| . |
Carlo Scarpa's
Scholarly Papers
Click on the title of any column to sort the table by that
column. |
|
|
| |
|
|
Aggregate Statistics |
|
Total Downloads
2,262 |
Total
Citations
41 |
|
|
|
|
|
1.
|
|
|
Michele Polo Bocconi University - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
26 May 03
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
05 Jun 03
|
|
595 (11,114)
|
3
|
|
| |
Abstract:
In this paper we review the recent liberalization process in energy markets promoted by the European Commission in the late Nineties and implemented in all the member countries. The electricity and gas industries are characterized by a predominant role of network infrastructures, and by upstream and downstream segments that can be opened to competition. The key issues that must be addressed to design a liberalization plan include the horizontal and vertical structure of the industry, the access to the transport facilities, the organization of a wholesale market and the development of competition in the liberalized segments. We analyze the liberalization policies in the EU as a two step approach: the Directives and the national liberalization plans have focussed so far on the goal of creating a level playing field for new comers through Third Party Access to the network infrastructure, the unbundling of monopolized from competitive activities of the incumbent and the opening of demand. Today, within a heterogeneous picture, all the member countries are implementing this phase. The second step refers to the development of a competitive environment in the liberalized markets, a goal that requires, but is not implied by, the creation of fair entry conditions to new comers. The reduction of market power of the incumbent through divestitures and the entry process, and the design of the market rules are the crucial issues, and neither the Directives not the national plans have been in most cases very effective on this issue. As a result, while we can start appreciating the entry of new operators in both the electricity and the gas industry, the effects on consumers choice and final prices are rather limited, in particular in the gas industry. In the second part of the paper we move our attention to the Italian case, describing the national liberalization plans and the policy issues still opened. Both the electricity and the gas reforms are more advanced than the minimum standards required by the Directives, and include in some cases interesting innovations. In particular, the Bersani Decree on electricity requires capacity divestitures in the generation plans and adopts a proprietary unbundling of the transport network, while the Letta Decree on gas introduces antitrust ceilings and a very quick schedule towards complete demand opening. Among the more relevant open issues, in the electricity industry the incumbent firm can maintain a market share of 50% in generation, with likely distortions in the wholesale market. There are two possible ways out of this central problem: a "market solution" that requires further reductions in the generation capacity of the dominant firm and an improvement in transborder interconnection capacity together with the start up of the wholesale market; an "administrative solution" that tries to limit the effects of the incumbent market power on prices by assigning the foreign low cost energy to some categories of (large) customers and introducing bid caps on prices, while delaying the opening of the wholesale market. It is not clear which choice has been made by the Government, even if the latter emerges from many recent decisions. In the gas industry the insufficient unbundling of the dominant firm is the most serious obstacle to developing competition. The antitrust ceilings may even determine perverse effects, with the new firms acting as (upstream) customers and (downstream) competitors of the dominant firm. Moreover, the access to international transmission capacity seems a crucial issue. Finally, the nature of competition with take-or-pay contracts suggests that a wholesale market for gas would be necessary. The last open issues are institutional: we argue that the recent assignment of the energy policy at the regional level and the prospected reduction of independence of the energy authority are two institutional reforms with a very negative impact on the liberalization process.
|
|
|
2.
|
|
|
Bernardo Bortolotti Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Marcella Fantini National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
16 May 00
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
05 Dec 03
|
|
324 (25,029)
|
8
|
|
| |
Abstract:
This paper provides an empirical analysis of Governments' decisions to sell privatised companies on both international and domestic markets in a sample of 392 privatisations in 42 countries in the 1977-1998 period. Political theories of privatisation find strong support in our analyses: market oriented Governments favour domestic investors in the allocation of shares. The need to expose the company to global competition, to penetrate foreign markets and to warrant better legal protection to shareholders also appears as relevant. Significant differences emerge in OECD and non-OECD countries. In wealthy economies stock market liquidity favours cross-listing, while in emerging countries Governments resort to cross-listing in order to "import" liquidity and to develop domestic stock markets. Legal institutions also play a different role. In OECD countries, weak shareholder protection induces Governments to cross-list, in order to borrow the reputation and best practices of established exchanges. On the other hand, creditors' protection is more relevant in non-OECD countries, where weak legal protection of creditors reduces the scope of bank finance, forcing Governments to look for funds abroad.
|
|
|
3.
|
|
|
Paolo M. Panteghini University of Brescia Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
08 May 03
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
17 Aug 04
|
|
209 (40,820)
|
7
|
|
| |
Abstract:
This paper addresses the issue of how regulatory constraints affect a firm's investment choices when the firm has an option to delay investment. The RPI-x rule is compared to a profit-sharing rule, which increases the x factor in case profits go beyond a given level. It is shown that a pure price cap and profit sharing are identical in their impact on investment choices: the change in the option value observed with a profit sharing regime exactly compensates the change in the "direct" profitability of investment. Regulatory risk - breaching of the regulatory contract - may or may not affect investment decisions negatively. Even if a distortion exists, we show that this distortion is the same, even if a pure price cap could be considered riskier than a profit-sharing rule.
Regulation, Investment, RPI-x, Profit Sharing
|
|
|
4.
|
|
|
Michele Moretto University of Padua - Department of Economics Paolo M. Panteghini University of Brescia Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
06 Nov 03
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
31 Aug 08
|
|
187 (45,647)
|
2
|
|
| |
Abstract:
In this article we analyse the effects of different regulatory schemes (price cap and profit sharing) on a firm's investment of endogenous size. Using a real option approach in continuous time, we show that profit sharing does not affect a firm's start-up decision relative to a pure price cap scheme. Unless the threshold after which profit sharing intervenes is very high, however, introducing a profit sharing element delays further investments: this decreases the present value of total investment. We also evaluate the reduction in the firm's value due to profit sharing, linking this reduction to the option value of future investments.
regulation, investment, profit sharing, real options, RPI-x
|
|
|
5.
|
|
Critical Mass Effect and Restructuring in the Transition Towards a Market Economy
|
Show Abstracts |
Hide Abstracts |
Versions (2)
|
hide multiple versions |
Export Bibliographic Info |
|
Pier Luigi Sacco affiliation not provided to SSRN Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
|
Posted:
|
|
06 Apr 99
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
18 Apr 01
|
|
140 ( 60,181) |
1
|
|
|
|
|
Pier Luigi Sacco affiliation not provided to SSRN Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
07 Mar 00
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
28 Apr 00
|
|
0
|
|
|
| |
Abstract:
In this paper we argue that restructuring firms in a transition economy produces an effect similar to a network externality, in that the profitability of restructuring depends on the number of firms that have already decided to adopt this strategy. While other papers assume the existence of a "critical mass effect", we want to investigate under what conditions such a critical mass exists. We define a "critical mass" as a situation in which such externality is positive and - as long as a sufficiently large number of firms have restructured - restructuring spurs imitation, possibly leading to the eventual transformation of the whole economy. We find that a critical mass effect exists when the main effect of restructuring is an increase in total value added (i.e., aggregate demand) rather than an increase in the firm's ability to compete against rival home firms. The critical mass case becomes the typical one when competition improves firms' efficiency.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pier Luigi Sacco affiliation not provided to SSRN Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
06 Apr 99
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
18 Apr 01
|
|
140
|
1
|
|
| |
Abstract:
Restructuring firms in a transition economy produces a sort of network externality, in that the profitability of restructuring depends on the number of firms that already adopted this strategy. We investigate under what conditions a "critical mass" exists, i.e., a situation in which such externality is positive and restructuring spurs imitation, possibly leading to the eventual transformation of the whole economy. We find a critical mass effect when the main effect of restructuring is an increase in value added (i.e., aggregate demand) rather than an increase in the firm's ability to compete against rival home firms. The critical mass case becomes the typical one when competition spurs firms' efficiency.
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.
|
|
|
Luca Lambertini University of Bologna - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
24 Mar 00
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
05 Dec 03
|
|
127 (65,414)
|
1
|
|
| |
Abstract:
This paper shows that the introduction of a minimum quality standard can have repercussions on market structure, opening the possibility of predatory behaviour. The predatory equilibrium exists independently of whether or not adjustment costs are present. Moreover, whenever predation is an equilibrium, it is selected by the risk dominance criterion.
MQS, vertical differentiation, predatory behaviour
|
|
|
7.
|
|
|
Paolo M. Panteghini University of Brescia Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
06 Apr 01
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
01 Sep 04
|
|
113 (71,984)
|
|
|
| |
Abstract:
This paper addresses the issue of how regulatory constraints affect firm's investment choices when the firm has the option to delay investment. The RPI-x rule is compared to a profit sharing rule, which increases the x factor in case profits go beyond a given level. It is shown that these rules are identical in their impact on investment choices, in that the change in the option value exactly compensates the change in the direct profitability of investment. The result is then analysed in the light of option theory and explained on the basis of the bad news principle.
|
|
|
8.
|
|
|
Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia Giacomo Calzolari University of Bologna - Department of Economics
|
| Posted: |
|
31 Jul 01
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
10 Sep 01
|
|
109 (74,030)
|
|
|
| |
Abstract:
This paper analyses in a hidden characteristic set-up the design of the optimal price for a firm which is a monopolist at home but competes abroad against foreign firms. As long as diseconomies of scope are not too strong, the optimal price is identified. The price rule depends on the sign of the technological relationship between home output and foreign output. With economies of scope, the regulator should set a price below marginal cost, in order to help the firm in the foreign market, and vice-versa with diseconomies of scope. Informational asymmetry introduces a distortion in the price rule, which is usually amplified by the existence of a foreign market.
Regulation, asymmetric information, multinational firms
|
|
|
9.
|
|
|
Giacomo Calzolari University of Bologna - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
13 Mar 00
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
05 Dec 03
|
|
103 (77,288)
|
4
|
|
| |
Abstract:
In this paper we analyse a common agency model in which agents can choose with how many principals they want to work for, while principals cannot condition contracts on the agent's decision to accept other contracts. In this case of "non-intrinsic" common agency we characterise the equilibrium. Unless the substitutability between the two outputs is very strong, optimality conditions for principals' contracts are the same as with intrinsic common agency. However, principals suffer from reciprocal competition, which with "moderate" substitutability increases the informational rent agents obtain in equilibrium.
|
|
|
10.
|
|
|
Michele Polo Bocconi University - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
12 Jan 04
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
12 Jan 04
|
|
87 (87,096)
|
2
|
|
| |
Abstract:
This paper examines competition in a liberalized market, with reference to some key features of the natural gas industry. Each firm has a low (zero) marginal cost core capacity, due to long term contracts with take or pay obligations, and additional capacity at higher marginal costs. The market is decentralized and the firms decide which customers to serve, competing then in prices. We show that under both sequential and simultaneous entry, there is a strong incentive to segment the market: when take-or-pay obligations are still to be covered, entering and competing for the same customers implies low margins. If instead a firm is left as a monopolist on a fraction of the market, exhausting its obligation, it has no further incentive to enter a second market, where the rival will be monopolist as well. Hence, we obtain entry without competition. Antitrust ceilings do not prevent such an outcome while a wholesale pool market induces generalized competition and low margins in the retail segment.
|
|
|
11.
|
|
|
Paola Valbonesi University of Padua - Department of Economics Raffaele Miniaci University of Brescia - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
16 Nov 05
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
28 Nov 05
|
|
84 (89,133)
|
|
|
| |
Abstract:
Competition in public utility sectors has been encouraged in recent years throughout Europe. In this paper we try and analyse the welfare effects of these reforms in Italy, with particular attention to water and energy goods. The first step is to introduce a sensible measure of affordability of public utilities and to see how many households fall below a critical threshold. This issue is analysed stressing how climatic conditions dramatically affect households' expenditure and how the affordability of utility bills varies a lot from region to region. So far, utilities' reforms do not seem to have produced negative effects on the weaker group of households.
Consumer behaviour, Public utilities, Regulation, Gas, Electricity, Water
|
|
|
12.
|
|
|
Michele Polo Bocconi University - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
21 Nov 07
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
26 Mar 08
|
|
77 (94,237)
|
1
|
|
| |
Abstract:
This paper examines competition in the liberalized natural gas market. Each firm has zero marginal cost core capacity, due to long term contracts with take or pay obligations, and additional capacity at higher marginal costs. The market is decentralized and the firms decide which customers to serve, competing then in prices. In equilibrium each .firm approaches a different segment of the market and sets the monopoly price, i.e. market segmentation. Antitrust ceilings do not prevent such an outcome while the separation of wholesale and retail activities and the creation of a wholesale market induces generalized competition and low margins in the retail segment.
entry, segmentation, decentralized market
|
|
|
13.
|
|
|
Ioannis N. Kessides World Bank Raffaele Miniaci University of Brescia - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia Paola Valbonesi University of Padua - Department of Economics
|
| Posted: |
|
12 May 09
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
12 May 09
|
|
38 (132,808)
|
|
|
| |
Abstract:
This paper reviews the progress made in the literature toward defining and measuring the affordability of utilities. It highlights the relative merits of alternate affordability metrics; the practical challenges to their operationalization, including the underlying data requirements; and their implications for the design, evaluation, and implementation of appropriate affordability programs.
Access to Finance, Economic Theory & Research, Town Water Supply and Sanitation, Public Sector Economics & Finance, Rural Poverty Reduction
|
|
|
14.
|
|
Regulating a Multi-Utility Firm
|
Show Abstracts |
Hide Abstracts |
Versions (2)
|
hide multiple versions |
Export Bibliographic Info |
|
Giacomo Calzolari University of Bologna - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
|
Posted:
|
|
01 Oct 07
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
22 May 08
|
|
34 (138,089) |
2
|
|
|
|
|
Giacomo Calzolari University of Bologna - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
22 May 08
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
22 May 08
|
|
0
|
2
|
|
| |
Abstract:
We study the regulation of a utility firm which is active in a competitive unregulated sector as well. If the firm jointly operates its activities in the two markets, it enjoys economies of scope, whose size is the firm's private information and is unknown to the regulator and the rival firms. We jointly characterize the unregulated market outcome (with price and quantity competition) and also optimal regulation. Accounting for the several effects of regulation on the unregulated market, we show the existence of an informational externality, in that regulation provides useful information to the rival firms. Although joint operation of multi-utility's activities generates scope economies, it also brings about private information to the multi-utility, so that regulation is less efficient and also the unregulated market may be negatively affected. Nevertheless, we show that letting the multi-utility integrate productions is (socially) desirable, unless joint production is instead characterized by dis-economies of scope.
Asymmetric information, competition, informational externality, multi-utility firms, regulation, scope economies
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Giacomo Calzolari University of Bologna - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
01 Oct 07
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
01 Oct 07
|
|
34
|
2
|
|
| |
Abstract:
We study the regulation of a multi-utility, i.e. a utility firm that is also active in a competitive, unregulated sector. If the firm conducts its activities in the two markets jointly, it enjoys economies of scope whose magnitude is the firm's private information, unknown either to the regulator or to the rival firms. We characterize the unregulated market outcome (with price and quantity competition) and optimal regulation that involves an informational externality to the multi-utility's rivals. Although joint conduct of multi-utility's activities generates scope economies, it also brings private information to the multi-utility, so that regulation is less efficient and the unregulated market too may be adversely affected. Nevertheless, we show that allowing the multi-utility to integrate productions is (socially) desirable, unless joint production is characterized by dis-economies of scope.
Regulation, Competition, Asymmetric Information, Multi-utility, Scope economies, Informational externality
|
|
|
|
|
|
15.
|
|
|
Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia Giacomo Calzolari University of Bologna - Department of Economics
|
| Posted: |
|
05 Aug 09
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
05 Aug 09
|
|
24 (158,762)
|
|
|
| |
Abstract:
We study the regulation of a firm which supplies a regulated service while also operating in a competitive, unregulated sector. If the firm conducts its activities in the two markets jointly, it enjoys economies of scope whose size is the firm’s private information, unknown either to the regulator or to the rival firms. We characterize the unregulated market outcome (with price and quantity competition) and optimal regulation that involves an informational externality to the competitors. Although joint conduct of the activities generates scope economies, it also entails private information, so that regulation is less efficient and the unregulated market too may be adversely affected. Nevertheless, we show that allowing the firm to integrate productions is (socially) desirable, unless joint production is characterized by dis-economies of scope.
Regulation, Competition, Asymmetric Information, Conglomerate Firms, Multiutility, Scope Economies, Informational Externality
|
|
|
16.
|
|
|
Bernardo Bortolotti Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Marcella Fantini National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
19 Oct 03
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
29 Feb 04
|
|
11 (193,140)
|
6
|
|
| |
Abstract:
Privatization through global equity market placement has largely contributed to financial market development and integration. Despite the relevance of the fact, the reasons underlying governments' choice to sell shares of privatized companies abroad are still poorly understood. This paper presents new evidence for a sample of 233 share issue privatizations in 20 OECD countries, showing that redistribution concerns and the objective of domestic financial market development make domestic privatization more likely. However, if budget constraints are binding, governments tend to sell abroad a larger quantity of shares, particularly when corporate governance at home is weak.
|
|
|
17.
|
|
Footloose Monopolies: Regulating a 'National Champion'
|
Show Abstracts |
Hide Abstracts |
Versions (2)
|
hide multiple versions |
Export Bibliographic Info |
|
Giacomo Calzolari University of Bologna - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
|
Posted:
|
|
29 May 08
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
26 Oct 09
|
|
0 (218,772) |
4
|
|
|
|
|
Giacomo Calzolari University of Bologna - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
26 Oct 09
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
26 Oct 09
|
|
0
|
4
|
|
| |
Abstract:
We analyze the design of optimal regulation of a domestic monopolist that also competes in an unregulated foreign market. We show how foreign activities affect regulation, consumers' surplus, national welfare, and firm's profits. Although expansion in unregulated foreign markets amplifies the distortions that are caused by the regulator's limited information, we also show that allowing the firm to compete abroad does not necessarily harm domestic consumers. We analyze if and when the firm's decision to expand abroad coincides with national interests.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Giacomo Calzolari University of Bologna - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia
|
| Posted: |
|
29 May 08
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
29 May 08
|
|
0
|
1
|
|
| |
Abstract:
We analyze the design of optimal regulation of a domestic monopolist that also competes in an unregulated foreign market. We show how foreign activities by the regulated firm affect domestic regulation, consumers' surplus and firm's profits. Although expansion in unregulated foreign markets amplifies the regulatory distortions that are caused by the regulator's limited information, we also show that allowing the firm to compete abroad does not necessarily harm domestic consumers and we analyze if and when the firm's decision to expand abroad does in fact coincide with consumers' interests in the regulated market.
Foreign Competition, Multinational Enterprises, National Champions, Regulation
|
|
|
|
|
|
18.
|
|
|
Raffaele Miniaci University of Brescia - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia Paola Valbonesi University of Padua - Department of Economics
|
| Posted: |
|
28 Oct 08
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
23 Nov 08
|
|
0 (0)
|
|
|
| |
Abstract:
In this paper, we analyze some distributional effects of the reforms to water and energy services in Italy. We first document the new regulation setting in these services, illustrating the dynamics of utility prices and of household expenditure in the period 1998-2005. We then propose a way to measure the affordability of public utilities, in order to investigate how many households would incur a potentially excessive burden if they consumed a minimum quantity of utility services. Finally, we calculate this index on data from the Survey on Family Budgets (Indagine sui consumi delle famiglie). Our results show how the affordability of utility bills varies from region to region depending on climate, income, family endowment and family size. The analysis - also based on a counter factual exercise - finds that so far, utility reforms do not seem to have produced any negative effects on weaker households.
Consumer behaviour, public utilities, regulation, gas, electricity, water
|
|
|
19.
|
|
|
Raffaele Miniaci University of Brescia - Department of Economics Carlo Scarpa University of Brescia Paola Valbonesi University of Padua - Department of Economics
|
| Posted: |
|
28 Oct 08
|
|
Last Revised:
|
|
23 Nov 08
|
|
0 (0)
|
|
|
| |
Abstract:
In this paper we analyze the affordability of water and energy for Italian households. We first document how the regulatory reform has changed the system of price setting, illustrating the dynamics of utility prices and of household expenditure in the period 1998-2005. We then discuss current indices adopted to measure the affordability of public utilities and propose an alternative one, in order to investigate how many households would incur a potentially excessive burden, if they consumed a minimum quantity of utility services.
Finally, we calculate the values of these indices on data from the 'Survey on Family Budgets' over the period, and use them to depict the affordability issue in Italy. Our results show that after the Italian reforms of the Nineties (at least until 2005) the affordability of public utility services has not worsened.
Affordability, Public Utilities, Regulation, Gas, Electricity, Water
|
|