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Abstract:
As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand factors that influence whether foreign investors provide capital to a country's firms. We study 4,409 firms from twenty-nine countries to assess whether and why concerns about corporate governance result in fewer foreign holdings. We find that foreigners invest less in firms that reside in countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems. This effect is particularly pronounced when earnings are opaque, indicating that information asymmetry and monitoring costs faced by foreign investors likely drive the results.

G11, G15, G32, G34

Abstract:
As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand the factors that influence whether foreign outside investors provide capital to a country's firms. This study examines whether and why investor concern about corporate governance results in fewer foreign holdings. We use a comprehensive set of foreign holdings by U.S. investors as a proxy for foreign investment and analyze a sample of 4,411 firms from 29 emerging market and developed economies. We find that foreigners invest significantly less in firms that are poorly governed, i.e., firms that have ownership structures that are more conducive to outside investor expropriation. Interestingly, this finding is not simply a matter of a country%u2019s economic development but appears to be directly related to a country%u2019s information rules and legal institutions. We therefore argue that information problems faced by foreign investors play an important role in this result. Supporting this explanation, we show that foreign investment is lower in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand factors that influence whether foreign investors provide capital to a country's firms. We study 4,409 firms from 29 countries to assess whether and why concerns about corporate governance result in fewer foreign holdings. We find that foreigners invest less in firms that reside in countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems. This effect is particularly pronounced when earnings are opaque, indicating that information asymmetry and monitoring costs faced by foreign investors likely drive the results.

Corporate governance, Foreign investment, Ownership structure, Information flow, Earnings management, Shareholder base, Home bias

Abstract:
Using a comprehensive new data set, we exploit the cross-sectional variation of U.S. holdings of equities in a wide range of countries to gain insight into the equity home bias phenomenon. We find that a direct barrier to international investment - restrictions on foreign ownership of equities - significantly affects the country distribution of U.S. equity holdings, but has only a small effect on the overall level of home bias. More important are information asymmetries due to the poor quality and low credibility of financial information in many countries. While no direct measure of information costs is available, some foreign firms have reduced these costs by publicly listing their securities in the United States, where investor protection regulations elicit standardized, credible financial information. We find that a proxy for the reduction in information asymmetries - the portion of a country's market that has a public U.S. listing - is a major determinant of a country's weight in U.S. investors' portfolios. Foreign countries whose firms do not alleviate information costs by opting into the U.S. regulatory environment are more severely underweighted in U.S. equity portfolios.

Information asymmetries; Investor protection; Accounting standards; Portfolio choice

Abstract:
Foreign official purchases of U.S. government bonds have an economically large and statistically significant impact on long-term interest rates. Federal Reserve credibility, as evidenced by dramatic reductions in both long-term inflation expectations and the volatility of long rates, contributed much to the decline of long rates in the 1990s. More recently, however, foreign flows have become important. Controlling for various factors given by a standard macroeconomic model, we estimate that had there been no foreign official flows into U.S. government bonds over the past year, the 10-year Treasury yield would currently be 90 basis points higher. Our results are robust to a number of alternative specifications.

Abstract:
Foreign official purchases of U.S. government bonds have an economically large and statistically significant impact on long-term interest rates. Federal Reserve credibility, as evidenced by dramatic reductions in both long-term inflation expectations and the volatility of long rates, contributed much to the decline of long rates in the 1990s. More recently, however, foreign flows have become important. Controlling for various factors given by a standard macroeconomic model, we estimate that had there been no foreign official flows into U.S. government bonds over the past year, the 10-year Treasury yield would currently be 90 basis points higher. Our results are robust to a number of alternative specifications.

bond yields, Japan, China, petrodollars

Abstract:
This technical note discusses risk and term premiums, prominent theories of the yield curve, and how to construct a yield curve.

Risk and Return

Abstract:
This technical note discusses risk and term premiums, prominent theories of the yield curve, and how to construct a yield curve.

Risk and Return

Abstract:
This paper investigates the underlying determinants of home bias using a comprehensive data set on U.S. investors' aggregate holdings of every foreign stock. Among those foreign stocks that are not listed on U.S. exchanges, which account for more than 96 percent of our usable data sample, we find that U.S. investors prefer firms with characteristics associated with greater information transparency, such as stronger home-country accounting standards. We document that a U.S. cross-listing is economically important, as U.S. ownership of a foreign firm roughly doubles upon cross-listing in the United States. We explore the cross-sectional variation in this "cross-listing effect" and find that the increase in U.S. investment is greatest for firms that are from weak accounting backgrounds and are otherwise informationally opaque, suggesting that the key effect of cross-listing is improvements in disclosure that are valued by U.S. investors. By contrast, cross-listing does not increase the appeal of stocks from countries with weak shareholder rights, suggesting that U.S. cross-listing cannot substitute for legal protections in the home country. Nor does the cross-listing effect appear to be driven simply by increased "familiarity"Â with the stock or lowered cross-border transactions costs.

Abstract:
This paper investigates the underlying determinants of home bias using a comprehensive data set on U.S. investors' aggregate holdings of every foreign stock. Among those foreign stocks that are not listed on U.S. exchanges, which account for more than 96 percent of our usable data sample, we find that U.S. investors prefer firms with characteristics associated with greater information transparency, such as stronger home-country accounting standards. We document that a U.S. cross-listing is economically important, as U.S. ownership of a foreign firm roughly doubles upon cross-listing in the United States. We explore the cross-sectional variation in this "cross-listing effect" and find that the increase in U.S. investment is greatest for firms that are from weak accounting backgrounds and are otherwise informationally opaque, suggesting that the key effect of cross-listing is improvements in disclosure that are valued by U.S. investors. By contrast, cross-listing does not increase the appeal of stocks from countries with weak shareholder rights, suggesting that U.S. cross-listing cannot substitute for legal protections in the home country. Nor does the cross-listing effect appear to be driven simply by increased "familiarity" with the stock or lowered cross-border transactions costs.

Cross-Listing, ADR, Home Bias, Selection Bias

Abstract:
We merge portfolio theories of home bias with corporate finance theories of insider ownership to create the optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias. The theory has two components: (i) foreign portfolio investors exhibit a large home bias against countries with poor governance because their investment is limited by high optimal ownership by insiders (the “direct effect” of poor governance) and domestic monitoring shareholders (the “indirect effect”) in response to the governance, and (ii) foreign direct investors from “good governance” countries have a comparative advantage as insider monitors in “poor governance” countries, so that the relative importance of foreign direct investment is negatively related to the quality of governance. Using both country-level data on U.S. investors' foreign investment allocations and Korean firm-level data, we find empirical evidence supporting our optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias.

Abstract:
Despite the disappearance of formal barriers to international investment across countries, we find that the average home bias of U.S. investors towards the 46 countries with the largest equity markets did not fall from 1994 to 2004 when countries are equally weighted but fell when countries are weighted by market capitalization. This evidence is inconsistent with portfolio theory explanations of the home bias, but is consistent with what we call the optimal insider ownership theory of the home bias. Since foreign investors can only own shares not held by insiders, there will be a large home bias towards countries in which insiders own large stakes in corporations. Consequently, for the home bias to fall substantially, insider ownership has to fall in countries where it is high. Poor governance leads to concentrated insider ownership, so that governance improvements make it possible for corporate ownership to become more dispersed and for the home bias to fall. We find that the home bias of U.S. investors decreased the most towards countries in which the ownership by corporate insiders is low and countries in which ownership by corporate insiders fell. Using firm-level data for Korea, we find that portfolio equity investment by foreign investors in Korean firms is inversely related to insider ownership and that the firms that attract the most foreign portfolio equity investment are large firms with dispersed ownership.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
Despite the disappearance of formal barriers to international investment across countries, we find that the average home bias of US investors towards the 46 countries with the largest equity markets did not fall from 1994 to 2004 when countries are equally weighted but fell when countries are weighted by market capitalisation. This evidence is inconsistent with portfolio theory explanations of the home bias, but is consistent with what we call the optimal insider ownership theory of the home bias. Since foreign investors can only own shares not held by insiders, there will be a large home bias towards countries in which insiders own large stakes in corporations. Consequently, for the home bias to fall substantially, insider ownership has to fall in countries where it is high. Poor governance leads to concentrated insider ownership, so that governance improvements make it possible for corporate ownership to become more dispersed and for the home bias to fall. We find that the home bias of US investors decreased the most towards countries in which the ownership by corporate insiders is low and countries in which ownership by corporate insiders fell. Using firm-level data for Korea, we find that portfolio equity investment by foreign investors in Korean firms is inversely related to insider ownership and that the firms that attract the most foreign portfolio equity investment are large firms with dispersed ownership.

Abstract:
This technical note presents basic definitions of real and nominal interest rates, including a short discussion on how to measure expected inflation. It also shows how to operationalize the workhorse IS/LM model in order to describe general movements in interest rates, and ends with a short aside on risk premiums.

business and government relations, inflation

Abstract:
This technical note presents basic definitions of real and nominal interest rates, including a short discussion on how to measure expected inflation. It also shows how to operationalize the workhorse IS/LM model in order to describe general movements in interest rates, and ends with a short aside on risk premiums.

business and government relations, inflation

Abstract:
We investigate the impact of two types of financial liberalizations on short- and long-horizon capital flows to emerging markets in a framework that controls for push and pull factors. The first type of liberalization, a reduction in capital controls, is countrywide but uncertain, because its extent and permanence is not known with certainty. The second type, a cross-border listing, is a firm-level liberalization that has no uncertainty. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that the deterministic cross-listing results in an immediate but short-lived increase in capital inflows. In contrast, the uncertain reduction in capital controls results in increased inflows only over a longer horizon, if at all.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We analyze capital flows to emerging markets in a framework that incorporates two quantitative measures of financial integration, the intensity of capital controls and the extent of cross-border listings, while controlling for traditional global (push) and country-specific (pull) factors. Two important results emerge. First, the cross-listing of an emerging market firm on a U.S. exchange is an important but short-lived capital flows event, suggesting that the cross-listed stock is in effect a new security that U.S. investors quickly bring into their portfolios. Second, the effect of financial liberalization on capital flows is more nuanced than is suggested by event studies: A reduction in capital controls results in increased inflows only when the controls are binding. Among the standard push and pull factors, global factors are importantslack U.S. economic activity is associated with increased flows to emerging marketsand U.S. investors appear to chase expected, but not past, returns.

portfolio equity flows capital flows emerging markets ADRs

Abstract:
We investigate the impact of two types of financial liberalizations on short- and long-horizon capital flows to emerging markets in a framework that controls for push and pull factors. The first type of liberalization, a reduction in capital controls, is countrywide but uncertain, because its extent and permanence is not known with certainty. The second type, a cross-border listing, is a firm-level liberalization that has no uncertainty. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that the deterministic cross-listing results in an immediate but short-lived increase in capital inflows. In contrast, the uncertain reduction in capital controls results in increased inflows only over a longer horizon, if at all.

Portfolio Equity Flows; Capital Flows; ADRs

Abstract:
We present a readily available monthly measure of the intensity of capital controls across 29 emerging market countries that is based on the degree of restrictions on foreign ownership of equities. The initial opening of a market as given by our measure corresponds well with the liberalization dates of Bekaert and Harvey (2000a). In addition, our measure provides information on the extent of the initial opening as well as the evolution of the liberalization over time. After presenting the measure, we compare it to other existing measures of capital controls and briefly describe empirical applications concerning home bias, capital flows to emerging markets, and the effects of financial liberalization on the cost of capital.

emerging markets international financial liberalization openness portfolio investment

Abstract:
We present a readily available monthly measure of the intensity of capital controls across 29 emerging market countries that is based on the degree of restrictions on foreign ownership of equities. The initial opening of a market as given by our measure corresponds well with the liberalization dates of Bekaert and Harvey (2000a). In addition, our measure provides information on the extent of the initial opening as well as the evolution of the liberalization over time. After presenting the measure, we compare it to other existing measures of capital controls and briefly describe empirical applications concerning home bias, capital flows to emerging markets, and the effects of financial liberalization on the cost of capital.

emerging markets, international financial liberalization, openness, portfolio investment

Abstract:
It is an established fact that investors favor the familiar - be it domestic securities or, within a country, the securities of nearby firms - and avoid investments that would provide the greatest diversification benefits. While we do not rule out familiarity as an important driver of portfolio allocations, we provide new evidence of investors' international diversification motive. In particular, our analysis of the security-level U.S. equity holdings of foreign and domestic institutional investors indicates that institutional investors reveal a preference for domestic multinationals (MNCs), even after controlling for familiarity factors. We attribute this revealed preference to the desire to obtain "safe" international diversification. We then show that holdings of domestic MNCs are substantial and, after accounting for this home-grown foreign exposure, that the share of "foreign" equities in investors' portfolios roughly doubles, reducing (but not eliminating) the observed home bias.

Abstract:
We analyze foreigners' and domestic institutional investors' positions in U.S. equities. Controlling for many factors, we uncover a common preference for large firms and firms that are diversified internationally. The domestic preference for internationally diversified firms implies that investors might obtain substantial international diversification by investing at home. Using an international factor model, we show that exposure to foreign equity markets is indeed greater for domestic firms that are more diversified internationally, suggesting that at least some of the home-grown foreign exposure translates into international diversification benefits. After accounting for home-grown foreign exposure, the share of 'foreign' equities in investors' portfolios nearly doubles, reducing (but not eliminating) the observed home bias.

home bias, international portfolio allocation, foreign exposure

Abstract:
While there is a severe home bias in U.S. investors' foreign bond portfolios, we find that portfolio weights are greater for countries with more open capital accounts and whose bond returns are less correlated with U.S. returns. Positions in local-currency-denominated bonds are particularly sensitive to past and prospective returns volatility. An analysis of changes in portfolio weights over time indicates that U.S. investors have recently moved out of smaller markets and those with low and declining credit ratings. Our data also allow for an analysis of the size and currency composition of international bond markets. We find that countries with stronger institutions and better inflation performance have larger local currency bond markets. An implication for developing countries is that creditor friendly policies, such as vigilance on the inflation front and the development of strong institutions, can enable local bond market development and may in turn attract global investors.

portfolio choice, bond market development, flight to quality, home bias, emerging market debt

Abstract:
In the summer of 2005, Alan Greenspan was faced with a conundrum. Despite a background of rising short-term rates, economic strength, and inflationary pressures, long-term rates had not risen at all. If long-term rates remained low, economic activity would likely strengthen and create further inflationary pressures. If some new force were depressing long-term interest rates, however, its removal could spark a disconcertingly sharp increase in rates. Either way, Greenspan would have to get to the bottom of this puzzlement.

business and government relations, interest rates

Abstract:
In the summer of 2005, Alan Greenspan was faced with a conundrum. Despite a background of rising short-term rates, economic strength, and inflationary pressures, long-term rates had not risen at all. If long-term rates remained low, economic activity would likely strengthen and create further inflationary pressures. If some new force were depressing long-term interest rates, however, its removal could spark a disconcertingly sharp increase in rates. Either way, Greenspan would have to get to the bottom of this puzzlement.

business and government relations, interest rates

Abstract:
This paper evaluates the ability of U.S. investors to allocate their foreign equity portfolios across 44 countries over a 25-year period. We find that U.S. portfolios achieved a significantly higher Sharpe ratio than foreign benchmarks, especially since 1990. We test whether this strong performance owed to trading expertise or longer-term allocation expertise. The evidence is overwhelmingly against trading expertise. While U.S. investors did abstain from momentum trading and instead sold past winners, we find no evidence that these past winners subsequently underperformed. In addition, conditional performance measures, which directly test reallocating into (out of) markets that subsequently outperformed (underperformed), suggest no significant trading expertise. In contrast, we offer strong evidence of longer-term allocation expertise: If we fix portfolio weights at the end of 1989 and do not allow reallocations, we still find superior performance in the recent period.

momentum, contrarian, conditional performance measures, equities, home bias

Abstract:
It is a stylized fact of international finance that foreign equities are underweighted (the home bias) but overtraded (the high turnover). Since stylized facts drive research, theoretical models are now developed to explain the puzzling coexistence of home bias and high turnover, first presented in Tesar and Werner (1995), and researchers now dismiss transaction costs as a plausible explanation of home bias. I show, however, that part of the puzzle - very high turnover rates on foreign equity portfolios - is based on inaccurate estimates of cross-border holdings. Revised estimates of holdings of foreign equities from comprehensive benchmark surveys produce foreign turnover rates that are much lower than previously reported and are comparable to domestic turnover rates. The implications of this finding are clear. First, researchers should no longer develop theoretical models to explain the coexistence of home bias and high turnover. Second, the relationship between transaction costs and home bias should be reexplored. On the second point, the basic intuition from Tesar and Werner (1995) - that transaction costs do not help explain the observed home bias - is confirmed using actual data on transaction costs in 41 markets.

Transaction costs, international portfolio diversification, foreign equity holdings

Abstract:
We analyze a unique data set and uncover a remarkable result
that casts a new light on the home bias phenomenon. The data
are comprehensive, security-level holdings of emerging market
equities by U.S. investors. We document, as expected, that at
a point in time U.S. portfolios are tilted towards firms that
are large, have fewer restrictions on foreign ownership, or are
cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. The size of the cross-listing
effect is striking. In contrast to the well-documented
underweighting of foreign stocks, emerging market equities
that are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange are incorporated into
U.S. portfolios at full international CAPM weights. Our results
suggest that information asymmetries play an important role in
equity home bias and that the benefits of international risk
sharing are limited to select firms.

emerging markets, portfolio choice, home bias, international risk sharing

Abstract:
We analyze a unique data set and uncover a remarkable result
that casts a new light on the home bias phenomenon. The data
are comprehensive, security-level holdings of emerging market
equities by U.S. investors. We document, as expected, that at
a point in time U.S. portfolios are tilted towards firms that
are large, have fewer restrictions on foreign ownership, or are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. The size of the cross-listing
effect is striking. In contrast to the well-documented
underweighting of foreign stocks, emerging market equities
that are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange are incorporated into
U.S. portfolios at full international CAPM weights. Our results
suggest that information asymmetries play an important role in
equity home bias and that the benefits of international risk
sharing are limited to select firms.

emerging markets, portfolio choice, home bias, international risk sharing

Abstract:
Countries that cannot attract foreigners to invest in their local currency bonds run the risk of currency mismatches that can result in painful crises. We analyze foreign participation in the bond markets of over 40 countries. Bond markets in less developed countries have returns characterized by high variance and negative skewness, factors that we show are eschewed by U.S. investors. While results based on a three-moment CAPM indicate that it is diversifiable idiosyncratic risk that U.S. investors shun, our analysis suggests that countries can improve foreign participation by reducing macroeconomic instability.

home bias, emerging market debt, diversification, original sin

Abstract:
We examine the extent to which markets enable the provision of housing finance across a wide range of countries. Housing is a major purchase requiring long-term financing, and the factors that are associated with well functioning housing finance systems are those that enable the provision of long-term finance. Across all countries, controlling for country size, we find that countries with stronger legal rights for borrowers and lenders (through collateral and bankruptcy laws), deeper credit information systems, and a more stable macroeconomic environment have deeper housing finance systems. These same factors also help explain the variation in housing finance across emerging market economies. Across developed countries, which tend to have low macroeconomic volatility and relatively extensive credit information systems, variation in the strength of legal rights helps explain the extent of housing finance. We also examine another potential factor—the existence of sizeable government securities markets—that might enable the development of emerging markets' housing finance systems, but we find no evidence supporting that.

mortgage, housing finance, emerging markets

Abstract:
The tremendous growth in cross-border securities investment in recent years has called attention to the systems used by the United States and other countries to measure international securities flows and holdings. Ideally, the data gathered by the United States could tell us the extent to which foreign investors hold U.S. securities, the types of securities held, and the countries in which the securities are held, for example, and could identify trends in investment. This article looks at how well the data shed light on these topics. Special attention is given to the system's design and the implications of the design for data analysis. Also discussed are anticipated changes to the system and international efforts to improve data collection systems worldwide. Finally, in an appendix we illustrate the technique for estimating holdings using capital flows data.

capital flows, international investment position

Abstract:
We examine an assumption common in empirical work on bilateral portfolio capital flows that the countries the flows are attributed to are also the countries of the security's issuer, seller, or ultimate buyer. We do this by estimating U.S. investors' holdings of debt and equities in over 40 countries and, for the same countries, foreign investors' holdings of U.S. debt and equities. A comparison of our estimates with data from benchmark surveys provides insight into U.S. data on international debt and equity transactions. We find that, contrary to the common assumption, the data do not track the location of U.S. investment or the location of investors in U.S. assets very well. Because the U.S. portfolio flow data collection system was designed to measure cross-border transactions with foreign counterparties who are often intermediaries, the majority of the flows are attributed to financial centers. By aggregating our country-level estimates, we find that U.S. data accurately portray net inflows into U.S. equities and net outflows into foreign bonds. However, the data substantially overcount net inflows into U.S. bonds and may undercount net outflows into foreign equities. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for research on capital flows.

portfolio flows, equity and bond flows, international investment position, net foreign assets

Abstract:
We evaluate the performance of U.S. investors' international portfolios over a 25-year period. Portfolio returns are formed by first estimating monthly bilateral holdings in 44 countries using high-quality but infrequent benchmark surveys that enable us to eliminate the geographical bias in reported capital flows data. In their foreign equity portfolios, U.S. investors achieved a significantly higher Sharpe ratio than global benchmarks, especially since 1990. We uncover three potential reasons for this success. First, they abstained from returns - chasing behavior and instead sold past winners. Second, conditional performance tests provide no evidence that the superior (unconditional) performance owed to private information, suggesting that the successful exploitation of publicly available information played a role. Third, well-documented preferences for cross-listed and well-governed foreign firms appear to have served U.S. investors well. We also evaluate the unconditional performance of bond portfolios, about which less information is available, and find that U.S. investors achieved higher Sharpe ratios than global benchmarks, although the difference here is not statistically significant.

Home bias, momentum, contrarian, conditional performance measures, equities, bonds

Abstract:
International spillovers and exchange rate dynamics are examined in a two-country dynamic optimizing model that allows for home-product bias in consumption patterns: at given relative prices the ratio of home goods consumed to foreign goods consumed is higher in the home country. The setup nests Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), who assume identical tastes. With home bias, results are different in three ways. When preferences are biased, the wealth transfers associated with current account imbalances induce movements in the real exchange rate and produce large short-run and small long-run deviations from consumption-based purchasing power parity. With home bias, interest rates, both real and nominal, can differ across countries; relatedly, home bias is a necessary but not sufficient condition for Dornbusch (1976) type exchange rate overshooting. Finally, in this model the welfare effects of expansionary monetary policy depend not only on world demand but also on the expenditure-switching effect of an exchange rate depreciation; monetary policy is 'beggar-thy-neighbor' if individuals have strong preferences for domestic products, but can be 'beggar-thyself' if, instead, imported goods are preferred.

dynamic optimizing model, beggar-thy-neighbor, purchasing power parity, exchange rate overshooting

Abstract:
We analyze the development of 49 local bond markets. Our main finding is that policies and laws matter: Countries with stable inflation rates and strong creditor rights have more developed local bond markets and rely less on foreign-currency-denominated bonds. The results suggest that "original sin" is a misnomer. Emerging economies are not inherently dependent upon foreign-currency debt. Rather, by improving policy performance and strengthening institutions they may develop local currency bond markets, reduce their currency mismatch, and lessen the likelihood of future crises.

Abstract:
We analyze the development of 49 local bond markets. Our main finding is that policies and laws matter: Countries with stable inflation rates and strong creditor rights have more developed local bond markets and rely less on foreign-currency-denominated bonds. The results suggest that "original sin" is a misnomer. Emerging economies are not inherently dependent upon foreign-currency debt. Rather, by improving policy performance and strengthening institutions they may develop local currency bond markets, reduce their currency mismatch, and lessen the likelihood of future crises.

bond market development, emerging market debt, original sin

Abstract:
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) have reinvigorated an old literature on the link between home bias in the goods market and home bias in the asset market by arguing that trade costs in the goods market can account for the observed portfolio home bias. The key link between home bias in the two markets is the real exchange rate. Home bias in consumption implies a different expenditure allocation across countries, which leads to different inflation rates when measured in the same currency. This leads investors from different countries to choose different portfolios to hedge against inflation uncertainty. An older partial equilibrium literature argued that such hedge portfolios are not large enough to produce substantial home bias. We link the general equilibrium and partial equilibrium literatures and show that in both the resulting home bias in the equity market depends on a covariance-variance ratio: the covariance between the real exchange rate and the excess return on home relative to foreign equity, divided by the variance of the excess return. Empirical evidence shows that this ratio and the implied home bias are close to zero, casting significant doubt on a meaningful link between home bias in the goods and asset markets. General equilibrium models that conclude otherwise imply a covariance-variance ratio that is at odds with the data.

Abstract:
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) have reinvigorated an old literature on the link between home bias in the goods markets and home bias in the asset market by arguing that trade costs in the goods market can account for the observed portfolio home bias. The key link between home bias in the two markets is the real exchange rate. Home bias in consumption implies a different expenditure allocation across countries, which leads to different inflation rates when measured in the same currency. This leads investors from different countries to choose different portfolios to hedge against inflation uncertainty. An older partial equilibrium literature argued that such hedge portfolios are not large enough to produce substantial home bias. We link the general equilibrium and partial equilibrium literatures and show that in both the resulting home bias in the equity market depends on a covariance-variance ratio: the covariance between the real exchange rate and the excess return on home relative to foreign equity, divided by the variance of the excess return. Empirical evidence shows that this ratio and the implied home bias are close to zero, casting significant doubt on a meaningful link between home bias in the goods and asset markets. General equilibrium models that conclude otherwise imply a covariance-variance ratio that is at odds with the data.

home bias, portfolio choice, trade costs

Abstract:
There are a number of worrisome features of the U.S. current account deficit. In particular, its size and persistence, the extent to which it is financing consumption as opposed to investment, and the reliance on debt inflows raise concerns about the likelihood of a sharp adjustment. We examine episodes of current account adjustment in industrial countries to assess the validity of these concerns. Our main findings are (i) larger deficits take longer to adjust and are associated with significantly slower income growth (relative to trend) during the current account recovery than smaller deficits, (ii) consumption-driven current account deficits involve significantly larger depreciations than deficits financing investment, and (iii) there is little evidence that deficits in economies that run persistent deficits, have large net foreign debt positions, experience greater short-term capital flows, or are less open are accommodated by more extensive exchange rate adjustment or slower growth. Our findings are consistent with earlier work showing that, in general, current account adjustment tends to be associated with slow income growth and a real depreciation. Overall, our results support claims that the size of the current account deficit and the extent to which it is financing consumption matter for adjustment.

global imbalances

Abstract:
To provide insight into the accuracy of U.S. data on international equity transactions, we compare estimates of U.S. holdings of equities in over 40 countries with actual holdings given by comprehensive U.S. benchmark surveys. If the rate of return used to revalue U.S. holdings in a given country is accurate, accurate holdings estimates imply accurate transactions data. For some countries, such as Canada and much of Latin America, the holdings estimates are quite accurate. For the majority of countries, however, there is a great disparity between our estimates and actual amounts, likely because U.S. data on international equity transactions record the country of the transactor, not the country of the issuer. Our estimates are far too high for financial centers - because many U.S. transactions that go through these countries involve securities issued in other countries - and far too low in most other countries, particularly in Europe and Asia. To illustrate the potential pitfalls of using estimated country-specific holdings data, we briefly present two cases in which the use of actual data leads to different conclusions. One case examines the determinants of U.S. equity holdings across countries; the other concerns the turnover rate of foreign equity portfolios.

portfolio flows, international investment position, net foreign assets

Abstract:
This paper attempts to add to the understanding of changes in the magnitude of business cycle fluctuations by examining disaggregated employment data. Specifically, we use a stochastic variance approach on monthly employment data for the 1946-1996 period to highlight two stylized facts of aggregate U.S. employment - greater volatility in recessions than expansions and reduced volatility since the early 1980s. These patterns are not, however, apparent in each sector of the economy. Asymmetric volatility is only evident in manufacturing and trade; other sectors, such as construction or the narrowly defined services sector, are just as likely to exhibit high volatility in expansions. A general reduction in volatility is evident only in goods-producing sectors; some industries in the broad service-producing sector have become more volatile over time. Our results highlight the close relationship between aggregate and manufacturing volatility, and suggest that to understand why the U.S. business cycle has become more muted, researchers should strive to understand the forces at work that are reducing volatility in the manufacturing sector.

Employment, Volatility, Variability, Business Cycle

Abstract:
We extend the sudden stops literature by allowing crisis episodes to be caused by either the retreat of global investors, as is assumed but not shown in the extant literature, or the sudden flight of local investors. We find that almost half of the previously defined sudden stops are actually episodes of sudden flight. Compared to sudden flight, true sudden stops are bunched and are associated with greater slowdowns in economic activity and sharper currency depreciations. We show that the empirical regularities of sudden flight and true sudden stops are consistent with theoretical models that incorporate gross capital flows and information asymmetries.

Abstract:
We extend the sudden stops literature by allowing crisis episodes to be caused by either the retreat of global investors, as is assumed but not shown in the extant literature, or the sudden flight of local investors. We find that almost half of the previously defined sudden stops are actually episodes of sudden flight. Compared to sudden flight, true sudden stops are bunched and are associated with greater slowdowns in economic activity and sharper currency depreciations. We show that the empirical regularities of sudden flight and true sudden stops are consistent with theoretical models that incorporate gross capital flows and information asymmetries.

international capital flows, capital flight, emerging market crises

Abstract:
High growth, liquid Chilean firms have greater relative weights in U.S. equity portfolios, but the most important determinant of a firm's portfolio weight is whether it is listed on a U.S. exchange. Cross-listing does not, however, appear to have permanent benefits: Weights in U.S. portfolios of firms that cross-listed in the mid-1990s increased at the expense of firms that cross-listed earlier. Put another way, firms appear to be able to access international capital at the time of the cross-listing, but this access may well be short-lived.

Financial liberalization, portfolio choice, emerging market, home bias

Abstract:
Were the U.S. to persistently earn substantially more on its foreign investments ("U.S. claims") than foreigners earn on their U.S. investments ("U.S. liabilities"), the likelihood that the current environment of sizeable global imbalances will evolve in a benign manner increases. However, utilizing data on the actual foreign equity and bond portfolios of U.S. investors and the U.S. equity and bond portfolios of foreign investors, we find that the returns differential of U.S. claims over U.S. liabilities is essentially zero. Ending our sample in 2005, the differential is positive, whereas through 2004 it is negative; in both cases the differential is statistically indecipherable from zero. Moreover, were it not for the poor timing of investors from developed countries, who tend to shift their U.S. portfolios toward (or away from) equities prior to the subsequent underperformance (or strong performance) of equities, the returns differential would be even lower. Thus, in the context of equity and bond portfolios we find no evidence that the U.S. can count on earning more on its claims than it pays on its liabilities.

Abstract:
Were the U.S. to persistently earn substantially more on its foreign investments ("U.S. claims") than foreigners earn on their U.S. investments ("U.S. liabilities"), the likelihood that the current environment of sizeable global imbalances will evolve in a benign manner increases. However, utilizing data on the actual foreign equity and bond portfolios of U.S. investors and the U.S. equity and bond portfolios of foreign investors, we find that the returns differential of U.S. claims over U.S. liabilities is essentially zero. Ending our sample in 2005, the differential is positive, whereas through 2004 it is negative; in both cases the differential is statistically indecipherable from zero. Moreover, were it not for the poor timing of investors from developed countries, who tend to shift their U.S. portfolios toward (or away from) equities prior to the subsequent underperformance (or strong performance) of equities, the returns differential would be even lower. Thus, in the context of equity and bond portfolios we find no evidence that the U.S. can count on earning more on its claims than it pays on its liabilities.

current account imbalances, international investment

Abstract:
Partly reflecting structural advantages such a liquidity and strong investor protection, foreigners have built up extremely large positions in U.S. (as well as other dollar-denominated) financial assets. This paper describes the impact on global wealth of an unanticipated shock to U.S. financial markets. For every 10 percent decline in the dollar, U.S. equity markets, and U.S. bond markets, total wealth losses to foreigners could amount to about 5 percentage points of foreign GDP. Four stylized facts emerge: (i) foreign countries, particularly emerging markets, are more exposed to U.S. bonds than U.S. equities; (ii) U.S. exposure has increased for most countries; (iii) on average, U.S. asset holdings of developed countries and emerging markets (scaled by GDP) are very similar; and (iv) based on their reserves position, wealth losses of emerging market governments could on average amount to about 2¾ percentage points of their GDP.

U.S. asset holdings, global asset portfolios, disorderly currency adjustments, global current account imbalances

Abstract:
This paper investigates the underlying determinants of home bias using a comprehensive sample of U.S. investor holdings of foreign stocks. We document that U.S. cross-listings are economically important, as U.S. ownership in a foreign firm roughly doubles upon cross-listing in the United States. We explore the cross-sectional variation in this "cross-listing effect" and show that increases in U.S. investment are largest in firms from weak accounting backgrounds and in firms that are otherwise informationally opaque, indicating that U.S. investors value the improvements in disclosure associated with cross-listing. We confirm that relative equity valuations rise for cross-listed stocks, and provide evidence suggesting that valuation increases are due in part to increases in U.S. shareholder demand and in part to the fact that the equities become more attractive to non-U.S. shareholders.

Home bias, portfolio choice, financial disclosure, corporate governance

Abstract:
International spillovers and exchange rate dynamics are examined in a two-country dynamic optimizing model that allows for idiosyncratic tastes across countries. Specifically, there is a home-good bias in consumption patterns: at given relative prices the ratio of home goods consumed to foreign goods consumed is higher in the home country. The setup nests Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), who assume identical tastes. Allowing for idiosyncratic tastes produces results that differ from Obstfeld and Rogoff's: expansionary monetary policy increases home utility by more, the positive spillovers of a fiscal expansion are reduced, and both short-run and long-run deviations from consumption-based purchasing power parity (PPP) are possible. The model's predictions are broadly consistent with those from the Frenkel, Razin and Yuen (1996) version of the two-country Mundell-Fleming model and with observed behavior of real and nominal exchange rates.

Abstract:
Riding the early morning Metro North train from Grand Central to Greenwich in late December 2004, the euro dominated Luke Anthonys thoughts. After bottoming out at about 0.85 $/¬, in 2000 and 2001, the euro had appreciated sharply and now stood at 1.35 $/¬ (Exhibit 1). Luke, an FX Strategist at a hedge fund, had to form a view about the likely path of the euro going forward. The evidence was in no way clear cut. Of the traditional factors, some were pointing toward further euro appreciation, but others seemed to favor the dollar. And there were a host of "new" factors to sift through. Sorting through the evidence would require both relatively standard thinking about forex markets and the more recent emphasis on prospective capital flows. And Luke had only this quiet week between Christmas and New Years to form a cohesive plan for early 2005.

Abstract:
We analyze a unique data set and uncover a remarkable result that casts a new light on the home bias phenomenon. The data are comprehensive, security-level holdings of emerging market equities by U.S. investors. We document, as expected, that at a point in time U.S. portfolios are tilted towards firms that are large, have fewer restrictions on foreign ownership, or are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. The size of the cross-listing effect is striking. In contrast to the well-documented underweighting of foreign stocks, emerging market equities that are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange are incorporated into U.S. portfolios at full international capital asset pricing model (CAPM) weights. Our results suggest that information asymmetries play an important role in equity home bias and that the benefits of international risk sharing are limited to select firms.

emerging markets portfolio choice home bias international risk sharing

Abstract:
Tito Mboweni was troubled. After a long debate, and not without controversy, South Africa had formally introduced a policy of inflation targeting (IT) on 23 February 2000, just 6 months after he had been appointed Governor of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). He knew IT was the best path for South Africa, but now, in December 2001, re-reading the latest statistics brought him great concern. Since implementing the IT regime, the economic data had been very disappointing. Persistently high unemployment, with some estimates putting it as high as 40%, meant that South Africa did not have the luxury of waiting for new policies to bear fruit. Mboweni knew that to reduce unemployment the country needed sustainable growth, and that would come only through strong increases in productive capacity, but investment was lagging and it was clear that the seeds for sustainable growth were not being planted. With inflation forecasted to exceed the mandated target, Mboweni would have to tighten monetary policy, which would further restrict investment. Was it time to change course?

Abstract:
Were the U.S. to persistently earn substantially more on its foreign investments ("U.S. claims") than foreigners earn on their U.S. investments ("U.S. liabilities"), the likelihood that the current environment of sizeable global imbalances will evolve in a benign manner increases. However, using a monthly dataset on the foreign equity and bond portfolios of U.S. investors and the U.S. equity and bond portfolios of foreign investors, we find that the returns differential for portfolio securities is near zero, far smaller than previously reported. Examining all U.S. claims and liabilities (portfolio securities as well as direct investment and banking), we find that previous estimates of large differentials are biased upward. The bias owes to computing implied returns from an internally inconsistent dataset of revised data; original data produce a much smaller differential. We also attempt to reconcile our finding of a near zero returns differential with observed patterns of cumulated current account deficits, the net international investment position, and the net income balance. Overall, we find no evidence that the U.S. can count on earning substantially more on its claims than it pays on its liabilities.

Current account imbalances, international investment

Abstract:
The sustainability of the large and persistent U.S. current account deficits is one of the biggest issues currently being confronted by international macroeconomists. Some very plausible theories suggest that the substantial global imbalances can continue in a benign manner, other equally plausible theories predict a disorderly resolution, and in general it is very difficult to discern between competing theories. To inform the debates, we view competing theories through the perspective of the relative reliability of the data the theories rely on. Our analysis of the dark matter theory is cursory; from a relative reliability perspective, it fails as it is built on the assumption that an item that is largely unmeasured is the most accurate component of the entire set of international accounts. Similarly, the best data currently available suggest that U.S. returns differentials are much smaller than implied by the exorbitant privilege theory. Our analysis opens up questions about potential inconsistencies in the international accounts, which we address by providing rough estimates of various holes in the accounts.

Current account imbalances, international investment, exorbitant privilege, dark matter, financial derivatives, real estate, short sales, R&D

Abstract:
The sustainability of the large and persistent U.S. current account deficits is one of the biggest issues currently being confronted by international macroeconomists. Some very plausible theories suggest that the substantial global imbalances can continue in a benign manner, other equally plausible theories predict a disorderly resolution, and in general it is very difficult to discern between competing theories. To inform the debates, we view competing theories through the perspective of the relative reliability of the data the theories rely on. Our analysis of the dark matter theory is cursory; from a relative reliability perspective, it fails as it is built on the assumption that an item that is largely unmeasured is the most accurate component of the entire set of international accounts. Similarly, the best data currently available suggest that U.S. returns differentials are much smaller than implied by the exorbitant privilege theory. Our analysis opens up questions about potential inconsistencies in the international accounts, which we address by providing rough estimates of various holes in the accounts.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We examine the extent to which markets enable the provision of housing finance across a wide range of countries. Housing is a major purchase requiring long-term financing, and the factors that are associated with well functioning housing finance systems are those that enable the provision of long-term finance. Across all countries, controlling for country size, we find that countries with stronger legal rights for borrowers and lenders (through collateral and bankruptcy laws), deeper credit information systems, and a more stable macroeconomic environment have deeper housing finance systems. These same factors also help explain the variation in housing finance across emerging market economies. Across developed countries, which tend to have low macroeconomic volatility and relatively extensive credit information systems, variation in the strength of legal rights helps explain the extent of housing finance. We also examine another potential factor--the existence of sizeable government securities markets--that might enable the development of emerging markets' housing finance systems, but we find no evidence supporting that.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
Riding the early morning Metro North train from Grand Central to Greenwich on April Fools Day 2006, Luke Anthony briefly pondered the revitalization of some of the once grand Harlem neighborhoods. But then his thoughts turned back to the task at hand: to form a cohesive view of the likely path of the Japanese yen. Was the dollar on one of its patented upward swings that would bring it to 140 ¥/$ before long? Or is the past years dollar appreciation just a brief pause in a longer-term downward march as the record current account deficit drags it to the depths?

Abstract:
In January 2008, Vietnam faced an economic challenge as the U.S. Federal Reserve cut rates by 75 basis points. What would it take to keep the financial markets from faltering? What would it take to maintain the high growth that had lifted millions out of poverty? Was it time for significant changes, or was a steady hand what the markets needed most?

Exchange rate risk, trade policy, monetary policy

Abstract:
Countries that cannot attract foreigners to invest in their local currency bonds run the risk of currency mismatches that can result in painful crises. We analyze foreign participation in the bond markets of over 40 countries. Bond markets in less developed countries have returns characterized by high variance and negative skewness, factors that we show are eschewed by U.S. investors. While results based on a three-moment CAPM indicate that it is diversifiable idiosyncratic risk that U.S. investors shun, our analysis suggests that countries can improve foreign participation by reducing macroeconomic instability.

Abstract:
This paper evaluates the ability of U.S. investors to allocate their foreign equity portfolios across 44 countries over a 25-year period. We find that U.S. portfolios achieved a significantly higher Sharpe ratio than foreign benchmarks, especially since 1990. We test whether this strong performance owed to trading expertise or longer-term allocation expertise. The evidence is overwhelmingly against trading expertise. While U.S. investors did abstain from momentum trading and instead sold past winners, we find no evidence that these past winners subsequently underperformed. In addition, conditional performance measures, which directly test reallocating into (out of) markets that subsequently outperformed (underperformed), suggest no significant trading expertise. In contrast, we offer strong evidence of longer-term allocation expertise: If we fix portfolio weights at the end of 1989 and do not allow reallocations, we still find superior performance in the recent period.

Abstract:
The person responsible for global allocation for a large pension fund had been asked by the board of directors in April 2008 for an assessment on whether she thinks the dollar would appreciate or depreciate over the next five to ten years. She has heard mostly negative views about path of the dollar over the long term, and former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan’s suggestion that the Gulf States, and others, should de-link from the U.S. dollar as a way to contain inflationary pressures. Currently, the fund is 60% in dollar-based assets and 40% in foreign markets. The dollar’s sharp decline against a broad array of currencies, central banks diversifying reserves away from dollars, and some OPEC members invoicing oil-sales currencies in other than dollars are discouraging news. She considers whether to increase the foreign weighting and, because the dollar has overshot its "long-term value," whether it is now more likely to appreciate than depreciate, and finally whether the fund should use the recent dollar pessimism as an opportunity to take profits on its foreign positions and increase the weighting on the now relatively cheap U.S. securities.

Foreign market

Abstract:
There are a number of worrisome features of the U.S. current account deficit. In particular, its size and persistence, the extent to which it is financing consumption as opposed to investment, and the reliance on debt inflows raise concerns about the likelihood of a sharp adjustment. We examine episodes of current account adjustment in industrial countries to assess the validity of these concerns. Our main findings are (i) larger deficits take longer to adjust and are associated with significantly slower income growth (relative to trend) during the current account recovery than smaller deficits, (ii) consumption-driven current account deficits involve significantly larger depreciations than deficits financing investment, and (iii) there is little evidence that deficits in economies that run persistent deficits, have large net foreign debt positions, experience greater short-term capital flows, or are less open are accommodated by more extensive exchange rate adjustment or slower growth. Our findings are consistent with earlier work showing that, in general, current account adjustment tends to be associated with slow income growth and a real depreciation. Overall, our results support claims that the size of the current account deficit and the extent to which it is financing consumption matter for adjustment.

Abstract:
This technical note introduces the basic structure of what we call the Three-Paned Model. The model is essentially just an "opening up" of the closed-economy IS/LM Model, with the main pane being the IS/LM Model (modified only slightly to allow for international trade) and two additional panes that determine the amount of capital inflows, net exports, and the exchange rate. This note is not a substitute for the more in-depth presentation of these models found in textbooks, but should be used to complement each textbook’s richer treatment of the theoretical and technical aspects of these models.

Exchange rate risk

Abstract:
We decompose the returns differential between U.S. portfolio claims and liabilities into the composition, return, and timing effects. Our most striking and robust finding is that foreigners exhibit poor timing when reallocating between bonds and equities within their U.S. portfolios. The poor timing of foreign investors-caused primarily by deliberate trading, not a lack of portfolio rebalancing-contributes positively to the U.S. external returns differential. We find no evidence that the poor timing is driven by mechanical reserve accumulation by emerging market countries; rather, it is driven almost entirely by the poor timing of rich, developed (mainly European) countries. Finally, while poor foreign timing appears to be persistent across subsamples, other terms in our decomposition (the composition and return effects and U.S. timing abroad), as well as the overall differential, are sometimes negative, sometimes positive, and usually indistinguishable from zero.

Returns differential, timing effect

Abstract:
We decompose the returns differential between U.S. portfolio claims and liabilities into the composition, return, and timing effects. Our most striking and robust finding is that foreigners exhibit poor timing when reallocating between bonds and equities within their U.S. portfolios. The poor timing of foreign investors--caused primarily by deliberate trading, not a lack of portfolio rebalancing--contributes positively to the U.S. external returns differential. We find no evidence that the poor timing is driven by mechanical reserve accumulation by emerging market countries; rather, it is driven almost entirely by the poor timing of rich, developed (mainly European) countries. Finally, while poor foreign timing appears to be persistent across subsamples, other terms in our decomposition (the composition and return effects and U.S. timing abroad), as well as the overall differential, are sometimes negative, sometimes positive, and usually indistinguishable from zero.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
Were the U.S. to persistently earn substantially more on its foreign investments ("U.S. claims") than foreigners earn on their U.S. investments ("U.S. liabilities"), the likelihood that the current environment of sizeable global imbalances will evolve in a benign manner increases. However, using a monthly dataset on the foreign equity and bond portfolios of U.S. investors and the U.S. equity and bond portfolios of foreign investors, we find that the returns differential for portfolio securities is near zero, far smaller than previously reported. Examining all U.S. claims and liabilities (portfolio securities as well as direct investment and banking), we find that previous estimates of large differentials are biased upward. The bias owes to computing implied returns from an internally inconsistent dataset of revised data; original data produce a much smaller differential. We also attempt to reconcile our finding of a near zero returns differential with observed patterns of cumulated current account deficits, the net international investment position, and the net income balance. Overall, we find no evidence that the U.S. can count on earning substantially more on its claims than it pays on its liabilities.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
This note presents a short description of the balance of payments (BOP) and international position (IIP) presentations. It refers to data for South Africa, but given that there are worldwide standards for countries that report both BOP adn IIP, it should provide guidance for understanding the data of just about any country.

international investment, balance of payments

Abstract:
Partly reflecting structural advantages such as liquidity and strong investor protection, foreigners have built up extremely large positions in US (as well as other dollar-denominated) financial assets. This paper describes the impact on global wealth of an unanticipated shock to US financial markets. For every 10 per cent decline in the dollar, US equity markets, and US bond markets, total wealth losses to foreigners could amount to about 5 percentage points of foreign GDP. Four stylized facts emerge: (i) foreign countries, particularly emerging markets, are more exposed to US bonds than to US equities; (ii) over time US exposure has increased for most countries; (iii) on average, US asset holdings of developed countries and emerging markets (scaled by GDP) are very similar; and (iv) based on their reserves position alone, wealth losses of emerging market governments could on average amount to about 2¾ percentage points of their GDP.

Abstract:
As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand factors that influence whether foreign investors provide capital to a country's firms. We study 4,409 firms from 29 countries to assess whether and why concerns about corporate governance result in fewer foreign holdings. We find that foreigners invest less in firms that reside in countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems. This effect is particularly pronounced when earnings are opaque, indicating that information asymmetry and monitoring costs faced by foreign investors likely drive the results.

Corporate governance, Firm valuation, Foreign investment, Ownership structure, Information flow, Earnings management, Shareholder base, Emerging markets, Home bias