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Abstract:
We analyse whether family firms differ from non-family firms in terms of business segment and geographical diversification or the application of currency hedging instruments. This analysis is based on a unique dataset of 339 publicly listed companies (1,561 firm years) in the German Prime Standard from 2002 to 2006. While there is widespread empirical evidence on differences between family and non-family firms in terms of corporate performance, comparatively little is known about the impact of family firm dimensions on firm behaviour. We try to fill this research gap with a single country study focusing on Germany, an economy where family-control traditionally plays a predominant role in corporate governance.

We find that family firms are less diversified in unrelated business segments. However, there are no differences between family firms and non-family firms in terms of overall and related business segment diversification. For geographical diversification, we do not find convincing evidence for any differences. Finally, our analysis indicates that family firms are less likely to use currency hedging instruments.

In a second step, we go beyond existing research and distinguish between two separate dimensions of family firms: family management and family ownership. Empirical results indicate that those two dimensions have conflictive effects on firm behaviour. Family management, i.e. the involvement of the founding family into firm management, reduces agency costs and thus leads to lower levels of business segment diversification and less currency hedging. In contrast family ownership leads to risk aversion and more business segment diversification. Overall, the family management aspect is more likely to dominate the family ownership aspect.

Family firms, family ownership, family management, risk management, risk aversion, agency costs, diversification, derivatives, hedging, corporate governance

Abstract:
This study examines how family firm characteristics affect capital structure decisions. In our analysis we disentangle the influence of three distinct components of a family firm: ownership, supervisory and management board activities by the founding family. Thereby, we use a unique panel dataset of 660 publicly listed companies (5,135 firm years) in the broadest German stock index CDAX from 1995 to 2006. This paper is motivated by hitherto inconclusive empirical findings on capital structure decisions in family firms from Anglo-Saxon countries. We provide new evidence for a bank-based economy. In this sense, Germany provides a very fruitful research environment as it (i) traditionally has a bank-based financial system and (ii) family firms are considered to be the backbone of the economy.

We find that family firms have significantly lower leverage ratios than non-family firms, independent of the definition of leverage applied. Among the three dimensions of a family firm, management board involvement by the founding family has a consistently negative influence on leverage across all our models. In contrast, the influence of ownership and supervisory board representation is insignificant in almost all of our models. In line with agency theory, we can show that the leverage level is the lowest if the founding family is simultaneously a large shareholder with monitoring incentives and involved in firm management with convergence-of-interest effects. Finally, we detect that the presence of a founder CEO in firm management has a significant negative effect on the leverage ratio. Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests including a matching estimator technique to demonstrate causal effects.

Family firms, family ownership, family management, founder CEO, agency costs, capital structure, debt-equity ratio, leverage, corporate governance, risk aversion

Abstract:
Family firms are an important phenomenon of the German capital market. We analyse the broadest market segment of the German Stock Exchange, the CDAX, for the years 1998 to 2008. According to a founding-family definition almost half of all CDAX-listed non-financial firms in Germany can be classified as family firms. They also represent about one third of all listed non-financial firms' market capitalization. Within these firms the founding family is not only the most important shareholder but also participates actively in most of the boards (management and supervisory board). In about 50% of all family firms the founder also serves as CEO. Family firms are smaller, younger and have higher equity ratios compared to their non-family counterparts. They are represented in all industries with a certain concentration in the services sectors. We confirm and extend previous evidence by Jaskiewicz (2006) and Andres (2008) that family ownership and management has a positive impact on a firm's operating performance. Our analysis of stock market performance provides evidence that family firms are more sensitive to market movements compared to non-family firms.

family firms, Germany, performance

Abstract:
We analyse to what extent the accrual anomaly is related to the choice of the accounting system as well as firm-level heterogeneity in corporate governance mechanisms. Using a unique dataset of listed German firms over the period 1995 to 2005 we first corroborate former results indicating that the accrual anomaly is also present in Germany. However, this anomaly seems to be driven mainly by firms with managerial ownership. In a second step, we test how different corporate governance mechanisms affect the anomaly. For the German experiment on voluntary adoption of IFRS our results confirm previous findings that the anomaly is less likely to be present under a conservative accounting system. While creditor monitoring is able to reduce the accrual anomaly, shareholder monitoring is not. Apart from offering evidence related to the cross-sectional difference in the degree of accrual mispricing, our results give also some insights related to the cross-country variation of this phenomenon.

Accrual Anomaly, Earnings Quality, Corporate Governance, Managerial Ownership, Capital Market Efficiency, Accounting Standard, Shareholder Monitoring, Creditor Monitoring

Abstract:
Recent research indicates that the majority of listed firms in Germany (and also in many other countries around the world) have a dominant owner rather than being widely-held. Hence, owner-dominated firms comprise an important subset of listed companies. This article introduces the concept of an ownership-based style index of listed firms in Germany, the German Entrepreneurial Index (GEX®). Introduced in 2005, the GEX® represents recently listed, ownerdominated firms in the German Prime Standard. We review the theoretical foundation and the index construction of the GEX®. In addition, we provide an overview of its development and performance between index inception and end of 2008 and relate this to properties of the German financial market. Finally, we conclude with a critical outlook for the index future against the background of recent developments.

insider ownership, style index, ownership structure, corporate governance