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Abstract:
This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.) We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and bibliographies.

Abstract:
This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.) We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and bibliographies.

Abstract:
This book is a non-technical introduction to auction theory; its practical application in auction design (including many examples); and its uses in other parts of economics. It can be used for a graduate course on auction theory, or - by picking selectively - an advanced undergraduate or MBA course on auctions and auction design.

Part A introduces the basic theory. Part B shows how modern auction-theoretic tools illuminate a range of mainstream economic questions that are superficially unconnected with auctions. Part C discusses practical auction design. Part D describes the one-hundred-billion dollar 3G mobile-phone license auctions. None of the writing is technical, except in the Appendices.

The material was presented as the inaugural (2003) Toulouse Lectures in Economics and is forthcoming at Princeton University Press.

This document contains the Contents, Preface and Introduction to the book. A draft of the FULL BOOK is available.

Auctions, Bidding, Auction Theory, Mechanism Design, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, 3G, UMTS

Abstract:
We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and "standard" economic theory; we show that situations that do not at first sight look like auctions can be recast to use auction-theoretic techniques; and we argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful arguments and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization. This was an Invited Symposium paper for the 2000 (Seattle) World Congress of the Econometric Society.

Auctions, Bidding, Auction Theory, Private Values, Common Values, Mechanism Design, Litigation, Stock Markets, Queues, Financial Crashes, Brand Loyalty, War of Attrition, Bertrand, Perfect Competition, E-Commerce, Spectrum Auctions, Treasury Auctions, Electricity, Internet

Abstract:
Toeholds have an enormous impact in "common-value" takeover battles, such as those between two financial bidders. This contrasts with the small impact of a toehold in a "private-value" auction. Our results are consistent with empirical findings that a toehold helps a buyer win an auction, sometimes very cheaply. A controlling minority shareholder may therefore be effectively immune to outside offers. A target may benefit by requiring "best and final" sealed-bid offers or by selling a cheap toehold or options to a "white knight." Our analysis extends to regulators selling "stranded assets," creditors bidding in bankruptcy auctions, and so forth.

Abstract:
Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a toehold bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of a toehold on a bidder's strategy may be small, the indirect effect is large in a common value auction. When a firm bids more aggressively, its competitors face an increased winner's curse and must bid more conservatively. This allows the toeholder to bid more aggressively still, and so on. One implication is that a controlling minority shareholder may be immune to outside offers. The board of a target may increase the expected sale price by allowing a second bidder to buy a toehold on favorable terms, or by running a sealed bid auction.

Abstract:
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy - preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, TV franchises, companies, electricity, etc., and especially the European "third-generation" (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not "one size fits all".

Auctions, Antitrust, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, Bidding, Auction Theory, Collusion, Entry Deterrence, Predation, Takeover Battles, Ascending Auction, Sealed-Bid Auction, Winner's Curse, Uniform Price Auction, Discriminatory Auction, Anglo-Dutch Auction, Electricity, TV franchise, Football TV-rights, Private Values, Common Values, Mechanism Design, Competition Policy

Abstract:
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy - preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, TV franchises, companies, electricity, etc., and especially the European "third-generation" (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not "one size fits all".

Auctions, Antitrust, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, Bidding, Auction Theory, Collusion, Entry Deterrence, Predation, Takeover Battles, Ascending Auction, Sealed-Bid Auction, Winner's Curse, Uniform Price Auction, Discriminatory Auction, Anglo-Dutch Auction, Electricity, TV franchise, Football TV-rights, Private Values, Common Values, Mechanism Design, Competition Policy

Abstract:
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy - preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems, and the Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may often perform better. Effective anti-trust policy is also critical.

However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circumstances of the recent U.K. mobile-phone license made an ascending format ideal, but this author (and others) correctly predicted the same format would fail in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Auction design is not "one size fits all".

We also discuss the 3G spectrum auctions in Germany, Italy, Austria and Switzerland, and football TV-rights, TV franchise and other radiospectrum auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles.

[This is a revised and extended version of the paper previously circulated under the title "What Really Matters in Auction Design".]

Antitrust, Collusion, Predation, Entry, Entry Deterrence, Auctions, Telecommunications, Takeovers, Electricity, Bidding, Auction Theory, Radiospectrum, UMTS, Mobile Phones, Mechanism Design

Abstract:
Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex post market power - over the same buyer in the case of switching costs (or brand loyalty), or over others with network effects. Firms compete ex ante for this ex post power, using penetration pricing, introductory offers, and price wars. Such 'competition for the market' or 'life-cycle competition' can adequately replace ordinary compatible competition, and can even be fiercer than compatible competition by weakening differentiation. More often, however, incompatible competition not only involves direct efficiency losses but also softens competition and magnifies incumbency advantages. With network effects, established firms have little incentive to offer better deals when buyers' and complementors' expectations hinge on non-efficiency factors (especially history such as past market shares), and although competition between incompatible networks is initially unstable and sensitive to competitive offers and random events, it later 'tips' to monopoly, after which entry is hard, often even too hard given incompatibility. And while switching costs can encourage small-scale entry, they discourage sellers from raiding one another's existing customers, and so also discourage more aggressive entry. Because of these competitive effects, even inefficient incompatible competition is often more profitable than compatible competition, especially for dominant firms with installed-base or expectational advantages. Thus firms probably seek incompatibility too often. We therefore favour thoughtfully pro-compatibility public policy.

Switching costs, network effects, lock-in, network externalities, coordination, indirect network effects

Abstract:
Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex post market power-over the same buyer in the case of switching costs (or brand loyalty), or over others with network effects.

Firms compete ex ante for this ex post power, using penetration pricing, introductory offers, and price wars. Such competition for the market or life-cycle competition can adequately replace ordinary compatible competition, and can even be fiercer than compatible competition by weakening differentiation. More often, however, incompatible competition not only involves direct efficiency losses but also softens competition and magnifies incumbency advantages. With network effects, established firms have little incentive to offer better deals when buyers' and complementors' expectations hinge on non-efficiency factors (especially history such as past market shares), and although competition between incompatible networks is initially unstable and sensitive to competitive offers and random events, it later tips to monopoly, after which entry is hard, often even too hard given incompatibility. And while switching costs can encourage small-scale entry, they discourage sellers from raiding one another's existing customers, and so also discourage more aggressive entry.

Because of these competitive effects, even inefficient incompatible competition is often more profitable than compatible competition, especially for dominant firms with installed-base or expectational advantages. Thus firms probably seek incompatibility too often. We therefore favor thoughtfully pro-compatibility public policy.

switching costs, network effects, lock-in, network externalities, co-ordination, indirect network effects

Abstract:
We usually assume that increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers reduce prices. But all these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these "anomalies" for symmetric buyers, small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear. Our results help explain rationing in initial public offerings and outcomes of spectrum auctions. We illustrate our results in the "Wallet Game" and in another new game we introduce, the "Maximum Game."

Abstract:
We usually assume increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers will never raise prices. But all of these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these "anomalies" when buyers are symmetric, small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear.

Abstract:
Economic theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention is paid to the wider economic context, and to the dangers posed by political pressures. Superficially trivial distinctions between policy proposals may be economically significant, while economically irrelevant distinctions may be politically important. I illustrate with some disastrous government auctions, but also show the value of economic theory.

Economic Theory, methodology, auctions, bidding, auction theory, spectrum auctions, telecommunications, UMTS, 3G, mobile-phones

Abstract:
Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: a public auction or an optimally structured negotiation with a smaller number of bidders? We show that under standard assumptions the public auction is always preferable, even if it forfeits all the seller's negotiating power, including the ability to withdraw the object from sale, provided that it attracts at least one extra bidder. An immediate public auction also dominates negotiating while maintaining the right to hold an auction subsequently with more bidders. The results hold for both the standard independent private values model and a common values model. They suggest that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition.

Abstract:
Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: a public auction or an optimally structured negotiation with a smaller number of bidders? We show that under standard assumptions, the public auction is always preferable, even if it forfeits all the seller's negotiating power, including the ability to withdraw the object from sale, provided that it attracts at least one extra bidder. An immediate public auction also dominates negotiating while maintaining the right to hold an auction subsequently with more bidders. The results hold for both the standard independent private values model and a common values model. They suggest that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition.

Abstract:
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised $22.5 billion ($34 billion or 2.5% of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever.

We discuss the merits of auctions versus "beauty contests", the aims of the auction, the problems we faced, the auction designs we considered, and the mistakes that were made.

Auctions, Telecommunications, SpectrumAuctions, Mobile Phones, 3G, MTS, Bidding

Abstract:
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised 22.5 billion pounds ($34 billion or 2.5% of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever.

We discuss the merits of auctions versus "beauty contests", the aims of the auction, the problems we faced, the auction designs we considered, and the mistakes that were made.

Auctions, Telecommunications, SpectrumAuctions, Mobile Phones, 3G, MTS, Bidding

Abstract:
The existence of a "bidding market" is commonly cited as a reason to tolerate the creation or maintenance of highly concentrated markets. We discuss three erroneous arguments to that effect: the "consultants' fallacy" that "market power is impossible," the "academics' fallacy" that (often) "market power does not matter," and the "regulators' fallacy" that "intervention against pernicious market power is unnecessary," in markets characterized by auctions or bidding processes.

Furthermore we argue that the term "bidding market" as it is widely used in antitrust is unhelpful or misleading. Auctions and bidding processes do have some special features - including their price formation processes, common-values behavior, and bid-taker power - but the significance of these features has been overemphasized, and they often imply a need for stricter rather than more lenient competition policy.

Bidding Markets, Auctions, Antitrust, Competition Policy, Bidding, Market Power, Private Values, Common Values, Anti-trust

Abstract:
Economic theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention is paid to the wider economic context, and to the dangers posed by political pressures. Superficially trivial distinctions between policy proposals may be economically significant, while economically irrelevant distinctions may be politically important. I illustrate with some disastrous government auctions, but also show the value of economic theory.

Methodology, economic policy, economic theory, auctions, bidding, auction theory, spectrum auctions, telecommunications, UMTS, 3G, mobile-phones

Abstract:
Economic theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention is paid to the wider economic context, and to the dangers posed by political pressures. Superficially trivial distinctions between policy proposals may be economically significant, while economically irrelevant distinctions may be politically important. I illustrate with some disastrous government auctions, but also show the value of economic theory.

Economic theory, methodology, auctions, bidding, auction theory, spectrum auctions, telecommunications, UMTS, 3G, mobile-phones

Abstract:
We analyse the major economic issues raised by the 1997 Tobacco Resolution and the ensuing proposed legislation that were intended to settle tobacco litigation in the United States. By settling litigation largely in return for tax increases, the Resolution was a superb example of a "win-win" deal. The taxes would cost the companies about $1 billion per year, but yield the government about $13 billion per year, and allow the lawyers to claim fees based on hundreds of billions in "damages". Only consumers, in whose name many of the lawsuits were filed, lost out.

Though the strategy seems brilliant for the parties involved, the execution was less intelligent. We show that alternative taxes would be considerably superior to those proposed, and explain problems with the damage payments required from the firms, and the legal protections offered to them. We argue that the legislation was not particularly focused on youth smoking, despite the rhetoric. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, youth smokers are not especially valuable to the companies, so marketing restrictions are a sensible part of any deal.

The individual state settlements set very dangerous examples which could open up unprecedented opportunities for collusion throughout the economy, and the multistate settlement of November 1998 is equally flawed. The fees proposed for the lawyers (around $15 billion) and the equally remarkable proposed payoff for Liggett (perhaps $400 million annually, for a company with a prior market value of about $100 million) also set terrible examples.

We conclude with some views about how public policy might do better.

Abstract:
We analyse the major economic issues raised by the 1997 Tobacco Resolution and the ensuing proposed legislation that were intended to settle tobacco litigation in the United States. By settling litigation largely in return for tax increases, the Resolution was a superb example of a "win-win" deal. The taxes would cost the companies about $1 billion per year, but yield the government about $13 billion per year, and allow the lawyers to claim fees based on hundreds of billions in "damages". Only consumers, in whose name many of the lawsuits were filed, lost out.

Though the strategy seems brilliant for the parties involved, the execution was less intelligent. We show that alternative taxes would be considerably superior to those proposed, and explain problems with the damage payments required from the firms, and the legal protections offered to them.

We argue that the legislation was not particularly focused on youth smoking, despite the rhetoric. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, youth smokers are not especially valuable to the companies, so marketing restrictions are a sensible part of any deal.

The individual state settlements set very dangerous examples which could open up unprecedented opportunities for collusion throughout the economy, and the multistate settlement of November 1998 is equally flawed.

The fees proposed for the lawyers (around $15 billion) and the equally remarkable proposed payoff for Liggett (perhaps $400 million annually, for a company with a prior market value of about $100 million) also set terrible examples.

We conclude with some views about how public policy might do better.

Abstract:
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS") mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the U.K., though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the U.K., Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark.

Auctions, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, 3G, UMTS, Bidding

Abstract:
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European 'third generation' (3G, or 'MTS') mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark.

Auctions, telecommunications, spectrum auctions, 3G, UMTS, bidding

Abstract:
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS") mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the U.K., though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the U.K., Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark.

Auctions, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, 3G, UMTS, Bidding

Abstract:
We briefly survey the economics of network effects and switching costs (in 3,400 words).

For comprehensive coverage of the same ground see Farrell and Klemperer's 60,000-word contemporaneous survey.

network effects, switching costs, lock-in, network externalities, co-ordination, indirect network effects

Abstract:
The existence of a "bidding market" is commonly cited as a reason to tolerate the creation or maintenance of highly concentrated markets. We discuss three erroneous arguments to that effect: the "consultants' fallacy" that "market power is impossible", the "academics' fallacy" that (often) "market power does not matter", and the "regulators' fallacy" that "intervention against pernicious market power is unnecessary", in markets characterised by auctions or bidding processes.

Furthermore we argue that the term "bidding market" as it is widely used in antitrust is unhelpful or misleading. Auctions and bidding processes do have some special features - including their price formation processes, common-values behaviour, and bid-taker power - but the significance of these features has been overemphasized, and they often imply a need for stricter rather than more lenient competition policy.

Auctions, Bidding Markets, Competition Policy, Bidding, Antitrust, Market Power, Common Values, Anti-trust

Abstract:
Committing to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market-clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex post inefficient, but it gives more surplus to lower-value customers who are the marginal consumers the monopolists want to tempt to make investments. Similarly, a monopsonist may procure some requirements from high-cost "second sources" rather than purchase only from the lowest-cost suppliers. The model contributes to the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, and it may also help explain "efficiency wages", "second prizes", and "fair" behavior.

Abstract:
Committing to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market-clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex post inefficient, but it gives more surplus to lower-value customers who are the marginal consumers the monopolists want to tempt to make investments. Similarly, a monopsonist may procure some requirements from high-cost "second sources" rather than purchase only from the lowest-cost suppliers. The model contributes to the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, and it may also help explain "efficiency wages", "second prizes", and "fair" behavior.

Abstract:
We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete. The sequential process is more efficient because entrants base their decisions on superior information. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue.

Abstract:
We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete. The sequential process is more efficient because entrants base their decisions on superior information. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue.

Auctions, jump bidding, sequential sales, procurement, entry

Abstract:
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions. Relative-performance maximisation may have been important, but the outcome of the British auction seems to have been efficient. This paper bundles my comments on two papers presented at the December 2001 CES Ifo conference on the telecom auctions. (For those readers new to the subject, I recommend first reading 'How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions' European Economic Review 2002 and 'The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses' Economic Journal 2002. Please contact the author for details.)

auctions, telecommunications, spectrum auctions, 3G, UMTS, bidding

Abstract:
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions. Relative-performance maximisation may have been important, but the outcome of the British auction seems to have been efficient.

This paper bundles my comments on two papers presented at the December 2001 CES Ifo conference on the telecom auctions. (For those readers new to the subject, I recommend first reading "How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions" European Economic Review 2002 and "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses" Economic Journal 2002. Please contact the author for details.)

Auctions, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, 3G, UMTS, Bidding, Mobile Phones

Abstract:
What should be the West's top priority for climate-change policy? This article is a revised and updated version of my talk to the Potsdam Global Sustainability Symposium (which drafted the Potsdam Declaration presented to the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference in Bali).

climate change mitigation, sustainability

Abstract:
What should be the West's top priority for climate-change policy?

This article is a revised and updated version of my talk to the Potsdam Global Sustainability Symposium (which drafted the Potsdam Declaration presented to the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference in Bali).

climate change, global warming, environmental policy

Abstract:
We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry - precisely because of its inefficiency - it usually generates higher expected revenue. We also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc.

Auctions, Sequential Sales, Procurement, Entry

Abstract:
A firm that offers an additional product can capture business from rival firms for other products when consumers prefer to concentrate their purchases at a single supplier. This may lead firms to offer excessive product variety from the social standpoint. A firm may even completely foreclose competing firms from the market by introducing a new product. Forbidding new product introductions (e.g., forbidding universal banking or forbidding a new airline route), forbidding mergers that broaden firms' product lines (e.g., as the EC forbade a merger of commuter aircraft manufacturers), and forbidding Sunday shopping may sometimes be appropriate public policies.

Abstract:
We model a War of Attrition with N+K firms competing for N prizes. If firms must pay their full costs until the whole game ends, even after dropping out themselves (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of other players' actions. If, instead, firms pay no costs after dropping out (as in a natural oligopoly), the field is immediately reduced to N+1 firms. Furthermore, in this limit it is always the K-1 lowest-value firms who drop out in zero time, even though each firm's value is private information to itself.

Abstract:
We model a War of Attrition with N+K firms competing for N prizes. If firms must pay their full costs until the whole game ends, even after dropping out themselves (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of other players' actions. If, instead, firms pay no costs after dropping out (as in a natural oligopoly), the field is immediately reduced to N+1 firms. Furthermore, in this limit it is always the K-1 lowest-value firms who drop out in zero time, even though each firm's value is private information to itself.

Abstract:
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organising the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised 22 and a half billion British Pounds ($34 billion or 2 1/2 % of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits of auctions versus "beauty contests", the aims of the auction, the problems we faced, the auction designs we considered, and the mistakes that were made.

Abstract:
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised 22.5 billion pounds ($34 billion or 2.5% of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits of auctions versus 'beauty contests', the aims of the auction, the problems we faced, the auction designs we considered, and the mistakes that were made.

Auctions, telecommunications, spectrum auctions, mobile phones, 3G, UMTS, bidding

Abstract:
We investigate pricing to market when the exchange rate changes in cases where firms` future demands depend on their current market shares. We show that i) profit maximizing foreign firms may either raise or lower their domestic currency export prices when the domestic exchange rate appreciates temporarily (i.e. the "pass-through" from exchange rate changes to import prices may be perverse); ii) current import prices may be more sensitive to the expected future exchange rate than to the current exchange rate; iii) current import prices fall in response to an increase in uncertainty about the future exchange rate. We present evidence that suggests the behavior of expected future exchange rates may provide a clue to the puzzling behavior of U.S. import prices during the 1980s.

Abstract:
The condition for when a price control increases consumer welfare in perfect competition is tighter than often realised. When demand is linear, a small restriction on price only increases consumer surplus if the elasticity of demand exceeds the elasticity of supply; with log-linear, or constant-elasticity, demand, consumers are always hurt by price controls. The results are best understood -- and can be related to monopoly-theory results -- using the fact that consumer surplus equals the area between the demand curve and the industry marginal-revenue curve.

Price Controls, Consumer Surplus, Rationing, Marginal Revenue, Minimum Wage, Rent Control

Abstract:
I describe a new static (sealed-bid) auction for multiple substitute goods. As in a two-sided simultaneous multiple round auction (SMRA), bidders bid on multiple assets simultaneously, and bid-takers choose supply functions across assets. The auction yields more efficiency, revenue, information, and trade than running multiple separate auctions, but is often simpler to use and understand, and less vulnerable to collusion, than a SMRA. I designed it after the 2007 Northern Rock bank run to help the Bank of England fight the credit crunch; in 2008 the U.S. Treasury planned (but later cancelled) using a related design to buy “toxic assets”.

multi-object auction, TARP, central banking, simultaneous ascending auction, treasury auction, term auction, toxic assets

Abstract:
Most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a Walrasian auctioneer. Because buyers can decide between buying now or later, rather than only now or never, buyers' current 'willingness to pay' is much more sensitive to price than is the demand curve. A consequence is that markets will be extremely sensitive to new information, leading to both 'frenzies, " where demand feeds upon itself, and "crashes," where price drops discontinuously. Although no buyer's independent reservation value reveals much about overall demand, a small increase in one such value can cause a large increase or decrease in average price.

Abstract:
We generalize the War of Attrition model to allow for N + K firms competing for N prizes. Two special cases are of particular interest. First, if firms continue to pay their full costs after dropping out (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of the actions of other players. Second, in the limit in which firms pay no costs after dropping out (as in a natural-oligopoly problem), the field is immediately reduced to N + 1 firms. Furthermore, we have perfect sorting, so it is always the K 1 lowest-value players who drop out in zero time, even though each player's value is private information to the player. We apply our model to politics, explaining the length of time it takes to collect a winning coalition to pass a bill.

Abstract:
We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, “Reference Rules,” to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost riskless, profitable deviations from “truthful bidding” are often easy for bidders to find under currently-used payment rules. Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as existing rules to large deviations. Other considerations, including fairness and comprehensibility, also support the use of Reference Rules.

multi-object auction, core, combinatorial auction, package auction, core-selecting auction, Vickrey auction, Vickrey, simultaneous ascending auction, robust design

Abstract:
The condition for when a price control increases consumer welfare in perfect competition is tighter than often realised. When demand is linear, a small restriction on price only increases consumer surplus if the elasticity of demand exceeds the elasticity of supply; with log-linear or constant-elasticity, demand consumers are always hurt by price controls. The results are best understood - and can be related to monopoly-theory results - using the fact that consumer surplus equals the area between the demand curve and the industry marginal-revenue curve.

Allocative Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, marginal revenue, Microeconomic Theory, Minimum Wage, rationing, rent control

Abstract:
We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry - precisely because of its inefficiency - it usually generates higher expected revenue. We also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc.

Auctions, entry, jump bidding, procurement, sequential sales

Abstract:
We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete. The sequential process is more efficient because entrants base their decisions on superior information. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue.

Auctions, Entry, Jump Bidding, Procurement, Sequential Sales

Abstract:
We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, "Reference Rules," to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost riskless, profitable deviations from "truthful bidding" are often easy for bidders to find under currently-used payment rules. Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as existing rules to large deviations. Other considerations, including fairness and comprehensibility, also support the use of Reference Rules.

combinatorial auction, core, core-selecting auction, multi-object auction, package auction, robust design, simultaneous ascending auction, Vickrey, Vickrey auction

Abstract:
I describe a new static (sealed-bid) auction for multiple substitute goods. As in a two-sided simultaneous multiple round auction (SMRA), bidders bid on multiple assets simultaneously, and bid-takers choose supply functions across assets. The auction yields more efficiency, revenue, information, and trade than running multiple separate auctions, but is often simpler to use and understand, and less vulnerable to collusion, than a SMRA. I designed it after the 2007 Northern Rock bank run to help the Bank of England fight the credit crunch; in 2008 the U.S. Treasury planned (but later cancelled) using a related design to buy "toxic assets".

central banking, multi-object auction, simultaneous ascending auction, TARP, term auction, treasury auction

Abstract:
Allowing patentees to profit from their patents encourages innovation. However, legal scholars have failed to appreciate that unconstrained monopoly pricing is socially inefficient, in that the last bit of monopoly pricing produces large amounts of deadweight loss for a relatively small amount of patentee profit. Uncertainty and delay in patent litigation may be a way of giving patentees constrained market power to reduce this inefficiency. It is possible to limit patentee's market power without reducing their incentives to innovate. Because the profit curve is "stationary" at the profit-maximizing price, small reduction from the monopoly price will not substantially reduce the patentee's incentive to innovate (but will yield substantial decreases in the dead weight loss). And more substantial reduction in monopoly pricing can be efficiently offset by increases in patent duration. Society would be better off giving patentees limited market power for a longer period rather than giving patentees monopoly power for a shorter period.