• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
We test a Wall Street investment strategy, pairs trading, with daily data over 1962-2002. Stocks are matched into pairs with minimum distance between normalized historical prices. A simple trading rule yields average annualized excess returns of up to 11 percent for selffinancing portfolios of pairs. The profits typically exceed conservative transaction costs estimates. Bootstrap results suggest that the pairs effect differs from previously-documented reversal profits. Robustness of the excess returns indicates that pairs trading profits from temporary mis-pricing of close substitutes. We link the profitability to the presence of a common factor in the returns, different from conventional risk measures.

Abstract:
We develop a model of optimal investment with two types of agents with different beliefs about the market dynamics. Market conformists agree with the true log-normal price distribution and rebels believe in price predictability. Depending on their exact beliefs, the rebels may follow either a momentum or a contrarian strategy. It is difficult to detect rebels' beliefs that are not far-fetched from the market perspective. The long-run investment portfolios of both conformist and rebels need not be biased towards equities.

Abstract:
We consider investing in a noisy market with incorrect beliefs about predictability. Two types of agents use subjective models to optimize their portfolios - "conformists" who happen to believe in the self-fulfilling market consensus and "rebels" who have wrong beliefs. We compare the agents' dynamic trading and their empirically observable investment performance. An agent who believes in log-normality is always a contrarian trader, who buys more shares after the price goes down, and sells shares when the price goes up. In contrast, an agent who believes in price predictability acts as a momentum trader, who buys more shares after the price goes up, for a range of subjective market mis-pricings. We show that more incorrect beliefs about predictability can lead to higher expected returns. Moreover, rebels with incorrect beliefs can have higher expected return than conformists with the same risk-aversion. We find that it is more dangerous to be a sophisticated rebel in a non-predictable world, than to be a simplistic rebel in a predictable world.

Abstract:
This paper argues that banks have a unique ability to hedge against market-wide liquidity shocks. Deposit inflows provide funding for loan demand shocks that follow declines in market liquidity. Consequently, one dimension of bank 'specialness' is that banks can insure firms against systematic declines in market liquidity at lower cost than other financial institutions. We provide supporting empirical evidence from the commercial paper (CP) market. When market liquidity dries up and CP spreads increase, banks experience funding inflows. These flows allow banks to meet increased loan demand from borrowers drawing funds from pre-existing commercial paper backup lines, without running down their holdings of liquid assets. Moreover, the supply of cheap funds is sufficiently large so that pricing on new lines of credit actually falls as market spreads widen.

Abstract:
This paper argues that banks have a unique ability to hedge against market-wide liquidity shocks. Deposit inflows provide a natural hedge for loan demand shocks that follow declines in market liquidity. Consequently, one dimension of bank "specialness" is that banks can insure firms against systematic declines in market liquidity at lower cost than other financial institutions. We provide supporting empirical evidence from the commercial paper (CP) market. When market liquidity dries up and CP spreads increase, banks experience funding inflows. These allow banks to meet increased loan demand from borrowers drawing funds from pre-existing commercial paper backup lines, without running down their holdings of liquid assets. Moreover, the supply of cheap funds is sufficiently large so that pricing on new lines of credit actually falls as market spreads widen.

banking, liquidity, commercial paper

Abstract:
Liquidity risk in banking has been attributed to transactions deposits and their potential to spark runs or panics. We show instead that transactions deposits help banks hedge liquidity risk from unused loan commitments. Bank stock-return volatility increases with unused commitments, but the increase is smaller for banks with high levels of transactions deposits. This deposit-lending risk management synergy becomes more powerful during periods of tight liquidity, when nervous investors move funds into their banks. Our results reverse the standard notion of liquidity risk at banks, where runs from depositors had been seen as the cause of trouble.

Abstract:
Unused loan commitments expose banks to systematic liquidity risk, but this exposure can be reduced by combining loan commitments with transactions deposits. We show that bank equity volatility increases with unused loan commitments, but this increase is reduced for banks with high levels of transaction deposits. This deposit-lending synergy becomes even more powerful during periods of tight liquidity, when nervous investors move funds into their banks. Thus, the simultaneous taking of deposits and lending may be thought of as a liquidity hedge.

Liquidity, banking, financial crisis

Abstract:
During systematic liquidity shocks, hedge funds are able to borrow from banks and thus are not limited by capital constraints. Government-protected bank deposits receive inflows during systematic liquidity shocks. These inflows provide low cost funding and help estimate the magnitude of a shock, reducing the information asymmetry that constrains hedge funds. The unique combination of low funding cost and sophisticated information gives banks an advantage in lending to hedge funds. While banks do not participate in the upside risk that they finance, they compete away their effective government subsidy to the benefit of their hedge fund clients.

banks, hedge funds, limited arbitrage, liquidity risk

Abstract:
We produce a comprehensive decomposition of syndicated loan risk into credit, market and liquidity risk and test how these shape loan syndicate structure. Banks dominate relative to onbank investors in loan syndicates that expose lenders to liquidity risk. This dominance is most pronounced when borrowers have high levels of credit or market risk. We then tie banks' comparative advantage in liquidity risk bearing to their access to transactions deposits by comparing investments across banks. The results suggest that risk-management considerations matter most for participants relative to lead arrangers. Links from transactions deposits to liquidity exposure, for instance, are more than 50% larger at participants than at lead arrangers.

Liquidity Risk, Banks, Syndicates, Syndicated Loans

Abstract:
We report evidence from the equity market that unused loan commitments expose banks to systematic liquidity risk, especially during crises such as the one observed in the fall of 1998. We also find, however, that banks with higher levels of transactions deposits had lower risk during the 1998 crisis than other banks. These banks experienced large inflows of funds just as they were needed -- when liquidity demanded by firms taking down funds from commercial paper backup lines of credit peaked. Our evidence suggests that combining loan commitments with deposits mitigates liquidity risk, and that this deposit-lending synergy is especially powerful during period of crises as nervous investors move funds into their banks.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We offer a new explanation of loan syndicate structure based on banks' comparative advantage in managing systematic liquidity risk. When a syndicated loan to a rated borrower has systematic liquidity risk, the fraction of passive participant lenders that are banks is about 8% higher than for loans without liquidity risk. In contrast, liquidity risk does not explain the share of banks as lead lenders. Using a new measure of ex-ante liquidity risk exposure, we find further evidence that syndicate participants specialize in liquidity-risk management while lead banks manage lending relationships. Links from transactions deposits to liquidity exposure are about 50% larger at participant banks than at lead arrangers.

Abstract:
We test a Wall Street investment strategy, "pairs trading," with daily data over 1962-2002. Stocks are matched into pairs with minimum distance between normalized historical prices. A simple trading rule yields average annualized excess returns of up to 11% for self-financing portfolios of pairs. The profits typically exceed conservative transaction-cost estimates. Bootstrap results suggest that the "pairs" effect differs from previously documented reversal profits. Robustness of the excess returns indicates that pairs trading profits from temporary mispricing of close substitutes. We link the profitability to the presence of a common factor in the returns, different from conventional risk measures.

Abstract:
Hedge funds facing capital constraints during market-wide liquidity shocks use bank credit lines to reduce the limits to arbitrage. During shocks, government-protected bank deposits receive inflows and this exclusive low cost funding enables banks to lend to hedge funds. In effect, banks compete away the government subsidy while tax-avoiding hedge funds reap the lion share of the benefits. After the advent of hedge funds, the existing government safety net protecting banks is no longer optimal in the sense of maximizing social surplus.

Value spread, value premium, market timing, Asia

Abstract:
Liquidity risk in banking has been attributed to transactions deposits and their potential to spark runs or panics. We show instead that transactions deposits help banks hedge liquidity risk from unused loan commitments. Bank stock-return volatility increases with unused commitments, but only for banks with low levels of transactions deposits. This deposit-lending hedge becomes more powerful during periods of tight liquidity, when nervous investors move funds into their banks. Our results reverse the standard notion of liquidity risk at banks, where runs from depositors had been seen as the cause of trouble.

G18, G21