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Armin Falk's
Scholarly Papers
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8,680 |
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968 |
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1.
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Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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17 Dec 01
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17 Mar 04
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1,191 (3,673)
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73
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Abstract:
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of human motivation may severely limit understanding the determinants and effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour if they neglect motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance with rules. In addition, these motives may generate very powerful incentives themselves.
Incentives, Contracts, Reciprocity, Social Approval, Social Norms, Intrinsic Motivation
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2.
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A Theory of Reciprocity
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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03 Apr 00
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10 Aug 04
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933 ( 5,542) |
184
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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08 Nov 01
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15 Nov 01
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37
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This Paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games. Among them are the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, the theory explains why the same consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why in bilateral interactions outcomes tend to be 'fair' whereas in competitive markets even extremely unfair distributions may arise.
Reciprocity, fairness, cooperation, game theory
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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03 Apr 00
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10 Aug 04
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896
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184
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Abstract:
This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games. Among them are the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, the theory explains why the same consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments Finally the theory explains why in bilaterial interactions outcomes tend to be "fair" whereas in competitive markets even extremely unfair distributions may arise.
Reciprocity, Fairness, Cooperation, Competition, Game Theory
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3.
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Simon Gächter CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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08 Feb 01
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06 Jan 06
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786 (7,316)
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In this paper we study experimentally four remedies to overcome inefficiencies that arise from the incompleteness of contracts. These remedies are reciprocity, repeated game effects, social embeddedness, and incentive contracts. In our baseline treatment we find that reciprocity is a powerful contract enforcement device. A second experiment establishes that repeated game effects interact with reciprocity in a complementary way, i.e., efficiency is increased compared to our baseline. Adding social approval incentives does not contribute significantly to efficiency. Finally, we show that explicit incentive contracts may have perverse effects in the sense that they "crowd out" reciprocity and therefore reduce efficiency compared to the baseline. In our concluding section we discuss the relation of our findings to the recent literature on "intrinsic motivation".
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Individual Risk Attitudes: New Evidence from a Large, Representative, Experimentally-Validated Survey
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Juergen Schupp German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen Gert G. Wagner German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
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27 Sep 05
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09 Jun 06
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326 ( 24,745) |
81
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Juergen Schupp German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen Gert G. Wagner German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
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06 Jun 06
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09 Jun 06
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62
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This paper presents new evidence on the distribution of risk attitudes in the population, using a novel set of survey questions and a representative sample of roughly 22,000 individuals living in Germany. Using a question that asks about willingness to take risks in general, on an 11-point scale, we find evidence of heterogeneity across individuals, and show that willingness to take risks is negatively related to age and being female, and positively related to height and parental education. We test the behavioral relevance of this survey measure by conducting a complementary field experiment, based on a representative sample of 450 subjects, and find that the general risk question is a good predictor of actual risk-taking behavior. We then use a more standard lottery question to measure risk preferences in our sample of 22,000, and find similar results regarding heterogeneity and determinants of risk preferences, compared to the general risk question. The lottery question also makes it possible to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion for each individual in the sample. Using five questions about willingness to take risks in specific domains - car driving, financial matters, sports and leisure, career, and health - the paper also studies the impact of context on risk attitudes, finding a strong but imperfect correlation across contexts. Using data on a collection of risky behaviors from different contexts, including traffic offences, portfolio choice, smoking, occupational choice, participation in sports, and migration, the paper compares the predictive power of all of the risk measures. Strikingly, the general risk question predicts all behaviors whereas the standard lottery measure does not. The best predictor for any specific behavior is typically the corresponding context-specific measure.
Risk preferences, experimental validation, field experiment, SOEP, gender differences, context, age, height, subjective well-being, migration, occupational choice, health
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen Juergen Schupp German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) Gert G. Wagner German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
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27 Sep 05
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02 Feb 06
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264
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Abstract:
This paper presents new evidence on the distribution of risk attitudes in the population, using a novel set of survey questions and a representative sample of roughly 22,000 individuals living in Germany. Using a question that asks about willingness to take risks on an 11-point scale, we find evidence of heterogeneity across individuals, and show that willingness to take risks is negatively related to age and being female, and positively related to height and parental education. We test the behavioral relevance of this survey measure by conducting a complementary field experiment, based on a representative sample of 450 subjects, and find that the measure is a good predictor of actual risk-taking behavior. We then use a more standard lottery question to measure risk preference, and find similar results regarding heterogeneity and determinants of risk preferences. The lottery question makes it possible to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion for each individual in the sample. Using five questions about willingness to take risks in specific domains - car driving, financial matters, sports and leisure, career, and health - the paper also studies the impact of context on risk attitudes, finding a strong but imperfect correlation across contexts. Using data on a collection of risky behaviors from different contexts, including traffic offenses, portfolio choice, smoking, occupational choice, participation in sports, and migration, the paper compares the predictive power of all of the risk measures. Strikingly, the general risk question predicts all behaviors whereas the standard lottery measure does not. The best overall predictor for any specific behavior is typically the corresponding context-specific measure. These findings call into the question the current preoccupation with lottery measures of risk preference, and point to variation in risk perceptions as an understudied determinant of risky behavior.
risk preferences, preference stability, experimental validation, field experiment, SOEP, gender differences, age, height, subjective well-being
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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08 Feb 01
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17 Mar 04
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324 (24,958)
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35
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Abstract:
Recently developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. The most controversial and yet unresolved issue in the modeling of fairness preferences concerns the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem to play an important role in economic relations, political struggles and legal disputes. Yet, so far there is little rigorous evidence supporting this intuition. In this paper we provide clear and unambiguous experimental evidence for the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Our results indicate that the attribution of fairness intentions is important both in the domain of negatively reciprocal behavior and in the domain of positively reciprocal behavior. This means that reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that take into account players' fairness intentions and distributional preferences are consistent with our data while models that focus exclusively on intentions or on the distribution of material payoffs are not.
Fairness, Reciprocity, Intentions, Experiments, Moonlighting Game
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6.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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10 Nov 00
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25 May 01
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324 (24,958)
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Informal sanctions are a major determinant of a society's social capital because they are key to the enforcement of implicit agreements and social norms. Yet, little is known about the driving forces behind informal sanctions. We examine systematically the determinants of informal sanctions by a large number of experiments. Our findings show that the violation of fairness principles is the most important driving force of sanctions but, in addition, a non-negligible part of the sanctions is driven by spitefulness. We find surprisingly little evidence for strategic sanctions that are imposed to create future material benefits. Within the class of fairness-driven sanctions the motive to harm those who committed unfair actions or who revealed unfair intentions seems most important. The motive to decrease unfair payoff differences also plays some role but it cannot explain a sizeable part of the sanctions. The motive to achieve a fair relative share is largely irrelevant for sanctioning behavior.
Informal Sanction, Social Norm, Social Capital, Strategic Sanction, Fairness, Reciprocity, Spitefulness.
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7.
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Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Michael Kosfeld Goethe-University Frankfurt
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30 Jun 04
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27 Sep 04
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318 ( 25,500) |
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Michael Kosfeld Goethe-University Frankfurt
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13 Sep 04
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27 Sep 04
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We show experimentally that a principal's distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on the agent's motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides whether he wants to restrict the agents' choice set by implementing a minimum performance level for the agent. Since both parties have conflicting interests, restriction is optimal for the principal whenever the latter expects the agent to behave opportunistically. We find that most principals in our experiment do not restrict the agent's choice set but trust that the agent will perform well voluntarily. Principals who trust induce, on average, a higher performance and hence earn higher payoffs than principals who control. The reason is that most agents lower their performance as a response to the signal of distrust created by the principal's decision to limit their choice set. Our results shed new light on dysfunctional effects of explicit incentives, as well as the puzzling incompleteness of many economic contracts.
Trust, distrust, motivation, principal-agent relationship, incentives, control, incomplete contracts
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Michael Kosfeld Goethe-University Frankfurt
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30 Jun 04
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02 Sep 04
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299
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Abstract:
We show experimentally that a principal's distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on the agent's motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides whether he wants to restrict the agents' choice set by implementing a minimum performance level for the agent. Since both parties have conflicting interests, restriction is optimal for the principal whenever the latter expects the agent to behave opportunistically. We find that most principals in our experiment do not restrict the agent's choice set but trust that the agent will perform well voluntarily. Principals who trust induce, on average, a higher performance and, hence, earn higher payoffs than principals who control. The reason is that most agents lower their performance as a response to the signal of distrust created by the principal's decision to limit their choice set. Our results shed new light on dysfunctional effects of explicit incentives, as well as, the puzzling incompleteness of many economic contracts.
Trust, distrust, motivation, principal-agent relationship, incentives, control, incomplete contracts
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Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions
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Martin Brown Swiss National Bank Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich
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Posted:
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29 Mar 02
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07 Jan 06
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266 ( 31,368) |
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Martin Brown Swiss National Bank Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich
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18 Apr 02
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25 Jun 02
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21
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We provide experimental evidence that contractual incompleteness, ie, the absence of third party enforcement of workers' effort or the quality of the good traded causes a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. If contracts are complete the vast majority of trades are initiated by public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner. Moreover, the short side of the market attempts to appropriate the whole gains from trade, which causes much disagreement about contract terms. If contracts are incomplete the vast majority of trades are initiated by private offers. The contracting parties form long-term relations and the provision of low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship. The threat of terminating the relation turns out to be an extremely powerful discipline device. Markets with incomplete contracts resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. The short side of the market shares the gains from trade with the long side of the market so that there is little disagreement about contract terms. Our results support theories of the labour market that are based on the idea that unemployment is a worker discipline device.
Market interaction, contract enforcement, incomplete contract, involuntary unemployment, repeated transaction, fairness preferences
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Martin Brown Swiss National Bank Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich
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29 Mar 02
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07 Jan 06
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245
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Abstract:
We provide experimental evidence that contractual incompleteness, i.e., the absence of third party enforcement of workers' effort or the quality of the good traded, causes a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. If contracts are complete the vast majority of trades are initiated by public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner. Moreover, the short side of the market attempts to appropriate the whole gains from trade, which causes much disagreement about contract terms. If contracts are incomplete the vast majority of trades are initiated by private offers. The contracting parties form long-term relations and the provision of low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship. The threat of terminating the relation turns out to be an extremely powerful discipline device. Markets with incomplete contracts resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. The short side of the market shares the gains from trade with the long side of the market so that there is little disagreement about contract terms. Our results support theories of the labor market that are based on the idea that unemployment is a worker discipline device.
Market Interaction, Contract Enforcement, Incomplete Contract, Involuntary Unemployment, Repeated Transaction, Fairness Preferences
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Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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Posted:
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10 Nov 00
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10 Aug 04
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246 ( 34,277) |
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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16 Oct 01
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06 Feb 04
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23
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In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. When communication or informal sanctions are available, however, appropriation behaviour is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.
Common pool resources, experiments, fairness, reciprocity, game theory, fairness models
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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10 Nov 00
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10 Aug 04
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223
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In this paper we show that a simple model of reciprocal preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.
Common Pool Resources, Experiments, Fairness, Reciprocity, Game Theory, Fairness Models
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On the Nature of Fair Behavior
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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Posted:
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11 Jan 00
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23 Jan 02
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239 ( 35,459) |
64
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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18 Oct 01
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23 Jan 02
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This Paper shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics of defining the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means, in particular, that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material pay-offs. Models that take into account players' fairness intentions and distributional preferences are consistent with our data while models that focus exclusively on intentions or on the distribution of material pay-offs are not.
Fairness, intentions, models of fairness
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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20 Dec 01
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17 Jan 02
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Abstract:
This paper shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means, in particular, that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that take into account players' fairness intentions and distributional preferences are consistent with our data while models that focus exclusively on intentions or on the distribution of material payoffs are not.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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11 Jan 00
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27 Jul 01
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222
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Abstract:
This paper shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means, in particular, that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that take into account players' fairness intentions and distributional preferences are consistent with our data while models that focus exclusively on intentions or on the distribution of material payoffs are not.
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Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation
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Simon Gächter CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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20 Feb 00
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10 Aug 04
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238 ( 35,459) |
5
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Simon Gächter CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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02 Dec 02
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29 Feb 04
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Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that, in the repeated game, some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that long-term interaction is a 'reciprocity-compatible' contract enforcement device.
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Simon Gächter CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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20 Feb 00
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10 Aug 04
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224
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Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that in the repeated game some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that a long-term interaction is a "reciprocity-compatible" contract enforcement device.
Reciprocity, Reputation, Repeated Games, Incomplete Contracts
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Martin Brown Swiss National Bank Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich
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18 Nov 03
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02 Sep 04
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233 (36,297)
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Abstract:
We provide evidence that long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are initiated with private offers and the parties share the gains from trade equally. Low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship, wielding a powerful effect on contract enforcement. Successful long-term relations exhibit generous rent sharing and high effort (quality) from the very beginning of the relationship. In the absence of third-party enforcement, markets resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. If contracts are third party enforceable, rent sharing and long-term relations are absent and the vast majority of trades are initiated with public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner.
relational contracts, implicit contracts, market interaction, involuntary unemployment, repeated transaction, fairness preferences
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13.
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Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Andrea Ichino European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO)
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Posted:
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23 Apr 03
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22 Oct 04
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193 ( 44,048) |
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Andrea Ichino European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO)
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| Posted: |
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16 May 03
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Last Revised:
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19 May 03
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23
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46
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Abstract:
While confounding factors typically jeopardise the possibility of using observational data to measure peer effects, field experiments offer the possibility of obtaining clean evidence. In this Paper we measure the output of four randomly selected groups of individuals who were asked to fill letters in envelopes, with a remuneration completely independent of output. For two of these groups the output of peers was exogenously manipulated (low or high) by making individuals aware of the number of letters previously produced by artificial colleagues. In the third group individuals were set up to work one in front of the other, while the fourth group gave the baseline output for independent not manipulated work. Our first finding is that effort of the less productive workers reacts in a sizeable and statistically significant way to peer pressure. Second, there is strong evidence of peer effects when individuals work in pairs. Third, these peer effects work in the direction of making the least productive individuals work harder, thereby increasing overall productivity.
Peer effects, field experiments, incentives
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Andrea Ichino European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO)
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| Posted: |
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23 Apr 03
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Last Revised:
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22 Oct 04
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170
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46
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Abstract:
While confounding factors typically jeopardize the possibility to use observational data to measure peer effects, field experiments offer the possibility to obtain clean evidence. In this paper we measure the output of four randomly selected groups of individuals who were asked to fill letters in envelopes, with a remuneration completely independent of output. For two of these groups the output of peers was exogenously manipulated (low or high) by making individuals aware of the number of letters previously produced by artificial colleagues. In the third group individuals were set up to work one in front of the other, while the fourth group gave the baseline output for independent not manipulated work. Our first finding is that effort of the less productive workers reacts in a sizeable and statistically significant way to peer pressure. Second, there is strong evidence of peer effects when individuals work in pairs. Third, these peer effects work in the direction of making the least productive individuals work harder, thereby increasing overall productivity.
Peer Effects, Field Experiments, Incentives
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14.
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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| Posted: |
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13 Mar 06
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Last Revised:
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07 Aug 06
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192 (44,267)
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21
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Abstract:
This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. In a first step we elicit subjects' productivity levels. Subjects then face the choice between a fixed or a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is either a piece rate, a tournament or a revenue-sharing scheme. We elicit additional individual characteristics such as subjects' risk attitudes, measures of self-assessment and overconfidence, social preferences, gender and personality. We also elicit self-reported measures of work effort, stress and exhaustion. Our main findings are as follows. First, output is much higher in the variable pay schemes (piece rate, tournament, and revenue sharing) compared to the fixed payment scheme. Second, this difference is largely driven by productivity sorting. On average, the more productive a worker is, the more likely he self-selects into the variable pay scheme. Third, relative self-assessment and overconfidence affect worker self-selection, in particular into tournaments. Fourth, risk averse workers prefer fixed payments and are less likely to sort into variable pay schemes. Fifth, people endowed with social preferences are less likely to sort into tournaments. Sixth, variable pay schemes attract men more than women, a difference that is partly explained by gender-specific risk attitudes. Seventh, self-selection is also affected by personality differences. Finally, reported effort is significantly higher in all variable pay conditions than in the fixed wage condition. In sum, our findings underline the importance of multi-dimensional sorting, i.e., the tendency for different incentive schemes to systematically attract people with different abilities, preferences, self-assessments, gender and personalities.
personnel economics, sorting, incentives, productivity, ability, piece rates
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15.
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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31 Oct 06
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Last Revised:
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29 May 08
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191 (44,514)
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30
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Abstract:
Recent theoretical contributions depart from the usual practice of treating individual attitude endowments as a black box, by assuming that these are shaped by the attitudes of parents and other role models. Attitudes include fundamental preferences such as risk preference, and crucial beliefs about the world, such as trust. This paper provides evidence on the three main mechanisms for attitude transmission highlighted in the theoretical literature: (1) transmission of attitudes from parents to children; (2) positive assortative mating of parents, which tends to reinforce the impact of parents on the child; (3) an impact of prevailing attitudes in the local environment. Investigating these mechanisms is important because they are crucial assumptions underlying a large literature. It also sheds light on the basic question of where individual attitude endowments come from, and the factors that determine these drivers of economic behavior. The findings are supportive of attitude transmission models, and indicate that all three mechanisms play a role in shaping economically relevant attitudes.
risk preferences, trust, intergenerational transmission, cultural transmission, assortative mating, social mobility, SOEP
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16.
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It's All About Connections: Evidence on Network Formation
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Michael Kosfeld Goethe-University Frankfurt
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Posted:
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28 Apr 03
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Last Revised:
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22 Oct 04
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189 ( 45,003) |
9
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Michael Kosfeld Goethe-University Frankfurt
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| Posted: |
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29 Aug 03
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Last Revised:
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02 Oct 03
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20
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9
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Abstract:
We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The game-theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000). They distinguish between two scenarios regarding the flow of benefits through a network, the so-called 1-way and 2-way flow model. Our main results show that the prediction based on Nash and strict Nash equilibrium works well in the 1-way flow model but largely fails in the 2-way flow model. We observe a strong learning dynamic in the 1-way flow model but less so in the 2-way flow model. Finally, costs of a direct link have a positive impact on the occurrence of (strict) Nash networks in the 1-way flow model but a negative impact in the 2-way flow model. In our discussion on possible explanations for these results we focus on strategic asymmetry and asymmetry with respect to payoffs. We find that the latter asymmetry, i.e. payoff inequity, plays an important role in the network formation process.
Network formation, experiments, coordination, fairness
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Michael Kosfeld Goethe-University Frankfurt
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| Posted: |
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28 Apr 03
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Last Revised:
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22 Oct 04
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169
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9
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Abstract:
We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The gametheoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000). They distinguish between two scenarios regarding the flow of benefits through a network, the so-called 1-way and 2-way flow model. Our main results show that the prediction based on Nash and strict Nash equilibrium works well in the 1-way flow model but fails largely in the 2-way flow model. We observe a strong learning dynamic in the 1-way flow model but less so in the 2- way flow model. Finally, costs of a direct link have a positive impact on the occurrence of (strict) Nash networks in the 1-way flow model but a negative impact in the 2-way flow model. In our discussion on possible explanations for these results we focus on strategic asymmetry and asymmetry with respect to payoffs. We find that the latter asymmetry, i.e., payoff inequity, plays an important role in the network formation process.
Network Formation, Experiments, Coordination, Fairness
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17.
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Charitable Giving as a Gift Exchange Evidence from a Field Experiment
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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Posted:
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04 Nov 03
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Last Revised:
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02 Sep 04
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164 ( 51,834) |
12
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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| Posted: |
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11 Feb 04
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Last Revised:
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17 Feb 04
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13
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12
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Abstract:
This study reports data from a field experiment that was conducted to investigate the relevance of gift-exchange for charitable giving. Roughly 10,000 solicitation letters were sent to potential donors in the experiment. One third of the letters contained no gift, one third contained a small gift and one third contained a large gift. Whether a potential donor received a letter with or without a gift was randomly determined. We observe strong and systematic effects from including gifts. Compared to the no gift condition, the relative frequency of donations increased by 17% if a small gift was included and by 75% for a large gift. Consequently, including gifts was highly profitable for the charitable organization. The contribution of this Paper is twofold: first, it shows that reciprocity is an important motive for charitable giving, in addition to the warm-glow motive. Second, the Paper confirms the economic relevance of reciprocity by using field data. This extends the current body of research on reciprocity, which is almost exclusively confined to laboratory studies.
Warm glow, reciprocity, charitable giving, field experiments
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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| Posted: |
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04 Nov 03
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Last Revised:
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02 Sep 04
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151
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12
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Abstract:
This study reports data from a field experiment that was conducted to investigate the relevance of gift-exchange for charitable giving. Roughly 10,000 solicitation letters were sent to potential donors in the experiment. One third of the letters contained no gift, one third contained a small gift and one third contained a large gift. Whether a potential donor received a letter with or without a gift was randomly determined. We observe strong and systematic effects from including gifts. Compared to the no gift condition, the relative frequency of donations increased by 17 percent if a small gift was included and by 75 percent for a large gift. Consequently, including gifts was highly profitable for the charitable organization. The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, it shows that gift-exchange is important for charitable giving, in addition to the warm-glow motive. Second, the paper confirms the economic relevance of reciprocity by using field data. This extends the current body of research on reciprocity, which is almost exclusively confined to laboratory studies.
charitable giving, field experiments, reciprocity, warm glow
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18.
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Choosing the Joneses: Endogenous Goals and Reference Standards
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Markus Knell Austrian National Bank - Economic Studies Division
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Posted:
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01 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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13 Jan 05
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152 ( 55,661) |
14
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Markus Knell Austrian National Bank - Economic Studies Division
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| Posted: |
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08 Dec 04
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Last Revised:
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13 Jan 05
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11
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14
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Abstract:
A growing economic literature stresses the importance of relative comparisons, e.g., for savings and consumption or happiness. In this literature it is usually assumed that reference standards against which people compare themselves are exogenously given. In contrast, findings from social psychology suggest that people play an active role in determining their reference standards. We introduce a social comparison model where people choose their reference standards to serve motives of self-improvement and self-enhancement. The model predicts that reference standards increase in individuals' abilities and that people thus tend to compare themselves to similar others. The results of a questionnaire study confirm the prediction of the model.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Markus Knell Austrian National Bank - Economic Studies Division
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| Posted: |
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04 Aug 04
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Last Revised:
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08 Dec 04
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11
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14
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Abstract:
A growing economic literature stresses the importance of relative comparisons, e.g., for savings and consumption or happiness. In this literature, it is usually assumed that reference standards against which people compare themselves are exogenously given. In contrast, findings from social psychology suggest that people play an active role in determining their reference standards. We present a social comparison model where people choose their reference standards to serve motives of self-improvement and self-enhancement. The model predicts that reference standards increase in individuals' abilities and that people, therefore, tend to compare themselves to similar others. The results of a questionnaire study confirm the model's prediction.
Reference standards, goals, social comparison, happiness
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Markus Knell Austrian National Bank - Economic Studies Division
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| Posted: |
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01 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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13 Jan 05
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130
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14
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Abstract:
A growing economic literature stresses the importance of relative comparisons, e.g., for savings and consumption or happiness. In this literature it is usually assumed that reference standards against which people compare themselves are exogenously given. In contrast findings from social psychology suggest that people play an active role in determining their reference standards. We present a social comparison model where people choose their reference standards to serve motives of self-improvement and self-enhancement. The model predicts that reference standards increase in individuals' abilities and that thus people tend to compare themselves to similar others. The results of a questionnaire study confirm the model's prediction.
reference standard, goals, social comparison, happiness
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19.
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The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Christian Zehnder University of Lausanne
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Posted:
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08 Jun 05
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Last Revised:
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26 Oct 05
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142 ( 59,273) |
7
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Christian Zehnder University of Lausanne
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| Posted: |
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10 Aug 05
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Last Revised:
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26 Oct 05
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11
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7
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Abstract:
The prevailing labor market models assume that minimum wages do not affect the labor supply schedule. We challenge this view in this paper by showing experimentally that minimum wages have significant and lasting effects on subjects' reservation wages. The temporary introduction of a minimum wage leads to a rise in subjects' reservation wages that persists even after the minimum wage has been removed. Firms are therefore forced to pay higher wages after the removal of the minimum wage than before its introduction. As a consequence, the employment effects of removing the minimum wage are significantly smaller than are the effects of its introduction. The impact of minimum wages on reservation wages may also explain the anomalously low utilization of sub-minimum wages if employers are given the opportunity of paying less than a minimum wage previously introduced. It may further explain why employers often increase workers' wages after an increase in the minimum wage by an amount exceeding that necessary for compliance with the higher minimum. At a more general level, our results suggest that economic policy may affect people's behavior by shaping the perception of what is a fair transaction and by creating entitlement effects.
Minimum wages, labor market, monopsony, fairness, reservation wages, entitlement
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Christian Zehnder University of Lausanne
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| Posted: |
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08 Jun 05
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Last Revised:
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10 Aug 05
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131
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7
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Abstract:
The prevailing labor market models assume that minimum wages do not affect the labor supply schedule. We challenge this view in this paper by showing experimentally that minimum wages have significant and lasting effects on subjects' reservation wages. The temporary introduction of a minimum wage leads to a rise in subjects' reservation wages which persists even after the minimum wage has been removed. Firms are therefore forced to pay higher wages after the removal of the minimum wage than before its introduction. As a consequence, the employment effects of removing the minimum wage are significantly smaller than are the effects of its introduction. The impact of minimum wages on reservation wages may also explain the anomalously low utilization of subminimum wages if employers are given the opportunity of paying less than a minimum wage previously introduced. It may further explain why employers often increase workers' wages after an increase in the minimum wage by an amount exceeding that necessary for compliance with the higher minimum. At a more general level, our results suggest that economic policy may affect people's behavior by shaping the perception of what is a fair transaction and by creating entitlement effects.
minimum wages, labor market, monopsony, fairness, reservation wages, entitlement
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20.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW) Simon Gächter CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
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| Posted: |
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10 Nov 04
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Last Revised:
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10 Apr 05
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142 (59,273)
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5
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Abstract:
Field evidence suggests that people belonging to the same group often behave similarly, i.e., behaviour exhibits social interaction effects. We conduct an experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field. Our novel design feature is that each subject simultaneously is a member of two randomly assigned and identical groups where only members ("neighbours") are different. In both groups subjects contribute to a public good. We speak of social interactions if the same subject at the same time makes group-specific contributions that depend on their respective neighbours' contribution. We find that a majority of subjects exhibits social interaction effects.
Social Interactions, Identification, Experiments
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21.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Markus Knell Austrian National Bank - Economic Studies Division
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| Posted: |
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31 Dec 00
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Last Revised:
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12 Jan 01
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140 (60,000)
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9
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Abstract:
A growing economic literature recognizes and deals with the fact that economic agents' utility and well-being is not solely determined by absolute achievements, but also by achievements relative to a reference standard or reference group. In this literature it is assumed that the reference standard is completely exogenous. Social psychologists have questioned the exogenous nature of the comparison process "forced comparison conception" and have emphasized that people play a more active role in the determination of their reference standards "coping approach". The present paper takes up this idea. In our model the reference standard is determined endogenously. Following the social comparison literature we assume that in choosing the optimal reference standard people pursue goals of self-improvement and self-enhancement. Our model predicts that the optimally chosen reference standard (or group) increases in people's abilities. We present new questionnaire data together with a review.
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22.
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Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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Posted:
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23 Apr 07
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Last Revised:
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23 Jun 08
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136 ( 61,569) |
16
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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17 Jun 08
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Last Revised:
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23 Jun 08
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9
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16
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Abstract:
Is the way that people make risky choices, or tradeoffs over time, related to cognitive ability? This paper investigates whether there is a link between cognitive ability, risk aversion, and impatience, using a representative sample of the population and incentive compatible measures. We conduct choice experiments measuring risk aversion, and impatience over an annual time horizon, for a randomly drawn sample of roughly 1,000 German adults. Subjects also take part in two different tests of cognitive ability, which correspond to sub-modules of one of the most widely used IQ tests. Interviews are conducted in subjects' own homes. We find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion, and more pronounced impatience. These relationships are significant, and robust to controlling for personal characteristics, educational attainment, income, and measures of credit constraints. We perform a series of additional robustness checks, which help rule out other possible confounds.
Cognitive Ability, Field Experiment, Risk Preference, Time Preference
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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30 May 08
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Last Revised:
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23 Jun 08
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7
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16
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Abstract:
Is the way that people make risky choices, or tradeoffs over time, related to cognitive ability? This paper investigates whether there is a link between cognitive ability, risk aversion, and impatience, using a representative sample of the population and incentive compatible measures. We conduct choice experiments measuring risk aversion, and impatience over an annual time horizon, for a randomly drawn sample of roughly 1,000 German adults. Subjects also take part in two different tests of cognitive ability, which correspond to sub-modules of one of the most widely used IQ tests. Interviews are conducted in subjects' own homes. We find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion, and more pronounced impatience. These relationships are significant, and robust to controlling for personal characteristics, educational attainment, income, and measures of credit constraints. We perform a series of additional robustness checks, which help rule out other possible confounds.
Cognitive Ability, Field Experiment, Risk Preference, Time Preference
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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23 Apr 07
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Last Revised:
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23 Apr 07
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120
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16
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| |
Abstract:
Is the way that people make risky choices, or tradeoffs over time, related to cognitive ability? This paper investigates whether there is a link between cognitive ability, risk aversion, and impatience, using a representative sample of the population and incentive compatible measures. We conduct choice experiments measuring risk aversion, and impatience over an annual time horizon, for a randomly drawn sample of roughly 1,000 German adults. Subjects also take part in two different tests of cognitive ability, which correspond to sub-modules of one of the most widely used IQ tests. Interviews are conducted in subjects' own homes. We find that lower cognitive ability is associated with significantly more impatient behavior in the experiments, and with greater risk aversion. This relationship is robust to controlling for personal characteristics, educational attainment, income, and measures of credit constraints. We perform a series of additional robustness checks, which help rule out other possible confounds.
risk preference, time preference, cognitive ability, field experiment
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23.
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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08 Sep 06
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Last Revised:
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08 Sep 06
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130 (63,975)
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3
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Abstract:
Prominent economic theories have emphasized the role of commonly held perceptions and expectations for determining macroeconomic outcomes. A key empirical question is how such collectively held beliefs are formed. We use the FIFA World Cup 2006 as a natural experiment. We provide direct evidence that seemingly irrelevant events (the outcomes of soccer matches) can systematically affect individual perceptions about economic prospects, both on a personal and economy-wide level.
expectation formation, sunspots, soccer world cup, macroeconomic outcomes
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24.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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| Posted: |
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29 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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23 Mar 05
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125 (66,089)
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12
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Abstract:
This study reports data from a field experiment that was conducted to investigate the relevance of gift-exchange for charitable giving. Roughly 10,000 solicitation letters were sent to potential donors in the experiment. One third of the letters contained no gift, one third contained a small gift and one third contained a large gift. Whether a potential donor received a letter with or without a gift was randomly determined. We observe strong and systematic effects from including gifts. Compared to the no gift condition, the relative frequency of donations increased by 17 percent if a small gift was included and by 75 percent for a large gift. Consequently, including gifts was highly profitable for the charitable organization. The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, it shows that gift-exchange is important for charitable giving, in addition to the warm-glow motive. Second, the paper confirms the economic relevance of reciprocity by using field data. This extends the current body of research on reciprocity, which is almost exclusively confined to laboratory studies.
charitable giving, field experiments, reciprocity
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25.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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| Posted: |
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16 Nov 01
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Last Revised:
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17 Mar 04
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117 (69,775)
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35
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Abstract:
Informal sanctions are a major determinant of a society's social capital because they are key to the enforcement of implicit agreements and social norms. Yet, little is known about the driving forces behind informal sanctions. We systematically examine the determinants of informal sanctions by a large number of experiments. Our findings show that the violation of fairness principles is the most important driving force of sanctions but, in addition, a non-negligible part of the sanctions is driven by spitefulness. We find surprisingly little evidence for strategic sanctions that are imposed to create future material benefits. While non-strategic sanctions are of major importance in our experiments, strategic sanctions seem to play a negligible role. Within the class of fairness-driven sanctions the motive to harm those who committed unfair actions seems most important. key-words: Informal Sanction, Social Norm, Social Capital, Strategic Sanction, Fairness, Reciprocity, Spitefulness
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26.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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31 Jul 06
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Last Revised:
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31 Jul 06
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108 (74,382)
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2
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Abstract:
Experimental evidence has convincingly shown the existence of reciprocal inclinations, i.e., a tendency for people to respond in-kind to hostile or kind actions. Little is known, however, about: (i) the prevalence of reciprocity in the population, (ii) individual determinants of reciprocity, (iii) the correlation between positive and negative inclinations within person, and (iv) consequences of reciprocal inclinations for wages, subjective well-being, friendships and other economic and social outcomes. Answering these questions requires moving out of the lab and using a large and representative subject pool, which combines information about subjects' reciprocal inclinations with extensive socioeconomic background information. In this paper we measure the reciprocal inclinations of 21,000 individuals. We show that most people state reciprocal inclinations, in particular in terms of positive reciprocity. However, there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of reciprocity, and quite surprisingly, only a weak correlation between positive and negative reciprocity for an individual. In terms of determinants, being female, and increasing age, lead to greater positive and less negatively reciprocal tendencies. Taller people are more positively reciprocal, but height has no impact on negative reciprocity. The asymmetric impact of these determinants provides further indication that positive and negative reciprocity are fundamentally different traits, rather than the outcome of a single underlying tendency. In terms of economic implications, we provide the first evidence using a large representative survey that corroborates an important hypothesis arising from laboratory experiments: Positively reciprocal workers are in fact paid more, and exert greater effort, on the job. Moreover, positively reciprocal people are more likely to be employed, report having more close friends, and have a higher overall level of life satisfaction. In this sense, Homo Reciprocans - in the positive domain - is in fact more successful than his or her non-reciprocal fellows.
reciprocity, trust, SOEP, wage regression, unemployment, happiness
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27.
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Institutions and Contract Enforcement
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) W. Bentley MacLeod Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics
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Posted:
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23 Apr 08
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Last Revised:
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29 Jul 08
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104 ( 76,528) |
1
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) W. Bentley MacLeod Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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23 May 08
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Last Revised:
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29 Jul 08
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22
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1
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Abstract:
We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.
employment protection, efficiency wages, bonus pay, incomplete contracts, firing costs, experiment
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) W. Bentley MacLeod Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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29 Apr 08
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Last Revised:
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22 Jun 08
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79
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1
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Abstract:
We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.
institutions, contracts, contract enforcement, market experiment
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) W. Bentley MacLeod Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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23 Apr 08
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Last Revised:
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08 May 08
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3
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1
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Abstract:
We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.
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28.
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The Success of Job Applications: A New Approach to Program Evaluation
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Rafael Lalive University of Lausanne - Department of Economics (DEEP) Josef Zweimüller University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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Posted:
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06 Mar 03
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Last Revised:
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22 Oct 04
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102 ( 78,184) |
1
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Rafael Lalive University of Lausanne - Department of Economics (DEEP) Josef Zweimüller University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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| Posted: |
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04 Aug 04
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Last Revised:
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04 Aug 04
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10
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1
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Abstract:
In this Paper, we suggest a novel approach to program evaluation that allows identification of the causal effect of a training program on the likelihood of being invited to a job interview under weak assumptions. The idea is to measure the program-effects by pre- and post-treatment data that are very close in time for the same individual. Our approach provides useful information on both average effects of the program, as well as information on potential differences in the effects of the program by type of vacancy or by individual.
Evaluation, active labor market program, correspondence testing, field experiments
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Rafael Lalive University of Lausanne - Department of Economics (DEEP) Josef Zweimüller University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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| Posted: |
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06 Mar 03
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Last Revised:
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22 Oct 04
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92
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1
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Abstract:
In this paper, we suggest a novel approach to program evaluation that allows identification of the causal effect of a training program on the likelihood of being invited to a job interview under weak assumptions. The idea is to measure the program-effects by pre- and post-treatment data that are very close in time for the same individual. Our approach provides useful information on both, average effects of the program as well as information on potential differences in the effects of the program by type of vacancy or by individual.
evaluation, active labour market program, correspondence testing
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29.
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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20 Apr 09
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Last Revised:
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20 Apr 09
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96 (81,679)
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16
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Abstract:
This paper investigates whether risk aversion and impatience are correlated with cognitive ability. We conduct incentive compatible choice experiments measuring risk aversion, and impatience over an annual time horizon, for a representative sample of roughly 1,000 German adults. A measure of cognitive ability is provided by two submodules of one of the most widely used IQ tests. Interviews are conducted in subjects' own homes. We find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion, and more pronounced impatience. These relationships are statistically and economically significant, and robust to controlling for personal characteristics, educational attainment, income, and measures of liquidity constraints. We perform a series of additional robustness checks, which help rule out other possible confounds.
risk preference, time preference, cognitive ability, field experiment
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30.
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Unemployment and Right-Wing Extremist Crime
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Andreas Kuhn University of Zurich Josef Zweimüller University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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Posted:
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30 Mar 05
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Last Revised:
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07 Oct 09
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89 ( 85,544) |
1
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Andreas Kuhn University of Zurich Josef Zweimüller University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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07 Oct 09
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07 Oct 09
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0
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Abstract:
It is frequently argued that unemployment plays a crucial role for the occurrence of right-wing extremist crimes. We empirically test this hypothesis using data from Germany. We find that right-wing criminal activities occur more frequently when unemployment is high. The big difference in right-wing crime between East and West German states can mostly be attributed to differences in unemployment. This finding reinforces the importance of unemployment as an explanatory factor for right-wing crime and questions explanations based solely on the different socialization in former communist East Germany and the liberal West German states.
cost of unemployment, Hate crime, right-wing extremism, unemployment
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Josef Zweimüller University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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| Posted: |
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22 Aug 05
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Last Revised:
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23 Aug 05
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18
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Abstract:
Right-wing extremism is a serious problem in many societies. A prominent hypothesis states that unemployment plays a crucial role for the occurrence of right-wing extremist crime. In this paper, we empirically test this hypothesis. We use a previously unused dataset that includes all officially recorded right-wing criminal acts in Germany. These data are recorded by the German Federal Criminal Police Office on a monthly state-level basis. Our main finding is that there is in fact a significant positive relation between unemployment and right-wing criminal activities. We show further that the big difference in right-wing crime between East and West German states can mostly be attributed to differences in unemployment. This finding reinforces the importance of unemployment as an explanatory factor for right-wing crime and questions explanations based solely on the different socialization in former communist East Germany and the liberal West German states. Our data further allow us to separate violent from non-violent right-wing crimes. We show that unemployment is closely related to both types of crimes, but that the association with non-violent crimes is much stronger. Since right-wing crime is committed particularly by relatively young males, we also explore whether the youth unemployment rate is a better predictor for right-wing crime than total unemployment. This hypothesis can be rejected: given total unemployment, a higher share of youth unemployment does not affect right-wing extremist crime rates.
Hate crime, right-wing extremism, unemployment, cost of unemployment
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Josef Zweimüller University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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| Posted: |
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30 Mar 05
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Last Revised:
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21 Sep 05
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71
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1
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Abstract:
Right-wing extremism is a serious problem in many societies. A prominent hypothesis states that unemployment plays a crucial role for the occurrence of right-wing extremist crime. In this paper we empirically test this hypothesis. We use a previously not used data set which includes all officially recorded right-wing criminal acts in Germany. These data are recorded by the German Federal Criminal Police Office on a monthly and state level basis. Our main finding is that there is in fact a significant positive relation between unemployment and right-wing criminal activities. We show further that the big difference in right-wing crime between East and West German states can mostly be attributed to differences in unemployment. This finding reinforces the importance of unemployment as an explanatory factor for right-wing crime and questions explanations based solely on the different socialization in former communist East Germany and the liberal West German states. Our data further allow us to separate violent from non-violent right-wing crimes. We show that unemployment is closely related to both types of crimes, but that the association with non-violent crimes is much stronger. Since right-wing crime is committed particularly by relatively young males, we also explore whether the youth unemployment rate is a better predictor for right-wing crime than total unemployment. This hypothesis can be rejected: given total unemployment, a higher share of youth unemployment does not affect right-wing extremist crime rates.
hate crime, right-wing extremism, unemployment, cost of unemployment
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31.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
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| Posted: |
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18 Jul 05
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Last Revised:
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21 Jul 05
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87 (86,852)
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36
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Abstract:
This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted towards the defectors but the latter also impose a considerable amount of spiteful punishment on the cooperators. However, spiteful punishment vanishes if the punishers can no longer affect the payoff differences between themselves and the punished individual, whereas the cooperators even increase the resources devoted to punishment in this case. Our data also discriminate between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own payoff to the group's average or the group's total payoff cannot explain the fact that cooperators target their punishment at the defectors. Fairness theories assuming that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that cooperators punish defectors even if payoff inequalities cannot be reduced. Therefore, retaliation, i.e., the desire to harm those who committed unfair acts, seems to be the most important motive behind fairness-driven informal sanctions.
sanctioning, cooperation, social norm, reciprocity, fairness, spitefulness
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32.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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| Posted: |
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03 Oct 06
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Last Revised:
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03 Oct 06
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82 (90,307)
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Abstract:
A central concern in economics is to understand the interplay between institutions and labor markets. In this paper we argue that laboratory experiments are a powerful tool for studying labor market institutions. One of the most important advantages is the ability to implement truly exogenous institutional change, in order to make clear causal inferences. We exemplify the usefulness of lab experiments by surveying evidence from three studies, each of which investigates a different, crucial labor market institution: minimum wage laws, employment protection legislation and workfare.
J9, I38, K31, J3
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33.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Christian Zehnder University of Lausanne
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| Posted: |
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17 Apr 07
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Last Revised:
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07 May 07
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72 (97,953)
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6
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Abstract:
This paper provides field experimental evidence on the prevalence and determinants of discrimination and in-group favoritism in trust decisions. We observe choices of about 1,000 inhabitants of the city of Zurich who take part in a sequential trust game, in which first movers can condition their investments on the residential districts of second movers. Our main results can be summarized as follows: First movers discriminate significantly in their investment choices, i.e., strangers receive different investments depending on the district they live in. The systematics of the discrimination pattern is underlined by data from an additional newspaper study, where participants correctly guessed the outcome of the study. In terms of district characteristics two factors seem to be key for a district's reputation: while expected trustworthiness of a district increases in the socio-economic status it decreases in the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. Observed discrimination is not just based on mistaken stereotypes but can at least partly be classified as statistical discrimination. This can be inferred from the fact that, on a district level, both expected return on investment and actual investments are positively correlated with actual back transfers. First movers correctly anticipate different levels of trustworthiness and discriminate accordingly. Furthermore, we provide evidence of in-group favoritism, i.e., people trust strangers from their own district significantly more than strangers from other districts. Finally, we discuss individual determinants of discrimination and in-group favoritism.
Discrimination, In-group Favoritism, Trust, Trustworthiness, Reciprocity, Social Capital, City Development
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34.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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12 Jan 07
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Last Revised:
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25 Jan 07
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67 (102,311)
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1
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Abstract:
Standard search theory assumes that individuals know, with certainty, how they compare to competing searchers in terms of ability. In contrast, we hypothesize that searchers are uncertain about relative ability, with important implications for search behavior. We test our hypotheses in a laboratory experiment. The first main finding is that people are substantially uncertain about whether they are a type with a high or low probability of success, determined by being above or below the median in terms of ability. Self-confidence, defined as an individual's self-assessed probability of being a high type, is too high (above zero) for many low types, and too low (below 1) for many high types. Second, people update beliefs based on search outcomes. Self-confidence increases or decreases in the right direction, but is less sensitive to new information than predicted by Bayes' rule. Third, updating affects future search decisions: people are less likely to search as confidence about being a high type falls. Fourth, some search too little, and others search too much, due to wrong beliefs. Fifth, at the end of the experiment a substantial fraction turn down the chance to learn their exact rank. These are overwhelmingly those with low ability, suggesting an aversion to learning that one is one of the worst performers. Given that people are uncertain even in the simple setting of our experiment, our evidence strongly suggests that uncertainty about ability is relevant in more complex, real-world search settings, including search for a job or search for a mate. Focusing on the case of job search, we discuss how our findings can provide a new explanation for various important stylized facts from field evidence.
search, self-confidence, discouraged workers, unemployment, gender
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35.
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David A. Jaeger City University of New York Graduate Center Holger Bonin Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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13 Mar 07
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Last Revised:
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13 Mar 07
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55 (113,475)
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6
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Abstract:
Geographic mobility is important for the functioning of labor markets because it brings labor resources to where they can be most efficiently used. It has long been hypothesized that individuals' migration propensities depend on their attitudes towards risk, but the empirical evidence, to the extent that it exists, has been indirect. In this paper, we use newly available data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to measure directly the relationship between migration propensities and attitudes towards risk. We find that individuals who are more willing to take risks are more likely to migrate between labor markets in Germany. This result is robust to stratifying by age, sex, education, national origin, and a variety of other demographic characteristics, as well as to the level of aggregation used to define geographic mobility. The effect is substantial relative to the unconditional migration propensity and compared to the conventional determinants of migration. We also find that being more willing to take risks is more important for the extensive than for the intensive margin of migration.
risk aversion, migration, Germany
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36.
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Johannes Abeler Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Lorenz F. Goette University of Lausanne David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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| Posted: |
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19 Mar 09
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Last Revised:
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19 Mar 09
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47 (121,800)
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2
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Abstract:
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low.
reference points, expectations, loss aversion, risk aversion, disappointment, experiment
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37.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich
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| Posted: |
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20 Feb 02
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Last Revised:
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06 Feb 03
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43 (126,353)
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72
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Abstract:
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organizations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this Paper is to show that this narrow view of human motivation may severely limit understanding the determinants and effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behavior if they neglect motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance with rules. In addition, these motives may generate very powerful incentives themselves.
Incentives, contracts, reciprocity, social approval, social norms, intrinsic motivation
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38.
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Holger Bonin Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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27 Jan 06
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Last Revised:
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24 Feb 06
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39 (131,222)
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17
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Abstract:
This paper investigates whether risk preferences explain how individuals are sorted into occupations with different earnings variability. We exploit data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, which contains a subjective assessment of willingness to take risks whose behavioral relevance has been validated in previous work. As a measure of earnings risk, we use the cross-sectional variation in earnings that is left unexplained by human capital in Mincerian wage regressions. By relating earnings risk to the measure of individual risk preference, our evidence shows that individuals with low willingness to take risks are more likely to be sorted into occupations with low earnings risk. This pattern is found regardless of the level of occupation categories, region, gender and labor market experience. We also find that risk preferences are significant determinant of wages in a Mincer regression, illustrating the importance of preferences and attitudes in addition to more standard regressors.
occupational choice, sorting, risk preferences, GSOEP, earnings risk
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39.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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16 Jan 07
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Last Revised:
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20 Feb 07
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33 (139,164)
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3
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Abstract:
This paper presents a model of the labor market in which unemployed workers are uncertain about their relative ability to find a job. Unsuccessful search induces individuals to revise their beliefs downwards. Once self-confidence is sufficiently low, workers become discouraged and give up on search. This non-stationarity gives rise to structural flows from unemployment to non-participation in equilibrium. In contrast, existing models typically maintain stationarity and appeal to exogenous stochastic shocks to generate transitions from unemployment to non-participation. Our model is based on relaxing a single assumption in a standard matching framework - workers are uncertain about their job finding probability - and yet the model generates a variety of important implications. Our alternative assumption is supported by experimental evidence. The first implication of the model is a declining hazard from unemployment to employment, arising due to erosion of self-confidence in search. Second, because search outcomes are only a noisy signal about ability, some individuals can become overly discouraged and stop search too early due to wrong beliefs. Finally, workers with greater unemployment duration are less confident, and thus have a worse threat point in wage bargaining. Consequentially, they earn lower starting wages even if they are identical in terms of objective productivity. We discuss how the model provides a new, unifying explanation for a variety of important facts from field evidence.
learning, discouraged workers, subjective job finding probabilities
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40.
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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14 Dec 06
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Last Revised:
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10 Jan 07
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31 (142,062)
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3
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Abstract:
Prominent economic theories have emphasized the role of commonly held perceptions and expectations for determining macroeconomic outcomes. A key empirical question is how such collectively held beliefs are formed. We use the FIFA World Cup 2006 as a natural experiment. We provide direct evidence that seemingly irrelevant events (the outcomes of soccer matches) can systematically affect individual perceptions about economic prospects, both on a personal and economy-wide level.
Expectation formation, sunspots, soccer World Cup, macroeconomic outcomes, psychology
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41.
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Felix Marklein Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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19 May 09
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Last Revised:
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19 May 09
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30 (143,612)
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Abstract:
Many economic decisions involve a substantial amount of uncertainty, and therefore crucially depend on how individuals process probabilistic information. In this paper, we investigate the capability for probability judgment in a representative sample of the German population. Our results show that almost a third of the respondents exhibits systematically biased perceptions of probability. The findings also indicate that the observed biases are related to individual economic outcomes, which suggests potential policy relevance of our findings.
long-term unemployment, representative design, hot hand fallacy, gambler's fallacy, probability judgment, bounded rationality, financial decision making
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42.
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Reference Points and Effort Provision
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Show Abstracts |
Hide Abstracts |
Versions (2)
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hide multiple versions |
Export Bibliographic Info |
|
Johannes Abeler Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Lorenz F. Goette University of Lausanne David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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Posted:
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19 Jan 09
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Last Revised:
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13 May 09
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30 (143,612) |
2
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Johannes Abeler Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Lorenz F. Goette University of Lausanne David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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| Posted: |
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07 Apr 09
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Last Revised:
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13 May 09
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2
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2
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Abstract:
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent references is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low.
Disappointment, Expectations, Experiment, Loss Aversion, Reference Points, Risk Aversion
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Johannes Abeler Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Lorenz F. Goette University of Lausanne David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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| Posted: |
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19 Jan 09
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Last Revised:
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19 Jan 09
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28
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2
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Abstract:
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low.
reference points, expectations, loss aversion, risk aversion, disappointment, experiment
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43.
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Steffen Altmann Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Matthias Wibral Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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25 Nov 08
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Last Revised:
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25 Nov 08
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27 (149,036)
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Abstract:
Promotion tournaments play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms. In this paper, we extend research on single-stage rank-order tournaments and analyze behavior in multi-stage elimination tournaments. The main treatment of our laboratory experiment is a two-stage tournament in which equilibrium efforts are the same in both stages. We compare this treatment to a strategically equivalent one-stage tournament and to another two-stage tournament with a more convex wage structure. Confirming previous findings average effort in our one-stage treatment is close to Nash equilibrium. In contrast, subjects in our main treatment provide excess effort in the first stage both with respect to Nash predictions and compared to the equivalent one-stage tournament. The results for the more convex two-stage tournament show that excess effort in the first stage is a robust finding and that subjects react only weakly to differences in the wage structure.
personnel economics, tournament, incentives, laboratory experiment
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44.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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23 Apr 09
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Last Revised:
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23 Apr 09
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24 (155,828)
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Abstract:
In this paper we discuss the complementarity of laboratory and field data. Experiments offer highly controlled environments that allow precise testing and causal inferences. Survey and field data on the other hand provide information on large and representative samples of people interacting in their natural environment. We discuss several concrete examples how to combine lab and field data and how to exploit potential complementarities. One example describes an experiment, which is run with a representative sample to guarantee control and representativeness. The second example is based on the idea to experimentally validate survey instruments to ensure behavioral validity of instruments that can be used in existing panel data sets. The third example describes the possibility to use the lab to identify causal effects, which are tested in large data sets. Topics discussed in this paper comprise the relation of cognitive skills (IQ) and risk and time preferences, determinants, prevalence and economic consequences of risk attitudes, selection into incentive schemes and the impact of unfair pay on stress.
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45.
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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09 Oct 06
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Last Revised:
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09 Oct 06
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20 (166,810)
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2
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Abstract:
Experimental evidence has convincingly shown the existence of reciprocal inclinations, i.e., a tendency for people to respond in-kind to hostile or kind actions. Little is known, however, about: (i) the prevalence of reciprocity in the population, (ii) individual determinants of reciprocity, (iii) the correlation between positive and negative inclinations within person, and (iv) consequences of reciprocal inclinations for wages, subjective well-being, friendships and other economic and social outcomes. Answering these questions requires moving out of the lab and using a large and representative subject pool, which combines information about subjects' reciprocal inclinations with extensive socioeconomic background information. In this paper we measure the reciprocal inclinations of 21,000 individuals. We show that most people state reciprocal inclinations, in particular in terms of positive reciprocity. However, there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of reciprocity, and quite surprisingly, only a weak correlation between positive and negative reciprocity for an individual. In terms of determinants, being female, and increasing age, lead to greater positive and less negatively reciprocal tendencies. Taller people are more positively reciprocal, but height has no impact on negative reciprocity. The asymmetric impact of these determinants provides further indication that positive and negative reciprocity are fundamentally different traits, rather than the outcome of a single underlying tendency. In terms of economic implications, we provide the first evidence using a large representative survey that corroborates an important hypothesis arising from laboratory experiments: Positively reciprocal workers are in fact paid more, and exert greater effort, on the job. Moreover, positively reciprocal people are more likely to be employed, report having more close friends, and have a higher overall level of life satisfaction. In this sense, Homo Reciprocans - in the positive domain - is in fact more successful than his or her non-reciprocal fellows.
Reciprocity, trust, SOEP, wage regression, unemployment, happiness
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46.
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Martin Brown Swiss National Bank Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich
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| Posted: |
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23 May 08
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Last Revised:
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23 May 08
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18 (172,515)
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3
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Abstract:
When unemployment prevails, relations with a particular firm are valuable for workers. As a consequence, a worker may adhere to an implicit agreement to provide high effort, even when performance is not third-party enforceable. But can implicit agreements - or relational contracts - also motivate high worker performance when the labor market is tight? We examine this question by implementing an experimental market in which there is an excess demand for labor and the performance of workers is not third-party enforceable. We show that relational contracts emerge in which firms reward performing workers with wages that exceed the going market rate. This motivates workers to provide high effort, even though they could shirk and switch firms. Our results thus suggest that unemployment is not a necessary device to motivate workers. We also discuss how market conditions affect relational contracting by comparing identical labor markets with excess supply and excess demand for labor. Long-term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor compared to a market characterized by unemployment. Surprisingly though, this does not compromise market performance.
relational contracts, involuntary unemployment
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47.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Simon Gächter CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
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08 Nov 01
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20 Apr 02
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18 (172,515)
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Abstract:
Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. Many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that in the repeated game some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behavior is robust against experience. We conclude that a long-term interaction is a "reciprocity-compatible" contract enforcement device.
Reciprocity, reputation, repeated games, incomplete contracts
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48.
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Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) James J. Heckman University of Chicago - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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09 Nov 09
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Last Revised:
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09 Nov 09
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14 (186,934)
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Abstract:
Laboratory experiments are a widely used methodology for advancing causal knowledge in the physical and life sciences. With the exception of psychology, the adoption of laboratory experiments has been much slower in the social sciences, although during the last two decades, the use of lab experiments has accelerated. Nonetheless, there remains considerable resistance among social scientists who argue that lab experiments lack "realism" and "generalizability". In this article we discuss the advantages and limitations of laboratory social science experiments by comparing them to research based on non-experimental data and to field experiments. We argue that many recent objections against lab experiments are misguided and that even more lab experiments should be conducted.
laboratory experiments, field experiments, controlled variation
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49.
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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19 Mar 08
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Last Revised:
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19 Mar 08
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7 (203,070)
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2
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Abstract:
This paper provides evidence about the determinants of trust and reciprocal inclinations, that is, a tendency for people to respond in kind to hostile or kind actions, in a representative setting. We investigate the prevalence of reciprocity in the population, the correlation between trust and positive and negative reciprocal inclinations within person, the individual determinants of reciprocity, and the relationship with psychological measures of personality. We find that most people state reciprocal inclinations, in particular in terms of positive reciprocity, as well as substantial heterogeneity in the degree of trust and reciprocity. Trust and positive reciprocity are only weakly correlated, while trust and negative reciprocity exhibit a negative correlation. In terms of determinants, being female and increasing age are associated with stronger positive and weaker negative reciprocal tendencies. Taller people are more positively reciprocal, but height has no impact on negative reciprocity. Psychological traits also affect trust and reciprocity. (JEL D63, J3, J6)
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50.
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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27 Apr 09
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Last Revised:
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28 May 09
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0 (0)
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4
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Abstract:
This article complements the experimental literature that has shown the importance of reciprocity for behaviour in stylised labour markets or other decision settings. We use individual measures of reciprocal inclinations in a large, representative survey and relate reciprocity to real world labour market behaviour and life outcomes. We find that reciprocity matters and that the way in which it matters is very much in line with the experimental evidence. In particular, positive reciprocity is associated with receiving higher wages and working harder. Negatively reciprocal inclinations tend to reduce effort. Negative reciprocity increases the likelihood of being unemployed.
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51.
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Thomas J. Dohmen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) David Huffman Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Uwe Sunde University of St. Gallen
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| Posted: |
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12 Jun 08
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Last Revised:
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12 Jun 08
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0 (0)
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30
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Abstract:
Recent theoretical contributions depart from the usual practice of treating individual attitude endowments as a black box, by assuming that these are shaped by the attitudes of parents and other role models. Attitudes include fundamental preferences such as risk preference, and crucial beliefs about the world, such as trust. This paper provides evidence on the three main mechanisms for attitude transmission highlighted in the theoretical literature: (1) transmission of attitudes from parents to children; (2) positive assortative mating of parents, which tends to reinforce the impact of parents on the child; (3) an impact of prevailing attitudes in the local environment. Investigating these mechanisms is important because they are crucial assumptions underlying a large literature. It also sheds light on the basic question of where individual attitude endowments come from, and the factors that determine these drivers of economic behaviour. The findings are supportive of attitude transmission models, and indicate that all three mechanisms play a role in shaping economically relevant attitudes.
Assortative Mating, Cultural Economics, Family Economics, Intergenerational Transmission, Risk Preferences, Social Interactions, SOEP, Trust
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52.
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Ernst Fehr Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich Armin Falk Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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| Posted: |
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19 Jan 99
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Last Revised:
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25 Jan 99
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
Do employers and workers underbid prevailing wages if there is unemployment? Do employers take advantage of workers' underbidding by lowering wages? We hypothesize that under conditions of incomplete labor contracts, wage levels may positively affect workers' propensity to cooperate. This, in turn, may prevent firms from underbidding or accepting the underbidding of workers. Experimental double auctions conducted for the purpose of examining these hypotheses yield the following results: (i) Workers' underbidding is very frequent, but employers refuse to accept workers' low wage offers in markets with incomplete labor contracts. However, in the presence of complete labor contracts, employers accept and actively enforce wages close to the competitive level. (ii) Workers' effort is positively related to the wage level. Therefore, wage cutting is costly for the employer if workers have discretion over their effort level. This holds true even in the presence of explicit performance incentives.
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