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Abstract:
Bargaining is ubiquitous in real-life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (e.g. climate change control). What factors determine the outcome of negotiations such as those mentioned above? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? This paper addresses these questions by focusing on a non-cooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing non-cooperative bargaining theory, non-cooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, this paper will try to identify the connection among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate the progress towards a unified framework.

Negotiation theory, Bargaining, Coalitions, Fairness, Agreements

Abstract:
The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water related issues - which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that to, on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their characteristics; and, on the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the rules of the game that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially of trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, this paper first discusses the non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Particular attention will be given to those directly modelling the process of negotiation, although some attempts at finding strategies to maintain the efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. In addition, this paper will focus on Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process of negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not yet found much use in real life negotiation. The paper will conclude by highlighting the key remaining gaps in the literature.

Negotiation theory, Water, Agreements, Stochasticity, Stakeholders, Bragaining, Coalitions, Fairness

Abstract:
This Paper examines recent theoretical developments in the theory of coalition stability. It focuses on the relationship between the incentives to defect from a coalition, the size of the resulting equilibrium coalition structure and the different assumptions on membership rules, coalition behaviour, players' conjectures, etc. The Paper considers several cases. Simultaneous versus sequential moves, linear versus circular order of moves, Nash versus rational conjectures, open versus exclusive membership, monotonic versus non-monotonic payoff functions and orthogonal versus non-orthogonal reaction functions. The profitable and stable coalition will be derived for each possible configuration of the rules of the game, the pay-off functions and the membership rules. The results show that the size of the profitable and stable coalition highly depends on the chosen configuration and that the equilibrium outcome ranges from a small coalition with a few signatories to full cooperation. The Paper explores under which conditions a large stable coalition is likely to emerge, and identifies the institutional setting that favours the emergence of such coalition.

Agreements, coaltions, incentives, negotiations, stability

Abstract:
This paper examines recent theoretical developments of the theory of coalition stability. It focuses on the relationship between the incentives to defect from a coalition, the size of the resulting equilibrium coalition structure, and the different assumptions on membership rules, coalition behaviour, players' conjectures, etc. The paper considers several cases. Simultaneous vs. sequential moves, linear vs. circular order of moves, Nash vs. rational conjectures, open vs. exclusive membership, monotonic vs. non monotonic payoff functions, and orthogonal vs. non-orthogonal reaction functions. The profitable and stable coalition will be derived for each possible configuration of the rules of the game, the payoff functions and the membership rules. The results show that the size of the profitable and stable coalition highly depends on the chosen configuration and that the equilibrium outcome ranges from a small coalition with a few signatories to full cooperation. The paper explores under which conditions a large stable coalition is likely to emerge, and identifies the institutional setting that favours the emergence of such coalition.

Agreements, coalitions, incentives, negotiations, stability

Abstract:
In this paper, the reaction of firms to the introduction of environmental charges in a given industry is analyzed. Firms may decide either to relocate their plants abroad or to adopt a new environmental-friendly technology. The latter can be either developed by investing in R&D or obtained by buying a licence. We show that, even if domestic firms share the same initial technology, at the equilibrium they make different choices in response to the same environmental policy. Some firms decide to cooperate in carrying out environmental R&D, other firms re-locate their plants abroad, and a third group decides to innovate through imitation. The size of the three groups can be affected by the government's industrial, trade and environmental policies.

Abstract:
This paper is the concluding chapter of Rights, Rents and Fairness: Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme, edited by the co-authors and forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. The main objective of this paper is to distill the lessons and general principles to be learnt from the allocation of allowances in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), i.e. in the world's first experience with allocating carbon allowances to sub-national entities. We discuss the lessons that emerge from this experience and make some comments on what seem to be more general principles informing the allocation process and on what are the global implications of the EU ETS. As has become obvious during the first allocation phase, the diversity of experience among the Member States is considerable, so that it must be understood that these lessons and unifying themes are drawn from the experience of most of the Member States, not necessarily from all. Lessons and unifying observations are grouped in three categories: those concerning the conditions encountered, the processes employed, and the actual choices.

Climate change, allocation, emission trading, fairness, EU policy

Abstract:
This paper is the concluding chapter of Rights, Rents and Fairness: Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme, edited by the co-authors and forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. The main objective of this paper is to distill the lessons and general principles to be learnt from the allocation of allowances in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), i.e. in the world's first experience with allocating carbon allowances to sub-national entities. We discuss the lessons that emerge from this experience and make some comments on what seem to be more general principles informing the allocation process and on what are the global implications of the EU ETS. As has become obvious during the first allocation phase, the diversity of experience among the Member States is considerable, so that it must be understood that these lessons and unifying themes are drawn from the experience of most of the Member States, not necessarily from all. Lessons and unifying observations are grouped in three categories: those concerning the conditions encountered, the processes employed, and the actual choices.

Climate Change, Emission Trading, Allocation, Fairness, EU Policy

Abstract:
This paper elaborates on the recent race to sequence the human genome. Starting from the debate on public vs. private research arising from the genome case, the paper shows that in some fundamental research areas, where knowledge externalities play an important role, market and non-market allocation mechanisms do coexist and should coexist in order to ensure socially desirable achievements. A game-theoretic model makes it possible to demonstrate the above results and to characterise some features of an optimal research policy.

Science, Technology, Allocation Mechanisms, Intellectual Property Rights, Welfare

Abstract:
This paper surveys the recent literature devoted to the analysis of the interactions between the adoption of voluntary or negotiated agreements as a tool of environmental policy and market structure. The goal of this survey is twofold. On the one hand, we would like to identify the market environment which is most favourable to the adoption of voluntary approaches, namely whether these are more likely to be signed within industries that are more or less concentrated. On the other hand, we aim at assessing the effects of voluntary approaches on market structure and industry concentration. Our findings suggest that the signature of voluntary approaches is favoured by a situation in which industry is more concentrated.

Moreover, the adoption of voluntary approaches is likely to further increase industry concentration. This clearly raises a trade-off between environmental benefits and economic costs provided by the adoption of voluntary approaches that must be dealt with an appropriate policy-mix.

Abstract:
The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties drastically reduces the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. The reason is not only the reduced emission abatement in the US, but also the spillover effects on technology and countries' relative bargaining power induced by the US decision. Therefore, it is crucial to analyse whether an incentive strategy exists that could induce the US to revise their decision and to comply with the Kyoto commitments. One solution, occasionally proposed in the literature and in actual policymaking, is to link negotiations on climate change control with decisions concerning international R&D cooperation. This Paper explores this idea by analysing on the one hand the incentives for EU, Japan and Russia to adopt this strategy, and on the other hand the incentives for the US to join a coalition which cooperates both on climate change control and on technological innovation. The extended regime in which cooperation takes place on both dimensions (GHG emissions and R&D) will be examined from the view-point of countries' profitability and free-riding incentives. Finally, after having assessed the effectiveness and credibility of the issue linkage strategy, we explore the economic and environmental benefits of a new, recently proposed regime, which aims at achieving GHG emission control by enhancing cooperation on technological innovation and diffusion (without targets on emissions).

Agreements, climate, incentives, negotiations, policy, technological change

Abstract:
The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties drastically reduce the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. The reason is not only the reduced emission abatement in the US, but also the spillover effects on technology and countries' relative bargaining power induced by the US decision. Therefore, it is crucial to analyse whether an incentive strategy exists that could induce the US to revise their decision and to comply with the Kyoto commitments. One solution, occasionally proposed in the literature and in actual policymaking, is to link negotiations on climate change control with decisions concerning international R&D cooperation. This paper explores this idea by analysing on the one hand the incentives for EU, Japan and Russia to adopt this strategy, and on the other hand the incentives for the US to join a coalition which cooperates both on climate change control and on technological innovation. The extended regime in which cooperation takes place on both dimensions (GHG emissions and R&D) will be examined from the view point of countries' profitability and free-riding incentives. Finally, after having assessed the effectiveness and credibility of the issue linkage strategy, we explore the economic and environmental benefits of a new, recently proposed regime, which aims at achieving GHG emission control by enhancing cooperation on technological innovation and diffusion (without targets on emissions).

Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy, Technological Change

Abstract:
The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties have important implications for both the effectiveness and the efficiency of future climate policies. Among these implications, those related with technical change and with the functioning of the international market for carbon emissions are particularly relevant, because these variables have the largest impact on the overall abatement cost to be borne by Annex B countries in the short and in the long run. This paper analyses the consequences of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol both on technological innovation and on the price of emission permits (and, as a consequence, on abatement costs). A first goal is to assess the impact of the US defection on the price of permits and compliance costs when technological innovation and diffusion is taken into account (the model embodies international technological spillovers). A second goal is to understand for what reasons in the presence of endogenous and induced technical change the reduction of the price of permits is lower than in most empirical analyses recently circulated. A third goal is to assess the role of Russia in climate negotiations, its increased bargaining power and its eventual incentives to follow the US defections.

Agreements, climate, incentives, negotiations, equity, policy, transfers

Abstract:
Since the framework convention of Rio, actual environmental negotiations on climate change aim at inducing all world countries to sign a global environmental agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the past unsuccessful attempts, even current negotiations seem to pursue the same objective. This paper shows from a game-theoretic viewpoint that the emergence of agreements signed by all countries is quite unlikely, even in the presence of appropriate and multi-issues negotiation strategies and transfers. Either a single partial agreement or a coalition structure in which regional environmental agreements to control climate change are signed are the most likely outcomes. The paper compares these two cases and argue that regional agreements may increase both countries welfare and environmental quality.

Abstract:
This paper analyses the relationship between different equity rules and the incentives to sign and ratify a climate agreement. A widespread conjecture suggests that a more equitable ex-ante distribution of the burden of reducing emissions would provide the right incentives for more countries - particularly big emitters - to accept an emission reduction scheme defined within an international climate agreement. This paper shows that this conjecture is only partly supported by the empirical evidence that can be derived from the Kyoto Protocol. Even though more equitable burden sharing rules provide better incentives to sign and ratify a climate agreement than the burden-sharing rule implicit in the Kyoto Protocol, a stable global agreement cannot be achieved. A possible strategy to achieve a global agreement without free-riding incentives is a policy mix in which global emission trading is coupled with a transfer mechanism designed to offset ex-post incentives to free ride.

Agreements, climate, incentives, negotiations, equity, policy, transfers

Abstract:
This paper analyses the conditions under which a group of firms has the incentive to sign a Voluntary Agreement (VA) in order to control its emission flows even in the presence of free-riding by other firms in the industry. For the purpose of this paper it is assumed that free-riders cannot be completely excluded from the expected benefits of the VA, which increase with the number of signatory firms and with the abatement level achieved. The paper focuses on policy design by discussing the features that a VA should possess in order to increase its economic and environmental effectiveness. The results support some important conclusions. First, VAs cannot emerge in the case of a pure public good, i.e. when spillovers are such that all firms benefit from the abatement of the signatory firms. Second, even in the case of partial spillovers, the regulator has to impose a minimum participation constraint for the VA to be signed. In this case, if the minimum participation constraint is met, all firms have an incentive to sign the VA. Third, a VA with a minimum amount of regulation improves welfare with respect to a VA in which firms are free to set their profit maximising abatement level.

Voluntary agreement, voluntary approach, environmental protection, free-riding, emissions tax

Abstract:
This Paper analyses whether different emission trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation process. Our analysis confirms the conjecture that, by appropriately designing the emission-trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore, participation and optimal policy should be jointly analysed. Moreover, our results show that the US, Russia and China have different most preferred climate coalitions and therefore adopt conflicting negotiation strategies.

Agreements, climate, incentives, negotiations, policy

Abstract:
This paper analyses whether different emissions trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation process. Our analysis confirms the conjecture that, by appropriately designing the emission trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore, participation and optimal policy should be jointly analysed. Moreover, our results show that the US, Russia and China have different most preferred climate coalitions and therefore adopt conflicting negotiation strategies.

Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy

Abstract:
In this paper a n-player non-cooperative game is used to model countries' decision of whether or not to sign an international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is also taken into account. At the equilibrium, a coalition may emerge despite the public good nature of climate. The size of the coalition depends on the degree of interdependence of countries' emission strategies, and on the type of conjectures that each country forms on the consequences of its own decision to join or to defect from the environmental coalition.

Abstract:
Many predictions and conclusions in the climate change literature have been made and drawn on the basis of theoretical analyses and quantitative models that are either static or that allow for simple forms of changes in technology, often along exogenously given time paths. It is therefore not clear a priori whether those conclusions and policy recipes still hold in the more realistic case of endogenously evolving technologies. In this paper, a quantitative tool with the features of an endogenous growth model is presented, which also accounts for the possibility that technical change can be induced by environmental policy measures. Both the output production technology and the emission-output ratio depend upon the stock of knowledge, which accumulates through R&D activities. R&D is thus an additional policy variable that comes into play along with pollution abatement and capital investment. Two versions of this climate model are studied, one with endogenous technical change but exogenous environmental technical change (i.e. no induced technical change) and the other with both endogenous and induced technical change. Hence, in both models technical change evolves endogenously as far as the production technology is concerned, but endogenous environmental (or induced) technical change is only accounted for in the second version. Finally, a third version of the model also captures technological spillover effects. As an application, the three versions of the model are simulated allowing for trade of pollution permits as specified in the Kyoto Protocol and assessing the implications in terms of cost efficiency, economic growth and R&D efforts of the three different specifications of technical change.

Climate policy, environmental modelling, integrated assessment, technical change

Abstract:
In this paper we use a simple climate model with endogenous
environmental technical change in order to analyse the effects on equity and efficiency of different degrees of restrictions on trade in the market for pollution permits. The model is obtained by incorporating in Nordhaus and Yang (1996)'s RICE model the notion of induced technical change as proposed in Goulder and Mathai (1998). With the help of such model we aim at assessing the pros and cons of the introduction of ceilings on emission trading. In particular, we analyse the implications of restrictions on trading both in terms of their cost effectiveness and in terms of their distributional effects. The analysis takes into account the role of environmental technical change that could be enhanced by the presence of ceilings on trading. However, this effect is shown to be offset by the increased abatement cost induced by the larger than optimal adoption of domestic policy measures when ceilings are binding. Hence, our analysis provides little support in favour of quantitative restrictions on emission trading even when these restrictions actually have a positive impact on technical change. Even in terms of equity, ceilings find no justification within our theoretical and modelling framework. Indeed, we find that flexibility mechanisms in the presence of endogenous technical change increase equity and that the highest equity levels are achieved without ceilings, both in the short and in the long run.
assessment, emission trading, technical change, ceilings

Climate policy, environmental modelling, integrated

Abstract:
This paper analyses issue linkage as a way to increase co-operation on issues where incentives to free-ride are strong. The goal is to determine under what conditions players prefer to link negotiations on two different issues rather than to negotiate on the two issues separately. Suppose that players are asked to vote on issue linkage before starting negotiations. Under what conditions would they vote in favour of issue linkage? The answer to this question is not trivial. Issue linkage may indeed increase the number of cooperators on the provision of a public good (a typical issue characterised by strong incentives to free-ride). However, at the same time, issue linkage may reduce the number of cooperating players on the other economic issue which is linked to the provision of a public good. Players therefore face a trade-off. This paper analyses this trade-off within a game-theoretic framework and shows under what conditions issue linkage is players' equilibrium strategy.

International Environmental Agreements, Coalition Formation Games, Issue Linkage

Abstract:
An integrated assessment (IA) model combines knowledge from very different disciplines in view of a practical problem. Most models developed so far are rather monolithic in the sense that it is difficult to combine components from different models for purposes of new assessments. We propose to develop a modular approach to IA based on advances in knowledge management as well as in object oriented software engineering. The incentive structure of modular IA is based on turning the knowledge produced neither into public nor into private, but rather into club goods. Competition amongst modelers becomes a process of discovery at the level of module design and module coupling, with strong synergies between competing teams. Together they develop a community pool of IAM-modules, along with software and know-how for running them in varying combinations.

Modular Integrated Assessment, Knowledge Management, Decision Support

Abstract:
Do multinationals cooperate in research and development with local firms in developing countries? This paper explores the theoretical underpinnings and provides new empirical evidence of R&D cooperation between firms with asymmetric endowments of knowledge.

Barba Navaretti and Carraro analyze the determinants of interfirm agreements between industrial and developing countries for research and development (R&D) - that is, between firms with asymmetric endowments of knowledge. They develop a model in which a multinational has two options: (1) setting up a subsidiary and competing with a local firm in a duopoly, or (2) implementing an agreement and sharing monopoly profits. The two firms, if they choose the agreement, may also cooperate in R&D. The model shows that:
° The choice of cooperating in R&D is influenced by the intertemporal preferences of the developing country firm, the relative efficiency in R&D of the two firms, and the extent of knowledge spillovers.
° The choice of cooperating in R&D increases both the profitability and stability of the agreement, stability because it affects the long-term trust between the partners.

The empirical analysis is based on a data set of international arm's length agreements, part of which involve joint R&D. Testing the two-choice model supports some of the key theoretical results and assumptions. R&D agreements are particularly likely to emerge when firms are operating in knowledge-intensive industries (where nontangible assets, like knowledge, are large relative to tangible assets), when the partners have a nonhierarchical contractual relationship (they all contribute to the R&D effort), and when technological asymmetries between home and host countries (as proxies of knowledge endowments of the contracting firms) exist but are not too great.

This paper - a product of the International Trade Division, International Economics Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to examine the impact of foreign direct investments on developing countries.

Abstract:
In this paper, the economic value of the impacts of climate change is assessed for different Italian economic sectors and regions. Sectoral and regional impacts are then aggregated to provide a macroeconomic estimate of variations in GDP induced by climate change in the next decades. Autonomous adaptation induced by changes in relative prices and in stocks of natural and economic resources is fully taken into account. The model also considers international trade effects. Results show that in Italy aggregate GDP losses induced by climate change are likely to be small. However, some economic sectors (e.g. tourism) and the alpine regions will suffer significant economic damages.

Impacts, Climate Change, Adaptation, GDP Losses, Tourism

Abstract:
This paper provides an analysis of the effectiveness of climate policies by focusing on the link between policy options on the one hand, and structure of the agreements and of the international regimes on the other hand. In particular, the paper analyses whether there are the conditions for an agreement on climate change to be signed by all or almost all world countries; and whether some countries can play a strategic role, with respect to the goal of achieving the largest possible agreement, by proposing strategies, measures, institutions that help to expand the number of countries which commit to control their emissions. In this way, the paper also analyses which strategies can be proposed to reduce the costs of mitigation policies, where the cost reduction is achieved by increasing the number of signatories and by dividing more equitably the burden of emission control.

agreements, climate, incentives, negotiations, leakage, linkage, policy, transfers

Abstract:
In recent years, a large number of papers have explored different attempts to endogenise technical change in climate models. The obvious reason is that technical change is widely considered the main route to achieving a significant reduction in global GHG emissions. This recent literature has emphasized that four factors - two inputs and two outputs - should play a major role when modelling technical change in climate models. The two inputs are R&D investments and Learning by Doing, the two outputs are energy-saving and fuel switching. Indeed, R&D investments and Learning by Doing are the main drivers of a climate-friendly technical change that eventually affect both energy intensity and fuel-mix. In this paper, we present and discuss an extension of the FEEM-RICE model in which these four factors are explicitly accounted for. In our new specification of endogenous technical change, an index of technical progress depends on both Learning by Researching and Learning by Doing. This index enters the equations defining energy intensity (i.e. the amount of carbon energy required to produce one unit of output) and carbon intensity (i.e. the level of carbonization of primarily used fuels). This new specification is embodied in the RICE 99 integrated assessment climate model and then used to generate a business as usual scenario and to analyze the relationship between climate policy and technical change. Sensitivity analysis is performed on different key parameters of the energy module in order to obtain crucial insights into the relative importance of the main channels through which technological changes affects the impact of human activities on climate. In addition, the effectiveness of different possible ways of combining Learning by Researching and Learning by Doing is also investigated.

Climate Policy, Environmental Modelling, Integrated Assessment, Technical Change

Abstract:
Most analyses of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms focus on the cost effectiveness of where flexibility (e.g. by showing that mitigation costs are lower in a global permit market than in regional markets or in permit markets confined to Annex 1 countries). Less attention has been devoted to when flexibility, i.e. to the benefits of allowing emission permit traders to bank their permits for future use. In the model presented in this paper, banking of carbon allowances in a global permit market is fully endogenised, i.e. agents may decide to bank permits by taking into account their present and future needs and the present and future decisions of all the other agents. It is therefore possible to identify under what conditions traders find it optimal to bank permits, when banking is socially optimal, and what are the implications for present and future permit prices. We can also explain why the equilibrium rate of growth of permit prices is likely to be larger than the equilibrium interest rate. Most importantly, this paper analyses the efficiency and distributional consequences of allowing markets to optimally allocate emission permits across regions and over time. The welfare and distributional effects of an optimal intertemporal emission trading scheme are assessed for different initial allocation rules. Finally, the impact of banking on carbon emissions, technological progress, and optimal investment decisions is quantified and the incentives that banking provides to accelerate technological innovation and diffusion are also discussed. Among the many results, we show that not only does banking reduce abatement costs, but it also increases the amount of GHG emissions abated in the short-term. It should therefore belong to all emission trading schemes under construction.

Banking, Climate Policy, Emission Trading, Flexibility

Abstract:
Most analyses of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms focus on the cost effectiveness of where flexibility (e.g. by showing that mitigation costs are lower in a global permit market than in regional markets or in permit markets confined to Annex 1 countries). Less attention has been devoted to when flexibility, i.e. to the benefits of allowing emission permit traders to bank their permits for future use. In the model presented in this paper, banking of carbon allowances in a global permit market is fully endogenised, i.e. agents may decide to bank permits by taking into account their present and future needs and the present and future decisions of all the other agents. It is therefore possible to identify under what conditions traders find it optimal to bank permits, when banking is socially optimal, and what are the implications for present and future permit prices. We can also explain why the equilibrium rate of growth of permit prices is likely to be larger than the equilibrium interest rate. Most importantly, this paper analyses the efficiency and distributional consequences of allowing markets to optimally allocate emission permits across regions and over time. The welfare and distributional effects of an optimal intertemporal emission trading scheme are assessed for different initial allocation rules. Finally, the impact of banking on carbon emissions, technological progress, and optimal investment decisions is quantified and the incentives that banking provides to accelerate technological innovation and diffusion are also discussed. Among the many results, we show that not only does banking reduce abatement costs, but it also increases the amount of GHG emissions abated in the short-term. It should therefore belong to all emission trading schemes under construction.

Emission Trading, Banking

Abstract:
This report summarises the main ideas, proposals, scientific achievements, consensus and conflicting issues that emerged at the Second EFIEA Policy Workshop, held at Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Palazzo delle Stelline, Corso Magenta 63, Milan, Italy, March 4th-6th, 1999. EFIEA, the European Forum for Integrated Environmental Assessment, is a concerted action funded by the Environment and Climate Programme of the European Commission, Directorate-General XII (contract no. ENV4-CT97-0450). The two main objectives of the EFIEA are: (i) to improve the scientific quality of integrated environmental assessment; (ii) to strengthen the interaction between environmental science and policy-making. In addition, the EFIEA fosters co-operation between scientists and decision makers inside the European Union, communication and co-operation outside the EU, and investigation of IEA techniques. The Second EFIEA Policy Workshop was devoted to improving communication and stimulating co-operation between different stakeholders, policymakers and scientists on the most relevant climate policy issues.

Abstract:
Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B-US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.

Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy

Abstract:
The present stalemate in climate negotiations has led policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes. This paper explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on climate-related technological innovation and diffusion. This idea - recently proposed among others by Barrett (2001) and Benedick (2001) - is based on the insight that incentives to free-ride are much smaller in the case of technological cooperation than in the case of cooperation on emission control. This paper provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcingness (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol. The analysis is carried out by using a model in which endogenous and induced technical change are explicitly modelled and in which international technological spillovers are also quantified. The results of our analysis partly support Barrett's and Benedick's conjecture. On the one hand, a self-enforcing agreement is more likely to emerge when countries cooperate on environmental technological innovation and diffusion than when they cooperate on emission abatement. However, technological cooperation - without any commitment to emission control - may not lead to a sufficient abatement of greenhouse gas concentrations.

Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Technological change, Policy

Abstract:
In this paper a simple model is used to analyse the strategic behaviour of countries that bargain over CO2 emission reductions. Five main world regions are considered and their incentives to sign an international agreement on climate change control are analysed. A non-cooperative approach to coalition formation is used to analyse profitability and stability of the agreement. The main focus of the paper is on the role of carbon leakage. On the one hand, by offsetting the effort of signatory countries, carbon leakage reduces the size of the equilibrium coalition and even the likelihood of a successful negotiation. On the other hand, by increasing the profitability of large coalitions, carbon leakage may stabilise agreements signed by many countries. The paper shows that both the size of leakage and the burden-sharing rule used to share the gains from cooperation among signatory countries are crucial variables which explain the type and size of the equilibrium coalitions.

Abstract:
The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process - asymmetries and uncertainties in particular - by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players' optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations, uncertainty crucially affects also bargaining processes. Therefore, in our analysis, we introduce uncertainty over the size of the pies to be shared and assess the impacts on players' strategic behaviour. Our results confirm that uncertainty crucially affects players' behaviour and modifies the likelihood of a self-enforcing agreement to emerge. The model proposed here can have several applications, in particular in the field of natural resource management, where conflicts over how to share a resource of a finite size are increasing.

Bargaining, Non-Cooperative Game Theory, Simulation Models, Uncertainty

Abstract:
Technical change is generally considered the key to the solution of environmental problems, in particular global phenomena like climate change. Scientists differ in their views on the thaumaturgic virtues of technical change. There are those who are confident that pollution-free technologies will materialize at some time in the future and will prevent humans from suffering the catastrophic consequences of climate change. Others believe that there are inexpensive technologies already available and argue the case for no-regret adoption policies (e.g. subsidies). Others again believe that the process of technological change responds to economic stimuli. These economic incentives to technological innovation are provided not only by forces that are endogenous to the economic system, but also by suitably designed environmental and innovation policies. In this paper, we consider and translate into analytical counterparts these different views of technical change. We then study alternative formulations of technical change and, with the help of a computerized climate-economy model, carry out a number of optimization runs in order to assess what type of technical change plays a role (assuming it does) in the evaluation of the impact of climate change and of the policies designed to cope with it.

Climate policy, Environmental modeling, Integrated assessment, Technical change

Abstract:
At the end of 2002, FEEM celebrated a major achievement in its publication history: 1000 published working papers. This paper provides an analysis of FEEM working papers according to different viewpoints. First, it assesses the evolution of the contents of FEEM working papers by identifying the main research areas that they cover and how these research areas have evolved over time. Then, it quantifies the success of FEEM working papers by computing the number of downloads from FEEM web site and the quantity and quality of subsequent publications in top economic journals. Finally, it compares the number of working papers published by FEEM with those published by other leading research institutions both in Europe and the US.

Abstract:
This paper analyses the costs and benefits of a fiscal reform designed to simultaneously increase environmental quality and employment. The investigation is carried out using an econometric general equilibrium model in which the labour market is unionised and segmented, i.e. in which demand, supply and the wages formation process for skilled and unskilled workers are explicitly modelled. This allows us to simulate the implementation in European countries of a harmonised carbon tax whose fiscal revenue in each country is re-cycled to reduce the gross wages of unskilled workers only rather than those of the whole labour force. This paper describes first the theoretical features of the segmented labour market which have been developed and then shows the estimates of the labour market equations. The effects of the double-dividend policy reform previously described are analysed and then compared with those of the traditional and simpler environmental fiscal reform in which the fiscal revenue is used to reduce the gross wages of all workers. We will show that (i) the "green" fiscal reform is more effective, in terms of employment gains, when the fiscal revenue is used to reduce gross wages of all employed workers as a mild substitutability relationship among skilled and unskilled workers is identified, (ii) the employment dividend increases when the tax reform is carried out in a co-operative way i.e. equalising through international co-operation its marginal benefits and costs among countries, (iii) if an "employment double dividend" is feasible in the short-run, a trade-off employment/environment remains in the longer term.

Abstract:
The stabilisation of GHG atmospheric concentrations at levels expected to prevent dangerous climate change has become an important, global, long-term objective. It is therefore crucial to identify a cost-effective way to achieve this objective. In this paper we use WITCH, a hybrid climate-energy-economy model, to obtain a quantitative assessment of some cost-effective strategies that stabilise CO2 concentrations at 550 or 450 ppm. In particular, this paper analyses the energy investment and R&D policies that optimally achieve these two GHG stabilisation targets (i.e. the future optimal energy mix consistent with the stabilisation of GHG atmospheric concentrations at 550 and 450 ppm). Given that the model accounts for interdependencies and spillovers across 12 regions of the world, optimal strategies are the outcome of a dynamic game through which inefficiency costs induced by global strategic interactions can be assessed. Therefore, our results are somehow different from previous analyses of GHG stabilisation policies, where a central planner or a single global economy are usually assumed. In particular, the effects of free-riding incentives in reducing emissions and in investing in R&D are taken into account. Technical change being endogenous in WITCH, this paper also provides an assessment of the implications of technological evolution in the energy sector of different stabilisation scenarios. Finally, this paper quantifies the net costs of stabilising GHG concentrations at different levels, for different allocations of permits and for different technological scenarios. In each case, the optimal long-term investment strategies for all available energy technologies are determined. The case of an unknown backstop energy technology is also analysed.

climate policy, energy R&D, investments, stabilisation costs

Abstract:
The stabilisation of GHG atmospheric concentrations at levels expected to prevent dangerous climate change has become an important, global, long-term objective. It is therefore crucial to identify a cost-effective way to achieve this objective. In this paper we use WITCH, a hybrid climate-energy-economy model, to obtain a quantitative assessment of some cost-effective strategies that stabilise CO2 concentrations at 550 or 450 ppm. In particular, this paper analyses the energy investment and R&D policies that optimally achieve these two GHG stabilisation targets (i.e. the future optimal energy mix consistent with the stabilisation of GHG atmospheric concentrations at 550 and 450 ppm). Given that the model accounts for interdependencies and spillovers across 12 regions of the world, optimal strategies are the outcome of a dynamic game through which inefficiency costs induced by global strategic interactions can be assessed. Therefore, our results are somehow different from previous analyses of GHG stabilisation policies, where a central planner or a single global economy are usually assumed. In particular, the effects of free-riding incentives in reducing emissions and in investing in R&D are taken into account. Technical change being endogenous in WITCH, this paper also provides an assessment of the implications of technological evolution in the energy sector of different stabilisation scenarios. Finally, this paper quantifies the net costs of stabilising GHG concentrations at different levels, for different allocations of permits and for different technological scenarios. In each case, the optimal long-term investment strategies for all available energy technologies are determined. The case of an unknown backstop energy technology is also analysed.

Climate Policy, Energy R&D, Investments, Stabilisation Costs

Abstract:
The recent events that followed the US decision not to comply with the Kyoto Protocol seem to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic factors and policy strategies that might help the US to modify its current policy and move back to the Kyoto-Bonn agreement. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase participation in the Kyoto-Bonn agreement? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to move back to the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the participation incentives for the major world countries and regions in these three regimes.

Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy

Abstract:
The need for a better understanding of future energy scenarios, of their compatibility with the objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations, and of their links with climate policy, calls for the development of hybrid models. Hybrid because both the technological detail typical of Bottom Up (BU) models and the long run dynamics typical of Top Down (TD) models are crucially necessary. We present WITCH - World Induced Technical Change Hybrid model - a neoclassical optimal growth model (TD) with energy input detail (BU). The model endogenously accounts for technological progress, both through learning curves affecting prices of new vintages of capital and through R&D investments. In addition, the model captures the main economic interrelationships between world regions and is designed to analyze the optimal economic and environment policies in each world region as the outcome of a dynamic game. This paper provides a detailed description of the WITCH model, of its baseline, and of the model calibration procedure.

Climate Policy, Hybrid Modelling, Integrated Assessment, Technological Change, Energy Mix

Abstract:
The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making 'welfare optimal agreements' self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, climate policy, transfers, international environmental agreements

Abstract:
Transfers often play a crucial role in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs). However, the economic literature on transfers is very limited and results achieved so far do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making welfare optimal agreements self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Climate policy, Transfers

Abstract:
No international regime on climate change is going to be fully effective in controlling GHG emissions without the involvement of countries such as China, India, the United States, Australia, and possibly other developing countries. This highlights an unambiguous weakness of the Kyoto Protocol, where the aforementioned countries either have no binding emission targets or have decided not to comply with their targets. Therefore, when discussing possible post-Kyoto scenarios, it is crucial to prioritise participation incentives for all countries, especially those without explicit or with insufficient abatement targets. This paper offers a bottom-up game-theoretic perspective on participation incentives. Rather than focusing on issue linkage, transfers or burden sharing as tools to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement, this paper aims at exploring whether a different policy approach could lead more countries to adopt effective climate control policies. This policy approach is explicitly bottom-up, namely it gives each country the freedom to sign agreements and deals, bilaterally or multilaterally, with other countries, without being constrained by any global protocol or convention. This study provides a game-theoretic assessment of this policy approach and then evaluates empirically the possible endogenous emergence of single or multiple climate coalitions. Welfare and technological consequences of different multiple bloc climate regimes will be assessed and their overall environmental effectiveness will be discussed.

Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy

Abstract:
Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Why do countries agree to introduce a minimum participation constraint among the rules characterizing an international treaty? This question is particularly relevant in the case of environmental treaties dealing with global commons, where free-riding incentives are strong. Is a minimum participation rule a way to offset these free-riding incentives? Why do countries that know they have an incentive to free-ride accept to 'tie their hands' through the introduction of a minimum participation constraint? This Paper addresses the above questions by analysing a three-stage non-cooperative coalition formation game. In the first stage, countries set the minimum coalition size that is necessary for the treaty to come into force. In the second stage, countries decide whether to sign the treaty. In the third stage, the equilibrium values of the decision variables are set. At the equilibrium, both the minimum participation constraint and the number of signatories - the coalition size - are determined. This Paper shows that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding minimum participation constraint, forms at the equilibrium. This Paper thus explains why in international negotiations all countries often agree on a minimum participation rule even when some of them do not intend to sign the treaty. The Paper also analyses the optimal size of the minimum participation constraint.

Agreements, climate, negotiation, policy, incentives

Abstract:
Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Why do countries agree to introduce a minimum participation constraint among the rules characterising an international treaty? This question is particularly relevant in the case of environmental treaties dealing with global commons, where free-riding incentives are strong. Is a minimum participation rule a way to offset these free-riding incentives? Why do countries that know they have an incentive to free-ride accept to tie their hands through the introduction of a minimum participation constraint? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing a three-stage non-cooperative coalition formation game. In the first stage, countries set the minimum coalition size that is necessary for the treaty to come into force. In the second stage, countries decide whether to sign the treaty. In the third stage, the equilibrium values of the decision variables are set. At the equilibrium, both the minimum participation constraint and the number of signatories - the coalition size - are determined. This paper shows that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding minimum participation constraint, forms at the equilibrium. This paper thus explains why in international negotiations all countries often agree on a minimum participation rule even when some of them do not intend to sign the treaty. The paper also analyses the optimal size of the minimum participation constraint.

Agreements, Climate, Negotiations, Policy, Incentives

Abstract:
It is widely recognized that technological change has the potential to reduce GHG emissions without compromising economic growth; hence, any better understanding of the process of technological innovation is likely to increase our knowledge of mitigation possibilities and costs. This paper explores how international knowledge flows affect the dynamics of the domestic R&D sector and the main economic and environmental variables. The analysis is performed using WITCH, a dynamic regional model of the world economy, in which energy technical change is endogenous. The focus is on disembodied energy R&D international spillovers. The knowledge pool from which regions draw foreign ideas differs between High Income and Low Income countries. Absorption capacity is also endogenous in the model. The basic questions are as follows. Do knowledge spillovers enhance energy technological innovation in different regions of the world? Does the speed of innovation increase? Or do free-riding incentives prevail and international spillovers crowd out domestic R&D efforts? What is the role of domestic absorption capacity and of policies designed to enhance it? Do greenhouse gas stabilization costs drop in the presence of international technological spillovers? The new specification of the WITCH model presented in this paper enables us to answer these questions. Our analysis shows that international knowledge spillovers tend to increase free-riding incentives and decrease the investments in energy R&D. The strongest cuts in energy R&D investments are recorded among High Income countries, where international knowledge flows crowd out domestic R&D efforts. The overall domestic pool of knowledge, and thus total net GHG stabilization costs, remain largely unaffected. International spillovers, however, are also an important policy channel. We therefore analyze the implication of a policy mix in which climate policy is combined with a technology policy designed to enhance absorption capacity in developing countries. Significant positive impacts on the costs of stabilising GHG concentrations are singled out. Finally, a sensitivity analysis shows that High Income countries are more responsive than Low Income countries to changes in the parameters and thus suggests to focus additional empirical research efforts on the former.

Climate policy, Energy R&D, GHG stabilisation, International R&D Spillovers

Abstract:
It is widely recognized that technological change has the potential to reduce GHG emissions without compromising economic growth; hence, any better understanding of the process of technological innovation is likely to increase our knowledge of mitigation possibilities and costs. This paper explores how international knowledge flows affect the dynamics of the domestic R&D sector and the main economic and environmental variables. The analysis is performed using WITCH, a dynamic regional model of the world economy, in which energy technical change is endogenous. The focus is on disembodied energy R&D international spillovers. The basic questions are as follows. Do knowledge spillovers enhance energy technological innovation in different regions of the world? Does the speed of innovation increase? Or do free-riding incentives prevail and international spillovers crowd out domestic R&D efforts? Our analysis shows that international knowledge spillovers tend to increase free-riding incentives and decrease the investments in energy R&D. The strongest cuts in energy R&D investments are recorded among High Income countries, where international knowledge flows crowd out domestic R&D efforts. The overall domestic pool of knowledge, and thus total net GHG stabilization costs, remain largely unaffected. We also analyze the implication of a policy mix in which climate policy is combined with a technology policy designed to enhance absorption capacity in developing countries. Significant positive impacts on the costs of stabilizing GHG concentrations are then singled out.

Climate Policy, Energy R&D, International R&D Spillovers, Stabilization

Abstract:
This paper comments and assesses "Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures," a paper that David Victor presented at the international workshop on Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World, organized by Joe Aldy and Rob Stavins at the J.F. Kennedy School of Government in May 2006. By analyzing Victor's proposals for an effective climate agreement post 2012, this paper emphasizes the contribution that game-theoretical analyses have provided to the design of climate agreements. It therefore emphasizes how incentives and institutions play a crucial role in affecting the final outcome of negotiations on climate change control, and how incentives and institutions can be modified to achieve a better control of climate change. This paper also discusses a wider policy approach that can enhance the effectiveness of measures designed to address the climate change problem.

Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy

Abstract:
The issue of greenhouse gas (GHG) stabilization stands on three critical open questions. Namely, what are the impacts deriving from different levels of climate change and their distribution. What are the levels at which GHG concentration should be stabilized in order to avoid unacceptable impacts. And, finally, what are the costs and what are the instruments available to reach such stabilization targets. In the present paper, we address the latter question, in the specific attempt of shedding some light on the debated role of technological progress in lowering the costs of GHG stabilization. In particular, we use an optimal growth climate-economy model, where technical change is endogenously driven by learning by researching and learning by doing. In the model, when an ambitious stabilization target has to be reached, some additional technological innovation and diffusion is induced. The magnitude of this induced effect substantially affects the costs of stabilizing greenhouse gasses and may even make a well-designed climate policy a win-win strategy. A sensitivity analysis on the model crucial parameters is performed to account for structural and parametric uncertainties on learning effects, on the relationship between knowledge accumulation and the energy and carbon intensity of the economic system, and on the crowding out of investments in the energy sector R&D with respect to other research fields.

Climate policy, Environmental modelling, Integrated assessment, Technical change

Abstract:
This paper provides a quantitative comparison of the main architectures for an agreement on climate policy. Possible successors to the Kyoto protocol are assessed according to four criteria: economic efficiency; environmental effectiveness; distributional implications; and their political acceptability which is measured in terms of feasibility and enforceability. The ultimate aim is to derive useful information for designing a future agreement on climate change control.

Climate Policy, Integrated Modelling, International Agreements

Abstract:
This paper provides a quantitative comparison of the main architectures for an agreement on climate policy. Possible successors to the Kyoto protocol are assessed according to four criteria: economic efficiency; environmental effectiveness; distributional implications; and their political acceptability which is measured in terms of feasibility and enforceability. The ultimate aim is to derive useful information for designing a future agreement on climate change control.

Climate Policy, Integrated Modelling, International Agreements

Abstract:
There are increasing signals that countries that negotiate on GHG emission control are unlikely to sign and ratify a single climate protocol, even though almost all countries have subscribed the UNFCCC convention that sets the framework of international climate cooperation. In addition to the US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, New Zealand and Australia recently led to the formation of a new alliance in which technological cooperation is the main tool to achieve GHG emission control. In the U.S., some States on the Eastern coast are negotiating to adopt emission reduction targets and to establish a permit market despite the opposition of the federal government. Cooperation on climate policy is also the objective of recent negotiations between ASEAN countries. Given this background, this paper aims at examining whether the aforementioned events are simply the noise of a political process leading to a global agreement on climate change control or are instead consistent with some basic economic incentives that are pushing countries towards the formation of two (or more) parallel climate blocs. To this aim, this paper uses a well known integrated assessment climate-economy model to evaluate the incentives to cooperation in climate negotiations for the main world countries. A game-theoretic framework is adopted to analyse a country's incentive to belong to a climate coalition. In our setting, a given country can either join one of the existing climate coalitions or can propose a new one or can decide to free-ride on the other countries' cooperative abatement effort. We then analyse the haracteristics of the main possible outcomes and assess which outcomes are most likely to prevail in future negotiations, at least as far as economic incentives are concerned.

Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy

Abstract:
This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1) countries decide to delay their GHG emission reductions by 30 years. What would be the cost difference between this scenario and a case in which both developed and developing countries start reducing their emissions at the same time? Then, we look at a scenario in which the timing of developing countries' participation is uncertain and again we compute the costs of climate policy in developed and developing countries. We find that delayed participation of NA1 countries has a negative impact on climate policy costs. Economic inefficiencies can be as large as 10-25 TlnUSD. However, this additional cost wanes when developing countries are allowed to trade emission reductions from their baseline emission paths during the 30-year delay period. Thus, irrespective of whether NA1 countries are immediately assigned an emission reduction target or not, they should nonetheless be included in a global carbon market. Technology deployment is also affected by the timing of developing countries' mitigation measures. Delayed NA1-country participation in a climate agreement would scale down the deployment of coal with CCS throughout the century. On the other hand, innovation in the form of energy R&D investments would be positively affected, since it would become crucial in developed countries. Finally, uncertainty about the timing of NA1-country participation does not modify the optimal abatement strategy for developed countries and does not alter policy costs as long as a global carbon market is in place.

Climate Policy, Delayed Action, Stabilisation Costs, Uncertain Participation

Abstract:
This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1) countries decide to delay their GHG emission reductions by 30 years. What would be the cost difference between this scenario and a case in which both developed and developing countries start reducing their emissions at the same time? Then, we look at a scenario in which the timing of developing countries' participation is uncertain and again we compute the costs of climate policy in developed and developing countries. We find that delayed participation of NA1 countries has a negative impact on climate policy costs. Economic inefficiencies can be as large as 10-25 TlnUSD. However, this additional cost wanes when developing countries are allowed to trade emission reductions from their baseline emission paths during the 30-year delay period. Thus, irrespective of whether NA1 countries are immediately assigned an emission reduction target or not, they should nonetheless be included in a global carbon market. Technology deployment is also affected by the timing of developing countries' mitigation measures. Delayed NA1-country participation in a climate agreement would scale down the deployment of coal with CCS throughout the century. On the other hand, innovation in the form of energy R&D investments would be positively affected, since it would become crucial in developed countries. Finally, uncertainty about the timing of NA1-country participation does not modify the optimal abatement strategy for developed countries and does not alter policy costs as long as a global carbon market is in place.

Delayed Action, Climate Policy, Stabilisation Costs, Uncertain Participation

Abstract:
This paper builds on the assumption that OECD countries are (or will soon be) taking actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These actions, however, will not be sufficient to control global warming, unless developing countries also get involved in the cooperative effort to reduce GHG emissions. This paper investigates the best short-term strategies that emerging economies can adopt in reacting to OECD countries’ mitigation effort, given the common long-term goal to prevent excessive warming without hampering economic growth. Results indicate that developing countries would incur substantial economic losses by following a myopic strategy that disregards climate in the short-run, and that their optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years. Investing in innovation ahead of time is also found to be advantageous. The degree of policy anticipation is shown to be important in determining the financial transfers of an international carbon market meant to provide incentives for the participation of developing countries. This is especially relevant for China, whose recent and foreseeable trends of investments in innovation are consistent with the adoption of domestic emission reduction obligations in 2030.

energy-economy modelling, climate policy, developing countries

Abstract:
This paper builds on the assumption that OECD countries are (or will soon be) taking actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These actions, however, will not be sufficient to control global warming, unless developing countries also get involved in the cooperative effort to reduce GHG emissions. This paper investigates the best short-term strategies that emerging economies can adopt in reacting to OECD countries’ mitigation effort, given the common long-term goal to prevent excessive warming without hampering economic growth. Results indicate that developing countries would incur substantial economic losses by following a myopic strategy that disregards climate in the short-run, and that their optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years. Investing in innovation ahead of time is also found to be advantageous. The degree of policy anticipation is shown to be important in determining the financial transfers of an international carbon market meant to provide incentives for the participation of developing countries. This is especially relevant for China, whose recent and foreseeable trends of investments in innovation are consistent with the adoption of domestic emission reduction obligations in 2030.

Energy-economy Modeling, Climate Policy, Developing Countries

Abstract:
Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus about the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement effective mitigation strategies, at least in the short-term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been reached. It is thus likely that some, if not all countries, will delay the adoption of effective climate policies. This delay will affect the cost of future policy measures that will be required to abate an even larger amount of emissions. What additional economic cost of mitigation measures will this delay imply? At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding the global stabilisation target to be achieved crucially affects short-term investment and policy decisions. What will this uncertainty cost? Is there a hedging strategy that decision makers can adopt to cope with delayed action and uncertain targets? This paper addresses these questions by quantifying the economic implications of delayed mitigation action, and by computing the optimal abatement strategy in the presence of uncertainty about a global stabilisation target (which will be agreed upon in future climate negotiations). Results point to short-term inaction as the key determinant for the economic costs of ambitious climate policies. They also indicate that there is an effective hedging strategy that could minimise the cost of climate policy under uncertainty, and that a short-term moderate climate policy would be a good strategy to reduce the costs of delayed action and to cope with uncertainty about the outcome of future climate negotiations. By contrast, an insufficient short-term effort significantly increases the costs of compliance in the long-term.

Uncertainty, Climate Policy, Stabilisation Costs, Delayed Action

Abstract:
This paper provides a quantitative comparison of the main architectures for an agreement on climate policy. Possible successors to the Kyoto protocol are assessed according to four criteria: economic efficiency; environmental effectiveness; distributional implications; and their political acceptability which is measured in terms of feasibility and enforceability. The ultimate aim is to derive useful information for designing a future agreement on climate change control.

climate policy, integrated modelling, international agreements

Abstract:
Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus about the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement effective mitigation strategies, at least in the short-term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been reached. It is thus likely that some, if not all countries, will delay the adoption of effective climate policies. This delay will affect the cost of future policy measures that will be required to abate an even larger amount of emissions. What additional economic cost of mitigation measures will this delay imply? At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding the global stabilisation target to be achieved crucially affects short-term investment and policy decisions. What will this uncertainty cost? Is there a hedging strategy that decision makers can adopt to cope with delayed action and uncertain targets? This paper addresses these questions by quantifying the economic implications of delayed mitigation action, and by computing the optimal abatement strategy in the presence of uncertainty about a global stabilisation target (which will be agreed upon in future climate negotiations). Results point to short-term inaction as the key determinant for the economic costs of ambitious climate policies. They also indicate that there is an effective hedging strategy that could minimise the cost of climate policy under uncertainty, and that a short-term moderate climate policy would be a good strategy to reduce the costs of delayed action and to cope with uncertainty about the outcome of future climate negotiations. By contrast, an insufficient short-term effort significantly increases the costs of compliance in the long-term.

uncertainty, climate policy, stabilisation costs, delayed action

Abstract:
This paper uses the WITCH model, a computable general equilibrium model with endogenous technological change, to explore the impact of various climate policies on energy technology choices and the costs of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations. Current and future expected carbon prices appear to have powerful effects on R&D spending and clean technology diffusion. Their impact on stabilisation costs depends on the nature of R&D: R&D targeted at incremental energy efficiency improvements has only limited effects, but R&D focused on the emergence of major new low-carbon technologies could lower costs drastically if successful - especially in the non-electricity sector, where such low-carbon options are scarce today. With emissions coming from multiple sources, keeping a wide range of options available matters for stabilisation costs more than improving specific technologies. Due to international knowledge spillovers, stabilisation costs could be further reduced through a complementary, global R&D policy. However, a strong price signal is always required.

Climate policy, Energy R&D, Fund, Stabilisation costs

Abstract:
This paper analyses whether and how a climate policy designed to stabilize greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is likely to change the direction and pace of technical progress. The analysis is performed using an upgraded version of WITCH, a dynamic integrated regional model of the world economy. In this version, a non-energy R&D Sector, which enhances the productivity of the capital-labor aggregate, has been added to the energy R&D sector included in the original WITCH model. We find that, as a consequence of climate policy, R&D is re-directed towards energy knowledge. Nonetheless, total R&D investments decrease, due to a more than proportional contraction of non-energy R&D. Indeed, when non-energy and energy inputs are weakly substitutable, the overall contraction of the economic activity associated with a climate policy induces a decline in total R&D investments. However, enhanced investments in energy R&D and in the energy sector are found not to “crowd-out” investments in non-energy R&D.

Technical Change, Climate Policy, Stabilization Cost, R&D Investments

Abstract:
This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1) countries decide to delay their GHG emission reductions by 30 years. What would be the cost difference between this scenario and a case in which both developed and developing countries start reducing their emissions at the same time? Then, we look at a scenario in which the timing of developing countries' participation is uncertain and again we compute the costs of climate policy in developed and developing countries. We find that delayed participation of NA1 countries has a negative impact on climate policy costs. Economic inefficiencies can be as large as 10-25 TlnUSD. However, this additional cost wanes when developing countries are allowed to trade emission reductions from their baseline emission paths during the 30-year delay period. Thus, irrespective of whether NA1 countries are immediately assigned an emission reduction target or not, they should nonetheless be included in a global carbon market. Technology deployment is also affected by the timing of developing countries' mitigation measures. Delayed NA1-country participation in a climate agreement would scale down the deployment of coal with CCS throughout the century. On the other hand, innovation in the form of energy R&D investments would be positively affected, since it would become crucial in developed countries. Finally, uncertainty about the timing of NA1-country participation does not modify the optimal abatement strategy for developed countries and does not alter policy costs as long as a global carbon market is in place.

delayed action, climate policy, stabilisation costs, uncertain participation

Abstract:
This paper summarizes research presented at the FEEM-NBER Conference on the Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy, held in Milan Italy in June 1999.

Abstract:
This Paper analyses the relationship between different equity rules and the incentives to sign and ratify a climate agreement. A widespread conjecture suggests that a more equitable distribution of the burden of reducing emissions would enhance the incentives for more countries - particularly big emitters - to accept an emission reduction scheme defined within an international climate agreement. This Paper shows that this conjecture is only partly supported by the empirical evidence that can be derived from the recent outcomes of climate negotiations. Even though an equitable sharing of the costs of controlling GHG emissions can provide better incentives to sign and ratify a climate agreement than the burden sharing implicit in the Kyoto agreement, a stable global agreement cannot be achieved. A possible strategy to achieve a global agreement without free-riding incentives is a policy mix in which global emission trading is coupled with a transfer mechanism designed to offset incentives to free ride.

Agreements, climate, incentives, negotiations, equity, policy, transfers

Abstract:
The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties has important implications for both the effectiveness and the efficiency of future climate policies. Among these implications, those related with technical change and with the functioning of the international market for carbon emissions are particularly relevant, because these variables have the largest impact on the overall abatement cost to be born by Annex B countries in the short and in the long run. This Paper analyses the consequences of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol both on technological innovation and on the price of emission permits (and, as a consequence, on abatement costs). A first goal is to assess the impact of the US defection on the price of permits and compliance costs when technological innovation and diffusion is taken into account (the model embodies international technological spillovers). A second goal is to understand for what reasons in the presence of endogenous and induced technical change the reduction of the price of permits is lower than in most empirical analyses recently circulated. A third goal is to assess the role of Russia in climate negotiations, its increased bargaining power and its eventual incentives to follow the US defections.

Agreements, climate, policy, incentives, negotiations

Abstract:
This paper builds on the assumption that OECD countries are (or will soon be) taking actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These actions, however, will not be sufficient to control global warming, unless developing countries also get involved in the cooperative effort to reduce GHG emissions. This paper investigates the best short-term strategies that emerging economies can adopt in reacting to OECD countries’ mitigation effort, given the common long-term goal to prevent excessive warming without hampering economic growth. Results indicate that developing countries would incur substantial economic losses by following a myopic strategy that disregards climate in the short-run, and that their optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years. Investing in innovation ahead of time is also found to be advantageous. The degree of policy anticipation is shown to be important in determining the financial transfers of an international carbon market meant to provide incentives for the participation of developing countries. This is especially relevant for China, whose recent and foreseeable trends of investments in innovation are consistent with the adoption of domestic emission reduction obligations in 2030.

Climate Policy, Developing Countries, Energy-economy modeling

Abstract:
This paper builds on the assumption that OECD countries are (or will soon be) taking actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These actions, however, will not be sufficient to control global warming, unless developing countries also get involved in the cooperative effort to reduce GHG emissions. This paper investigates the best short-term strategies that emerging economies can adopt in reacting to OECD countries’ mitigation effort, given the common long-term goal to prevent excessive warming without hampering economic growth. Results indicate that developing countries would incur substantial economic losses by following a myopic strategy that disregards climate in the short-run, and that their optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years. Investing in innovation ahead of time is also found to be advantageous. The degree of policy anticipation is shown to be important in determining the financial transfers of an international carbon market meant to provide incentives for the participation of developing countries. This is especially relevant for China, whose recent and foreseeable trends of investments in innovation are consistent with the adoption of domestic emission reduction obligations in 2030.

Energy-economy modeling, Climate Policy, Developing Countries

Abstract:
Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus about the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement effective mitigation strategies, at least in the short-term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been reached. It is thus likely that some, if not all countries, will delay the adoption of effective climate policies. This delay will affect the cost of future policy measures that will be required to abate an even larger amount of emissions. What additional economic cost of mitigation measures will this delay imply? At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding the global stabilisation target to be achieved crucially affects short-term investment and policy decisions. What will this uncertainty cost? Is there a hedging strategy that decision makers can adopt to cope with delayed action and uncertain targets? This paper addresses these questions by quantifying the economic implications of delayed mitigation action, and by computing the optimal abatement strategy in the presence of uncertainty about a global stabilisation target (which will be agreed upon in future climate negotiations). Results point to short-term inaction as the key determinant for the economic costs of ambitious climate policies. They also indicate that there is an effective hedging strategy that could minimise the cost of climate policy under uncertainty, and that a short-term moderate climate policy would be a good strategy to reduce the costs of delayed action and to cope with uncertainty about the outcome of future climate negotiations. By contrast, an insufficient short-term effort significantly increases the costs of compliance in the long-term.

Uncertainty, Climate Policy, Stabilisation Costs, Delayed Action

Abstract:
This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant coalitions appear to be stable. This is because the collective welfare surplus from cooperation is not found to be large enough for transfers to offset the free-riding incentives of all countries simultaneously. Some factors omitted from the analysis, which might improve coalition stability, include the co-benefits from mitigation action, the costless removal of fossil fuel subsidies, as well as alternative assumptions regarding countries’ bargaining behaviour.

Climate Policy, Climate Coalition, Game Theory, Free Riding

Abstract:
No international regime on climate change is going to be fully effective in controlling GHG emissions without the involvement of countries such as China, India, the United States, Australia, and possibly other developing countries. This highlights an unambiguous weakness of the Kyoto Protocol, where the aforementioned countries either have no binding emission targets or have decided not to comply with their targets. Therefore, when discussing possible post-Kyoto scenarios, it is crucial to prioritize participation incentives for all countries, especially those without explicit or with insufficient abatement targets. This paper offers a bottom-up game-theoretic perspective on participation incentives. Rather than focusing on issue linkage, transfers or burden sharing as tools to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement, this paper aims at exploring whether a different policy approach could lead more countries to adopt effective climate control policies. This policy approach is explicitly bottom-up, namely it gives each country the freedom to sign agreements and deals, bilaterally or multilaterally, with other countries, without being constrained by any global protocol or convention. This study provides a game-theoretic assessment of this policy approach and then evaluates empirically the possible endogenous emergence of single or multiple climate coalitions. Welfare and technological consequences of different multiple bloc climate regimes will be assessed and their overall environmental effectiveness will be discussed.

Agreements, climate, incentives, negotiations, policy

Abstract:
This paper shows that international policy coordination is not counterproductive in a world where the incentive to run beggar-thy-neighbor policies internationally arises from the inefficiency that characterizes, within each country, the interaction between policymakers and private agents. The domestic inefficiency arises from the presence of nominal contracts that give central banks the power to affect real variables. In this setting we show that international cooperation belongs to central banks' dominant strategy. The paper is motivated by a common and misleading interpretation of a paper by Rogoff [1985], namely that international cooperation may be counterproductive in the presence of a domestic inefficiency.

Abstract:
This Paper elaborates on the recent race to sequence the human genome. Starting from the debate arising from the genome case on public versus private research, the Paper shows that in some fundamental research areas, where knowledge externalities play an important role, market and non-market allocation mechanisms do coexist and should coexist in order to ensure socially desirable achievements. A game-theoretic model makes it possible to demonstrate the above results and to characterise some features of an optimal research policy.

Science, technology, allocation mechanisms, intellectual property rights, welfare

Abstract:
The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players' strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players' objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.

bargaining, non-cooperative game theory, simulation models, uncertainty

Abstract:
The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players' strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players' objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.

bargaining, non-cooperative game theory, simulation models, uncertainty

Abstract:
This Paper provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcement (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol. The analysis is carried out using a model in which endogenous and induced technical changes are explicitly modelled and in which international technological spillovers are also quantified. The results of our analysis partly support Barrett's and Benedick's conjecture. On the one hand, a self-enforcing agreement is more likely to emerge when countries cooperate on environmental technological innovation and diffusion than when they cooperate on emission abatement. Technological cooperation - without any commitment to emission control - may not lead to a sufficient abatement of greenhouse gas concentrations, however.

Agreements, climate, incentives, technological change, policy

Abstract:
The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process - asymmetries and uncertainties in particular by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players' optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations, uncertainty crucially affects also bargaining processes. Therefore, in our analysis, we introduce uncertainty over the size of the pies to be shared and assess the impacts on players' strategic behaviour. Our results confirm that uncertainty crucially affects players' behaviour and modify the likelihood of a self-enforcing agreement to emerge. The model proposed here can have several applications, in particular in the field of natural resource management, where conflicts over how to share a resource of a finite size are increasing.

bargaining, non-cooperative game theory, simulation models, uncertainty

Abstract:
Discussion over post-2012 climate policy is now entering a crucial phase. Despite the potential great risks of prolonged global warming, the success of an international climate stabilization agreement hinges to a great extent on its economic feasibility. This article makes precise the assumptions that underpin current mainstream estimates of the costs of controlling climate change and provides quantitative estimates of cost differentials under different scenarios. In particular, the article analyses the role of three utmost factors in the economic cost of a climate treaty: energy technology development; the participation rate of developing countries; and the timing of global action. We show that all three factors have a major impact on policy macroeconomic costs. Addressing them effectively is therefore indispensable in ensuring the feasibility of any international agreement to control global warming. Therefore, we propose a series of policy recommendations that can help addressing the issues of technology, timing and participation, and that represent key policy implications for a post-2012 climate policy. (JEL codes: C72, H23, Q25, Q28)

climate policy, delayed action, stabilisation costs, uncertain participation

Abstract:
Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus about the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement effective mitigation strategies, at least in the short-term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been reached. It is thus likely that some, if not all countries, will delay the adoption of effective climate policies. This delay will affect the cost of future policy measures that will be required to abate an even larger amount of emissions. What additional economic cost of mitigation measures will this delay imply? At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding the global stabilisation target to be achieved crucially affects short-term investment and policy decisions. What will this uncertainty cost? Is there a hedging strategy that decision makers can adopt to cope with delayed action and uncertain targets? This paper addresses these questions by quantifying the economic implications of delayed mitigation action, and by computing the optimal abatement strategy in the presence of uncertainty about a global stabilisation target (which will be agreed upon in future climate negotiations). Results point to short-term inaction as the key determinant for the economic costs of ambitious climate policies. They also indicate that there is an effective hedging strategy that could minimise the cost of climate policy under uncertainty, and that a shortterm moderate climate policy would be a good strategy to reduce the costs of delayed action and to cope with uncertainty about the outcome of future climate negotiations. By contrast, an insufficient short-term effort significantly increases the costs of compliance in the long-term.

Uncertainty, Climate Policy, Stabilisation Costs, Delayed Action

Abstract:
Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus about the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement effective mitigation strategies, at least in the short-term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been reached. It is thus likely that some, if not all countries, will delay the adoption of effective climate policies. This delay will affect the cost of future policy measures that will be required to abate an even larger amount of emissions. What additional economic cost of mitigation measures will this delay imply? At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding the global stabilisation target to be achieved crucially affects short-term investment and policy decisions. What will this uncertainty cost? Is there a hedging strategy that decision makers can adopt to cope with delayed action and uncertain targets? This paper addresses these questions by quantifying the economic implications of delayed mitigation action, and by computing the optimal abatement strategy in the presence of uncertainty about a global stabilisation target (which will be agreed upon in future climate negotiations). Results point to short-term inaction as the key determinant for the economic costs of ambitious climate policies. They also indicate that there is an effective hedging strategy that could minimise the cost of climate policy under uncertainty, and that a short-term moderate climate policy would be a good strategy to reduce the costs of delayed action and to cope with uncertainty about the outcome of future climate negotiations. By contrast, an insufficient short-term effort significantly increases the costs of compliance in the long-term.

Climate Policy, Delayed Action, Stabilisation Costs, Uncertainty

Abstract:
It is often argued that policies designed to protect the environment may harm economic growth. Moreover, if introduced unilaterally by a given country, they may reduce the competitiveness of domestic firms. These arguments are generally based on the assumption that environmental protection has to be achieved through the introduction of emission charges (e.g. a carbon tax). However, three issues need to be raised: first, the tax is not the only policy instrument - and is not the most efficient one - that can be used to reduce polluting emissions; secondly, even when a tax policy is implemented, it is important to assess the feedback effects induced by recycling the tax revenue; thirdly, and most importantly, the role of technical progress cannot be neglected. Therefore, there may exist a policy mix that provides firms with the correct incentives to adopt energy - saving technologies and to invest in environment - friendly R & D. The first two issues have partly been explored both in the theoretical and empirical literature. The third issue, i.e. the role of incentives to technical progress, still lacks adequate quantitative assessment. This is why a new model has been developed which endogenizes technical progress and its effects and feedbacks on economic, energy and environmental variables. Using WARM, an econometric general equilibrium model for the European Union and for each member country, this paper presents simulation results up to 2015 of the effects of some industrial-environmental policies which are aimed at protecting the environment without necessarily damaging competitiveness and economic growth. The results show that policies that stimulate environmental R & D, technological innovation and diffusion may provide firms with the correct incentives to avoid damaging the environment, while preserving their competitiveness in the market. Moreover, such a policy, based both on R & D subsidies and on innovation incentives, may not worsen the public-sector budget balance, as a result of the positive effects on economic growth.

Environment, fiscal reforms, innovation, sustainable development

Abstract:
The employment 'double dividend hypothesis' suggests that an appropriately designed fiscal reform, in which emission charges are used to subsidize employers' social security contributions, may realize (at least) two relevant policy goals: a better quality of the environment and, at the same time, an increase in employment levels. This paper uses a newly developed econometric general equilibrium model for the European Union as well as for each member country and presents simulation results up to the year 2010 of the effects of a European carbon tax the revenues from which are recycled to reduce employers' social security contributions. The results show that recycling carbon tax revenues may provide an 'employment double dividend' only in the short run.

Environment, employment, taxation, growth, policy

Abstract:
This paper reviews recent developments in the study of the so-called double dividend, i.e., the possibility of improving the environment and, at the same time, reducing the distortions of the tax system through revenue-neutral green taxes. Recent modeling advances are considered at both the theoretical and the empirical levels. In particular, we note that the most significant theoretical advances have been made in the direction of allowing for imperfectly competitive markets, especially the market for labor. At the same time, we argue that empirical work, particularly on the employment double dividend, is still relatively scant and that much more needs to be done both in the direction of more realistic empirical models and of an extended sensitivity analysis of the main findings.

Double dividend, environmental fiscal reform, environmental modelling