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Abstract:
In this study, we examine how institutional ownership affects the quality and riskiness of the financial statement audit. We hypothesize that institutional investors can influence corporate policy to employ governance mechanisms that reduce their monitoring costs. Our evidence shows that firms are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor (our proxy for audit quality) when long-term institutional ownership is high, suggesting that long-term institutional investors view high quality audits as a viable means of improving corporate governance while reducing their direct monitoring costs. We find no association between auditor choice and short-term institutional ownership. Next, we find that auditors charge higher fees (our proxy for audit risk) when short-term institutional ownership is high, consistent with short-term investors creating greater incentives for managers to act myopically. We find no association between audit fees and long-term institutional ownership. Taken together, our evidence suggests that dedicated long-term institutional investors demand higher quality audits to enhance corporate monitoring, and that short-term institutional ownership is positively associated with higher audit risk.
audit quality, institutional ownership, monitoring, audit risk, corporate governance
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Soongsoo Han
Singapore Management University - School of Accountancy Tony Kang
Oklahoma State University - School of Accounting Stephen B. Salter
University of Texas at El Paso - Department of Accounting Yong Keun Yoo
Korea University Business School
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27 Jun 08
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Last Revised:
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18 Aug 08
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Abstract:
This study hypothesizes and tests whether the degrees to which managers exercise earnings discretion relates to their value system (i.e., culture) as well as the institutional features (i.e., legal environment) of their country. We find that uncertainty avoidance and individualism dimensions of national culture explain managers' earnings discretion across countries and that this association varies with the strength of investor protection. This study extends prior literature by documenting that both national culture and institutional structure are important factors that explain corporate managers' earnings discretion practices around the world and that the influences of these factors on earnings discretion are conditional on each other.
Cross-Cultural Management, Cultural Frameworks, Earnings Management, Investor Protection
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