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Abstract:
This Paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a 'managerial power' approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm's length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, executive loans, retirement benefits, payments to departing executives, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives.

M14, corporate governance, managers, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, stock options, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, executive loans, compensation consultants, expensing

Abstract:
This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a 'managerial power' approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm's length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, stealth compensation, executive loans, payments to departing executives, retirement benefits, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives.

Abstract:
This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm's length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, stealth compensation, executive loans, payments to departing executives, retirement benefits, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives.

Abstract:
In a recent book, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of executive Compensation, we critique existing executive pay arrangements and the corporate governance processes producing them, and put forward proposals for improving both executive pay and corporate governance. This paper provides an overview of the main elements of our critique and proposals. We show that, under current legal arrangements, boards cannot be expected to contract at arm's length with the executives whose pay they set. We discuss how managers' influence can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that researchers subscribing to the arm's length contracting view have long viewed as puzzling. We also explain how managerial influence can lead to inefficient arrangements that generate weak or even perverse incentives, as well as to arrangements that make the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay less transparent. Finally, we outline our proposals for improving the transparency of executive pay, the connection between pay and performance, and the accountability of corporate boards.

Keywords: Corporate governance, managers, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, stock options, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, disclosure, stealth compensation, compensation consultants, camouflage.

Abstract:
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the managerial power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm's length in devising executive compensation arrangements; rather, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage rent extraction might lead to the use of inefficient pay arrangements that provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value. The authors show that the processes that produce compensation arrangements, and the various market forces and constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, the authors show that managerial power and the desire to camouflage rents can explain significant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have long been viewed as puzzling or problematic from the optimal contracting perspective. The authors conclude that the role managerial power plays in the design of executive compensation is significant and should be taken into account in any examination of executive pay arrangements or of corporate governance generally.

Corporate governance, managers, shareholders, directors, boards, executive compensation, stock options, private benefits of control, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, accounting, FASB rules, disclosure, camouflage

Abstract:
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic re-search on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the managerial power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm's length in devising executive compensation arrangements; rather, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage rent extraction might lead to the use of inefficient pay arrangements that provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value. The authors show that the processes that produce compensation arrangements, and the various market forces and constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, the authors show that managerial power and the desire to camouflage rents can explain significant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have long been viewed as puzzling or problematic from the optimal contracting perspective. The authors conclude that the role managerial power plays in the design of executive compensation is significant and should be taken into account in any examination of executive pay arrangements or of corporate governance generally.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the managerial power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm's length in devising executive compensation arrangements; rather, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage rent extraction might lead to the use of inefficient pay arrangements that provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value. The authors show that the processes that produce compensation arrangements, and the various market forces and constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, the authors show that managerial power and the desire to camouflage rents can explain significant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have long been viewed as puzzling or problematic from the optimal contracting perspective. The authors conclude that the role managerial power plays in the design of executive compensation is significant and should be taken into account in any examination of executive pay arrangements or of corporate governance generally.

corporate governance, managers, shareholders, directors, boards, executive compensation, stock options, private benefits of control, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, accounting, FASB rules, disclosure, camouflage, insider trading, indexed options, vesting

Abstract:
This book provides a detailed account of how structural flaws in corporate governance have enabled managers to influence their own pay and produced widespread distortions in pay arrangements. The book also examines how these flaws and distortions can best be addressed.

Part I of the book (titled The Official View and its Limits) critically examines the arm's length contracting view, which underlies much of the academic research on executive compensation as well as the law's approach to it. We show that boards have not been operating at arm's length from the executives whose pay they set. While recent reforms can improve matters, they cannot be expected to eliminate significant deviations from arm's length contracting. We also show that the constraints imposed by market forces and shareholders' power to intervene are not tight enough to prevent such deviations.

Part II of the book (titled Power and Pay) shows how an understanding of the role of managerial power can help explain executive compensation practices. We provide a framework for assessing whether pay arrangements are a product of managerial influence. We discuss managers' interest in camouflaging the amount and the performance-insensitivity of their pay. Applying our framework, we discuss how managerial influence can help explain, among other things, the evidence on the relationship between managerial pay and managerial power; the use of retirement benefits and other compensation arrangements to provide stealth compensation; and the ability of departing managers to obtain more than their contractual entitlement.

Part III of the book (titled Decoupling Pay from Performance) examines how managerial influence has operated to reduce the performance-sensitivity of executive pay. Among other things, we examine the structure of non-equity compensation, the design of conventional option plans, the use of restricted stock grants, and managers' freedom to unload options and shares.

Part IV of the book (titled Going Forward) discusses how executive compensation - and corporate governance more generally - can be improved. We examine the extent to which pay arrangements can be improved by adopting board process rules, imposing shareholder approval requirements, and making pay more transparent. We conclude that problems with compensation arrangements cannot be fully addressed without ensuring that directors focus on shareholder interests and operate at arm's length from the executives whose compensation they set. To achieve this result, we argue, it is not sufficient to make directors independent of executives as recent reforms has sought to do; it is also necessary to make directors dependent on shareholders by changing the legal arrangements that insulate boards from shareholders.

The preface and introduction are available to download at the bottom of this page. Also available for downloading from SSRN are three papers on which the book partly draws:

- Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, "Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits," http://ssrn.com/abstract=583861

- Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, pp. 71-92, 2003, http://ssrn.com/abstract=364220

- Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and David Walker, "Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation," University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 751-846, 2002, http://ssrn.com/abstract=316590

Corporate governance, managers, executives, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, principal-agent problem, pay for performance, agency costs, stock options, rents, camouflage

Abstract:
This paper is a case study of Fannie Mae's executive compensation arrangements during the period 2000-2004. We identify and analyze four problems with these arrangements:

- First, by richly rewarding executives for reporting higher earnings, without requiring return of the compensation if earnings turned out to be misstated, Fannie Mae's arrangement provided perverse incentives to inflate earnings.

- Second, Fannie Mae's arrangements provided soft landings to executives who were pushed out by the board for failure; expectation of such outcome adversely affected ex ante incentives.

- Third, even if the executives had retired after years of unblemished service, the value of their retirement packages would have been largely unrelated to their own performance.

- Fourth, both when promising retirement payments to executives and when making theses payments, Fannie Mae's disclosures obscured rather than made transparent the total values of the executives' retirement packages.

Because many other companies have practices similar to Fannie Mae's, our case study highlights some general problems with existing pay practices and the need for reform.

Executive compensation, agency problems, pay for performance, nonperformance pay, performance pay, soft landing, golden goodbyes, camouflage, misreporting, restatement, earning manipulation, incentives

Abstract:
This paper analyzes an important form of "stealth compensation" provided to managers of public companies. We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amount of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments. Our study highlights the significant role that camouflage and stealth compensation play in the design of compensation arrangements. Our study also highlights the significance of whether information about compensation arrangements is not merely publicly available but also communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
This Article analyzes an important form of stealth compensation provided to managers of public companies. We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amounts of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments. Our study illustrates the significant role that camouflage and stealth compensation play in the design of compensation arrangements. It also highlights the importance of having information about compensation arrangements not only publicly available but also communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders.

To improve the transparency of executives' retirement payments and benefits, we propose several changes in current disclosure requirements. Among other things, firms should be required to report to investors each year the dollar value of all the retirement benefits to which their executives become entitled. For example, firms should disclose to investors the annual buildup in the actuarial value of executives' retirement plans, as well as the tax savings reaped by executives at the company's expense through the use of deferred compensation arrangements. Firms should also disclose to investors each year the present value of all the retirement benefits their top executives have accumulated.

Executive compensation, pay for performance, agency costs, rent extraction, stealth compensation, camouflage, retirement benefits, deferred compensation, executive pensions, perks

Abstract:
Cash distributed to public shareholders is distributed through three mechanisms: dividends, open market repurchases (OMRs), and repurchase tender offers (RTOs). The leading explanation for why a corporation would distribute cash through an RTO rathe than an OMR or a dividend is the signaling theory: that managers use RTOs to signal that the stock is underpriced.

The Article has three main purposes: (1) to challenge the signaling theory, by exposing a flaw in one of its key assumptions and presenting empirical data suggesting that the theory cannot account for most RTOs; (2) to show that the same empirical data are consistent with insiders using RTOs to engage in insider trading with public shareholders; and (3) to propose that insiders be (a) required to disclose their tendering decision before the close of the RTO and (b) forbidden from selling stock outside of the RTO until six months after the announcement date. The Article explains how this disclose/delay rule would substantially reduce insiders' ability to use RTOs for insider trading, without interfering with the use of RTOs for any other purpose (including signaling).

share repurchases, repurchase tender offer, insider trading, signaling, securities regulation, corporate governance

Abstract:
In many business bankruptcies in which the firm is to be preserved as a going concern, one of the most difficult and important problems is that of valuing the assets that serve as collateral for secured creditors. Valuing a secured creditor's collateral is needed to determine the amount of the creditor's secured claim, which in turn affects the payout that must be made to the creditor. Such valuation has generally been believed to require either litigation or bargaining among the parties, which in turn give rise to uncertainty, delay, and deviations from parties' entitlements. This paper puts forward a new approach to valuing collateral that involves neither bargaining nor litigation. Under this approach, a market-based mechanism would determine the value of collateral in such a way that no participant in the bankruptcy would have a basis for complaining that secured creditors are either over- or under-compensated. Our approach would considerably improve the performance of business bankruptcy and could constitute an important element of any proposal for bankruptcy reform.

Abstract:
In many business bankruptcies in which the firm is to be preserved as a going concern, one of the most difficult and important problems is that of valuing the assets that serve as collateral for secured creditors. Valuing a secured creditor's collateral is needed to determine the amount of the creditor's secured claim, which in turn affects the payout that must be made to the creditor. Such valuation has generally been believed to require either litigation or bargaining among the parties, which in turn give rise to uncertainty, delay, and deviations from parties' entitlements. This paper puts forward a new approach to valuing collateral that involves neither bargaining nor litigation. Under this approach, a market-based mechanism would determine the value of collateral in such a way that no participant in the bankruptcy would have a basis for complaining that secured creditors are either over- or under-compensated. Our approach would considerably improve the performance of business bankruptcy and could constitute an important element of any proposal for bankruptcy reform.

bankruptcy, insolvency, secured debt, security interest, collateral, valuation, bankruptcy reform

Abstract:
Managers conduct open market repurchases (OMRs) for a number of different reasons, including to distribute excess cash. However, the most widely discussed explanation for OMRs is the signaling theory: that managers announce OMRs to signal that the stock is underpriced. The first purpose of this paper is to show that the signaling theory is theoretically problematic - in part because it assumes managers deliberately sacrifice their own wealth to increase that of shareholders - as well as inconsistent with much of the empirical evidence. The second purpose of the paper is to put forward an alternative explanation for managers' use of OMRs: the managerial-opportunism theory. This theory, which assumes that managers seek to maximize their own wealth, predicts that managers announce OMRs both when the stock is underpriced and when it is not. When the stock is underpriced, managers announce and conduct an OMR to transfer value to themselves and other remaining shareholders. When managers wish to sell a large portion of their shares, they announce an OMR to boost the stock price before selling their shares. The paper shows that managerial opportunism is not only a more plausible motive for OMRs than is signaling, it is also more consistent with the empirical data. The paper concludes by describing some testable predictions of the theory.

Keywords:

share repurchases, open market repurchases, signaling, managerial opportunism, insider trading, payout policy

Abstract:
Incomplete contracting theory suggests that VC cash flow rights - including liquidation preferences - may be subject to renegotiation. Using a hand-collected dataset of sales of Silicon Valley firms, we find common shareholders do sometimes receive payment before VCs' liquidation preferences are satisfied. However, such deviations tend to be small. We also find that renegotiation is more likely when governance arrangements, including the firm's choice of corporate law, give common shareholders power to impede the sale. Our study provides support for incomplete contracting theory, improves understanding of VC exits, and suggests that choice of corporate law matters in private firms.

Venture capital, preferred stock, liquidation preferences, corporate governance, incomplete contracting

Abstract:
Public companies in the United States and elsewhere increasingly use open market stock buybacks, rather than dividends, to distribute cash to shareholders. Academic commentators have emphasized the possible benefits of such repurchases for shareholders. However, little attention has been paid to their potential drawbacks. This Article shows that managers use open market repurchases to indirectly buy stock for themselves at a bargain price. Managers also boost stock prices by announcing repurchase programs they do not intend to execute, enabling them to unload their own shares at a higher price. Such bargain repurchases and inflated-price sales systematically transfer significant amounts of value from public investors to managers, as well as distort managers' payout decisions. The Article concludes by proposing a new approach to regulating open market repurchases: requiring firms to disclose specific details of their buy orders in advance. This pre-repurchase disclosure rule, the Article shows, would undermine managers' ability to use repurchases for informed trading and false signaling, thereby reducing the resulting distortions and costs to shareholders. Moreoever, it would achieve these objectives without eroding any of the potential benefits of repurchases.

Payout policy, stock repurchases, dividends, signaling, insider trading

Abstract:
Venture capitalists investing in U.S. startups typically receive preferred stock and extensive control rights. Various explanations for each of these arrangements have been offered. However, scholars have failed to notice that when combined these arrangements result in a highly unusual corporate governance structure: one in which preferred shareholders, not common shareholders, control the board and the firm. The purpose of this Article is threefold: (1) to highlight the unusual governance structure of these VC-backed startups; (2) to show that preferred shareholder control can give rise to potentially large agency costs, and (3) to suggest legal reforms that may help VCs and entrepreneurs reduce these agency costs and improve corporate governance in startups.

venture capital, start-ups, preferred stock, corporate governance, fiduciary duties

Abstract:
Thousands of US companies appear to have secretly backdated stock options. This paper analyzes three forms of secret option backdating: (1) the backdating of executives' option grants; (2) the backdating of non-executive employees' option grants; and (3) the backdating of executives' option exercises. It shows that each type of backdating less likely reflects arm's-length contracting than a desire to inflate and camouflage executive pay. Secret backdating thus provides further evidence that pay arrangements have been shaped by executives' influence over their boards. The fact that so many firms continued to secretly backdate after the Sarbanes Oxley Act, in blatant violation of its reporting requirements, suggests recent reforms may have failed to adequately curb such managerial power.

Executive compensation, stock options, corporate governance, managers, shareholders, CEOs, boards, camouflage, managerial power, Sarbanes Oxley, independent directors

Abstract:
In an earlier article, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,' 105 Yale Law Journal 857 (1996), we suggested that the case for a full priority of secured claims in bankruptcy is an uneasy one. In this paper, we address various reactions and objections to our analysis that have been offered by subsequent work. We also further develop some of the main elements of the analysis in our earlier article with respect to both our analysis of the comparative merits of full and partial priority and our analysis of how a partial priority regime could be implemented. The analysis confirms our earlier conclusion that the case for a full priority of secured claims in bankruptcy is an uneasy one.

Abstract:
In an earlier article, "The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy" 105 Yale Law Journal 857 (1996), we suggested that the case for a full priority of secured claims in bankruptcy is an uneasy one. In this paper, we address various reactions and objections to our analysis that have been offered by subsequent work. We also further develop some of the main elements of the analysis in our earlier article with respect to both our analysis of the comparative merits of full and partial priority and our analysis of how a partial priority regime could be implemented. The analysis confirms our earlier conclusion that the case for a full priority of secured claims in bankruptcy is an uneasy one.

Secured debt, bankruptcy, reorganization, chapter 11, priority, creditors, debtors, security interests, collateral, unsecured debt, lenders, borrowers

Abstract:
According to conventional wisdom, insiders' use of private information to abstain from trading raises the same policy concerns as insider trading. This widely held perception has dominated much of the academic debate over the regulation of insider trading. I show that this view is flatly incorrect: as long as insiders cannot trade while in possession of nonpublic information, their ability to use nonpublic information to abstain from trading does not make them better off than public shareholders. I then explain why insider abstention cannot give rise to the same type of economic distortions that might be associated with insider trading. I conclude by analyzing the implications of my findings for a number of issues in insider trading regulation, including the use vs. possession debate and the Rule 10b5-1 safe harbor.

Key Words:

inside information, insider trading, securities regulation

Abstract:
The leading view among corporate law scholars is that an insolvent firm's managers should maximize the sum of the values of all financial claims - both those held by shareholders and those held by creditors - against the firm. This Article points out a previously unrecognized problem with this financial value maximization (FVM) approach. What FVM proponents have overlooked is that an insolvent firm is likely to have two types of creditors: (1) payment creditors - parties owed cash, who hold financial claims against the firm; and (2) performance creditors - parties owed contractual performance, who hold claims for performance against the firm. The FVM approach requires managers to take into account the effect of their actions on payment creditors but not on performance creditors. We show that FVM's failure to account for performance creditors might cause an insolvent firm's managers to act in a way that harms performance creditors more than it benefits those with financial claims against the firm and, therefore, is inefficient. Our analysis indicates that an insolvent firm's managers should be obligated to maximize the sum of the values of all claims (both cash and performance) against the firm. This approach, we show, would eliminate the distortions associated with the FVM approach and make shareholders better off ex ante.

insolvency, bankruptcy, contracts, executory contracts, fiduciary duty

Abstract:
The securities laws currently permit certain firms to exit the mandatory disclosure system even though their shares are held by hundreds (or even thousands) of investors and continue to be publicly traded. Such exiting firms are said to "go dark" because they subsequently provide little information to public investors. This paper addresses the going-dark phenomenon and its implications for the debate over mandatory disclosure. Mandatory disclosure's critics contend that insiders of publicly traded firms will always voluntarily provide adequate information to investors. The disclosure choices of gone-dark firms raise doubts about this claim. The paper also puts forward a new approach to regulating going-dark firms: giving public shareholders a veto right over exits from mandatory disclosure. Such an approach, it shows, will prevent undesirable exits from mandatory disclosure while preserving firms' ability to engage in value-increasing exits.

securities regulation, mandatory disclosure, going dark, agency costs

Abstract:
This paper reexamines a longstanding principle of bankruptcy law: that secured claims are entitled to be paid in full before unsecured claims receive any payment. There is a widespread consensus among legal scholars and economists that according full priority to secured claims is desirable because it promotes economic efficiency. Our analysis, however, demonstrates that full priority actually distorts the arrangements negotiated between commercial borrowers and their creditors, producing various efficiency costs. We show that according only partial priority to secured claims could eliminate or reduce these efficiency costs - and that such an approach might well be superior to the rule of full priority. The analysis also suggests that a mandatory rule of partial priority could be effectively implemented within the framework of existing bankruptcy law, and that such an approach would be consistent with fairness and freedom of contract considerations. We therefore present two different rules of partial priority that should be considered as alternatives to full priority.

Secured debt, bankruptcy, reorganization, chapter 11, priority, creditors, debtors, security interests, collateral, unsecured debt, lenders, borrowers

Abstract:
Over the last six decades, the federal government has constructed an extensive system of civil and criminal laws designed to reduce the ability of corporate insiders to make profits trading on inside information. During the 1980s, the government sought to increase the system's effectiveness by increasing penalties and devoting more resources to enforcement. However, both the volume of trading by corporate insiders and the profits these insiders make from corporate insider trading have increased dramatically since these measures were put into effect. In fact, I calculate that corporate insiders make almost $5 billion per year in insider trading profits. After surveying the evidence that corporate insiders trade on inside information, this Article explains why insiders are able to engage in such trading. The Article then puts forward a simple method for reducing insiders' ability to make profits trading on inside information: requiring insiders to disclose publicly their intended trades shortly before submitting orders to their brokers. The Article shows that this pretrading disclosure rule could substantially reduce aggregate corporate insider trading profits. The Article also explains how adopting a pretrading disclosure rule would enable the government to eliminate some of the existing restrictions on insiders' trading and thereby reduce the overall regulatory burden on insiders.

insider trading, executive compensation, corporate governance, securities regulation

Abstract:
Over the last six decades, the federal government has constructed an extensive system of civil and criminal laws designed to reduce the ability of corporate insiders to make profits trading on inside information. During the 1980s, the government sought to increase the system's effectiveness by increasing penalties and devoting more resources to enforcement. However, both the volume of trading by corporate insiders and the profits these insiders make from corporate insider trading have increased dramatically since these measures were put into effect. In fact, I calculate that corporate insiders make almost $5 billion per year in insider trading profits. After surveying the evidence that corporate insiders trade on inside information, this Article explains why insiders are able to engage in such trading. The Article then puts forward a simple method for reducing insiders' ability to make profits trading on inside information: requiring insiders to disclose publicly their intended trades shortly before submitting orders to their brokers. The Article shows that this pretrading disclosure rule could substantially reduce aggregate corporate insider trading profits. The Article also explains how adopting a pretrading disclosure rule would enable the government to eliminate some of the existing restrictions on insiders' trading and thereby reduce the overall regulatory burden on insiders.

insider trading, executive compensation, corporate governance, securities regulation

Abstract:
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value by designing an optimal principal-agent contract. Under the alternative rent extraction view that we examine, the board does not operate at arm's length; rather, executives have power to influence their own compensation, and they use their power to extract rents. As a result, executives are paid more than is optimal for shareholders and, to camouflage the extraction of rents, executive compensation might be structured sub-optimally. The presence of rent extraction, we argue, is consistent both with the processes that produce compensation schemes and with the market forces and constraints that companies face. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, we show that the picture emerging from it is largely compatible with the rent extraction view. Indeed, rent extraction, and the desire to camouflage it, can better explain many puzzling features of compensation patterns and practices. We conclude that extraction of rents might well play a significant role in US executive compensation; and that the significant presence of rent extraction should be taken into account in any examination of the practice and regulation of corporate governance.

Executive compensation, stock options, corporate governance, private benefits of control, agency costs, rent extraction

Abstract:
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value by designing an optimal principal-agent contract. Under the alternative rent extraction view that we examine, the board does not operate at arm's length; rather, executives have power to influence their own compensation, and they use their power to extract rents. As a result, executives are paid more than is optimal for shareholders and, to camouflage the extraction of rents, executive compensation might be structured sub-optimally. The presence of rent extraction, we argue, is consistent both with the processes that produce compensation schemes and with the market forces and constraints that companies face. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, we show that the picture emerging from it is largely compatible with the rent extraction view. Indeed, rent extraction, and the desire to camouflage it, can better explain many puzzling features of compensation patterns and practices. We conclude that extraction of rents might well play a significant role in U.S. executive compensation; and that the significant presence of rent extraction should be taken into account in any examination of the practice and regulation of corporate governance.

Abstract:
Despite recent reforms, public company executives can still use inside information to time their stock sales, secretly boosting their pay. They can also still inflate the stock price before selling. Such insider trading and price manipulation imposes large costs on shareholders. This paper suggests that executives' options be cashed out according to a pre-specified, gradual schedule. These hands-off options would substantially reduce the costs associated with current equity arrangements while imposing little burden on executives.

Executive compensation, stock options, insider trading, earnings manipulation

Abstract:
This paper focuses on the treatment in bankruptcy of a debtor's executory contracts - contracts under which the debtor still owes (or is owed) performance at the time it files for bankruptcy. Under the bankruptcy laws of most countries, including the U.S., the bankruptcy trustee usually disposes of an executory contract in one of two ways: either by (1) assuming and seeking performance of the contract; or by (2) rejecting the contract, in which case any resulting damage claim is treated as a prebankruptcy unsecured claim and receives its ratable share of the assets available to pay unsecured claims. Since such unsecured claims are typically paid only a fraction of their face amount, a party injured by rejection usually receives less than full compensation. This approach is widely supported by U.S. bankruptcy commentators. The paper first explains how this ratable damages rule can give the bankruptcy trustee an incentive to reject contracts when performance would be efficient. It then shows that the manner in which the ratable damages rule is actually applied by U.S. courts tends to worsen the problem. The paper concludes by considering various arrangements for eliminating the distortion.

executory contracts, bankruptcy, inefficient breach

Abstract:
In Israel, as in a number of other economies, a few large banks have historically played a major role in the nonfinancial sector. At the end of 1995, the Israeli government appointed the Brodet Committee to examine bank investments in nonfinancial corporations. The Israeli Knesset subsequently adopted the committee's recommendations and imposed major limitations on the role of banks in the nonfinancial sector. These limitations required the two biggest Israeli banks to start selling much of their nonfinancial investments.This paper is based on the research report that we prepared for the Brodet Committee at the request of the Israeli Finance Ministry and Antitrust Authority. We explain why we recommended to the Committee that substantial limitations be imposed on bank investment in nonfinancial companies. We provide a detailed analysis of the effects that bank- conglomerate combinations have in a small economy -- such as Israel's -- that is characterized by a great deal of concentration in both the financial and nonfinancial sectors. In particular, we analyze the effects that bank-conglomerate combinations have on the safety and soundness of banks, on the decisions of the investment funds managed by banks, and on the level of competition in the economy in both the short run and the long run.