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Abstract:
One of the most controversial theoretical issues of our time is the governance of cybersecurity. Computer security experts, national security experts, and policy analysts have all struggled to bring meaningful analysis to cybersecurity; however, the discipline of law & economics has yet to be fully applied to the issue. This introduction presents work by leading national scholars who examine this complex national security challenge from a law and economics perspective. The focus spans from a discussion of pure market solutions to public-private issue analysis, providing a valuable basis for policy considerations concerning the appropriate governmental role on the issue of cybersecurity.

Cyberlaw, Criminal Law, Regulatory Law

Abstract:
Following Thomas Hobbes, public-choice economists have theorized that constitutions arise from agreements among subordinates to establish private rules for their own transactions with each other. They then supposedly delegate to a sovereign the obligation to enforce these rules. The sovereign then violates the constitution by instituting wrong-headed rules to govern the subordinates' relations with each other. Instead, it seems more realistic to see constitutions as arising from subordinates' agreements with each other to resist excessive appropriations. An advanced constitution is a substitute for this original type of agreement, which only works well when the subordinates' numbers are small, as in some hunter-gatherer societies. An advanced constitution also limits a sovereign's appropriations, arises only from subordinates' threats of the sovereign, and marshals the sovereign's own instruments of force against him.

Abstract:
When Oliver Wendell Holmes synthesized the writs of trespass and trespass on the case, he left out of his gloss of modern accident law an extremely important part, namely, the strict liability that everyone faces for routine errors, such as failing to check one's blind spot before changing lanes.

One proof of how poorly the language of negligence fits the strict liability that actually exists for routine "compliance errors" is the debate among legal historians about whether the modern tort rule governing accidents is less strict than the classical English rule. As I develop in the article, the modern accident rule is, in reality, strikingly similar to the ancient accident rule. Holmes's neglect of the strict liability component of the modern negligence rule has hindered our understanding of both it and the classical accident rule.

When we see clearly what the strict-liability component of the modern negligence rule is, it opens a new window on negligence theory.

negligence theory, intentional torts, negligence rule, strict liability

Abstract:
In negligence law, "unavoidable accident" is the risk that remains when an actor has used due care. The counterpart of unavoidable accident is "negligent harm." Negligence law makes parties immune for unavoidable accident even when they have used less than due care. Courts have developed a number of methods by which they "sort" accidents to unavoidable accident or to negligent harm, holding parties liable only for the latter. These sorting techniques are interesting in their own right and also provide a way of conceptualizing the relationship between specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur, which are two variants of the negligence rule. One judicial sorting technique reveals a paradox of negligence law. New safety technology often reduces the amount of unavoidable accident and simultaneously increases the expected number of "compliance errors," or routine negligent lapses, that actors will make. Paradoxically, an actor's use of new safety technology can make it more likely that a court will sort an accident to negligent harm as opposed to unavoidable accident. The article develops these theoretical ideas through a series of graphical illustrations analogous to those of traditional price theory.

negligence rule, positive theory of economic law, "unavoidable accident"

Abstract:
Rational and irrational people are typically held to an identical tort standard when it is a question of their own liability. On the other hand, when it is a question of whether someone else has encouraged some dangerous behavior, as under the doctrines of duty and proximate cause, the encouragers will be liable only when the persons were part of a group whose members typically lack rationality. The courts' apparent purpose is to prevent accidents in every way possible even if it means diluting the incentives of irrational people in order to increase the incentives of responsible people to refrain from creating tempting opportunities for them.

Tort law, doctrine of duty and proximate cause, the EFR doctrine

Abstract:
In BMW v Gore, the Supreme Court held that a state court's award of punitive damages was so excessive that it violated the Due Process Clause. In three other recent cases, the Court had rejected due process challenges to large awards of punitive damages. Although the Court did not articulate an economic rationale, these four cases are consistent with a theory under which federal courts should intervene only when there is a high risk that punitive damages will systematically appropriate wealth from the citizens of other states. Rather than apply due process analysis directly to punitive damages awards, the Court might more usefully revise the constitutional rules regulating the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction. With clear and realistic rules allowing firms to avoid states in which juries are not adequately restrained, the mechanisms of federalism would adequately control excessive punitive damages. Gore may be an effort to approximate this result by other means.

Due Process Clause, punitive damages

Abstract:
Most economists associate antitrust policy with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Nonetheless, there is in England and America a much older body of antitrust law, namely, the common law of restraint of trade. This regulation, like language and markets, evolved over a long period of time. This article examines whether the rules that the common law courts developed can be explained by a hypothetical wish to maximize social wealth and concludes that many of them can be. The last part of the article outlines a theory of legal evolution.

antitrust law, comman law of restraint of trade, legal history

Abstract:
Some have seen the doctrine of proximate cause as an especially incoherent feature of negligence law. This Article demonstrates that the doctrine is far more regular than many have supposed. Proximate cause is really two doctrines at the same time, one directed toward cases with multiple causes and another directed toward cases with multiple risks. Each doctrine includes distinct paradigms leading to either liability or nonliability. When we sort problem cases between these paradigms, we can reliably predict how the courts will decide them.

proximate cause, negligence liability