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Abstract:
In signaling environments ranging from consumption to education, high quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal or "countersignal". High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignaling itself is a signal of confidence which separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.

signaling, countersignaling, confidence, understatement

Abstract:
We analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry. Although perfect price discrimination ensures efficient output decisions given product characteristics, coordination failures may prevent efficiency in the choice of product characteristics. More fundamentally, even if we have efficient product choices for a fixed number of firms, one always has excessive entry in free entry equilibrium. Our results apply to a large class of models of product differentiation including location models as well as representative consumer models of the demand for variety. These results also apply to models of common agency or lobbying with free entry and imply that one has excessive entry into the ranks of lobbyists.

price discrimination, efficiency, free entry, product differentiation

Abstract:
Is it always wise to disclose good news? When both the sender and the receiver have private information about the sender's quality, we find that the worst sender type with good news has the most incentive to disclose it, so reporting good news can paradoxically make the sender look bad. If the good news is attainable by sufficiently mediocre types, or if the sender is already expected to be of a relatively high type, nondisclosure equilibria exist in which good news is withheld. Since the sender has a legitimate fear of looking too eager to reveal good news, having a third party disclose the news, or mandating that the sender disclose the news, can help the sender. The predictions are tested by examining when faculty use titles such as "Dr" and "Professor" in voicemail greetings and course syllabi.

disclosure, persuasion, communication, verifiable message, countersignaling

Abstract:
In the United States, there is evidence that domestic non-filing firms do not always support dumping investigations. Absent other factors, domestic firms have an unambiguous incentive to support petitions filed by other domestic producers. We argue that in cases where the non-complainant firm is not a significant importer or exporter, the most plausible explanation is that non-support acts as a costly signal of private information. Extending the model to allow firms to engage in preplay communication, such signaling can take place even in the absence of an investigation. We then allow firms to endogenously initiate investigations and find that firms may be reluctant to even initiate a petition because doing so may be viewed as a sign of weakness. These latter results provide an explanation for the puzzling observation that fewer antidumping investigations are filed than one would expect.

anti-dumping, signaling, asymmetric information, cheaptalk, preplay communcation

Abstract:
The standard resource extraction framework assumes infinitely lived agents and yields an overfishing result. For some applications, a finite time horizon may be more appropriate. A direct extension of the Levhari-Mirman model to overlapping generations yields an extreme overfishing result. Alternatively, we assume young and old specialize and respectively fish and supply capital. In this model, under some circumstances there may well be under-utilization of natural, renewable resources. However, for a given production technology, if there are a sufficiently large number of agents, overfishing always results.

Renewable resource, overlapping generations, Golden Rule

Abstract:
We set out a model of monopsonistic competition, where each employer competes equally with every other employer. The employment effects of minimum wages depend on the degree of distortion in the labor market. If fixed costs per firm are high then the labor market is relatively non-competitive and minimum wages increase employment. Conversely, low fixed costs make for a more competitive labor market where minimum wages reduce employment. This contrasts with the results of a Salop style model with localized employer competition where a minimum wage unambiguously raises employment. We also find that the welfare effect of a small minimum wage is unambiguously positive.

monopsonistic competition, labor theory, minimum wages, monopsony

Abstract:
We propose a simple model of wage dispersion arising from oligopsonistic competition in the labor market. Our model has workers who are equally able but who have heterogeneous preferences for non-wage characteristics, while employers have heterogeneous productivity characteristics. We completely and explicitly solve for the equilibrium wage distribution and show that "inside" and "outside" forces interact in wage determination. This interaction generates spillover effects of minimum wages in a manner which is consistent with the empirical evidence.

wage differentials, wage dispersion, monopsony, oligopsony, labor theory, minimum wage

Abstract:
The workhorse of urban labor theory in development economics is the formal/informal model of labor market segmentation and its variants. The seminal Harris-Todaro model has been extended over the years to cope with various empirical puzzles not explained in the original framework. However, one issue stands out that cannot easily be explained in a competitive framework. Specifically, there is considerable evidence suggesting that many workers choose to work in the informal sector, even though formal sector jobs are available to them and despite the fact that wages are typically higher in the formal sector. One solution is to depart from the usual competitive framework and consider formal and informal labor markets under oligopsony/monopsonistic competition.

Harris-Todaro, formality, informality, development, monopsonistic competition, oligopsony, Dixit-Stiglitz

Abstract:
When can you cheat some people without damaging your reputation among others? In a trust game between a firm and a series of individuals from two groups of different sizes, the firm has more incentive to cheat minority individuals because trade with the minority is less frequent and the long-term benefits of a reputation for fairness toward the minority are correspondingly smaller. If the majority is sufficiently large it gains nothing from a solidarity strategy of punishing opportunism against the minority, so the firm can continue doing business with the majority even if it cheats the minority. When some firms have a preference-based bias against the minority, the interaction with reputation effects gives all firms a stronger incentive to cheat the minority, and discrimination is the unique equilibrium for firms of intermediate patience.

discrimination, trust, social capital, opportunism, reputation spillover

Abstract:
In signalling environments ranging from consumption to education, high-quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower-quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal or "countersignal." High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignalling itself is a signal of confidence that separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.

Abstract:
The fundamental contribution of the paper is to contest the view that reducing barriers to entry cannot retard market performance when firm rivalry is productive. In a model of employee entry, we demonstrate that a reduction in barriers to entry causes no fall in industry price when incumbents are able to buy-off potential entry through higher wages. Over the longer term, the analysis illustrates that reductions in barriers to entry can cause industry price to be greater than if entry barriers had persisted at their initial level. Correspondingly, the model indicates that investment in endogenous barriers to entry and wage ceilings on executive salaries may enhance market performance.

Abstract:
I examine a Knightian (1921) model of risk using a general equilibrium model of investment and trade. A population of agents with various preference types can choose between a safe production technology and a risky production technology. In addition, the distribution of types of agents changes through a standard evolutionary dynamic. For a given population distribution, the equilibrium is in general inefficient, however, by allowing the population distribution to change in response to market generated rewards, the population will converge to one where the equilibrium is efficient and where the population as a whole behaves as if all agents were risk neutral.