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Abstract:
This paper proposes a model in which the removal of barriers to trade and factor mobility is associated with endogenous fragmentation of the value-added chain. Fragmentation is the outcome of cost competition; the profit-maximizing choice of cost structure by monopolistically competitive firms. An expansion of the integrated trading area can induce globalization not only in the horizontal dimension associated with love-of-variety preferences, but also in a vertical dimension as firms vary specialization of production stages. While increased trade is likely to induce fragmentation when the number of firms is fixed, free entry can either reverse or intensify this result.

International Trade, Organization of Production, Technology Choice, Division of Labor

Abstract:
Fragmentation of the value-added-chain is modeled as the reaction of monopolistically competitive firms to the removal of barriers to trade and factor mobility in an integrated trading environment. Since fragmentation requires high-skilled labor, this form of globalization can induce labor market effects similar to those caused by skill-biased technical change. In the short run, it is likely that fragmentation will be accompanied by an increase in high and low-skilled service employment as well as in the skilled wage premia, as observed in OECD countries. These implications can be reversed, however, as new firms enter the market.

International trade, organization of production, technology choice, division of labor

Abstract:
Using time-diary data from 25 countries, we demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between real GDP per capita and the female-male difference in total work time per day - the sum of work for pay and work at home. In rich northern countries on four continents there is no difference - men and women do the same amount of total work. This latter fact has been presented before by several sociologists for a few rich countries; but our survey results show that labour economists, macroeconomists, the general public and sociologists are unaware of it and instead believe that women perform more total work. The facts do not arise from gender differences in the price of time (as measured by market wages), as women's total work is further below men's where their relative wages are lower. Additional tests using U.S. and German data show that they do not arise from differences in marital bargaining, as gender equality is not associated with marital status; nor do they stem from family norms, since most of the variance in the gender total work difference is due to within-couple differences. We offer a theory of social-norms to explain the facts. The social-norm explanation is better able to account for within-education group and within-region gender differences in total work being smaller than inter-group differences. It is consistent with evidence using the World Values Surveys that female total work is relatively greater than men's where both men and women believe that scarce jobs should be offered to men first.

Gender differences, household production, paid work, time use

Abstract:
Using time-diary data from 25 countries, we demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between real GDP per capita and the female-male difference in total work time per day - the sum of work for pay and work at home. In rich northern countries on four continents there is no difference - men and women do the same amount of total work. This latter fact has been presented before by several sociologists for a few rich countries; but our survey results show that labor economists, macroeconomists, the general public and sociologists are unaware of it and instead believe that women perform more total work. The facts do not arise from gender differences in the price of time (as measured by market wages), as women's total work is further below men's where their relative wages are lower. Additional tests using U.S. and German data show that they do not arise from differences in marital bargaining, as gender equality is not associated with marital status; nor do they stem from family norms, since most of the variance in the gender total work difference is due to within-couple differences. We offer a theory of social norms to explain the facts. The social-norm explanation is better able to account for within-education group and within-region gender differences in total work being smaller than inter-group differences. It is consistent with evidence using the World Values Surveys that female total work is relatively greater than men's where both men and women believe that scarce jobs should be offered to men first.

time use, gender differences, household production, paid work

Abstract:
Using time-diary data from 25 countries, we demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between real GDP per capita and the female-male difference in total work time per day -- the sum of work for pay and work at home. In rich northern countries on four continents, including the United States, there is no difference -- men and women do the same amount of total work. This latter fact has been presented before by several sociologists for a few rich countries; but our survey results show that labor economists, macroeconomists, the general public and sociologists are unaware of it and instead believe that women perform more total work. The facts do not arise from gender differences in the price of time (as measured by market wages), as women's total work is further below men's where their relative wages are lower. Additional tests using U.S. and German data show that they do not arise from differences in marital bargaining, as gender equality is not associated with marital status; nor do they stem from family norms, since most of the variance in the gender total work difference is due to within-couple differences. We offer a theory of social norms to explain the facts. The social-norm explanation is better able to account for within-education group and within-region gender differences in total work being smaller than inter-group differences. It is consistent with evidence using the World Values Surveys that female total work is relatively greater than men's where both men and women believe that scarce jobs should be offered to men first.

Abstract:
This paper reports on ongoing research on the interactions between product regulation and labor market outcomes. In particular, I summarize work on the employment effects of shop-closing regulation in the retail and other related sectors. Evidence on employment in the retail sector from Germany, the Netherlands and the United States suggests that the regulatory regime might play an important role; I argue that a nonnegligible component of the recent Dutch employment miracle could be attributed to product market deregulation, in particular liberalization of shop-closing laws effected in the mid-1990s. I sketch a model, based on Burda and Weil (1999), which can rationalize potential public interest aspects of such regulations as well as identify their employment and output costs.

Abstract:
Using two time-diary data sets each for Germany, Italy the Netherlands and the U.S. from 1985-2003, we demonstrate that Americans work more than Europeans: 1) in the market; 2) in total (market and home production) - there is no one-for-one tradeoff across countries in total work; 3) at unusual times of the day and on weekends. In addition, gender differences in total work within a given country are significantly smaller than variation across countries and time. We conclude that some of the transatlantic differences could reflect inferior equilibria that are generated by social norms and externalities. While an important outlet for total work, home production by females appears very sensitive to tax rates in the G-7 countries. We adapt the theory of home production to account for fixed costs of market work and adduce evidence that they, in contrast to other relative costs, vary significantly across countries.

time use, gender inequality, household production, hours of work

Abstract:
In this paper six authors propose guidelines for German labor market policy, to overcome current discouragement and lead to a new balance of social security and individual competetiveness. Crucial aspects in this regard should be a reformed tax system based on excise instead of income taxes, and a system of incentives (vouchers) to encourage further education and individual initiative in the event of unemployment. In addition the declaration pleads for economic regulation of immigration and demands more marketability of honorary work. The welfare state should not be shattered but has to stimulate the individual to take economic risks and chances. This paper has been forwarded to a broader German public in order to influence discussion on the future course of labor market policy.

Labor Market, Migration and Economics, Tax System, Welfare State

Abstract:
Firing frictions and renegotiation costs affect worker and firm preferences for rigid wages versus individualized Nash bargaining in a standard model of equilibrium unemployment, in which workers vary by observable skill. Rigid wages permit savings on renegotiation costs and prevent workers from exploiting the firing friction. For standard calibrations, the model can account for political support for wage rigidity by both workers and firms, especially in labor markets for intermediate skills. The firing friction is necessary for this effect, and reinforces the impact of both turbulence and other labor market institutions on preferences for rigid wages.

wage rigidities, job protection, firing taxes, renegotiation costs, equilibrium unemployment

Abstract:
Using time-diary data from four countries we show that the unemployed spend most of the time not working for pay in additional leisure and personal maintenance, not in increased household production. There is no relation between unemployment duration and the split of time between household production and leisure. U.S. data for 2003-2006 show that almost none of the lower amount of market work in areas of long-term high unemployment is offset by additional household production. In contrast, in those areas where unemployment has risen cyclically reduced market work is made up almost entirely by additional time spent in household production.

household production, paid work, time use, unemployment

Abstract:
Using time-diary data from four countries we show that the unemployed spend most of the time not working for pay in additional leisure and personal maintenance, not in increased household production. There is no relation between unemployment duration and the split of time between household production and leisure. U.S. data for 2003-2006 show that almost none of the lower amount of market work in areas of long-term high unemployment is offset by additional household production. In contrast, in those areas where unemployment has risen cyclically reduced market work is made up almost entirely by additional time spent in household production.

Abstract:
Using time-diary data from four countries we show that the unemployed spend most of the time not working for pay in additional leisure and personal maintenance, not in increased household production. There is no relation between unemployment duration and the split of time between household production and leisure. U.S. data for 2003-2006 show that almost none of the lower amount of market work in areas of long-term high unemployment is offset by additional household production. In contrast, in those areas where unemployment has risen cyclically reduced market work is made up almost entirely by additional time spent in household production.

unemployment, time use, household production, paid work

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the interaction between structural change and labor market dynamics in West Germany, during a period in which industrial employment declined by more than 30% and service sector employment more than doubled. Using transition data on individual workers, we document a marked increase in structural change and turbulence, in particular since 1990. Net employment changes resulted partly from an increase in gross flows, but also from an increase in the net transition "yield" at any given gross worker turnover. In growing sectors, net structural change was driven by accessions from nonparticipation rather than unemployment; contracting sectors reduced their net employment primarily via lower accessions from nonparticipation. While gross turnover is cyclically sensitive and strongly procyclical, net reallocation is countercyclical, meaning that recessions are associated with increased intensity of sectoral reallocation. Beyond this cyclical component, German reunification and Eastern enlargement appear to have contributed significantly to this accelerated pace of structural change.

Gross worker flows, sectoral and occupational mobility, turbulence

Abstract:
The secular rise of European unemployment since the 1960s is hard to explain without reference to structural change. This is especially true in Germany, where industrial employment has declined by more than 30% and service sector employment has more than doubled over the past three decades. Using individual transition data onWest German workers, we document a marked increase in structural change and turbulence, in particular since 1990. Net employment changes resulted partly from an increase in gross flows, but also from an increase in the net transition "yield" at any given gross worker turnover. In growing sectors, net structural change was driven by accessions from nonparticipation rather than unemployment; contracting sectors reduced their net employment primarily via lower accessions from nonparticipation. While gross turnover is cyclically sensitive and strongly procyclical, net reallocation is countercyclical, meaning that recessions are associated with increased intensity of sectoral reallocation. Beyond this cyclical component, German reunification and Eastern enlargement appear to have contributed significantly to this accelerated pace of structural change.

Gross worker flows, sectoral and occupational mobility, turbulence

Abstract:
The sustained rise in German unemployment since 1973 poses a problem of critical importance for the world economy. Fewer than two decades ago, Germany boasted an average unemployment rate of under 1% and imported labor to relieve chronic labor shortages. By the mid-1980s, unemployment had risen to over 8 percent of the labor force. This paper investigates some of the reasons for the secular rise in unemployment. We find that while deficient aggregate demand can probably explain some of the current joblessness, the secular rise in unemployment has consisted primarily of an increase in the equilibrium rate of unemployment. We also find little evidence that this increase is due to changes in frictional unemployment. Rather, after reviewing institutional details of the labor market in Germany, we identify various impediments to the kinds of structural adjustments that have operated to maintain a fairly constant equilibrium rate of unemployment in the United States.

Abstract:
Standard models of equilibrium unemployment assume exogenous labour market institutions and flexible wage determination. This paper models wage rigidity and collective bargaining endogenously, when workers differ by observable skill and may adopt either individualized or collective wage bargaining. In the calibrated model, a substantial fraction of workers and firms as well as the median voter prefer collective bargaining to the decentralised regime. A fundamental distortion of the separation decision represented by employment protection (a firing tax) is necessary for such preferences to emerge. Endogenizing collective bargaining can significantly modify comparative statics effects of policy arising in a single-regime setting.

wage rigidity, employment protection, equilibrium unemployment

Abstract:
Firing frictions and renegotiation costs affect worker and firm preferences for rigid wages versus individualized Nash bargaining in a standard model of equilibrium unemployment, in which workers vary by observable skill. Rigid wages permit savings on renegotiation costs and prevent workers from exploiting the firing friction. For standard calibrations, the model can account for political support for wage rigidity by both workers and firms, especially in labour markets for intermediate skills. The firing friction is necessary for this effect, and reinforces the impact of both turbulence and other labour market institutions on preferences for rigid wages.

Wage rigidities, job protection, firing taxes, renegotiation costs, equilibrium unemployment

Abstract:
Standard models of equilibrium unemployment assume exogenous labour market institutions and flexible wage determination. This article models wage rigidity and the coverage of collective bargaining endogenously, when workers differ by observable skill and may adopt either individualised or collective wage bargaining. In the calibrated model, a substantial fraction of workers and firms as well as the median voter prefer collective bargaining to the decentralised regime. A fundamental distortion of the separation decision in the form of a firing tax is necessary for these preferences to emerge. Endogenous coverage of collective bargaining can significantly modify the model's comparative statics predictions.

Abstract:
The secular rise of European unemployment since the 1960s is hard to explain without reference to structural change. This is especially true in Germany, where industrial employment has declined by more than 30% and service sector employment has more than doubled over the past three decades. Using individual transition data on West German workers, we document a marked increase in structural change and turbulence, in particular since 1990. Net employment changes resulted partly from an increase in gross flows, but also from an increase in the net transition yield at any given gross worker turnover. In growing sectors, net structural change was driven by accessions from nonparticipation rather than unemployment; contracting sectors reduced their net employment primarily via lower accessions from nonparticipation. While gross turnover is cyclically sensitive and strongly procyclical, net reallocation is countercyclical, meaning that recessions are associated with increased intensity of sectoral reallocation. Beyond this cyclical component, German reunification and Eastern enlargement appear to have contributed significantly to this accelerated pace of structural change.

Gross worker flows, sectoral and occupational mobility, turbulence

Abstract:
This paper evaluates complementarities of labor market institutions and the business cycle in the context of a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model economy. Matching between workers and vacancies with endogenous time spent in search, Nash-bargained wages, payroll taxation, and differential support for unemployed labor in search and leisure are central aspects of the model. For plausible regions of the policy and institutional parameter space, the model exhibits more persistence than standard real business cycle models and can exhibit indeterminacy of rational expectations paths without increasing returns in production. Furthermore, labor market institutions act in a complementary fashion in generating these effects.

Abstract:
This paper investigates the effect of displacement on wages of socially insured German workers, who became unemployed in 1986. Because detailed information on job loss is unavailable, displacement status is predicted using a probit, estimated on the German Socioeconomic Panel. In contrast to U.S. findings, post-displacement wages decline only slightly upon re-employment. The lowest earnings quartile, in which displacement is concentrated, even gains slightly (2%), while wage growth losses for the upper three quartiles are higher (17%). Limited wage adjustment of displaced workers is likely to play an important role in explaining aggregate wage rigidity in Germany.

Abstract:
This paper summarizes some of the findings of Boeri, Burda and Kollo (1998), which provide an overview of the state of labor markets in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. It argues that a hasty "return to Europe" with respect to labor market policies may not be in the best interests of these economies, and may actually impede an efficient transition.