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Abstract:
This paper examines the pervasiveness of earnings management across 31 countries between 1990 and 1999. It documents systematic differences in earnings management across different clusters of countries. We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our evidence is consistent with this prediction. The findings suggest a link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings, and complement prior finance research that treats the quality of corporate reporting as exogenous.

corporate governance, earnings management, investor protection, law, private control benefits

Abstract:
This paper examines the pervasiveness of earnings management across 31 countries between 1990 and 1999. It documents systematic differences in earnings management across different clusters of countries. We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our evidence is consistent with this prediction. The findings suggest a link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings, and complement prior finance research that treats the quality of corporate reporting as exogenous.

Corporate Governance, Earnings Management, Investor Protection, Law, Private Control Benefits

Abstract:
This paper surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on the economic consequences of financial reporting and disclosure regulation. We integrate theoretical and empirical studies from accounting, economics, finance and law in order to contribute to the cross-fertilization of these fields. We provide an organizing framework that identifies firm-specific (micro-level) and market-wide (macro-level) costs and benefits of firms' reporting and disclosure activities and then use this framework to discuss potential costs and benefits of regulating these activities and to organize the key insights from the literature. Our survey highlights important unanswered questions and concludes with numerous suggestions for future research.

Accounting, Asymmetric information, Capital markets, Institutional economics, International, Mandatory disclosure, Political economy, Regulation, Standards

Abstract:
Drawing on the academic literature in accounting, finance and economics, we analyze economic and policy factors related to the potential adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the U.S. We highlight the unique institutional features of U.S. markets to assess the potential impact of IFRS adoption on the quality and comparability of U.S. reporting practices, the ensuing capital market effects, and the potential costs of switching from U.S. GAAP to IFRS. We discuss the compatibility of IFRS with the current U.S. regulatory and legal environment as well as the possible effects of IFRS adoption on the U.S. economy as a whole. We also consider how a switch to IFRS may affect worldwide competition among accounting standards and standard setters, and discuss the political ramifications of such a decision on the standard setting process and on the governance structure of the International Accounting Standards Board. Our analysis shows that the decision to adopt IFRS mainly involves a cost-benefit tradeoff between (1) recurring, albeit modest, comparability benefits for investors, (2) recurring future cost savings that will largely accrue to multinational companies, and (3) one-time transition costs borne by all firms and the U.S. economy as a whole, including those from adjustments to U.S. institutions. We conclude by outlining several possible scenarios for the future of U.S. accounting standards, ranging from maintaining U.S. GAAP, letting firms decide whether and when to adopt IFRS, to the creation of a competing U.S. GAAP-based set of global accounting standards that could serve as an alternative to IFRS.

Accounting, Regulation, IFRS, U.S. GAAP, SEC, Standard setting, U.S. equity markets, Mandatory disclosure, Political economy

Abstract:
This paper examines the dynamic behavior of analysts' earnings forecasts over the twelve months preceding annual earnings announcements. We investigate the claim that analysts make optimistic forecasts at the start of the year and then 'walk down' their estimates to a level the firm is likely to beat by the end of the year. The sample consists of I/B/E/S individual-analyst forecasts for the period 1983-1997. In the post-1992 period, we find strong evidence of a switch from upward-biased to downward-biased forecasts of annual earnings as the announcement date approaches. Forecast pessimism is strongest for high market-to-book firms, for large firms, and in periods when real GDP is growing. We also find that analysts forecasts are more accurate for firms involved in new equity issuance. Finally, we find that pessimistic forecasts are more frequent in years when firms report positive special items, high cash flows from operations and high working capital accruals.

Abstract:
In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors.

Bad News, Conservatism, Disclosure

Abstract:
Security regulators and the business press have alleged that firms play an 'earnings-guidance game' where analysts make optimistic forecasts at the start of the year and then 'walk down' their estimates to a level the firm can beat by the end of the year. In a comprehensive sample of I/B/E/S individual analysts' forecasts of annual earnings from 1983-1998, we find strong support for the claim in the post-1992 period. We examine whether the 'walk down' to beatable targets is associated with managers' incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (via new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (insider trades). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the 'walk down' to beatable targets is most pronounced in firms that are either net issuers of equity or in firms where managers are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on how capital market incentives affect communications between managers and analysts.

Analyst forecasts; Benchmark beating; Pessimism; Optimism; Walkdown; Equity issuance; Insider trading; Earnings guidance; Disclosure; Earnings surprise; Forecast error

Abstract:
This paper examines the informativeness of segment disclosures using a real-options framework. I study the relation between firm value and segment earnings when managers have options to adapt poorly-performing segments and to expand segments with investment opportunities. The segment adaptation option implies that segment losses should be less informative than segment profits about firm value. The segment expansion option implies that earnings will be capitalized at a higher rate for segments with higher investment opportunities. My empirical results are consistent with the hypotheses. This framework and supporting empirical evidence provide a direct link between the valuation and managerial-monitoring roles of segment disclosures.

Abstract:
This paper explores whether firms that share common directors also pursue similar corporate policies. Using a sample of 885 U.S. firms with common directors, we find that director fixed effects strongly explain variation in firms' governance, financial, disclosure, and strategic policy choices. Moreover, the director fixed effects provide incremental explanatory power over traditional economic determinants of firms' policies. consistent with our hypotheses, the director effects are less pronounced in large firms, in firms with more outside board members, and for directors with numerous outside board appointments. Our evidence is more consistent with directors and firms "matching" their policy preferences rather than directors "imposing" their policy preferences on firms.

Board of Directors, Corporate Governance, Corporate Policies, Disclosure

Abstract:
This paper examines investment allocations in emerging markets by actively-managed U.S. mutual funds. We analyze both country- and firm-level characteristics and policies that influence these investment allocations. At the country-level, we find that U.S. funds invest more in open emerging markets with stronger shareholder rights, legal frameworks and accounting policies. After controlling for country characteristics, U.S. funds are found to invest more in large growing firms with high analyst following and policies such as ADR listing and more transparent accounting policies. The impact of ADR listing and better accounting policies is most pronounced in countries with weaker investor protection. Our results suggest that steps can be taken both at the country- and the firm-level to create an environment conducive to foreign institutional investment.

Institutional Investors, Portfolio Allocations, Emerging Markets, Corporate Governance

Abstract:
This paper examines the cross-sectional and time-series determinants of message-posting volume on stock message boards on the Web. I test whether variation in message-posting volume is just noise or is related to underlying firm characteristics and stock market activity. Using a sample of over 3,000 stocks listed on Yahoo! message boards, I find that cumulative posting volume is, on average, highest for firms with extreme past returns and accounting performance, high market capitalization, high price-earnings and market-to-book ratios, high volatility and trading volume, high analyst following and low institutional holdings. Changes in daily posting volume are associated with earnings-announcement events and daily changes in stock trading volume and returns. Overnight message-posting volume is found to predict changes in next day stock trading volume and returns. Rational and behavioral explanations for the observed pattern in message-posting activity are discussed.

Abstract:
This paper examines the source of the documented empirical link between measures of accruals quality and a firm's cost of capital. First, we argue that when regressions include accruals quality and operating volatility as determinants, these highly correlated measures capture different underlying constructs. Second, we find that in such regressions, the accruals quality measure displays inconsistent associations, while operating volatility variables display robust associations, with various cost of capital measures. Third, we provide research design suggestions to disentangle the effect of accruals quality from operating volatility, and we show how this method leads to less noisy coefficient estimates. These findings should be useful in designing empirical tests of the hypothesized associations involving accruals quality, operating volatility, and cost of capital.

Abstract:
This study investigates security analysts' reactions to public management guidance and assesses whether managers successfully guide analysts toward beatable earnings targets. We use a panel dataset between 1995 and 2001 to examine the fiscal-quarter-specific determinants of management guidance and the timing, extent, and outcomes of analysts' reactions to this guidance. We find that management guidance is more likely when analysts' initial forecasts are optimistic, and, after controlling for the level of this optimism, when analysts' forecast dispersion is low. Analysts quickly react to management guidance and they are more likely to issue final meetable or beatable earnings targets when management provides public guidance. Our evidence suggests that public management guidance plays an important role in leading analysts toward achievable earnings targets.

Analysts, Earnings guidance, Expectations management, Management earnings forecasts

Abstract:
Recent accounting research has started to investigate the links between corporate compensation and auditor compensation. Engel, Hayes and Wang (2010) take a first step to connect these previously-distinct literatures by investigating the association between audit committee pay and audit fees. I discuss the findings of this study and then present complementary empirical evidence on the association between CEO compensation and audit fees. My descriptive empirical evidence suggests economically large co-variation in CEO compensation and audit fees. I conclude with suggestions for future research on the links between firms’ corporate compensation and auditor compensation policies.

Audit Fees, CEO Compensation, Complexity, Entrenchment, Risk

Abstract:

Abstract:
It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an earnings guidance game where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then 'walk down' their estimates to a level firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk-down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (via new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk-down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.

Earnings Announcement, Expectations Management, Insider Trading, Stock Options

Abstract:
This discussion re-examines two major elements of Haw et al (2004). First, I present empirical evidence suggesting that tax compliance and earnings management are endogenous outcomes around the world. This result raises questions whether tax compliance is a causal determinant of either private control benefits or earnings management. I therefore outline a competing view, with supporting empirical evidence, that suggests that better investor protection laws and accounting standards can mitigate earnings management and, as a side benefit, increase corporate tax compliance. Second, I investigate the empirical validity of the Haw et al (2004) earnings management proxy. I find that it exhibits no association with relevant economic factors or with previously validated earnings management and accounting quality measures.

Earnings Management, Tax, Institutional

Abstract:
We examine the relation between managers' disclosure activities and their stock price-based incentives. Managers are privy to information that investors demand and are reluctant to publicly disseminate it unless provided appropriate incentives. We argue that stock price-based incentives in the form of stock-based compensation and share ownership mitigate this disclosure agency problem. Consistent with this prediction, we find that firms' disclosures, measured both by management earnings forecast frequency and analysts' subjective ratings of disclosure practice, are positively related to the proportion of CEO compensation affected by stock price and the value of shares held by the CEO.

compensation, disclosure