bond market. We investigate the importance of this link. Our results show that when the cost to access the bond market goes up, banks that rely on bond financing charge higher interest rates on their loans. They also show that on these occasions, banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding follow bond financing banks and increase the interest rates on their loans, though by smaller amounts. Our results further reveal that banks pass the bond market shocks predominantly to their risky borrowers that have access to the bond market and to their borrowers that do not have access to the bond market. These results show that banks propagate shocks to the bond market by passing them through their loan policies to their borrowers, including those that do not use bond financing.

Bank subdebt, bond spreads, lending channel, loan spreads

Abstract:
Data show that better creditor protection is correlated across countries with lower average stock market volatility. Moreover, countries with better creditor protection are observed to have suffered lower decline in their stock market indexes during the current financial crisis. To explain this regularity, we use a stylised Tobin-q model of investment. Our model predicts that (1) the incidence of credit crunches should be lower in countries with better creditor protection; and, {2) that the decline in the stock market index during crises should be lower in countries with better creditor protection. We find support for these mechanisms in a panel data consisting of both OECD and OECD countries. We find that countries with higher level of creditor-rights protection are less likely to experience liquidity crises, even within the subsamples of OECD and non-OECD countries. We find, however, that only in the subsample of non-OECD countries do we observe a larger decline in the stock market index for countries with low level of creditor rights protection, in the presence of credit crunches.

credit crunch, Tobin Q

Abstract:
Data show that better creditor protection is correlated across countries with lower average stock market volatility. Moreover, countries with better creditor protection seem to have suffered lower decline in their stock market indexes during the current financial crisis. To explain this regularity, we use a Tobin q model of investment and show that stronger creditor protection increases the expected level and lowers the variance of stock prices in the presence of credit crunches. There are two main channels through which creditor protection enhances the performance of the stock market: (1) The credit-constrained stock price increases with better protection of creditors; (2) The probability of a credit crunch leading to a binding credit constraint falls with strong protection of creditors. These mechanisms are consistent with the patterns observed in the cross-country data. We find that except for OECD countries with low creditor protection, stock market return is negative in the crisis years and positive in non-crisis years.

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Abstract:
We study a mechanism through which strong creditor protection affect positively the level, and negatively the volatility, of the aggregate stock market price. In a Tobin-q model with liquidity and productivity shocks, two channels are at work: (1) Creditor protection raises the stock value in a credit-constraint regime; (2) Creditor protection lowers the probability of the credit crunch. We confront the key predictions of the model to a panel of 40 countries over the period from 1984 to 2004. We find support to the hypothesis that creditor protection have a positive effect on the level, and a negative effect of the volatility, of stock prices, via the negative effect of the creditor protection on the probability of credit crunch.

Credit crunch, Probit estimation, Tobin-q

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the effect of creditor protection on the volatility of stock market returns. Our application of the Tobin's q model predicts that credit protection reduces the probability of oscillations between binding and nonbinding states of the credit constraint, which result from liquidity crises and their aftermath. In this way creditor protection regulation reduces the stock market price volatility. We test this prediction by using cross-country panel regressions of the stock return volatility, in 40 countries, over the period from 1984 to 2004. Estimated probabilities of big shocks to liquidity are used as a forecast of a switch from a credit-unconstrained to a credit-constrained regime. We find support for the hypothesis that creditor protection institutions reduce the probability of oscillations between binding and nonbinding states of the credit constraint and thereby help reduce the asset price volatility.

collateral, Credit constrained regimes, probability of liquidity crisis

Abstract:
This paper addresses how creditor protection affects the volatility of stock market prices. Credit protection reduces the probability of oscillations between binding and non-binding states of the credit constraint; thereby lowering the rate of return variance. We test this prediction of a Tobin's q model, by using cross-country panel regression on stock price volatility in 40 countries over the period from 1984 to 2004. Estimated probabilities of a liquidity crisis are used as a proxy for the probability that credit constraints are binding. We find support for the hypothesis that institutions that help reduce the probability of oscillations between binding and non-binding states of the credit constraint also reduce asset price volatility.

Binding credit constraints, liquidity crises, Tobin-q investment model