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Abstract:
We analyze cross-sectional and time series information from forty-six equity markets around the world to consider whether short sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market and the distributional characteristics of returns to individual stocks and market indices. We construct two measures of price efficiency that quantify the asymmetric response of individual stock returns to negative vs. positive information, and find some evidence that prices incorporate negative information faster in countries where short sales are allowed and practiced. This evidence is consistent with more efficient price discovery at the individual security level. A common conjecture by regulators is that short sales restrictions can reduce the relative severity of a market panic. We test this conjecture by examining the skewness of market returns. We find strong evidence that in markets where short selling is either prohibited or not practiced, market returns display significantly less negative skewness. However, at the individual stock level, short sales restrictions appear to make no difference.

Short Sales, Market Efficiency, Market Crashes

Abstract:
We analyze cross-sectional and time series information from forty-seven equity markets around the world, to consider whether short-sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market, and the distributional characteristics of returns to individual stocks and market indices. Using the approach developed in Morck et.al. (2000) we find significantly more cross-sectional variation in equity returns in markets where short selling is feasible and practiced, controlling for a host of other factors. This evidence is consistent with more efficient price discovery at the individual security level. A common conjecture by regulators is that short-selling restrictions can reduce the relative severity of a market panic. We test this conjecture by examining the skewness of market returns. We find that in markets where short selling is either prohibited or not practiced, returns display significantly less negative skewness, and the frequency of extreme negative returns is lower. On the other hand, the overall volatility of individual returns and market returns is higher.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We analyze cross-sectional and time series information from forty-six equity markets around the world, to consider whether short sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market, and the distributional characteristics of returns to individual stock and market indices. We construct two measures of price efficiency that quantify the asymmetric response of individual stock returns to negative vs. positive information, and find that prices incorporate information faster in countries where short sales are allowed and practiced. This evidence is consistent with more efficient price discovery at the individual security level. A common conjecture by regulators is that short sales restrictions can reduce the relative severity of a market panic. We test this conjecture by examining the skewness of market returns. We find some evidence that in markets where short selling is either prohibited or not practices, market returns display significantly less negative skewness. However, at the individual stock level, short sales restrictions appear to make no difference.

Abstract:
This paper presents the first comprehensive global study of insider trading laws and their first enforcement. In a sample of 4,541 acquisitions from 52 countries, I find that insider trading enforcement increases both the incidence, and the profitability of insider trading. The expected total insider trading gains increase. Consequently, laws that proscribe insider trading fail to eliminate insider profits. However, harsher laws work better at reducing the incidence of illegal insider trading.

Abstract:
By calculating an estimated measure of undetected insider trading, this paper shows that profits made by informed corporate insiders prior to tender offer announcements increase after the first enforcement of insider trading laws. I analyze the effects of Insider Trading regulation on a sample of 5,099 acquisitions in 56 different countries, and estimate the profits due to insider trading from the abnormal volume in the weeks prior to the announcement, under the assumption that insiders purchase those shares at the prevailing price and hold them until the public announcement. I find that laws that prosecute insider trading fail to eliminate profits made by insiders, and make acquisitions more expensive. Therefore, by increasing the market reaction to an acquisition, insider trading laws make it profitable to violate them.

Insider trading, takeovers, market regulation

Abstract:
Cross-border mergers allow firms to alter the level of protection they provide to their investors, because target firms usually import the corporate governance system of the acquiring company. This article extends the existing literature by evaluating the effect of changes in corporate governance induced by cross-border mergers on industry value, instead of focusing on cross-country comparisons. We construct measures of the change in investor protection induced by cross-border mergers in a sample of 9,277 industry-country-year observations. We find that the Tobin's Q of an industry increases when firms within the industry are acquired by foreign firms coming from countries with better corporate governance. In addition, we show that acquisitions of firms in countries with less protective regimes--French and German legal origin--have a negative impact on the acquiror's value. Conversely, target industries benefit from acquisitions by firms from countries with better corporate governance--English and Scandinavian legal origin. Ours is among the first studies to document in a panel-data framework that improving investor protection creates value.

Corporate Governance, Market Regulation, Cross-border Acquisitions

Abstract:
We analyze the effect of capital adequacy requirements on bank risk policy when managers and shareholders have different information about the quality of the loan portfolio. In a two-period model in which shareholders implement the optimal contract with managers, we show that the level of managerial effort (and therefore the quality of the loan portfolio) is higher when shareholders cannot observe the manager's action. When information regarding the bank loan portfolio is symmetric, capital requirements help reduce the excess risk-taking problem that deposit insurance creates. Taking as given optimal regulation on capital requirements and deposit insurance, we show that the moral hazard problem in banks leads to a reduction in the banks' loan portfolio through an increase in the managerial effort in loan supervision. Only high-quality loans are accepted by the bank, but some profitable investments are bypassed because managers are more interested in maximizing their compensation (diluting the stock value) than in maximizing the shareholders' wealth. Thus we conclude that the riskiness of banks may be suboptimally low under moral hazard. We show how bank debt can help alleviate this problem. Our results are related to the theoretical and empirical literature that deals with the effects of the Basle Accords on the banks' credit policy.

Abstract:
Short-selling differs significantly around the world, and practice depends not only on regulatory structure but upon costs and tax considerations. Our survey of world markets suggests that, while as much as 93 percent of the world's equity market by capitalization is shortable, there are particular regions of the world where it is difficult to take a short position. These include several countries in Southeast Asia and South America. When dual listings in markets allowing short-sales are considered, the capitalization that is potentially shortable increases to 96 percent. In this paper, we examine what factors in the global equity universe are not shortable and consider the implications for long-short strategies tied to global indices and futures instruments. We find important periods when an index of non-shortable securities is a major determinant of the global equity portfolio. We ask whether short-sales constraints are binding on global index arbitrage.

Abstract:
In this paper we illustrate the role of cross-border mergers in the process of corporate governance convergence. We explore in detail the corporate governance provisions in Rhone-Poulenc, a French company, and Hoechst, a German firm, and the resulting structure after the two firms merged in 1999 to create Aventis, legally a French corporation. We show that, despite the nationality of the firm, the corporate governance structure of Aventis is a combination of the corporate governance systems of Hoechst and Rhone-Poulenc, where the newly merged firm adopted the most protective provisions of the two merging firms. In some cases this resulted in Aventis' borrowing from the corporate governance structure of Hoechst while in others Aventis replicated Rhone-Poulenc's structure. Most interesting is the situation where Aventis introduced improved provisions over both systems. The resulting corporate governance system in Aventis is significantly more protective than the default French legal system of investor protection.

corporate governance, cross-border mergers, investor protection

Abstract:
International law prescribes that in a cross-border acquisition of 100% of the target shares, the target firm becomes a national of the country of the acquiror, and consequently subject to its corporate governance system. Therefore, cross-border mergers provide a natural experiment to analyze the effects of changes in corporate governance on firm value. We construct measures of the change in investor protection in a sample of 506 acquisitions from 39 countries. We find that the better the shareholder protection and accounting standards in the acquiror's country, the higher the merger premium in cross-border mergers relative to matching domestic acquisitions.

F3, F4, G3

Abstract:
International law prescribes that in a cross-border merger where the acquiror buys 100 percent of the target, the target firm becomes a national of the country of the acquiror. Among other effects, the change in nationality implies a change in investor protection, because the law that is applicable to the newly merged firm changes as well. Therefore, cross-border mergers provide a natural experiment to analyze the effects of changes - both improvements and deteriorations - in corporate governance on firm value. We construct measures of the change in investor protection induced by cross-border mergers in a sample of 506 acquisitions from 39 countries, spanning the period 1989 to 2002. We find that the announcement effect of a cross-border merger for the target firm is higher - relative to a matching, domestic acquisition - the better the shareholder protection and the accounting standards in the country of origin of the acquiror. This result is only significant in acquisitions where the acquiror buys 100 percent of the target, and therefore where the nationality of the target firm changes. In addition, this result is only significant when the acquiror comes from a more-protective country, which suggests that target firms avoid addopting weaker protection via private contracting. Interestingly, we do not find a symmetric effect on the acquiror's return. All in all, we present evidence that the transfer of better corporate governance practices through cross-border mergers is positively valued by markets with weaker corporate governance.

corporate governance, market regulation, cross-border acquisitions

Abstract:
The fees of experts (financial advisors, lawyers, accountants) are a substantial fraction of bankruptcy costs. Scholars have considered how best to reduce these costs, but have not considered how they should be allocated among creditors. The allocation issue is important because creditors can spend redistributionally (to violate or uphold absolute priority) and productively (to increase the value of the bankrupt firm). An efficient bankruptcy cost allocation scheme should discourage redistributional and encourage productive creditor spending.

We consider the desirability of various allocation schemes in a model in which senior and junior creditors can engage in both types of spending but the bankruptcy court cannot distinguish productive from rent seeking activities. We suppose that the senior claim is at or in the money. This implies that the seniors have an incentive to spend only to defend their position while the juniors have both good and bad incentives: to spend productively on value improvement because they are residual claimants and to spend redistributionally because they are partly or totally out of the money under absolute priority. A good bankruptcy cost allocation scheme thus should induce the seniors to spend more and the juniors to spend less.

We show: (i) The current US cost allocation system is unsatisfactory because the scheme partially reimburses junior expenses on experts but does not reimburse seniors at all; (ii) Full reimbursement schemes that imposes all costs on one set of parties, such as seniors, juniors or the government, are dominated by partial reimbursement schemes, because these can be better tailored to encourage the right and discourage the wrong kind of spending; and (iii) A cost allocation scheme that approaches first best and is implementable would delegate the issue of expert cost reimbursement to the debtor in possession. The incentive of Chapter 11 debtors to survive would induce them partly to reimburse senior spending but not to reimburse junior spending.

Abstract:
Using data from 20 countries that have suffered a currency crisis, this paper studies firm-level leverage and performance before and after a crisis has occurred. First we provide some evidence of increasing leverage both before and after a crisis. We show that, in the years preceding a currency crisis, companies that benefit from currency depreciations increase their leverage more than companies that are harmed by currency depreciations. These findings do not hold for countries with either floating exchange rates or currency boards. We argue that increasing leverage is a sign that some firms behave strategically towards governments that lack commintment mechanisms not to devalue their currencies. We also provide evidence that the Asian crisis is different from the previous European and Latin American ones: in Asia firms become more fragile after the crisis and their profitability declines further, whereas in Europe and Latin America there are clear signs of recovery after a crisis has occurred.

Currency Crises, Corporate Leverage, Capital Structure, Profitability, Exchange Rates

Abstract:
There are situations in which dispersed creditors (e.g., public creditors) have more difficulties and higher costs when collecting their claims in financial distress than concentrated creditors (e.g., banks). Under this assumption, our model predicts that measures of debt concentration relate [a] positively to creditors' chosen aggregate debt collection expenditures; [b] positively to management's chosen expenditures to avoid paying; [c] positively to total net litigation costs/waste in financial distress; and [d] positively to accomplished claim recovery by creditors (to which we present some preliminary favorable empirical evidence). Under additional assumptions, measures of debt concentration relate [e] positively to intrinsic firm quality; [f] positively to creditor monitoring and negatively to managerial waste; [g] positively to optimal continuation/discontinuation choices; [h] negatively to issuing marketing expenses. In a signaling model, when concentration alone is not a sufficient signal, firms choose the ultimately concentrated debt (i.e., a house bank) and have to pay a high interest.

Abstract:
Our model assumes that creditors need to expend resources to collect on
claims. Consequently, because diffuse creditors suffer from mutual
free-riding (Holmstrom (1982)), they fare worse than
concentrated creditors (e.g. a house bank). The model predicts that
measures of debt concentration relate positively to creditors'
(aggregate) debt collection expenditures and positively to management's
chosen expenditures to resist paying. However, collection activity is
purely redistributive, so social waste is larger when creditors are
concentrated. If borrower quality is not known, the best firms choose
the most concentrated creditors and pay higher expected yields.

Banking, Capital Structure

Abstract:
This paper provides an explanation of currency crises based on an argument that bailing out financially distressed exporting firms through a currency depreciation is ex-post optimal. Exporting firms have profitable investment opportunities, but they will not invest because high leverage causes debt overhang problems. The government can make investments feasible by not defending a fixed exchange rate and letting the currency depreciate. Currency depreciation always increases the profitability of new investments when revenues are in a foreign currency and costs are at least partially in domestic. Interestingly, foreign borrowing by exporting firms doesn't change the qualitative results: if firms' debt is denominated in foreign currency, a larger depreciation is needed to restore incentives to invest. An important feature in our model is that in general exporting firms choose to finance investments with debt instead of equity. Currency depreciation is socially optimal if risky projects have a higher expected return than safe projects and if firms are forced to rely on debt financing because of underdeveloped equity markets. Although currency depreciation is always ex-post optimal, it can be harmful ex-ante. Exporting firms know that the government will let the currency depreciate, if their risky investments have failed. This leads to excessive investment in risky projects even if more valuable safe projects are available.

Abstract:
In this paper we formalize the information acquisition process by a potential bidder and its relationship with the target firm's capital structure. We show that debt increases prior to an acquisition are negatively related to the precision of the bidder's information. Incumbent managers, by means of leverage, offset shareholders' losses derived from information acquisition about the firm's prospects by potential acquirors. This explanation for the use of capital structure to deter rivals for control complements the ones provided by the literature. We test our model with a sample of 739 U.S. targets of hostile tender offers, and show that informational variables (such as toehold size and nature of target and bidder industries) are significant determinants of the decision to adjust leverage. The paper shows that target firms display slightly higher debt levels than their industry peers, and that target firms significantly reduce leverage in the year prior to the tender offer announcement. The latter result indicates that leverage favors entrenchment prior to battles for control, although incumbent managers use gearing to benefit from the takeover when its announcement is imminent.

Abstract:
This paper is the first attempt to isolate the direct effect of competition laws on a country's merger activity and indirectly on corporate value. We find that, although the direct relationship between merger laws and Tobin's Q is positive and significant, once we control for the net cross-border merger flows in a country, the relationship vanishes. We conclude that the positive effect of merger laws on corporate value is driven by their deterring effect on horizontal, cross-border, anti-competitive mergers. To the extent that the trend towards globalization in the world has dramatically increased merger flows from some countries to others, we argue that there is a need for competition laws that make up for the pervasive effects of the global market on some countries. We also show that the European Merger Directive has had a negative impact on corporations value.

mergers, market regulation, cross-border acquisitions

Abstract:
It is well known that cross-listing domestic stocks in foreign exchanges has significant valuation effects on the listed company's shares. Using a sample of firms with dual shares, we explore the differential effects of cross-listing on prices and we are able to separate the different sources of the benefits of cross-listing. These sources include market segmentation, liquidity, and the bonding of controlling shareholders to lower expropriation of firm resources. Our results show that even though the market segmentation and bonding effects are both statistically significant, the economic significance of segmentation is more than double that of bonding. Furthermore, we document an economically and statistically significant increase in the liquidity of both share classes after the listing. Overall, our results explain why less and less firms are willing to list in the USA: Sarbanes Oxley has increased the cost of adopting better governance while its benefits are not substantial; and market segmentation has decreased significantly in the last years.

Abstract:
It is well known that cross-listing domestic stocks in foreign exchanges has significant valuation effects on the listed company's shares. Using a sample of firms with dual shares, we explore the differential effects of cross-listing on prices and we are able to separate the different sources of the benefits of cross-listing. Our results show that even though the market segmentation and bonding effects are both statistically significant, the economic significance of segmentation is more than double that of bonding. Furthermore, we document an economically and statistically significant increasse in the liquidity of both share classes after the listing. Overall, our results explain why less and less firms are willing to list in the U.S.: Sarbanes Oxley has increased the cost of adopting better governance while its benefits are not substantial; and market segmentation has decreased significantly in the last years.

Corporate Governance, Finance, International Finance, Mergers

Abstract:
Our paper explores a comprehensive sample of small and large corporate bankruptcies in Arizona and New York from 1995-2001. We find that bankruptcy costs are very heterogeneous and sensitive to measurement method. Still, Chapter 7 liquidations appear no faster or cheaper (in terms of direct expense) than Chapter 11 bankruptcies. But Chapter 11 seems to preserve assets better, and thereby allows creditors to recover relatively more. Our paper also provides a large number of further empirical regularities.

Abstract:
This paper shows that the dynamics of Chapter 11 turn dramatically on the size of the business. The vast majority of the assets administered in Chapter 11 are concentrated in a handful of large cases, but most of the businesses in Chapter 11 are small, and the smaller the business, the smaller the distribution to general unsecured creditors. For businesses with assets above $5 million, unsecured creditors typically collect half of what they are owed. Where the business's assets are worth less than $200,000, ordinary general creditors usually recover nothing. In the typical small Chapter 11 case, the tax collector is the central figure. In small business bankruptcies, priority tax liabilities are the largest unsecured liabilities of the business. Tax obligations are entitled to priority and are obligations of both the corporation and those who run it. Given the large shadow tax claims cast over small Chapter 11 reorganizations, accounts of small Chapter 11 must focus squarely on them.

bankruptcy, creditors, Chapter 11

Abstract:
Our paper explores a comprehensive sample of both small and large corporate bankruptcies in Arizona and New York from 1995-2001. We find that bankruptcy costs are very heterogeneous and sensitive to measurement method. Still, Chapter 7 liquidations seem more expensive in direct and equally expensive in indirect costs, than Chapter 11 bankruptcies. The paper provides a large number of further empirical regularities.

Abstract:
Most of the theoretical literature on tender offers has been devoted to illustrating the positive effects of the toehold on the bidder's profits. Empirical research, however, shows that a high proportion of bidders do not trade on the target's shares prior to the tender offer announcement. This paper presents a model in which the bidder trades in the open market before announcing a tender offer and the incumbent shareholders form beliefs about the rival's quality given the order size. Market liquidity allows the potential bidder to partially hide her trade, and thus insiders are not able to ascertain whether an increase in volume indicates toehold acquisition. Stock price prior to the announcement date and market perception about the probability of a takeover are therefore contingent on players actions. We show that in some situations no trade will be optimal, and a negative relationship between takeover premium and toehold size arises. Interestingly, stock liquidity and initial stake are positively related. Our results also provide a theoretical basis for the observed pre-bid stock price dynamics. In particular, we show that the ratio between price runup and bid premium is increasing in the toehold size. The model's implications are then tested with a sample including tender offers in the US and the UK, estimating a bivariate generalization of the tobit model. We find a broad support for the model and significant differences across countries. We show that toeholds and probability of an acquisition are negatively related, and that companies in which the appropriation of private benefits of control is more likely have a higher probability of being taken over.

Abstract:
Cross-border mergers allow firms to alter the level of protection they provide to their investors, because target firms usually import the corporate governance system of the acquiring company by law. Therefore, cross-border mergers provide a natural experiment to analyze the effects of changes in corporate governance on firm value, and on an industry as a whole. We construct measures of the change in investor protection induced by cross-border mergers in a sample of 7,330 'national industry years' (spanning 39 industries in 41 countries in the period 1990-2001). We find that the Tobin's Q of an industry - including its unmerged firms - increases when firms within that industry are acquired by foreign firms coming from countries with better shareholder protection and better accounting standards. We present evidence that the transfer of corporate governance practices through cross-border mergers is Pareto improving. Firms that can adopt better practices willingly do so, and the market assigns more value to better protection.

Corporate governance, market regulation, cross-border acquisitions

Abstract:
In this paper we study the changes in corporate valuation, investments, and financing choices induced by the formation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. We use corporate - level data from ten countries that adopted the euro, the three EU countries that did not join EMU, as well as Norway and Switzerland. We show that the introduction of the euro has increased valuations for large firms in EMU countries, especially in countries that had experienced currency crises. Firm values have also increased for firms that were previously exposed to currency risks irrespective of size. Investments have increased for all firms, but the effects are bigger for large firms and for firms coming from countries with experiences of currency depreciations. The increase in investments has been financed mainly via debt issues. The evidence provided here supports the view that the introduction of the euro has lowered firms' cost of capital by eliminating currency risks among the countries that have adopted the common currency, and by further increasing capital market integration in Europe.

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), The Euro, Valuation, Investment, Debt, Equity, Cost of Capital, Currency Risk

Abstract:
We model a competitive industry where managers choose quantities and costs to maximize a combination of firm profits and private benefits from expropriation. Expropriation is possible because of corporate governance 'slack' permitted by the government. We show that corporate governance slack induces managers to choose levels of output and costs that are higher than would otherwise be optimal. This, in turn, benefits consumers - the equilibrium price is lower - and other stakeholders such as suppliers and employees. Depending on the government's social welfare objective, less-than-perfect investor protection can be optimal. We show why some mechanisms suggested by the literature as improving investor protection - legal change, cross-listing, domestic mergers - may not be effective. We provide a theoretical argument showing the efficacy of cross-border mergers. The stronger corporate governance of a foreign acquirer, imposed on the domestic target firm, benefits merging shareholders and those of competing unmerged domestic firms.

international corporate governance, market regulation, cross-listing, domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions

Abstract:
We examine a sample of 125 equity mutual funds that closed to new investment between 1993 and 2004. We find that funds close following a period of superior performance and abnormal fund inflows. Fund managers raise their fees when they close to compensate managers for losses in income due to the restrictions in size imposed by the fund closure decision. Managers reopen when fund size declines. However, they do not earn superior returns after re-opening, suggesting that the fund closure decision does not provide information about superior fund managers.

Mutual funds, Fund flows, Fund size, Fund returns, Fund manager performance

Abstract:
In this paper we study the changes in corporate valuations induced by the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe. We use corporate-level data from 17 European countries of which 11 adopted the euro. We show that the introduction of the euro has increased Tobin's Q-ratios by 17.1% in the euro-area countries that previously had weak currencies. Part of the increase in corporate valuations is explained by the decrease in interest rates and by the decrease in the cost of equity. The increases in Tobin's Q are larger for firms that would be harmed by currency devaluations.

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the euro, valuation, cost of capital, currency risk, currency union

Abstract:
In this paper we study the changes in corporate valuations induced by the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe. We use corporate-level data from eleven countries that adopted the euro, the three EU countries that did not start using the euro, as well as Norway and Switzerland. We show that the introduction of the euro has increased Tobin's Q-ratios by 17.1% in the euro-area countries that previously had weak currencies. Part of the increase in corporate valuations is explained by the decrease in interest rates and by the decrease in the cost of equity. The increases in Tobin's Q are larger for firms that would be harmed by currency devaluations.

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the euro, valuation, cost of capital, currency risk, currency union

Abstract:
We study how the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe has affected firms' investment rates. Using corporate data from the eleven countries that adopted the euro in January 1999, as well as from a control sample of five other European countries, our paper shows that: (i) the euro has increased investments for firms from countries that previously had weak currencies, (ii) the euro has had a positive impact on financially constrained firms' investments, and (iii) the euro has decreased investments for financially unconstrained firms from countries that previously had strong currencies.

Abstract:
We study how the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe has affected firms' investment rates. Using corporate data from the eleven countries that adopted the euro in January 1999, as well as from a control sample of five other European countries, our paper shows that: (i) the euro has increased investments for firms from countries that previously had weak currencies, (ii) the euro has had a positive impact on financially constrained firms' investments, and (iii) the euro has decreased investments for financially unconstrained firms from countries that previously had strong currencies.

EMU, the euro, currency union, investments

Abstract:
Existing evidence shows that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has reduced the cost of capital for firms in the euro area. We study the impact of the adoption of the euro in January 1999 by 11 countries in Europe on the firms' investment rates, and show that the investment results are consistent with reduction in cost of capital. Using corporate data from the 11 EMU countries, as well as from a control sample of 5 non-EMU European countries, our paper shows that: (i) investments for EMU-firms have grown 2.5% more than for non-EMU firms, after 1999; and (ii) the benefits of the euro accrue especially to small, domestic firms from countries with previously weak currencies.

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the euro, investments, cost of capital, currency union

Abstract:
We study how the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe has affected firms' investment rates. Using corporate data from the eleven countries that adopted the euro in January 1999, as well as from a control sample of five other European countries, our paper shows that: (i) the euro has increased investments for firms from countries that previously had weak currencies, (ii) the euro has had a positive impact on financially constrained firms' investments, and (iii) the euro has decreased investments for financially unconstrained firms from countries that previously had strong currencies.

EMU, the euro, investments, currency union, financial constraints

Abstract:
We present a model that shows how interactions between creditor groups in bankruptcy can affect the debt issuance decisions of firms, and test the most important implications of the theory. In particular, we show that firms that issue debt with a specific seniority level may tend to keep issuing debt at the same level to avoid the costs of conflicts in bankruptcy. Our model also has predictions as to what types of firms may change seniority level in sequential issues. We also find that as costs of conflict increase, firms will tend to issue more junior debt. The empirical implications of our model are consistent with the somewhat surprising fact that most firms issue debt at one seniority level only, and quite a few of them cluster at the senior subordinated level. Our probit analysis shows that companies that issue subordinated debt are much smaller than those that issue senior debt, while those that issue at both levels are intermediate on most financial measures. These empirical regularities are broadly consistent with our theoretical analysis. Our model is also supported by the fact that companies that issue only senior debt pay lower spreads than companies that issue at both levels. Finally, we find some support for our theory in an analysis of bankrupt firms.

Seniority, Bankruptcy, Absolute Priority Rule violations, Debt

Abstract:
We present a model that shows how interactions between creditor groups in bankruptcy can affect the debt issuance decisions of firms. In particular, we show that firms that issue debt with a specific seniority level may tend to keep issuing debt at the same level to avoid the costs of conflicts in bankruptcy. Our model also has predictions as to what types of firms may change seniority level in sequential issues. We also find that as bankruptcy costs increase, firms will tend to issue more junior debt. The empirical implications of our model are consistent with the somewhat surprising fact that most firms issue debt at one seniority level only, and quite a few of them cluster at the senior subordinated level. We also find that companies that issue subordinated debt are much smaller than those which issue senior debt, while those that issue at both levels are intermediate on most financial measures. These empirical regularities are broadly consistent with our theoretical analysis. Our model is also supported by the fact that companies that issue only senior debt pay lower spreads than companies that issue at both levels.

Bankruptcy, Absolute Priority Rule, Senioriy, Debt

Abstract:
We present a model that shows how interactions between creditor groups in bankruptcy can affect the debt issuance decisions of firms. In particular, we show that firms that issue debt with a specific seniority level may tend to keep issuing debt at the same level to avoid the costs of conflicts in bankruptcy. Our model also has predictions as to what types of firms may change seniority level in sequential issues. We also find that as bankruptcy costs increase, firms will tend to issue more junior debt. The empirical implications of our model are consistent with the somewhat surprising fact that most firms issue debt at one seniority level only, and quite a few of them cluster at the senior subordinated level. We also find that companies that issue subordinated debt are much smaller than those which issue senior debt, while those that issue at both levels are intermediate on most financial measures. These empirical regularities are broadly consistent with our theoretical analysis. Our model is also supported by the fact that companies that issue only senior debt pay lower spreads than companies that issue at both levels.

Bankruptcy, Absolute Priority Rule, Seniority, Debt

Abstract:
We present a model that shows how interactions between creditor groups in bankruptcy can affect the debt issuance decisions of firms. In particular, we suggest that deviations from APR should be priced and can affect the issuing decisions of junior and senior debt. Our model suggests that once firms issue debt with one level of seniority, they have an incentive to alternate, and subsequent issues will have a different seniority level. When we introduce explicit costs of conflict in our model, we find that as these costs increase, firms will tend to stay with one class of debt. The empirical implications of our model are consistent with the somewhat surprising fact that most firms issue debt at one seniority level only, and quite a few of them never issue any senior debt. We also find that companies that issue only senior subordinated debt are much smaller than those that issue senior debt, while those that issue at both levels are intermediate on most financial measures. This is broadly consistent with our theoretical analysis. Our model is also supported by the fact that companies that issue only senior debt pay lower spreads than companies that issue at both levels. Finally, we study a sample of firms in bankruptcy and again find significant relationships between corporate characteristics and the types of debts that they issue, as predicted by the model.

Bankruptcy, Absolute Priority Rule, Seniority, Debt

Abstract:
We exploit a unique feature of the organizational structure of the London Stock Exchange that allows for direct tests of the market segmentation and liquidity hypotheses against the information based hypotheses of cross-listing. We identify a sample of international firms that are admitted to trading on London's SEAQ-I platform without their involvement. We estimate the valuation effects of this multi-market trading event and compare them to those enjoyed by firms that pursue a London Stock Exchange cross-listing. A cross-sectional abnormal returns analysis documents strong evidence in support of significant information driven valuation benefits and limited support for the effects of market segmentation and liquidity. An analysis of the firms' home market price volatility corroborates the results.

International Finance, Cross-Listing, Information

Abstract:
In this Paper we study the changes in corporate valuation induced by the formation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. We use corporate-level data from ten countries that adopted the euro, the three EU countries that did not join EMU, as well as Norway and Switzerland. We show that the introduction of the euro has increased Tobin's Q-ratios in EMU countries by 7.4%. The effects prevail even if we account for the decrease in long-term interest rates. The increases in Tobin's Q are larger for firms that are ex-ante expected to benefit more, i.e. firms from countries that had weak currencies and firms that were exposed to intra-European currency risks. Finally, the increases are also more significant for firms that are financially unconstrained. The evidence provided here supports the view that the introduction of the euro has lowered firms' cost of capital in EMU-countries.

Economic and monetary union (EMU), the euro, valuation, cost of capital, currency risk, currency union

Abstract:
We study the influence of television translation techniques on the quality of the English spoken across the EU and OCDE. We identify a large positive effect for subtitled original version as opposed to dubbed television, which loosely corresponds to between four and twenty years of compulsory English education at school. We also show that the importance of subtitled television is robust to a wide array of specifications. We then find that subtitling and better English skills have an influence on high-tech exports, international student mobility, and other economic and social outcomes.

English, language skills, subtitles, television

Abstract:
We study the price convergence of goods and services in the euro area in 2001-2002. To measure the degree of convergence, we compare the prices of around 220 items in 32 European cities. The width of the border is the price difference attributed to the fact that the two cities are in different countries. We find that the markets were quite integrated before the euro changeover. Moreover, we do not identify an integration effect attributable to the introduction of the euro. We then explore the determinants of the European borders. We find that different languages, wealth and population differences tend to split the markets. Historical inflation, though, tends to lead to price convergence.

Abstract:
In this paper, we study the changes in corporate valuations induced by the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe. We use corporate-level data from seventeen European countries, of which eleven adopted the euro. We show that the introduction of the euro has increased Tobin's Q-ratios by 17.1% in the {euro-area} countries that previously had weak currencies. Part of the increase in corporate valuations is explained by the decrease in interest rates and by the decrease in the cost of equity. The increases in Tobin's Q are larger for firms that would be harmed by currency devaluations.

F33, F36, G32

Abstract:
We study the influence of television translation techniques on the quality of the English spoken across the EU and OECD. We identify a large positive effect for subtitled original version as opposed to dubbed television, which loosely corresponds to between four and twenty years of compulsory English education at school. We also show that the importance of subtitled television is robust to a wide array of specifications.

We then find that subtitling and better English skills have an influence on high-tech exports, international student mobility, and other economic and social outcomes.

English, language skills, subtitles, television

Abstract:
This paper provides an explanation of currency crises based on an argument that bailing out financially distressed exporting firms through a currency depreciation is ex-post optimal. Exporting firms have profitable investment opportunities, but they will not invest because high leverage causes debt overhang problems. The government can make investments feasible by not defending an exchange rate and letting the currency depreciate. Currency depreciation always increases the profitability of new investments when revenues from that project are in foreign currency and costs denominated in the domestic currency are nominally rigid. Although currency depreciation is always ex-post optimal once risky projects have been taken and failed, it can be harmful ex-ante, because it leads to excessive investment in risky projects even if more valuable safe projects are available. However, currency depreciation is also ex-ante optimal if risky projects have a higher expected return than safe projects and if firms are forced to rely on debt financing because of underdeveloped equity markets.

currency depreciation, debt overhang, emerging markets, efficient investment policy, excessive risk taking

Abstract:
We examine a sample of 125 equity mutual funds that closed to new investment between 1993 and 2004. We find that funds close following a period of superior performance and abnormal fund inflows. Fund managers raise their fees when they close to compensate managers for losses in income due to the restrictions in size imposed by the fund closure decision. Managers reopen when fund size declines. However, they do not earn superior returns after re-opening, suggesting that the fund closure decision does not provide information about superior fund managers.

Mutual funds, Fund flows, Fund size, Fund returns, Fund manager performance

Abstract:
This paper studies firm-level leverage and performance measures before and after a currency crisis has occurred using data from 17 countries. We show that prior to a crisis, companies that are expected to benefit from currency depreciations increase their leverage more than other companies. Profitability and financial fragility ratios display similar patterns. We provide evidence that the Asian crisis is different from the previous European and Latin American ones: in Asia all firms become more fragile after the crisis and their profitability declines and leverage increases further, whereas elsewhere there are clear signs of recovery after a crisis has occurred.

Currency crises, corporate leverage, capital structure, profitability, exchange rates