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Abstract:
Funds of funds are an increasingly popular avenue for hedge fund investment. Despite the increasing interest in hedge funds as an alternative asset class, the high degree of fund specific risk and the lack of transparency may give fiduciaries pause. In addition, many of the most attractive hedge funds are closed to new investment. Funds of funds resolve these issues by providing investors with diversification across manager styles and professional oversight of fund operations that can provide the necessary degree of due diligence. In addition, many such funds hold shares in hedge funds otherwise closed to new investment allowing smaller investors access to the most sought-after managers. However, the diversification, oversight and access comes at the cost of a multiplication of the fees paid by the investor. It is not generally understood that the incentive fee component of the fee on fee arrangement may under certain circumstances exceed the realized return on the fund. In this paper we argue that the disappointing after fee performance of some fund of funds may be explained by the nature of this fee arrangement. We examine an alternative fee arrangement that may provide better incentives at a lower cost to investors in these funds.

Abstract:
Funds of funds are an increasingly popular avenue for hedge fund investment. Despite the increasing interest in hedge funds as an alternative asset class, the high degree of fund specific risk and the lack of transparency may give fiduciaries pause. In addition, many of the most attractive hedge funds are closed to new investment. Funds of funds resolve these issues by providing investors with diversification across manager styles and professional oversight of fund operations that can provide the necessary degree of due diligence. In addition, many such funds hold shares in hedge funds otherwise closed to new investment allowing smaller investors access to the most sought-after managers. However, the diversification, oversight and access comes at the cost of a multiplication of the fees paid by the investor. One would expect that the information advantage of funds of funds would more than compensate investors for these fees. Unfortunately, individual hedge funds dominate fund of funds on an after-fee return or Sharpe ratio basis. In this paper we argue that the disappointing after-fee performance of some fund of funds might be explained by the nature of this fee arrangement, and that fund of funds providers may actually benefit from considering other possible fee arrangements. These alternative arrangements will improve reported performance and may make funds of funds more attractive to a growing institutional clientele.

Abstract:
Funds of funds are an increasingly popular avenue for hedge fund investment. Despite theincreasing interest in hedge funds as an alternative asset class, the high degree of fund specific risk and the lack of transparency may give fiduciaries pause. In addition, many of the most attractivehedge funds are closed to new investment. Funds of funds resolve these issues by providing investors with diversification across manager styles and professional oversight of fund operations that can provide the necessary degree of due diligence. In addition, many such funds hold shares inhedge funds otherwise closed to new investment allowing smaller investors access to the most sought-after managers. However, the diversification, oversight and access comes at the cost of a multiplication of the fees paid by the investor. It is not generally understood that the incentive feecomponent of the fee on fee arrangement may under certain circumstances exceed the realized return on the fund. In this paper we argue that the disappointing after fee performance of some fund of funds may be explained by the nature of this fee arrangement. We examine an alternative feearrangement that may provide better incentives at a lower cost to investors in these funds.

Abstract:
Funds of funds are an increasing popular avenue for hedge fund investment. Despite the increasing interest in hedge funds as an alternative asset class, the high degree of fund specific risk and the lack of transparency may give fiduciaries pause. In addition, many of the most attractive hedge funds are closed to new investment. Funds of funds resolve these issues by providing investors with diversification across manager styles and professional oversight of fund operations that can provide the necessary degree of due diligence. In addition, many such funds hold shares in hedge funds otherwise closed to new investment allowing smaller investors access to the most sought-after managers. However, the diversification, oversight and access comes at the cost of a multiplication of the fees paid by the investor. One would expect that the information advantage of funds of funds would more than compensate investors for these fees. Unfortunately, individual hedge funds dominate fund of funds on an after-fee return to Sharpe ratio basis. In this paper we argue that the disappointing after-fee performance of some fund of funds might be explained by the nature of this fee argument, and that fund of funds providers may actually benefit from considering other possible fee arrangements. These alternative arrangements will improve reported performance and may make funds of funds more attractive to a growing institutional clientele.

Hedge funds, funds-of-funds, incentive fees

Abstract:
Funds of funds are an increasingly popular avenue for hedge fund investment. Despite the increasing interest in hedge funds as an alternative asset class, the high degree of fund specific risk and the lack of transparency may give fiduciaries pause. In addition, many of the most attractive hedge funds are closed to new investment. Funds of funds resolve these issues by providing investors with diversification across manaager styles and professional oversight of fund operations that can provide the necessary degree of due diligence. In addition, many such funds hold shares in hedge funds otherwise closed to new investment allowing smaller investors access to the most sought-after managers. However, the diversification, oversight and access comes at the cost of a multiplication of fees paid by the investor. One would expect that the information advantage of funds of funds would more than compensate investors for these fees. Unfortunately, individual hedge funds dominate fund of funds on an after-fee return or Sharpe ratio basis. In this paper we argue that the disappointing after-fee performance of some fund of funds may be explained by the nature of this fee arrangement. Fund of funds providers pass on individual hedge fund incentive fees in the form of after-fee returns, although they are in a better position to hedge these fees than are their investors. We examine a new fee arrangement emerging in the industry that may provide better incentives at a lower cost to investors in these funds.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
Funds of funds are an increasingly popular avenue for hedge fund investment. Despite the increasing interest in hedge funds as an alternative asset class, the high degree of fund specific risk and the lack of transparency may give fiduciaries pause. In addition, many of the most attractive hedge funds are closed to new investment. Funds of funds resolve these issues by providing investors with diversification across manager styles and professional oversight of fund operations that can provide the necessary degree of due diligence. In addition, many such funds hold shares in hedge funds otherwise closed to new investment allowing smaller investors access to the most sought-after managers. However the diversification, oversight and access comes at the cost of a multiplication of the fees paid by the investor. One would expect that the information advantage of funds would more than compensate investors for these fees. Unfortunately, individual hedge funds dominate fund of funds on an after-fee return or Sharpe ratio basis. In this paper we argue that the disappointing after-fee performance of some fund of funds might be explained by the nature of this fee arrangement, and that fund of funds providers may actually benefit from considering other possible fee arrangements. These alternative arrangements will improve reported performance and may make funds of funds more attractive to a growing institutional clientele.

Abstract:
This paper investigates hedge fund performance and risk. The empirical evidence indicates that hedge funds differ substantially from traditional investment vehicles such as mutual funds. The funds with watermarks significantly outperform the funds without watermarks. The average hedge fund returns are related positively to incentive fees, the size of the fund, and the lockup period. Hedge funds follow dynamic trading strategies and have low systematic risk. There are low correlations among different strategies. Compared with mutual funds, hedge funds offer better risk-return trade-offs: they have higher Sharpe ratios, lower market risks, and higher abnormal returns. In the period of January 1994 to December 1996, hedge funds provide positive abnormal returns. Overall, hedge fund strategies dominate mutual fund strategies, hence hedge funds provide a more efficient investment opportunity set for investors.

Abstract:
Due diligence is an important source of alpha in a well designed hedge fund portfoliostrategy. It is generally understood that the high returns possible in investing in hedgefunds are somewhat offset by the relative lack of transparency on operational issues. Theperformance of a diversified hedge fund portfolio can be enhanced by excluding thosefunds likely to do poorly or fail due to operational risk concerns. However, effectivedue diligence is an expensive concern. This implies that there is a strong competitiveadvantage to those funds of funds sufficiently large to absorb this fixed and necessary cost. The consequent economies of scale that we document in funds of funds are quite substantial and support the proposition that due diligence is a source of alpha in hedge fund investment.

Hedge funds, operational risk, due diligence, alpha

Abstract:
Due diligence is an important source of alpha in a well designed hedge fund portfolio strategy. It is generally understood that the high returns possible in investing in hedge funds are somewhat offset by the relative lack of transparency on operational issues. The performance of a diversified hedge fund portfolio can be enhanced by excluding those funds likely to do poorly - or fail - due to operational risk concerns. However, effective due diligence is an expensive concern. This implies that there is a strong competitive advantage to those funds of funds sufficiently large to absorb this fixed and necessary cost. The consequent economies of scale that we document in funds of funds are quite substantial and support the proposition that due diligence is a source of alpha in hedge fund investment.

Hedge funds, operational risk, due diligence, alpha

Abstract:
We examine the risk characteristics and capital adequacy of hedge funds through the Value-at-Risk approach. Using extensive data on nearly fifteen hundred hedge funds, we find that only 3.7% live and 10.9% dead funds are under-capitalized as of March 2003. Moreover, the under-capitalized funds are relatively small and constitute a tiny fraction of the total fund assets in our sample. Cross-sectionally, the variability in fund capitalization is related to size, investment style, age, and management fee. Hedge fund risk and capitalization also display significant time variation. Traditional risk measures like standard deviation or leverage ratios fail to detect these trends.

Hedge funds, Value-at-Risk, Capital adequacy, Extreme value theory, Monte Carlo simulation.

Abstract:
Mandatory disclosure is a regulatory tool intended to allow market participants to assess operational risk. We examine the value of disclosure through the controversial SEC requirement, since overturned, which required major hedge funds to register as investment advisors and file Form ADV disclosures. Leverage and ownership structures suggest that lenders and equity investors were already aware of operational risk. However, operational risk does not mediate flow-performance relationships. Investors either lack this information or regard it as immaterial. These findings suggest that regulators should account for the endogenous production of information and the marginal benefit of disclosure to different investment clienteles.

Hedge funds, operational risk, SEC filing, Form ADV

Abstract:
In this paper, we study alternative investment vehicles such as hedge funds, funds-of-funds, and commodity trading advisors (CTAs) by investigating their performance, risk, and fund characteristics. Differing from the previous studies that pool these investment vehicles, we consider them as three distinctive investment classes. We study them not only on a stand-alone basis but also on a portfolio basis. We find several interesting results. First, CTAs differ from hedge funds and funds-of-funds in terms of trading strategies, attrition rates and survivorship bias, liquidities, and correlation structures in different market environments. However, funds-of-funds are similar to hedge funds in these dimensions. Second, during the period of 1994 to 2001, hedge funds outperform funds-of-funds, which in turn outperform CTAs on a stand-alone basis. These results can be explained by the double fee structure but not survivorship bias. Third, correlation structures for alternative investment vehicles are different under different market conditions. Hedge funds are highly correlated to each other and are not well hedged in the down markets with liquidity squeeze. The negative correlations with other instruments make CTAs suitable hedging instruments for insuring downside risk. When adding CTAs to the hedge fund portfolio or the fund-of-fund portfolio, investors can benefit significantly from the risk-return trade-off.

Abstract:
Using a complete set of the SEC filing information on hedge funds (Form ADV) and the TASS data, we develop a quantitative model called the ω-Score to measure hedge fund operational risk. The ω-Score is related to conflict of interest issues, concentrated ownership, and reduced leverage in the ADV data. With a statistical methodology, we further relate the ω-Score to readily available information such as fund performance, volatility, size, age, and fee structures. Finally, we demonstrate that while operational risk is more significant than financial risk in explaining fund failure, there is a significant and positive interaction between operational risk and financial risk. This is consistent with rogue trading anecdotes that suggest that fund failure associated with excessive risk taking occurs when operational controls and oversight are weak.

mutual funds, hedge funds, investments, the Omega Score

Abstract:
In this paper, we examine survivorship bias in hedge fund returns by comparing two large databases. We find that the survivorship bias exceeds 2% per year. We reconcile the conflicting results about survivorship bias in previous studies by showing that the two major hedge fund databases contain different amounts of dissolved funds. Empirical results show that poor performance is the main reason for a fund?s disappearance.

Furthermore, we find that there are significant differences in fund returns, inception date, net assets value, incentive fee, management fee, and investment styles for the 465 common funds covered by both databases. One database has more return and NAV observations, longer fund return history, and more funds with fee information than the other database. There are at least 5% return numbers and 5% NAV numbers which differ dramatically across the two databases. Mismatching between reported returns and the percentage changes in NAVs can partially explain the difference. The two databases also have different style classifications. Results of survivorship bias by styles indicate that the biases are different across styles and significant for ten out of fifteen styles in one database but none is significant for the other one.

Abstract:
Due to imperfect transparency and costly auditing, trust is an essential component of financial intermediation. In this paper we study a sample of 444 due diligence (DD) reports from a major hedge fund DD firm. A routine feature of due diligence is an assessment of integrity. We find that misrepresentation about past legal and regulatory problems is frequent (21%), as is incorrect or unverifiable representations about other topics (28%). Misrepresentation, the failure to use a major auditing firm, and the use of internal pricing are significantly related to legal and regulatory problems, indices of operational risk. We find that DD reports are typically performed after positive performance and investor inflows. We control for potential bias due to this and other potential conditioning. An operational risk score based on information contained in the DD reports significantly predicts subsequent fund failure and statistical performance characteristics out of sample. Finally we find that observed operational risk characteristics do not appear to moderate fund flow.

Abstract:
Due to imperfect transparency and costly auditing, trust is an essential component of financial intermediation. In this paper we study a sample of 444 due diligence (DD) reports from a major hedge fund DD firm. A routine feature of due diligence is an assessment of integrity. We find that misrepresentation about past legal and regulatory problems is frequent (21%), as is incorrect or unverifiable representations about other topics (28%). Misrepresentation, the failure to use a major auditing firm, and the use of internal pricing are significantly related to legal and regulatory problems, indices of operational risk. We find that DD reports are typically performed after positive performance and investor inflows. We control for potential bias due to this and other potential conditioning. An operational risk score based on information contained in the DD reports significantly predicts subsequent fund failure and statistical performance characteristics out of sample. Finally we find that observed operational risk characteristics do not appear to moderate fund flow.

Hedge Funds, Operational Risk, Due Diligence

Abstract:
This paper compares downside risk measures that incorporate higher return moments with traditional risk measures such as standard deviation in predicting hedge fund failure. When controlling for styles, performance, fund age, size, lockup, high-water mark, and leverage, we find that funds with larger downside risk have a higher hazard rate. However, standard deviation loses the explanatory power once the other explanatory variables are included in the hazard model. Further, we find liquidation does not necessarily mean failure in the hedge fund industry. By reexamining the attrition rate, we show that the real failure rate of 3.1% is lower than the attrition rate of 8.7% on an annual basis from the period of 1995-2004.

hedge fund failure, downside risk, expected shortfall, VaR, attrition rate

Abstract:
This paper analyses the risk-return trade-off in the hedge fund industry. We compare semi-deviation, value-at-risk (VaR), Expected Shortfall (ES) and Tail Risk (TR) with standard deviation at the individual fund level as well as the portfolio level. Using the Fama and French (1992) methodology and the combined live and defunct hedge fund data from TASS, we find that the left-tail risk captured by Expected Shortfall (ES) and Tail Risk (TR) explains the cross-sectional variation in hedge fund returns very well, while the other risk measures provide statistically insignificant or marginally significant results. During the period between January 1995 and December 2004, hedge funds with high ES outperform those with low ES by an annual return difference of 7%. We provide empirical evidence on the theoretical argument by Artzner et al. (1999) that ES is superior to VaR as a downside risk measure. We also find the Cornish-Fisher (1937) expansion is superior to the nonparametric method in estimating ES and TR.

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the risk-return trade-off in the hedge fund industry. We compare semi-deviation, value-at-risk (VaR), Expected Shortfall (ES), and Tail Risk (TR) with standard deviation at the individual fund level as well as the portfolio level. Using the Fama and French (1992) methodology and the combined live and defunct hedge fund data from TASS, we find that the left-tail risk captured by the Expected Shortfall (ES) and Tail Risk (TR) explains the cross-sectional variation in hedge fund returns very well, while the other risk measures provide statistically insignificant or marginally significant results. During the period between January 1995 and December 2004, hedge funds with high ES outperform those with low ES by an annual return difference of 7%. We provide empirical evidence on the theoretical argument by Artzner et al. (1999) that ES is superior to VaR as a downside risk measure. We also find the Cornish-Fisher (1937) expansion is superior to the nonparametric method in estimating ES and TR.

hedge funds, cross-section of expected returns, conditional VaR, downside risk, Cornish-Fisher expansion

Abstract:
This paper examines whether self-described market timing hedge funds have the ability to time the U.S. equity market. We propose a new measure for timing return and volatility jointly that relates fund returns to the squared Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. Using a sample of 221 market timing funds during 1994-2005, we find evidence of timing ability at both the aggregate and fund levels. Timing ability appears relatively strong in bear and volatile market conditions. Our findings are robust to other explanations, including public information-based strategies, options trading, and illiquid holdings. Bootstrap analysis shows that the evidence is unlikely to be attributed to luck.

Hedge funds, Return timing, Volatility timing, Bootstrap, Persistence

Abstract:
Using two large hedge fund databases, this paper empirically tests the presence and significance of a cross-sectional relation between hedge fund returns and value at risk (VaR). The univariate and bivariate portfolio-level analyses as well as the fund-level regression results indicate a significantly positive relation between VaR and the cross-section of expected returns on live funds. During the period of January 1995 to December 2003, the live funds with high VaR outperform those with low VaR by an annual return difference of 9%. This risk-return tradeoff holds even after controlling for age, size, and liquidity factors. Furthermore, the risk profile of defunct funds is found to be different from that of live funds. The relation between downside risk and expected return is found to be negative for defunct funds because taking high risk by these funds can wipe out fund capital, and hence they become defunct. Meanwhile, voluntary closure makes some well performed funds with large assets and low risk fall into the defunct category. Hence, the risk-return relation for defunct funds is more complicated than what implies by survival. We demonstrate how to distinguish live funds from defunct funds on an ex ante basis. A trading rule based on buying the expected to live funds and selling the expected to disappear funds provides an annual profit of 8-10% depending on the investment horizons.

hedge funds, value at risk, cross-section of expected returns, liquidity

Abstract:
This paper examines analysts' security recommendations in the "Dartboard" column of the Wall Street Journal and tests whether the impact on the recommended security prices is temporary or permanent. We document a two-day announcement effect for the experts' stocks, which exhibits mean reversion and varies with experts' reputation and stock sizes. Our study supports the price pressure hypothesis: abnormal returns and trading volumes following the announcement date are driven by noise trading from naive investors. The bootstrapping results indicate that the performance of the pros' stocks is indistinguishable from that of the dartboard stocks for 90% of the contests. Overall, pros can neither outperform the darts nor the market. By examining the pre- and post-contest periods, we find that pros follow relative strength strategies to choose past winners with high risk and low dividend yields, but the stock prices of these winners tend to show mean reversal in the subsequent period. In addition, a lower bound for sample size is derived for reliable statistical inference on mean returns.

Abstract:
This paper studies the effect of share restrictions on the flow-performance relation of individual hedge funds. As such, we reconcile previous research that shows conflicting results for this relation without explicitly considering restrictions. Specifically, we find that hedge funds exhibit a convex flow-performance relation in the absence of share restrictions (similar to mutual funds), but exhibit a concave relation in the presence of restrictions—our evidence is consistent with both a direct effect of the binding restrictions and an indirect effect that is due to investors endogenizing expected future binding restrictions when investing their money. Further, we find that live funds exhibit a concave flow-performance relation due to stricter flow restrictions than defunct funds, which display a convex relation. Finally, we find that money is “smart,” that is, fund flows predict future hedge fund performance; however, this “smart money” effect is eliminated among funds with greater share restrictions.

hedge fund flows, share restrictions, asset illiquidity, life/defunct funds, smart money effect

Abstract:
This paper examines share restrictions and liquidity premium by comparing offshore hedge funds with onshore hedge funds. Due to tax provisions and regulatory concerns, offshore and onshore hedge funds have different legal structures, which lead to differences in share restrictions such as the lockup provision. On average, offshore funds impose less severe share restrictions than onshore funds, hence underperforming their onshore counterparts due to illiquidity premium, consistent with Aragon (2007).

However, we find that once offshore funds impose share restrictions the illiquidity premium is higher because of a tighter relation between share illiquidity and asset illiquidity in the offshore fund portfolio. We show that onshore lockup funds are not necessarily holding illiquid assets, and the higher illiquidity of assets in offshore lockup funds is significant at 1 percent level. Hence introducing the lockup provision increases the abnormal return by 4.4% per year for offshore funds compared with only 2.7% for onshore funds during the period of 1994-2005.

We also examine the impact of a master-feeder (MF) structure on the difference between offshore funds and onshore funds. The MF structure is devised for hedge fund managers who wish to market a fund to both onshore and offshore investors. Instead of managing two different portfolios, the manager usually sets up one master company and two feeders. One feeder is a limited partnership for onshore investors and the other feeder is an offshore corporation for offshore investors. The actual portfolio investment is made at the master company level. We find that share illiquidity premium becomes lower when an offshore fund is affected by its onshore equivalence through a master-feeder structure.

In addition to the lockup provision, we examine other share restrictions such as redemption notice period, redemption frequency, subscription frequency and minimum investment, and the results are similar. The risk-adjusted return is higher in offshore funds than onshore funds when the same amount of a share restriction is introduced because the relation between share illiquidity and asset illiquidity is stronger in offshore funds.

Our findings have implications on the welfare of hedge fund investors. In addition to the tax advantage, offshore investors may collect higher illiquidity premium when their investment has the same level of share illiquidity as the investment of onshore investors. Our results may help explaining why the growth rate has been much higher in offshore funds than in onshore funds (26.4 vs. 15.0 percent per year from 2000 to 2004).

offshore hedge funds, share restrictions, liquidity premium, master-feeder structure

Abstract:
In this paper, we investigate why the same hedge fund may report different performance measures in different places. We find that auditing plays an important role in explaining this difference. Although majority hedge funds state they have auditors, a significant proportion of hedge funds are not effectively audited. Especially, dead funds are less effectively audited than live funds. We find that audited funds have a much lower return discrepancy than non-audited funds. There is a significantly positive correlation between the auditing variable and fund size. Large funds tend to be audited while small funds tend not to be. Funds listed on exchanges, fund of funds, funds with broad investors, funds open to the public, funds invested in a single industrial sector, and unleveled funds have less return discrepancy than the other funds. These findings suggest a need for hedge fund auditing.

auditing effectiveness, return consistency

Abstract:
It is mysterious that the same hedge fund may report different performance measures in different places. This paper explores why it is the case. We find that auditing plays an important role in explaining this difference. Due to the private nature, a significant amount of hedge funds are not effectively audited. Especially, defunct funds are less effectively audited than live funds. Empirical results show that audited funds have much less return discrepancy than non-audited funds. There is a positive correlation between the auditing variable and fund size. Large funds tend to be audited while small funds tend not to be. In addition, those funds that are listed on exchanges, fund of funds, funds with both domestic and foreign investors, funds open to the public, funds invested in a single industrial sector, and unleveled funds have less return discrepancy than the other funds.

hedge funds, auditing, return accuracy

Abstract:
We demonstrate that portfolio approach could suffer a serious problem when the sorting variables contain not only true values but also measurement errors. The grouped measurement errors will be embedded into the data used to test financial models and further bias the testing results. To correct for this measurement error problem, we develop a random sampling approach to form portfolios. Results from this new methodology are unbiased and robust. By applying this methodology to investigate beta shifts, we show that the previous results about beta shifts are driven by measurement errors. The actual beta shift pattern is more complicated than that predicted by the previous studies. The risk shift hypothesis is unlikely to explain the De Bondt and Thaler's mean reversion puzzle (1985).

Abstract:
Using a complete set of the SEC filing information on hedge funds (Form ADV) and the TASS data, we develop a quantitative model called the É-Score to measure hedge fund operational risk. The É-Score is related to conflict of interest issues, concentrated ownership, and reduced leverage in the ADV data. With a statistical methodology, we further relate the É-Score to readily available information such as fund performance, volatility, size, age, and fee structures. Finally, we demonstrate that this risk score can be used to effectively predict fund failures in the future.

Abstract:
Mandatory disclosure is a regulatory tool intended to allow market participants to assess operational risk. We examine the value of disclosure through the controversial SECrequirement, since overturned, which required major hedge funds to register as investment advisors and file Form ADV disclosures. Leverage and ownership structures suggest that lenders and equity investors were already aware of operational risk. However, operational risk does not mediate flow-performance relationships. Investorseither lack this information or regard it as immaterial. These findings suggest thatregulators should account for the endogenous production of information and the marginalbenefit of disclosure to different investment clienteles.

Hedge funds, operational risk, SEC filing, Form ADV

Abstract:
Previous results find CEOs' pay packages typically have low sensitivities to performance. Therefore, CEOs have incentives to increase firm size, even if those actions cause losses for current shareholders. Using nine versions of the Lipper/TASS Data, we investigate if hedge fund mangers' higher pay-performance sensitivities cause them to act in their current investors' best interests by limiting assets. While our results show closed hedge funds do experience significantly lower flows, managers' and management companies' primary objective is to hoard assets. These results suggest even high pay-performance deltas are not strong enough to overcome additional fees generated from larger amounts of assets. Other monitoring mechanisms are necessary to reduce agency costs for investors.

Hedge funds, closed to investment, compensation

Abstract:
Due to imperfect transparency and costly auditing, trust is an essential component of financial intermediation. In this paper we study a sample of 444 due diligence (DD) reports from a major hedge fund DD firm. A routine feature of due diligence is an assessment of integrity. We find that misrepresentation about past legal and regulatory problems is frequent (21%), as is incorrect or unverifiable representations about other topics (28%). Misrepresentation, the failure to use a major auditing firm, and the use of internal pricing are significantly related to legal and regulatory problems, indices of operational risk. We find that DD reports are typically performed after positive performance and investor inflows. We control for potential bias due to this and other potential conditioning. An operational risk score based on information contained in the DD reports significantly predicts subsequent fund failure and statistical performance characteristics out of sample. Finally we find that observed operational risk characteristics do not appear to moderate fund flow.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
Using a complete set of U.S. SEC filing information on hedge funds (Form ADV) and data from the Lipper TASS Hedge Fund Database, the study reported here developed a quantitative model called the É-score to measure hedge fund operational risk. The É-score is related to conflict-of-interest issues, concentrated ownership, and reduced leverage in the Form ADV data. With a statistical methodology, the study further related the É-score to such readily available information as fund performance, volatility, size, age, and fee structures. Finally, the study demonstrated that although operational risk is more significant than financial risk in explaining fund failure, a significant and positive interaction exists between operational risk and financial risk.

Risk Measurement and Management: Alternative Investments; Portfolio Management: Hedge Fund strategies; Alternative Investments: Hedge Fund Strategies

Abstract:
Due diligence is an important source of alpha in a well designed hedge fund portfolio strategy. It is generally understood that the high returns possible in investing in hedge funds are somewhat offset by the relative lack of transparency on operational issues. The performance of a diversified hedge fund portfolio can be enhanced by excluding those funds likely to do poorly or fail due to operational risk concerns. However, effective due diligence is an expensive concern. This implies that there is a strong competitive advantage to those funds of funds sufficiently large to absorb this fixed and necessary cost. The consequent economies of scale that we document in funds of funds are quite substantial and support the proposition that due diligence is a source of alpha in hedge fund investment.

Hedge funds, operational risk, due diligence, alpha

Abstract:
In this paper, we study alternative investment vehicles such as hedge funds, funds-of-funds, and commodity trading advisors (CTAs) by investigating their performance, risk, and fund characteristics. Considering them as three distinctive investment classes, we study them not only on a stand-alone basis but also on a portfolio basis. We find several interesting results. First, CTAs differ from hedge funds and funds-of-funds in terms of trading strategies, liquidity, and correlation structures. Second, during the period of 1994 to 2001, hedge funds outperform funds-of-funds, which in turn outperform CTAs on a stand-alone basis. These results can be explained by the double fee structure but not survivorship bias. Third, correlation structures for alternative investment vehicles are different under different market conditions. Hedge funds are highly correlated to each other and are not well hedged in the down markets with liquidity squeeze. The negative correlations with other instruments make CTAs suitable hedging instruments for insuring downside risk. When adding CTAs to the hedge fund portfolio or the fund-of-fund portfolio, investors can benefit significantly from the risk-return trade-off.

Hedge funds, funds-of-funds, commodity trading advisors

Abstract:
This paper demonstrates that portfolio approach could suffer a serious problem when the sorting variables contain not only true values but also measurement errors. The grouped measurement errors will be embedded into the data used to test financial models and further bias the testing results. To correct for this measurement error problem, I develop a random sampling approach to form portfolios. Results from this new methodology are unbiased and robust. By applying this methodology to investigate beta shifts, I show that the previous results about beta shifts are driven by measurement errors. The actual beta shift pattern is more complicated than that predicted by the previous studies. The risk shift hypothesis is unlikely to explain the mean reversion puzzle for stock returns.

Abstract:
We investigate whether analysts' recommendations in the "Dartboard" column of the Wall Street Journal have an impact on stock prices and whether this impact is temporary or long-lived. We document a significant 2-day announcement effect that is reversed within 15 days. This announcement effect is intertwined with the pros' track record. Our study supports the price pressure hypothesis: abnormal returns and trading volumes around the announcement day are mainly driven by noise trading from naive investors. On average, investors following the experts' recommendations lost 3.8% on a risk-adjusted basis over a 6-month holding period.