• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
This paper argues that a theoretical account of the formation and operation of the nonprofit organizations (NPOs) that increasingly manage public property must have a place for the way in which nonprofits manifest responsibility. The current nonprofit models, therefore, must be extended and refined in order to explain the private management of public space by nonprofits. NPOs take responsibility in two ways that reduce the cost of monitoring their performance and, consequently, help to create positive outcomes for public spaces with respect to funding and maintenance. First, NPOs as a single entity assume responsibility for public space in a way that contrasts strongly with the diffuse accountability of governmental managers and, more importantly, in a way that makes them easier to monitor. Second, the dependence of NPOs on their revenue streams - donations or user fees, depending on the type of NPO - makes them responsible for the success of the park in a way that both contrasts strongly with insulated civil servants and places the burden on the NPO, instead of on individuals outside the organization, to compile and communicate information about their operation for monitors. Private managers, therefore, are more accountable for their actions than governmental managers because they are more responsible and, thus, less costly to monitor. Several policy and legal reforms are helpful to fostering NPO responsibility that reduces monitoring costs.

nonprofit organization, Central Park, Bryant Park, business improvement district, conservancy

Abstract:
Two circuit conflicts have developed regarding the proper interpretation of the FCA. First, the circuits are divided over whether an implicit certification of compliance with a federal law, regulation, or contract is sufficient to give rise to liability under the FCA. Second, the circuits have split on what constitutes "presentment" of a claim to the government as required by the FCA. While the two circuit splits involve separate questions of interpretation, courts that have rejected liability on both issues are motivated by a common but unacknowledged concern: ensuring that unsuspecting defendants do not face FCA liability. The interpretive moves used to achieve this result, however, in practice create additional scienter requirements that are imperfect solutions for the problem of unsuspecting defendants. In fact, the courts are doing more harm than good. The statutory scienter framework can better protect unsuspecting defendants than the courts' similarly intentioned reinterpretations of the FCA.

False Claims Act, scienter, Totten, Allison Engine