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Abstract:
This article makes valuable new contributions to the burgeoning scholarly discourse on Apprendi v. New Jersey-a landmark decision that celebrates its tenth anniversary this year. It builds on the author's experience as a public defender, during which she pioneered the surprising but straightforward argument that under Apprendi, findings that justify transferring a juvenile to adult court must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi requires that any fact authorizing a sentence higher than the otherwise applicable statutory maximum must be found by a jury using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. This tenet applies directly to juvenile transfer hearings, which rely on a consideration of facts to determine whether a juvenile should face trial and sentence in adult court. The facts that serve as a basis for transfer result in exposure to a higher sentence than could be imposed if the offender remained in juvenile court. Despite Apprendi's readily apparent application, juvenile courts have refused to apply Apprendi to juvenile transfer hearings. This article presents this argument and critiques the reasoning of courts that have refused to apply Apprendi in this context. It then explores the theoretical underpinnings of courts' reluctance to apply Apprendi, filling a scholarly void that exists at the intersection of Apprendi and the juvenile justice system.

Apprendi, Juvenile, Transfer, Punishment, Due Process, Decline, Kent

Abstract:
This article examines the role of the jury in a post-Apprendi justice system. Apprendi and its progeny recognize the vital role the jury plays in establishing the legitimacy of criminal convictions and sentences. I contend that the Apprendi line confirms the jury’s responsibility, as representatives of the community, to give the law meaning in their determination of criminal culpability. In this, Apprendi seeks to restore the original role of the jury as the bridge between the law itself and the community the law seeks to regulate. This restoration is incomplete, and the jury’s true significance cannot be realized, without a recognition of the jury’s original right to judge law as well as fact. Only through the revitalization of this power to nullify can the jury assume its intended role and provide community sanction to the designation of criminal culpability. I conclude that democracy, and indeed the underlying goals of the criminal justice system, are best served when criminal processes allow forums for dissenting perspectives and juries are allowed to assess both the legal and factual bases of guilt.