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Abstract:
Using a dictator game, we examine the other-regarding behavior of allocators who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making an allocation decision without consultation on behalf of a two-person group between their group and another group. We then contrast the behavior of the same individuals in an analogous inter-individual situation. We also explore other-regarding perceptions of passive recipients, who are asked to give behavioral forecasts of how they would behave if assigned the allocator role and how they think their allocators would behave. Gender differences are found in both behavior and perceptions. Males are significantly more self-interested and less other-regarding when they are responsible for a group, while females behave similarly under both conditions. Female recipients' forecasts of their own behavior are significantly higher than both their expectations of allocators and the actual female behavior observed in the experiment. Both male and female recipients underestimate the other-regarding behavior of allocators.

Other-regarding behavior, gender, behavioral forecast, perception bias

Abstract:
We examine equilibrium selection in a two-stage sequential elimination contest in which contestants compete for a single prize. This game has a continuum of equilibria, only one of which satisfies the Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) refinement. That equilibrium involves burning out by using all of one's resources in the first stage. It is Pareto-dominated by many other equilibria. We find that CPNE predicts well when four people compete, but not when eight people compete for two second-stage spots. Using a cognitive hierarchy (CH) framework, we show that when the number of players and the mean number of thinking steps are large, the CH prediction involves burning out. This provides a partial explanation of our results. We also develop a formal argument as to why CPNE logic is more compelling with more players. We conclude that more competition leads to higher bids, and that burning out is indeed a competitive phenomenon.

all-pay auction; burning out; cognitive hierarchy; coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; contests; experiment; step thinking.

Abstract:
To investigate the effects of gender and national culture on economic behavior, we compare all-male and all-female groups from Japan and Canada in the context of a threshold public goods game with a strong free-riding equilibrium and many socially efficient threshold equilibria. Females and Canadians exhibit higher levels of conformity when compared with males and Japanese respectively. However, such symmetric group behavior translates into significantly tighter equilibrium convergence only for Canadian females. Canadians, particularly Canadian females, are more successful at providing the public good than Japanese. The results suggest that the prevalence of different notions of self-construal, may affect behavior.

Abstract:
Employing a two-by-two factorial design that manipulates whether dictator groups are single or mixed-sex and whether procedures are single or double-blind, we examine gender effects in a standard dictator game. No gender effect was found in any of the experimental treatments. Moreover, neither single - versus mixed - sex groups nor level of anonymity had any impact on either male or female behavior.

dictator game, gender, anonymity

Abstract:
Using real-effort laboratory experiments with salient incentives, we examine the impact of performance-based versus lump-sum compensation schemes on self-selection and productivity. A laboratory firm offering pay-for-performance compensation achieved significantly higher productivity than an identical firm offering lump-sum compensation for two reasons: first, more highly skilled workers selected it, and second, workers on average, regardless of their self-selections, were more productive under the pay-for-performance scheme. Although skill level significantly affected self-selection, individual attitudes toward risk, elicited using a lottery-selection task, also mattered with less risk-averse individuals more likely to choose the productivity-based scheme.

Abstract:
Understanding norms of fairness is essential for explaining many phenomena in organizations. Using a dictator game, we examine the behavior of individuals who are given the responsibility of individually making an allocation decision on behalf of a two-person group in a dictator game without consultation. We find that men are significantly more self-interested and less fair when they are responsible for a group, while women behave similarly under both conditions. Both males and females underestimate the fairness of others whose decisions can affect their earnings, but only among females are self-predictions significantly greater than expectations of others. In sum, other-regarding considerations may affect decisions in radically different ways depending not only on whether the decision is made on behalf of an individual or group, but also on the way the group decision is operationalized, whether the decision is hypothetical or real, and on the gender of the decision makers.

Fairness, Discontinuity, Gender

Abstract:
Tendering decisions of shareholders endowed with multiple shares are studied in the laboratory to test game-theoretic models of the tendering process. Tendered shares cycle around the equilibrium level. Contrary to game-theoretic predictions, bid level and bid type affect the number of shares tendered and the bid success rate. When players are given unequal endowments of shares, an equal proportion strategy organizes the data better than Holmstrom and Nalebuff's (1992) symmetric focal equilibrium in which larger shareholders tender down to a common share level. However, large shareholders often tender proportionately more shares than small shareholders.