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Abstract:
Value stocks have higher returns than growth stocks in markets around the world. For 1975-95, the difference between the average returns on global portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks is 7.60% per year, and value stocks outperform growth stocks in 12 of 13 major markets. An international CAPM cannot explain the value premium, but a two-factor model that includes a risk factor for relative distress captures the value premium in international returns.

Abstract:
We use cross-section regressions to study how a firm's value is related to dividends and debt. With a good control for profitability, the regressions can measure how the taxation of dividends and debt affects firm value. Simple tax hypotheses say that value is negatively related to dividends and positively related to debt. We find the opposite. We infer that dividends and debt convey information about profitability (expected net cash flows) missed by a wide range of control variables. This information about profitability obscures any tax effects of financing decisions.

Abstract:
We use cross-section regressions to study how a firm's value is related to dividends and debt. With a good control for profitability, the regressions can measure how the taxation of dividends and debt affects firm value. Simple tax hypotheses say that value is negatively related to dividends and positively related to debt. We find the opposite. We infer that dividends and debt convey information about profitability (expected net cash flows) missed by a wide range of control variables. This information about profitability obscures any tax effects of financing decisions.

Abstract:
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of William Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965) marks the birth of asset pricing theory (resulting in a Nobel Prize for Sharpe in 1990). Before their breakthrough, there were no asset pricing models built from first principles about the nature of tastes and investment opportunities and with clear testable predictions about risk and return. Four decades later, the CAPM is still widely used in applications, such as estimating the cost of equity capital for firms and evaluating the performance of managed portfolios. And it is the centerpiece, indeed often the only asset pricing model taught in MBA level investment courses.

The attraction of the CAPM is its powerfully simple logic and intuitively pleasing predictions about how to measure risk and about the relation between expected return and risk. Unfortunately, perhaps because of its simplicity, the empirical record of the model is poor - poor enough to invalidate the way it is used in applications. The model's empirical problems may reflect true failings. (It is, after all, just a model.) But they may also be due to shortcomings of the empirical tests, most notably, poor proxies for the market portfolio of invested wealth, which plays a central role in the model's predictions. We argue, however, that if the market proxy problem invalidates tests of the model, it also invalidates most applications, which typically borrow the market proxies used in empirical tests.

For perspective on the CAPM's predictions about risk and expected return, we begin with a brief summary of its logic. We then review the history of empirical work on the model and what it says about shortcomings of the CAPM that pose challenges to be explained by more complicated models.

Abstract:
We estimate the equity premium using dividend and earnings growth rates to measure the expected rate of capital gain. Our estimates for 1951 to 2000, 2.55 percent and 4.32 percent, are much lower than the equity premium produced by the average stock return, 7.43 percent. Our evidence suggests that the high average return for 1951 to 2000 is due to a decline in discount rates that produces a large unexpected capital gain. Our main conclusion is that the average stock return of the last half-century is a lot higher than expected.

Abstract:
We estimate the equity premium using dividend and earnings growth rates to measure the expected rate of capital gain. Our estimates for 1951-2000, 2.55% and 4.32%, are much lower than the equity premium produced by the average stock return, 7.43%. Our evidence suggests that the high average return for 1951-2000 is due to a decline in discount rates that produces large unexpected capital gains. Our main conclusion is that the stock return of the last half-century is a lot higher than expected.

Abstract:
The value premium in U.S. stocks returns is robust. The positive relation between average return and book-to-market equity (BE/ME) is as strong for 1929-63 as for the subsequent period studied in previous papers. Like others, we also find a size premium in stock returns. Small stocks have higher average returns than big stocks. The size premium is, however, weaker and less reliable than the value premium. The relations between average return and firm characteristics (size and BE/ME) are better explained by a three-factor risk model than by the behavioral hypothesis that investor overreaction causes characteristics to be compensated irrespective of risk loadings.

Abstract:
The value premium in U.S. stocks returns is robust. The positive relation between average return and book-to-market equity (BE/ME) is as strong for 1929-63 as for the subsequent period studied in previous papers. Like others, we also find a size premium in stock returns. Small stocks have higher average returns than big stocks. The size premium is, however, weaker and less reliable than the value premium. The relations between average return and firm characteristics (size and BE/ME) are better explained by a three-factor risk model than by the behavioral hypothesis that investor overreaction causes characteristics to be compensated irrespective of risk loadings.

Abstract:
The percent of firms paying cash dividends falls from 66.5 in 1978 to 20.8 in 1999. The decline is due in part to the changing characteristics of publicly traded firms. Fed by new lists, the population of publicly traded firms tilts increasingly toward small firms with low profitability and strong growth opportunities characteristics typical of firms that have never paid dividends. More interesting, we also show that controlling for characteristics, firms become less likely to pay dividends. This lower propensity to pay is at least as important as changing characteristics in the declining incidence of dividend payers.

Abstract:
We estimate two internal rates of return for the non-financial corporate sector: (i) the return on the initial market values of the securities issued by firms, and (ii) the return on the cost of their investments. The return on cost is the return delivered by firms on investment outlays. The return on value is an estimate of the overall corporate cost of capital, that is, the return on investment required by the capital market. The estimate of the corporate cost of capital for 1950-96 is 10.72 percent. The return on cost is larger, 12.11 percent, so on average corporate investment seems to be profitable. A byproduct of calculating these returns is information about the history of corporate earnings, investment, and financing decisions that is perhaps more interesting than the returns themselves.

Abstract:
There is a strong presumption in economics that, in a competitive environment, profitability is mean reverting. We provide corroborating evidence. In a simple partial adjustment model, the estimated rate of mean reversion is about 40 percent per year. But a simple partial adjustment model with a uniform rate of mean reversion misses rich non-linear patterns in the behavior of profitability. Specifically, we find that mean reversion is faster when profitability is below its mean and when it is further from its mean in either direction. We also show that the mean reversion in profitability produces predictable variation in earnings.

Abstract:
There is a strong presumption in economics that, in a competitive environment, profitability is mean reverting. We provide corroborating evidence. In a simple partial adjustment model, the estimated rate of mean reversion is about 40 percent per year. But a simple partial adjustment model with a uniform rate of mean reversion misses rich non-linear patterns in the behavior of profitability. Specifically, we find that mean reversion is faster when profitability is below its mean and when it is further from its mean in either direction. We also show that the mean reversion in profitability produces predictable variation in earnings.

Abstract:
Confirming predictions shared by the tradeoff and pecking order models, more profitable firms and firms with fewer investments have higher dividend payouts. Confirming the pecking order model but contradicting the tradeoff model, more profitable firms are less levered. Firms with more investments have less market leverage, which is consistent with the tradeoff model and a complex pecking order model. Firms with more investments have lower long-term dividend payouts, but dividends do not vary to accommodate short-term variation in investment. As the pecking order model predicts, short-term variation in investment and earnings is mostly absorbed by debt.

Abstract:
We examine (i) how value premiums vary with firm size, (ii) whether the CAPM explains value premiums, and (iii) whether in general average returns compensate beta in the way predicted by the CAPM. Loughran's (1997) evidence for a weak value premium among large firms is special to 1963-1995, U.S. stocks, and the book-to-market value-growth indicator. Ang and Chen's (2003) evidence that the CAPM can explain U.S. value premiums is special to 1926-1963. The CAPM's general problem is that variation in unrelated to size and value-growth goes unrewarded throughout 1926-2004. This produces rejections of the model for 1926-1963 and 1963-2004.

Abstract:
The anomalous returns associated with net stock issues, accruals, and momentum are pervasive; they show up in all size groups (micro, small, and big) in cross-section regressions, and they are also strong in sorts, at least in the extremes. The asset growth and profitability anomalies are less robust. There is an asset growth anomaly in average returns on microcaps and small stocks, but it is absent for big stocks. Among profitable firms, higher profitability tends to be associated with abnormally high returns, but there is little evidence that unprofitable firms have unusually low returns.

Anomalies

Abstract:
I compare the fees, expenses, and trading costs society pays to invest in the U.S. stock market with an estimate of what would be paid if everyone invested passively. Averaging over 1980 to 2006, I find investors spend 0.67% of the aggregate value of the market each year searching for superior returns. Society's capitalized cost of price discovery is at least 10% of the current market cap. Under reasonable assumptions, the typical investor would increase his average annual return by 67 basis points over the 1980 to 2006 period if he switched to a passive market portfolio.

Abstract:
We break average returns on value and growth portfolios into dividends and three sources of capital gain, (i) growth in book equity primarily due to earnings retention, (ii) convergence in price-to-book ratios (P/B) due to mean reversion in profitability and expected returns, and (iii) upward drift in P/B during 1927-2006. The capital gains of value stocks trace mostly to convergence: P/B rises as some value firms become more profitable and move to lower expected return groups. Growth in book equity is trivial to negative for value portfolios, but it is a large positive factor in the capital gains of growth stocks. For growth stocks, convergence is negative: P/B falls because growth stocks do not always remain highly profitable with low expected returns. Relative to convergence, drift is a minor factor in average returns.

Abstract:
Financing decisions seem to violate the central predictions of the pecking order model about how often and under what circumstances firms issue equity. Specifically, most firms issue or retire equity each year, the issues are on average large, and they are not typically done by firms under duress. We estimate that during 1973-2002 the year-by-year equity decisions of more than half of our sample firms violate the pecking order. And contradictions are more common among larger firms.

Abstract:
The class of firms that obtain public equity financing expands dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s. After 1979, the rate at which new firms are listed on major U.S. stock exchanges jumps from about 160 to near 550 per year, and the characteristics of new lists change. The cross-section of new list profitability becomes progressively more left skewed, and growth becomes more right skewed. The result is a sharp decline in new list survival rates. We suggest that the changes in the characteristics of new lists are due to a decline in the cost of equity capital that allows weaker firms and firms with more distant expected payoffs to become viable candidates for public equity financing.

Abstract:
Standard asset pricing models assume that (i) there is complete agreement among investors about probability distributions of future payoffs on assets, and (ii) investors choose asset holdings based solely on anticipated payoffs; that is, investment assets are not also consumption goods. Both assumptions are unrealistic. We provide a simple framework for studying how disagreement and tastes for assets as consumption goods can affect asset prices.

Abstract:
Valuation theory says that expected stock returns are related to three variables: the book-to-market equity ratio (B/M), expected profitability, and expected investment. Given B/M and expected profitability, higher rates of investment imply lower expected returns. But controlling for the other two variables, more profitable firms have higher expected returns, as do firms with higher B/M. These predictions are confirmed in our tests. Our results are qualitatively similar to earlier evidence, but in quantitative (economic) terms, there are some interesting surprises.

Abstract:
In aggregate mutual funds produce a portfolio close to the market portfolio but with high costs of active management that show up intact as lower returns. Persistence tests that sort funds on three-factor alpha estimates suggest information effects in the future returns of past winners and losers, but persistence is temporary, it is weak to nonexistent in sorts on average return, and it largely disappears after 1992. Bootstrap simulations that use entire histories of fund returns do not identify information effects in three-factor or four-factor alpha estimates.

Abstract:
Migration of stocks across size and value portfolios contributes to the size and value premiums in average stock returns. The size premium is almost entirely generated by the small-capitalization stocks that earn extreme positive returns and thus become big-cap stocks. The value premium comes from (1) value stocks that improve in type because their companies are acquired by other companies or because they earn high returns and migrate to a neutral or growth portfolio, (2) growth stocks that earn low returns and thus move to a neutral or value portfolio, and (3) the slightly higher returns on value stocks that do not migrate compared with the returns on growth stocks that do not migrate.

Portfolio Management: Equity Strategies, Asset Allocation

Abstract:
We study how migration of firms across size and value portfolios contributes to the size and value premiums in average stock returns. The size premium is almost entirely due to the small stocks that earn extreme positive returns and as a result become big stocks. The value premium has three sources: (i) value stocks that improve in type either because they are acquired by other firms or because they earn high returns and so migrate to a neutral or growth portfolio; (ii) growth stocks that earn low returns and as a result move to a neutral or value portfolio; and (iii) slightly higher returns on value stocks that remain in the same portfolio compared to growth stocks that do not migrate.

Size premium, value premium, average returns

Abstract:
The book-to-market ratio, B/M, is a noisy measure of expected stock returns because B/M also varies with expected cashflows. Our hypothesis is that the evolution of B/M, in terms of past changes in book equity and price, contains independent information about expected cashflows that can be used to improve estimates of expected returns. The tests support this hypothesis, with results that are largely but not entirely similar for Microcap stocks (below the 20th NYSE market capitalization percentile) and All but Micro stocks.

Average Returns, B/M, and Share Issues

Abstract:
We extend the evidence of Fama and French (1995) on the post-1962 profitability and equity financing of firms in different style groups (small versus big, value versus growth) to 1926-2006. The emphasis is on whether equity-financed investment varies with cashflows and price-to-book ratios in ways that support or violate the pecking order model of Myers (1984) or the Q theory of investment. The long-term perspective from the results for 1926-2006 provides insights into inferences about the pecking order and Q theory drawn from previous work that focuses on shorter, more recent periods.

Equity financing, pecking order, Q-theory

Abstract:
We examine financing decisions from the perspective of the mispricing model of Debondt and Thaler (1985) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (LSV 1994). In their world value stocks are underpriced, growth stocks are overpriced, and the higher average returns of value stocks are the result of slow price corrections. The financial aggregates of style groups (small versus big, value versus growth) do not suggest that opportunistic financing in response to mispricing is a dominant factor in financing decisions, but regression tests on individual firms suggest that mispricing has marginal effects at least on equity financing decisions.

Opportunistic Financing

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
The difference between reported price-earnings ratios in the United States and Japan is not as puzzling as it appears at first glance. Nearly half the disparity is caused by differences in accounting practices with respect to consolidation of earnings from subsidiaries and depreciation of fixed assets. If Japanese firms used U.S. accounting rules, we estimate that the P/E ratio for the Tokyo Stock Exchange would have been 32.1, not the reported 54.3, at the end of 1988. Accounting differences are unable, however, to explain the sharp rise in the Japanese stock market during the mid-1980s. Changes in required returns on equities, or in investor expectations of future growth for Japanese firms, must be invoked to explain this phenomenon. Real interest rates declined during the period of rapid price increase, but there is little evidence that growth expectations because more optimistic. The real interest rate changes do not, however, appear large enough to fully account for the change in stock prices.

Abstract:
At the end of 1989, Japanese investors held just over 1% of the U.S. stock market, while U.S. investors held less than 1% of the Tokyo market. This pattern of very limited cross-holding has persisted for nearly two decades, despite the diversification gains from cross-border investment. None of the standard explanations for limited international equity holding, such as capital controls on Japanese investors or limits on the international exposure of institutional portfolios, appears satisfactory. To justify these patterns, investors in both the United States and Japan must believe, inconsistently, that expected returns are substantially higher in their own market than in foreign markets.

Abstract:
The aggregate portfolio of U.S. equity mutual funds is close to the market portfolio, but the high costs of active management show up intact as lower returns to investors. Bootstrap simulations suugest that few funds produce benchmark adjusted expected returns sufficient to cover their costs. If we add back the costs in expense ratios, there is evidence of inferior and superior performance (non-zero true alpha) in the extreme tails of the cross section of mutual fund alpha estimates.

Abstract:
Average returns on value and growth portfolios are broken into dividends and three sources of capital gain: (1) growth in book equity, primarily from earnings retention, (2) convergence in price-to-book ratios (P/Bs) from mean reversion in profitability and expected returns, and (3) upward drift in P/B during 1927-2006. The capital gains of value stocks trace mostly to convergence: P/B rises as some value companies become more profitable and their stocks move to lower-expected-return groups. Growth in book equity is trivial to negative for value portfolios but is a large positive factor in the capital gains of growth stocks. For growth stocks, convergence is negative: P/B falls because growth companies do not always remain highly profitable with low expected stock returns. Relative to convergence, drift is a minor factor in average returns.

Portfolio Management: Equity Strategies

Abstract:
We study whether the behavior of stock prices, in relation to size and book to market equity (BE/ME), reflects the behavior of earnings. Consistent with rational pricing, high BE/ME signals persistent poor earnings and low BE/ME signals strong earnings. Moreover, stock prices forecast the reversion of earnings growth observed after firms are ranked on size and BE/ME. Finally, there are market, size, and BE/ME factors in earnings like those in returns. The market and size factors in earnings help explain those in returns, but we find no link between BE/ME factors in earnings and returns.

Abstract:
Previous work shows that average returns on common stocks are related to firm characteristics like size, earnings/price, cashflow/price, book-to-market equity, past sales growth, long-term past return, and short term past return. Because these patterns in average returns apparently are not explained by the CAPM, they are called anomalies. We find that, except for the continuation of short-term returns, the anomalies largely disappear in a three-factor model. Our results are consistent with rational ICAPM or APT asset pricing, but we also consider irrational pricing and data problems as possible explanations.

Abstract:
We estimate that the average value of a dollar invested in the U.S. corporate sector is $1.18. When we delete utilities and current assets, where opportunities for value added seem limited, the estimate jumps to $1.68. We use cross-section regressions to study how value is related to dividends and debt. The regressions can potentially identify tax effects, but they cannot disentangle other factors, including bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and asymmetric information. Simple tax stories say value is negatively related to dividends and positively related to debt, but we find the opposite. We infer that dividends and debt convey information about profitability that obscures any tax effects.