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Abstract:
China's legislators are debating the enactment of an anti-monopoly law. The pending draft legislation would prohibit abuse of administrative monopoly. Administrative abuses are provincial and local measures that discriminate against and burden goods and services from other provinces and localities. State-owned monopolies would apparently be covered by the law except in regulated industries.

Most nations deal with abusive government restraints and abusive private restraints by different instruments of law. This essay demonstrates, however, the integral nature of public and private protectionist restraints. It provides examples of integrated analysis in the United States, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization. It argues that a Chinese effort to address administrative economic abuses in its competition law would be progressive and helpful to the Chinese economy, especially in the absence of a Chinese "Commerce Clause." Also, it argues for fuller coverage of state-owned monopolies. SOEs and provincial and local protectionist restraints are among China's most significant obstacles to realizing the benefits of markets.

Abstract:
In this forthcoming chapter in Antitrust Stories (Eleanor Fox & Dan Crane, eds., forthcoming 2007 Foundation Press), Eleanor Fox recounts the story of the proposed merger between General Electric and Honeywell that was blessed by U.S. antitrust regulators and then blocked by the European Commission.

antitrust, mergers

Abstract:
Developed countries often insist that antitrust is only for efficiency and consumer welfare, and that any broader focus will protect small competitors and mire the economy in inefficiencies. Developing countries retort that their antitrust must also address issues of distribution and power.

This article contests the standard Western claim that if conduct cannot be shown to raise prices to consumers it must be efficient and should be beyond antitrust challenge. It also argues that developing countries need a broader standard than whether conduct decreases aggregate consumer or total wealth. Developing country antitrust should not be used to protect inefficient Davids against Goliath, but it may and should be used to empower Davids against Goliath by keeping open paths of mobility and access. Indeed, enhanced mobility tends to produce efficiencies in societies in which economic opportunity of masses of people has been suppressed. An antitrust law for developing countries that values mobility, access and efficient development of the economy, while not protecting small firms at the expense of consumers, is The Other Path of the title to this article. The article articulates principles, factors and strategies that give content to this other path.

Abstract:
This book offers an unparalleled analysis of the emerging law and economics of competition policy in Latin America. Nearly all Latin American countries now have competition laws and agencies to enforce them. Yet these laws and agencies are relatively young. The relative youth of Latin American competition agencies and the institutional and political environment in which they operate limit the ability of agencies to address anti-competitive conduct effectively. Competition policy is a tool to overcome anti-market traditions in Latin America. Effective competition policy is critical to assisting in the growth of Latin American economies and their global competitiveness, and to improving the welfare of domestic consumers. This book provides new region-specific insights into how better to achieve these aims.

Abstract:
The article assumes arguendo that efficiency is the sole goal of antitrust. It then observes that how to achieve efficiency by applications of antitrust law is not obvious; that there are various routes towards attempting to achieve efficiency, and Chicago School advocates have picked one based on a principle of non-intervention rather than one based on a principle of trust in rivalry and open markets. The article shows how application of the non-intervention principle protects dominant firms from the competition of their rivals and in that connection deprives the market of efficiencies. Robert Bork argued in THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: in the name of competition, antitrust harmed competition. Professor Fox now argues: in the name of efficiency, conservative advocates and jurists harm efficiency. This is The Efficiency Paradox of her title.

Abstract:
This paper was prepared as background for the American Antitrust Institute's Annual Conference in June, 2005, whose topic was Creative Antitrust Remedies. This paper contains a bibliography of general books and annotations of general articles, ABA documents, and governmental statements; followed by annotations of specific topics: monopolization, mergers, cartels, and, finally, OECD materials.

antitrust, Remedies, Monopolization, Mergers, Cartels, OECD

Abstract:
The International Competition Network is one of the several new transnational networks of specialized government officials. Unlike some others, this network is not intended to be a new form of governance. It has no secretariat, no land address, and notionally no power. It is intended to bring together antitrust authorities of the world to share ideas and knowhow, cross-fertilize, give support especially to younger agencies in developing countries, and work towards better, common antitrust process and principles. This article describes the creation and evolution of the International Competition Network. It describes its work and work product. It then assesses its effectiveness, legitimacy and sufficiency. It asks how the ICN can be effective if it has no power. Then it asks whether, in spite of its charter principle, the ICN has power or influence, and, to the extent it does, what are the implications for inclusiveness, transparency and governance within the ICN?

Abstract:
To advance the debate about whether competition should be on the agenda of the World Trade Organization, this paper identifies the keypoint at which trade law and competition law meet: the blockage of market access by anti-competitive restraints. At this open-market intersection, there is a synergy to be captured by combining principles of free trade and principles of free competition. The author proposes a simple architecture, with a choice of law principle for seamlessly incorporating into the WTO a discipline against private market access restraints. The author cautions against indiscriminately raising antitrust issues to an international level and against doing so under a trade law banner. For the world competition issues that are not trade issues, a free-standing World Competition Forum is proposed, interactive where appropriate with the WTO.