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Abstract:
Using data from 20 countries that have suffered a currency crisis, this paper studies firm-level leverage and performance before and after a crisis has occurred. First we provide some evidence of increasing leverage both before and after a crisis. We show that, in the years preceding a currency crisis, companies that benefit from currency depreciations increase their leverage more than companies that are harmed by currency depreciations. These findings do not hold for countries with either floating exchange rates or currency boards. We argue that increasing leverage is a sign that some firms behave strategically towards governments that lack commintment mechanisms not to devalue their currencies. We also provide evidence that the Asian crisis is different from the previous European and Latin American ones: in Asia firms become more fragile after the crisis and their profitability declines further, whereas in Europe and Latin America there are clear signs of recovery after a crisis has occurred.

Currency Crises, Corporate Leverage, Capital Structure, Profitability, Exchange Rates

Abstract:
This paper provides an explanation of currency crises based on an argument that bailing out financially distressed exporting firms through a currency depreciation is ex-post optimal. Exporting firms have profitable investment opportunities, but they will not invest because high leverage causes debt overhang problems. The government can make investments feasible by not defending a fixed exchange rate and letting the currency depreciate. Currency depreciation always increases the profitability of new investments when revenues are in a foreign currency and costs are at least partially in domestic. Interestingly, foreign borrowing by exporting firms doesn't change the qualitative results: if firms' debt is denominated in foreign currency, a larger depreciation is needed to restore incentives to invest. An important feature in our model is that in general exporting firms choose to finance investments with debt instead of equity. Currency depreciation is socially optimal if risky projects have a higher expected return than safe projects and if firms are forced to rely on debt financing because of underdeveloped equity markets. Although currency depreciation is always ex-post optimal, it can be harmful ex-ante. Exporting firms know that the government will let the currency depreciate, if their risky investments have failed. This leads to excessive investment in risky projects even if more valuable safe projects are available.

Abstract:
Anecdotal evidence suggests that investor protection affects the demand for equity, but existing theories emphasize only the effect of investor protection on the supply of equity. We build a model showing that the demand for equity is important in explaining stock market development. If the level of investor protection is low, wealthy investors have an incentive to become controlling shareholders, because they can earn additional benefits by expropriating outside shareholders. In equilibrium, since the market price reflects the demand from both controlling and outside shareholders, the stock price of weak corporate governance stocks is not low enough to fully discount the extraction of private benefits. This generates the following empirical implications. First, stocks have lower expected return when investor protection is weak. Second, differences in stock market participation rates across countries, home equity bias and flow of foreign direct investment depend on investor protection. Finally, we uncover a good country bias in investment decisions as portfolio investors from countries with low level of investor protection hold relatively more foreign equity. We provide novel international evidence on stock market participation rates, and on holdings of domestic and foreign stocks consistent with the predictions of the model.

Investor Protection, Private Benefits of Control, Portfolio Choice, Home Equity Bias, Limited Participation

Abstract:
In this paper we study the changes in corporate valuation, investments, and financing choices induced by the formation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. We use corporate - level data from ten countries that adopted the euro, the three EU countries that did not join EMU, as well as Norway and Switzerland. We show that the introduction of the euro has increased valuations for large firms in EMU countries, especially in countries that had experienced currency crises. Firm values have also increased for firms that were previously exposed to currency risks irrespective of size. Investments have increased for all firms, but the effects are bigger for large firms and for firms coming from countries with experiences of currency depreciations. The increase in investments has been financed mainly via debt issues. The evidence provided here supports the view that the introduction of the euro has lowered firms' cost of capital by eliminating currency risks among the countries that have adopted the common currency, and by further increasing capital market integration in Europe.

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), The Euro, Valuation, Investment, Debt, Equity, Cost of Capital, Currency Risk

Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation for relative pricing of futures contracts with respect to underlying stocks using a model incorporating short sales constraints and informational lags between the two markets. In this model stocks and futures are perfect substitutes, except for the fact that short sales are only allowed in futures markets. The futures price is more informative than the stock price, because the existence of short sales constraints in the stock market prohibits trading in some states of the world. If an informed trader with no initial endowment in stocks receives negative information about the common future value of stocks and futures, he is only able to sell futures. Uninformed traders also face a similar short sales constraint in the stock market. As a result of the short sales constraint, the stock price is less informative than the futures price even if the informed trader has received positive information. Stocks can be under- and overpriced in comparison with futures, provided that market makers in stocks and futures only observe the order flow in the other market with a lag. Our theory implies that: 1) the basis is positively associated with the contemporaneous futures returns; 2) the basis is negatively associated with the contemporaneous stock return; 3) futures returns lead stock returns; 4) stock returns also lead futures returns, but to a lesser extent; and 5) the trading volume in the stock market is positively associated with the contemporaneous stock return. The model is tested using daily data from the Finnish index futures markets. Finland provides a good environment for testing our theory, since short sales were not allowed during the period for which we have data (27 May 1988 - 31 May 1994). We find strong empirical support for the implications of our theory.

Futures' markets, short sales constraints, asymmetric information

Abstract:
We study the effects of investor protection on equilibrium stock prices, returns and portfolio allocation decisions. In our theoretical model, if investor protection is weak, wealthy investors have an incentive to become controlling shareholders. In equilibrium, the stock price reflects the demand from both controlling shareholders and portfolio investors. As a consequence, due to the high demand from controlling shareholders, the price of weak corporate governance stocks is not low enough to fully discount the extraction of private benefits. This generates the following empirical implications. First, stocks should have lower expected returns when investor protection is weak. Second, domestic and foreign investors' participation in the stock market should be lower in countries with weak investor protection. Third, portfolio investors from countries with weak investor protection should hold relatively more foreign equity. Fourth, countries with weak investor protection should receive relatively more foreign direct investment. We show that these implications are consistent with existing empirical studies and we provide original evidence that domestic portfolio investors are less likely to participate in the domestic stock market and hold more foreign equity, when investor protection is weak.

G11, G32, G38, F21, F36

Abstract:
We model the natural evolution of private information over the life of a venture capitalist
financed project. In the early stages, the entrepreneur is better informed regarding the project, and as the project matures, the venture capitalist gains an informational advantage over the entrepreneur. Within this framework, we examine how the venture capitalist’s relative bargaining power affects cash flow rights and investment. When the bargaining advantage lies with the entrepreneur, the project may not be screened and the venture capitalist may acquiesce to excessively initial investment, but subsequently terminate the project. Increased venture capitalist bargaining power encourages project screening, attenuates incentives to overinvest, and reduces the incidence of project termination subsequent to the initial investment. The payoff sensitivity of venture the capitalist’s financing contract also increases as his bargaining power improves.

Venture capital, Asymmetric information, Bargaining power, Financial contracting, Investment distortions

Abstract:
In this paper we study the changes in corporate valuations induced by the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe. We use corporate-level data from 17 European countries of which 11 adopted the euro. We show that the introduction of the euro has increased Tobin's Q-ratios by 17.1% in the euro-area countries that previously had weak currencies. Part of the increase in corporate valuations is explained by the decrease in interest rates and by the decrease in the cost of equity. The increases in Tobin's Q are larger for firms that would be harmed by currency devaluations.

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the euro, valuation, cost of capital, currency risk, currency union

Abstract:
In this paper we study the changes in corporate valuations induced by the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe. We use corporate-level data from eleven countries that adopted the euro, the three EU countries that did not start using the euro, as well as Norway and Switzerland. We show that the introduction of the euro has increased Tobin's Q-ratios by 17.1% in the euro-area countries that previously had weak currencies. Part of the increase in corporate valuations is explained by the decrease in interest rates and by the decrease in the cost of equity. The increases in Tobin's Q are larger for firms that would be harmed by currency devaluations.

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the euro, valuation, cost of capital, currency risk, currency union

Abstract:
We study how the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe has affected firms' investment rates. Using corporate data from the eleven countries that adopted the euro in January 1999, as well as from a control sample of five other European countries, our paper shows that: (i) the euro has increased investments for firms from countries that previously had weak currencies, (ii) the euro has had a positive impact on financially constrained firms' investments, and (iii) the euro has decreased investments for financially unconstrained firms from countries that previously had strong currencies.

EMU, the euro, currency union, investments

Abstract:
Existing evidence shows that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has reduced the cost of capital for firms in the euro area. We study the impact of the adoption of the euro in January 1999 by 11 countries in Europe on the firms' investment rates, and show that the investment results are consistent with reduction in cost of capital. Using corporate data from the 11 EMU countries, as well as from a control sample of 5 non-EMU European countries, our paper shows that: (i) investments for EMU-firms have grown 2.5% more than for non-EMU firms, after 1999; and (ii) the benefits of the euro accrue especially to small, domestic firms from countries with previously weak currencies.

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the euro, investments, cost of capital, currency union

Abstract:
We study how the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe has affected firms' investment rates. Using corporate data from the eleven countries that adopted the euro in January 1999, as well as from a control sample of five other European countries, our paper shows that: (i) the euro has increased investments for firms from countries that previously had weak currencies, (ii) the euro has had a positive impact on financially constrained firms' investments, and (iii) the euro has decreased investments for financially unconstrained firms from countries that previously had strong currencies.

EMU, the euro, investments, currency union, financial constraints

Abstract:
Finland experienced an extremely severe economic depression in the early 1990s. As a part of the government's crisis management policies, significant new legislation was passed that increased supervisory powers of financial market regulators and reformed bankruptcy procedures significantly decreasing the protection of creditors. We show that the introduction of these new laws resulted in positive abnormal stock returns. The new laws also lead to increases in firms' Tobin's q, especially for more levered firms. In contrast to previous studies, our results also suggest that public supervision of financial markets fosters rather than hampers financial market development.

corporate governance, bankruptcy, financial supervision, shareholder protection, creditors' rights, corporate valuations, political economy

Abstract:
Finland experienced an extremely severe economic depression in the early 1990s. As a part of the government's crisis management policies, significant new legislation was passed that increased supervisory powers of financial market regulators and reformed bankruptcy procedures significantly decreasing the protection of creditors. We show that the introduction of these new laws resulted in positive abnormal stock returns. The new laws also lead to increases in firms' Tobin's q, especially for more levered firms. In contrast to previous studies, our results also suggest that public supervision of financial markets fosters rather than hampers financial market development.

corporate governance, bankruptcy, financial supervision, shareholder protection, creditors' rights, corporate valuations, political economy

Abstract:
In this Paper we study the changes in corporate valuation induced by the formation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. We use corporate-level data from ten countries that adopted the euro, the three EU countries that did not join EMU, as well as Norway and Switzerland. We show that the introduction of the euro has increased Tobin's Q-ratios in EMU countries by 7.4%. The effects prevail even if we account for the decrease in long-term interest rates. The increases in Tobin's Q are larger for firms that are ex-ante expected to benefit more, i.e. firms from countries that had weak currencies and firms that were exposed to intra-European currency risks. Finally, the increases are also more significant for firms that are financially unconstrained. The evidence provided here supports the view that the introduction of the euro has lowered firms' cost of capital in EMU-countries.

Economic and monetary union (EMU), the euro, valuation, cost of capital, currency risk, currency union

Abstract:
We develop a model where wealthy investors have an incentive to become controlling shareholders because they can earn additional benefits by expropriating outside shareholders. As a consequence, in countries where minority investor rights are poorly protected, both domestic and foreign portfolio investors have a disincentive to hold stocks. The model implies that the differences in stock market participation rates across countries and the pervasiveness of home equity bias depend on the degree of investor protection. We provide international evidence on stock market participation rates, and holdings of domestic and foreign stocks consistent with the predictions of the model.

Home equity bias, portfolio choice, limited participation, investor protection, private benefits of control

Abstract:
We model a situation where the entrepreneur has an informational advantage during the early stages of an investment project while the venture capitalist has the informational advantage during the later stages. We examine how this evolution of informational asymmetry affects venture investment and the nature of financing contracts under two different scenarios with regard to the distribution of bargaining power between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur: when the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage and when the entrepreneur has the bargaining advantage. Our results demonstrate that the distribution of bargaining power has a profound influence both on the terms of contracts and on investments in venture-backed projects. Changes in bargaining power can completely alter the payoff sensitivity of contracts offered to entrepreneurs, and, as witnessed in the recent past, when entrepreneurs hold the bargaining advantage, venture capitalists may acquiesce to excessive investments in early stages of projects and subsequently terminate a larger number of projects.

Asymmetric information, financial contracting, venture capital, bargaining power, investment distortions

Abstract:
This paper provides an explanation of currency crises based on an argument that bailing out financially distressed exporting firms through a currency depreciation is ex-post optimal. Exporting firms have profitable investment opportunities, but they will not invest because high leverage causes debt overhang problems. The government can make investments feasible by not defending an exchange rate and letting the currency depreciate. Currency depreciation always increases the profitability of new investments when revenues from that project are in foreign currency and costs denominated in the domestic currency are nominally rigid. Although currency depreciation is always ex-post optimal once risky projects have been taken and failed, it can be harmful ex-ante, because it leads to excessive investment in risky projects even if more valuable safe projects are available. However, currency depreciation is also ex-ante optimal if risky projects have a higher expected return than safe projects and if firms are forced to rely on debt financing because of underdeveloped equity markets.

currency depreciation, debt overhang, emerging markets, efficient investment policy, excessive risk taking

Abstract:
We study the effects of investor protection on stock returns and portfolio allocation decisions. In our theoretical model, if investor protection is weak, wealthy investors have an incentive to become controlling shareholders. In equilibrium, the stock price reflects the demand from both controlling shareholders and portfolio investors. Due to the high demand from controlling shareholders, the price of weak corporate governance stocks is not low enough to fully discount the extraction of private benefits. Thus, stocks have lower expected returns when investor protection is weak. This has implications for domestic and foreign investors' stockholdings. In particular, we show that portfolio investors' participation in the domestic stock market and home equity bias are positively related to investor protection and provide original evidence in their support.

Investor Protection, Corporate Governance, Private Benefits of Control, Stock Returns, Portfolio Choice, Home Equity Bias

Abstract:
This paper studies firm-level leverage and performance measures before and after a currency crisis has occurred using data from 17 countries. We show that prior to a crisis, companies that are expected to benefit from currency depreciations increase their leverage more than other companies. Profitability and financial fragility ratios display similar patterns. We provide evidence that the Asian crisis is different from the previous European and Latin American ones: in Asia all firms become more fragile after the crisis and their profitability declines and leverage increases further, whereas elsewhere there are clear signs of recovery after a crisis has occurred.

Currency crises, corporate leverage, capital structure, profitability, exchange rates