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Abstract:
Although the theoretical literature has identified various sizeable benefits from foreign direct investment inflows (FDI), the empirical literature has been unable to establish a positive and significant impact of FDI on the rates of economic growth of host countries. One reason for this difficulty is that theory equates FDI to technology transferred, while in most countries and regions of the world FDI encompasses an array of arrangements that goes well beyond pure technology transfer. This Paper tests for the effects of FDI on growth in a set of countries in which FDI is pure technology transfer: the 25 Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union transition countries between 1990-98. Our main finding is that, in this more appropriate setting, FDI has a positive and significant impact on economic growth as theory predicts.

Foreign direct investment, economic growth, transition economies

Abstract:
Although the theoretical literature has identified various sizeable benefits from foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, the empirical literature has been unable to establish a positive and significant impact of FDI on the rates of economic growth of host countries. One reason for this difficulty is that theory equates FDI to technology transferred, while in most countries and regions of the world FDI encompasses an array of arrangements that goes well beyond pure technology transfer. This paper tests for the effects of FDI on growth in a set of countries in which FDI is pure technology transferred: the 25 Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union transition countries between 1990 and 1998. Our main finding is that, in this more appropriate setting, FDI has a positive and significant impact on economic growth as theory predicts.

Abstract:
Although the theoretical literature has identified various sizeable benefits from foreign direct investment inflows (FDI), the empirical literature has been unable to establish a positive and significant impact of FDI on the rates of economic growth of host countries. One reason for this difficulty is that theory equates FDI to technology transferred, while in most countries and regions of the world FDI encompasses an array of arrangements that goes well beyond pure technology transfer. This paper tests for the effects of FDI on growth in a set of countries in which FDI is purer technology transferred: the 25 Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union transition countries between 1990 and 1998. Our main finding is that, in this more appropriate setting, FDI has a positive and significant impact on economic growth as theory predicts.

Foreign Direct Investment, economic growth, transition economies

Abstract:
This paper examines the importance of agglomeration economies and institutions vis-a-vis initial conditions and factor endowments in explaining the locational choice of foreign investors. Using a unique panel data set for 25 transition economies between 1990 and 1998, we find that the main determinants are institutions, agglomeration and trade openness. We find important differences between the Eastern European and Baltic countries, on the one hand, and the former Soviet Union countries on the other: in the latter group, natural resources and infrastructure matter, while agglomeration matters only for the former group.

foreign direct investment, transition economies

Abstract:
This paper investigates the role of structural reforms - privatization, financial reform and trade liberalization - as determinants of FDI inflows based on newly constructed dataset on structural reforms for 19 Latin American and 25 Eastern European countries between 1989 and 2004.

Our main finding is a strong empirical relationship from reforms to FDI, in particular, from financial liberalization and privatization. These results are robust to different measures of reforms, split samples, and potential endogeneity and omitted variables biases.

privatization, financial reform, trade liberalization, foreign

Abstract:
This paper investigates the role of structural reforms - privatization, financial reform and trade liberalization - as determinants of FDI inflows based on newly constructed dataset on structural reforms for 19 Latin American and 25 Eastern European countries between 1989 and 2004. Our main finding is a strong empirical relationship from reforms to FDI, in particular, from financial liberalization and privatization. These results are robust to different measures of reforms, split samples, and potential endogeneity and omitted variables biases.

financial reform, foreign direct investment, Latin America, privatization, trade liberalization, transition economies

Abstract:
This paper investigates the role of structural reforms - privatization, financial reform and trade liberalization - as determinants of FDI inflows based on newly constructed dataset on structural reforms for 19 Latin American and 25 Eastern European countries between 1989 and 2004. Our main finding is a strong empirical relationship from reforms to FDI, in particular, from financial liberalization and privatization. These results are robust to different measures of reforms, split samples, and potential endogeneity and omitted variables biases.

privatization, financial reform, trade liberalization, foreign direct investment, Latin America, transition economies

Abstract:
This paper investigates the role of structural reforms - financial reforms, trade liberalization, and privatization - as determinants of FDI inflows based on newly constructed dataset on structural reforms for 19 Latin American and 25 Eastern European countries between 1989 and 2004. Our main finding is a strong empirical relationship from reforms to FDI, in particular, from financial liberalization and privatization. These results are robust to different measures of reforms, split samples, and potential endogeneity and omitted variables biases.

Foreign direct investment, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Trade liberalization, Privatization

Abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for about 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if anything; (b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in poorer, less developed countries.

Lobbying, corruption, transition, institutions

Abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for about 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if anything; (b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in poorer, less developed countries.

lobbying, corruption, transition, institutions

Abstract:
What aspects of institution building most affect the transition to a market economy? In terms of effects on per capita income and school enrollment, the rule of law may be most important. In terms of life expectancy, the quality of the bureaucracy plays a more crucial role.

Campos presents measures with which to map institution building during the transition from centrally planned to market economies. Data collection and indicators are measured in terms of five institutional dimensions of governance:
- Accountability of the executive
- Quality of the bureaucracy
- Rule of law
- Character of policymaking process
- Strength of civil society.

Campos highlights the differences over time and between Central and Eastern European countries and those of the former Soviet Union.

In terms of effects on per capita income and school enrollment, Campos finds the rule of law to be the most important institutional dimension, both for the sample as a whole and for differences between the two regions.

In terms of life expectancy, however, the quality of the bureaucracy plays the most crucial role.

One important message Campos draws from the results is that institutions do change over time and are by no means as immutable as the literature has suggested. The range of feasible policy choices (for changing institutions) may be much wider than is often assumed.

This paper is a product of Development Policy, Development Economics Senior Vice Presidency. The author may be contacted at nauro.campos@cerge.cuni.cz.

Abstract:
During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence. We argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm's potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement. Our econometric results, for about 950 firms in five transition economies, provide support for this argument.

Asset stripping, law enforcement, corruption, transition

Abstract:
During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence. We argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm's potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement. Our econometric results, for about 950 firms in five transition economies, provide support for this argument.

asset stripping, law enforcement, corruption, transition

Abstract:
During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence. We argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm's potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement. Our econometric results, for about 950 firms in five transition economies, provide support for this argument.

Asset stripping, law enforcement, corruption, transition

Abstract:
What are the determinants of economic reform efforts? This paper tries to throw light on this question by examining recent reforms in Brazil, a country which followed a gradualist approach and was a late-starter among Latin American economies. We argue that these first generation reforms (trade liberalization, stabilization, privatization and the adoption of a new macro-policy framework) were driven by the drastic growth slowdown and redemocratization of the 1980s. We argue that their gradual and democratic implementation not only respond for their sustainability but also shows that the country is ready for a second generation of reforms focusing explicitly on institutional deficiencies.

Reform, Stabilization, Economic Policy, Growth, Brazil

Abstract:
Why are socially beneficial reforms not implemented? One simple answer to this question (which has received little attention in the literature) is that this may be caused by generalized uncertainty about the effectiveness of reforms. If agents are unsure about whether a proposed reform will work, it will be less likely to be adopted. Despite the numerous benefits economists assign to structural reforms, the empirical literature has thus far failed to establish a positive and significant effect of reforms on economic performance. We collect data from 43 econometric studies (for more than 300 coefficients on the effects of reform on growth) and show that approximately one third of these coefficients is positive and significant, another third is negative and significant, and the final third is not statistically significant different from zero. In trying to understand this remarkable variation, we find that the measurement of reform and controlling for institutions and initial conditions are main factors in decreasing the probability of reporting a significant and positive effect of reform on growth.

structural reforms, economic growth, transition, meta-analysis

Abstract:
This paper investigates the importance of factor endowment vis-à-vis institutions in explaining the locational choice of foreign investors during the 1990s. Using dynamic panel estimation on data for transition economies, we find that low labour costs, bureaucratic efficiency ("institutions"), agglomeration economies and natural resource abundance are key factors explaining foreign investors' decisions. However, sampling proves fundamental as these overall determinants mask deep and, so far empirically unexplored, differences between groups of recipient countries. For example, for the former Soviet Union economies we estimate that labour costs are no longer crucial, but abundance of natural resources and (interestingly) lower levels of human capital are. For Eastern Europe, we find that external liberalisation (one aspect of economic reform) is crucial in foreign investor's decisions. The main message is that minimising sampling biases and accounting for previously omitted variables yields a different, much richer picture than previously available.

foreign direct investment, dynamic panel estimation, transition economies

Abstract:
Does fractionalization change over (short periods of) time? If so, are there any substantial implications for economic performance? To answer such questions, we construct a new panel data set with measures of fractionalization for 26 former communist countries covering the period from 1989 to 2002. Our fractionalization measures show that transition economies became more ethnically homogenous over such a short period of time, although the same did not happen in terms of linguistic and religious fractionalization. In line with the most recent literature, there seems to be no effect of (exogenous) fractionalization on macroeconomic performance (that is, on per capita GDP growth). However, we find that dynamic ethnic fractionalization is negatively related to growth (although this is still not the case for linguistic and religious fractionalization). These findings are robust to different specifications, polarization measures, instrument sets as well as to a composite index of ethnic-linguistic-religious fractionalization.

Ethnic fractionalization, growth, polarization, transition economies

Abstract:
Does fractionalization change over time? If so, are there any substantial implications for economic performance? To answer such questions, we construct a new panel data set with fractionalization measures for 26 former communist countries covering the period from 1989 to 2002. Our fractionalization measures show that transition economies became more ethnically homogenous over such a short period of time, although the same did not happen in terms of linguistic and religious fractionalization. In line with the most recent literature, there seems to be little effect of (exogenous) fractionalization on macroeconomic performance (that is, on per capita GDP growth). However, we find that dynamic ethnic fractionalization is negatively related to growth (although this is still not the case for linguistic and religious fractionalization). These findings are robust to different specifications, polarization measures, instrument sets as well as to a composite index of ethnic-linguistic-religious fractionalization.

ethnic fractionalization, polarization, growth, transition economies

Abstract:
This paper examines the importance of agglomeration economies and institutions vis-à-vis initial conditions and factor endowments in explaining the locational choice of foreign investors. Using a unique panel data set for 25 transition economies between 1990 and 1998, we find that the main determinants are institutions, agglomeration, and trade openness. We find important differences between the Eastern European and Baltic countries, on the one hand, and the CIS countries on the other: in the latter group, natural resources and infrastructure matter, while agglomeration matters only for the former group.

foreign direct investment transition economies

Abstract:
Recent research convincingly shows that crises beget reform. Although the consensus is that economic crises foster macroeconomic stabilization, it is silent on which types of crises cause which types of reform. Is it economic or political crises that are the most important drivers of structural reforms? To answer this question we put forward evidence on trade and labour market liberalization from panel data on more than 100 developed and developing countries from 1950 to 2000. We find important differences in the effects of the two types of crises on the two reforms across regions and even from one measure of crisis to another. Yet, in general, we consistently find that political considerations (political crises as well as political institutions) are more important determinants of these reforms than economic crises. This finding is robust to the inclusion of interdependencies between the two types of crises, feedbacks between the two types of reform, the use of alternative measures of political and economic crises and whether or not the data are pooled across all countries or only across regions.

Economic reform, political crisis, labour market reform, economic crisis, trade liberalisation

Abstract:
Recent research convincingly shows that crises beget reform. Although the consensus is that economic crises foster macroeconomic stabilization, it is silent on which types of crises cause which types of reform. Is it economic or political crises that are the most important drivers of structural reforms? To answer this question we put forward evidence on trade and labour market liberalization from panel data on more than 100 developed and developing countries from 1950 to 2000. We find important differences in the effects of the two types of crises on the two reforms across regions and even from one measure of crisis to another. Yet, in general, we consistently find that political considerations (political crises as well as political institutions) are more important determinants of these reforms than economic crises. This finding is robust to the inclusion of interdependencies between the two types of crises, feedbacks between the two types of reform, the use of alternative measures of political and economic crises and whether or not the data are pooled across all countries or only across regions.

economic reform, economic crisis, political crisis, trade liberalisation, labour

Abstract:
How valuable are the education and skills acquired under socialism in a market economy? This paper uses data for about 3 million Hungarian wage earners, from 1986 to 1998, to throw light on this question. We find that returns to schooling reach 10 percent early on and remain at this high level. These estimates are larger than for other transition economies, but similar to those for middle-income developing countries. With the gap in average years of schooling unremitting, we argue that the Hungarian stock of human capital is considerably less than the existing figures have led us to believe.

Human Capital, Labor Markets, Transition Economies, Hungary

Abstract:
The transition from centrally planned to market economy involves a process of massive occupational change that has been largely neglected in the literature. This paper investigates this process using data from the 1995 Estonian Labour Force Survey. We find that between 35 and 50 percent of wage earners changed occupations from 1989 to 1995 and that job tenure is a consistently important determinant of occupational mobility. Our results also show the speed with which the market mechanism takes root: the returns to current and alternative occupations play, over these few years, increasingly important roles in explaining occupational change.

Occupational Mobility, Human Capital, Transition Economies

Abstract:
The transition from centrally planned to market economy involves a process of massive occupational change that has been largely neglected in the literature. This paper investigates this process using data from the 1995 Estonian Labour Force Survey. We find that between 35 and 50 percent of wage earners changed occupations from 1989 to 1995 and that job tenure is a consistently important determinant of occupational mobility. Our results also show the speed with which the market mechanism takes root: the returns to current and alternative occupations play, over these few years, increasingly important roles in explaining occupational change.

Occupational mobility, human capital, transition economies

Abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that the stocks of human capital were one of the few positive legacies from communism. However, if factories under communism were so inefficient, why would the education system not have been? Using the education production function approach and new data on educational inputs and outcomes from 1960 to 1989, we find evidence suggesting that the official human capital stocks figures were 'overestimated' during the communist period. In other words, we find that the official human capital stock numbers are significantly higher than those predicted not only in relation to countries at similar levels of development, but also on the basis of educational systems with comparable features and efficiency levels.

Abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that the stocks of human capital were one of the few positive legacies from communism. However, if factories under communism were so inefficient, why would the education system not have been? Using the education production function approach and new data on educational inputs and outcomes from 1960 to 1989, we find evidence suggesting that the official human capital stocks figures were "over-estimated" during the communist period. In other words, we find that the official human capital stock numbers are significantly higher than those predicted not only in relation to countries at similar levels of development, but also on the basis of educational systems with comparable features and efficiency levels.

human capital, education, transition economies

Abstract:
An alleged achievement of socialism was gender equality in the labour market. Has its collapse shattered this accomplishment? The theoretical literature and attendant empirical evidence are inconclusive. Using data for 2.9 million wage earners in Hungary we find that the male-female difference in log wages declined from 0.31 to 0.19 between 1986 and 1998 and that this is largely explained by a matching decline in "Oaxaca's discrimination," suggesting extraordinary improvement of women's relative situation. Further, we find that variation over time in the wage gaps is associated with public and large firms having progressively smaller gaps than their counterparts.

Hungary, transition, discrimination, gender, wage gap, education

Abstract:
We construct objective measures of privatization, internal and external liberalization reform efforts, across countries over time, and investigate their determinants, reversals and macroeconomic impacts. We find that GDP growth determines external liberalization and privatization, concentration of political power drives internal liberalization, and democracy underpins all three. We find that FDI inflows reduce the probability of privatization reversals, labour strikes increase that of internal liberalization reversals, and OECD growth increase that of external liberalization reversals. We replicate previous studies and find that the macroeconomic effects of reform (when measured objectively) tend to be larger and more precisely estimated.

Reform, privatization, political economy, transition

Abstract:
We construct objective measures of privatization, internal and external liberalization reform efforts, across countries over time, and investigate their determinants, reversals and macroeconomic impacts. We find that GDP growth determines external liberalization and privatization, concentration of political power drives internal liberalization, and democracy underpins all three. We find that FDI inflows reduce the probability of privatization reversals, labour strikes increase that of internal liberalization reversals, and OECD growth increase that of external liberalization reversals. We replicate previous studies and find that the macroeconomic effects of reform (when measured objectively) tend to be larger and more precisely estimated.

reform, liberalization, privatization, political economy, transition

Abstract:
Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these views. Based on whether influence is sought with rule-makers or rule-enforcers, we develop a conceptual framework that highlights how political institutions are instrumental in defining the choice between bribing and lobbying. We test our predictions using survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries. Our results suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in explaining whether firms choose bribing or lobbying, (c) lobbying is more effective than corruption as an instrument for political influence, and (d) lobbying is more powerful than corruption as an explanatory factor for enterprise growth, even in poorer, often perceived as highly corrupt, less developed countries.

corruption, lobbying, political institutions

Abstract:
Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these views. Based on whether influence is sought with rule-makers or rule-enforcers, we develop a conceptual framework that highlights how political institutions are instrumental in defining the choice between bribing and lobbying. We test our predictions using survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries. Our results suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in explaining whether firms choose bribing or lobbying, (c) lobbying is more effective than corruption as an instrument for political influence, and (d) lobbying is more powerful than corruption as an explanatory factor for enterprise growth, even in poorer, often perceived as highly corrupt, less developed countries.

lobbying, corruption, political institutions

Abstract:
Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these views. Based on whether influence is sought with rulemakers or rule-enforcers, we develop a conceptual framework that highlights how political institutions are instrumental in defining the choice between bribing and lobbying. We test our predictions using survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries. Our results suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in explaining whether firms choose bribing or lobbying, (c) lobbying is more effective than corruption as an instrument for political influence, and (d) lobbying is more powerful than corruption as an explanatory factor for enterprise growth, even in poorer, often perceived as highly corrupt, less developed countries.

lobbying, corruption, political institutions

Abstract:
This paper investigates the effects of financial development and political instability on economic growth in a power-ARCH framework with data for Argentina from 1896 to 2000. Our findings suggest that (i) informal or unanticipated political instability (e.g., guerrilla warfare) has a direct negative impact on growth; (ii) formal or anticipated instability (e.g., cabinet changes) has an indirect (through volatility) impact on growth; (iii) the effect of financial development is positive and, surprisingly, not via volatility; (iv) the informal instability effects are much larger in the short- than in the long-run; and (v) the impact of financial development on economic growth is negative in the short- but positive in the long-run.

economic growth, financial development, volatility, political instability, power-ARCH

Abstract:
How does the relationship between earnings and schooling change with the introduction of comprehensive economic reform? This paper sheds light on this question using a unique data set and procedure to reduce sample selection bias. Our evidence is from consistently coded, non-retrospective data for about 4 million Hungarian wage earners. We find that returns to skill increased by 75 percent from 1986 to 2004 (that is, during the period stretching from communism to full membership in the European Union). Moreover, our results identify winners and losers from reform. Winners were the college and university educated and those employed in the services sector (which excludes those in public services). Our results show that reform losers were those in construction and agriculture, those who attained only primary or vocational education (who actually experience a decrease in the returns to their education) as well as those younger workers which acquired most of their education after the collapse of communism (that is, after the main reforms were in place).

human capital, transition economies, economic reform

Abstract:
What are the main causes of international terrorism? The lessons from the surge of academic research that followed 9/11 remain elusive. The careful investigation of the relative roles of economic and political conditions did little to change the fact that existing econometric estimates diverge in size, sign and significance. In this paper we present a new rationale (the escalation effect) stressing domestic political instability as the main reason for international terrorism. Econometric evidence from a panel of more than 130 countries (yearly from 1968 to 2003) shows this to be a much more promising avenue for future research than the available alternatives.

terrorism, international terrorism, political instability, escalation

Abstract:
This paper uses a unique data set of Latin American paintings auctioned by Sotheby&apos's between 1995 and 2002 to investigate several puzzles from the recent auctions literature. Our results suggest that: (1) the reputation of an artist and the provenance of the artwork, omitted variables in most previous studies, seem to be more important determinants of the sale price of a painting than standard factors, such as medium and size, (2) the opinion of art experts seems to be of limited use in predicting whether or not an artwork sells at auction, (3) there is little supporting evidence for the widespread notion that the best or more expensive artworks tend to generate above average returns (the "masterpiece effect"), although (4) there is strong evidence in our data for the declining price anomaly, or "afternoon effect."

art auctions, masterpiece effect, declining price anomaly, Latin American art

Abstract:
This Paper examines the importance of agglomeration economies and institutions vis-a-vis initial conditions and factor endowments in explaining the locational choice of foreign investors. Using a unique panel data set for 25 transition economies between 1990-98, we find that the main determinants are institutions, agglomeration and trade openness. We find important differences between the Eastern European and Baltic countries, on the one hand, and the former Soviet Union countries on the other: in the latter group, natural resources and infrastructure matter, while agglomeration matters only for the former group.

Foreign direct investment, transition economies

Abstract:
This essay surveys macroeconomic issues that marked the transition from centrally planned to market economy in Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries. We first establish a set of stylized facts of the transition so far, namely: (1) output fell, (2) capital shrank, (3) labour moved, (4) trade reoriented, (5) the structure changed, (6) institutions collapsed, and (7) the transition costs. We then critically survey the theoretical literature on transition, discussing various explanations for the initial output fall as well as medium term issues, such as optimal speed of transition, disorganization, institutions and sectoral reallocation as a source of output dynamics. Last, we review the empirical literature to assess how well it translates the theoretical models and explains the stylized facts. The essay concludes with a succinct list of suggestions for future research.

Transition, growth, Central and Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union, stylized facts

Abstract:
What is the relationship between economic growth and its volatility? Does political instability affect growth directly or indirectly, through volatility? This paper tries to answer such questions using a power-ARCH framework with annual time series data for Argentina from 1896 to 2000. We show that while assassinations and strikes (what we call "informal" political instability) have a direct negative effect on economic growth, "formal" political instability (constitutional and legislative changes) has an indirect (through volatility) negative impact. We also find preliminary support for the idea that while the effects of "formal" instability are stronger in the long-run, those of "informal" instability are stronger in the short-run.

economic growth, volatility, political instability, power-ARCH

Abstract:
The relationship between economic and political liberalization has received a great deal of attention lately, yet the possibility of a non-linear relationship and the role of reversals remain largely neglected. Focusing on democratization and financial reform, this paper offers evidence for a U-shaped relationship across countries, over time as well as in a panel setting using a wide range of estimators for various reform measures. We link this non-linear relationship to the notion of partial or captured democracy. We provide as well econometric support showing that even when de facto is modelled as a function of de jure financial liberalization, this non-linearity obtains.

economic liberalization, financial reform, political liberalization, reform reversals

Abstract:
The relationship between economic and political liberalization has received a great deal of attention lately, yet the possibility of a nonlinear relationship and the role of reversals remain largely neglected. Focusing on democratization and financial reform, this paper offers evidence for a U-shaped relationship across countries, over time as well as in a panel setting using a wide range of estimators for various reform measures. We link this non-linear relationship to the notion of partial or captured democracy. We provide as well econometric support showing that even when de facto is modelled as a function of de jure financial liberalization, this non-linearity obtains.

reform reversals, political liberalization, economic liberalization, financial reform

Abstract:
What are the main causes of international terrorism? The lessons from the surge of academic research that followed 9/11 remain elusive. The careful investigation of the relative roles of economic and political conditions did little to change the fact that existing econometric estimates diverge in size, sign and significance. In this paper we present a new rationale (the escalation effect) stressing domestic political instability as the main reason for international terrorism. Econometric evidence from a panel of more than 130 countries (yearly from 1968 to 2003) shows this to be a much more promising avenue for future research than the available alternatives.

escalation, international terrorism, political instability, terrorism

Abstract:
What are the main causes of international terrorism? The lessons from the surge of academic research that followed 9/11 remain elusive. The careful investigation of the relative roles of economic and political conditions did little to change the fact that existing econometric estimates diverge in size, sign and significance. In this paper we present a new rationale (the escalation effect) stressing domestic political instability as the main reason for international terrorism. Econometric evidence from a panel of more than 130 countries (yearly from 1968 to 2003) shows this to be a much more promising avenue for future research than the available alternatives.

terrorism, international terrorism, political instability, escalation

Abstract:
How does the relationship between earnings and schooling change with the introduction of comprehensive economic reform? This Paper uses a unique dataset (covering about 3 million Hungarian wage earners, from 1986 to 1998) and a novel procedure to correct sample selection bias (based on DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux's) to shed light on this question. We find that reform was successful in general, increasing returns to skill by 70.5%, but that there were winners and losers. The winners seem to be the college and university educated, those employed by the smaller firms and those in commerce and services. The losers are those in manufacturing and agriculture and, surprisingly, those who received their formal education after the initiation of reform.

Human capital, transition economics, economic reform

Abstract:
How does the relationship between earnings and schooling change with the introduction of comprehensive economic reform? This Paper uses a unique dataset (covering about 3 million Hungarian wage earners, from 1986 to 1998) and a novel procedure to correct sample selection bias (based on DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux's) to shed light on this question. We find that reform was successful in general, increasing returns to skill by 70.5%, but that there were winners and losers. The winners seem to be the college and university educated, those employed by the smaller firms and those in commerce and services. The losers are those in manufacturing and agriculture and, surprisingly, those who received their formal education after the initiation of reform.

Human capital, transition economics, economic reform

Abstract:
How valuable are the skills acquired under socialism in a market economy? This Paper throws light on this question using unique data covering the years before and during transition (1986-98) for about 3 million Hungarian wage earners. We find that returns to a year of schooling increased by 75% from 6.4% in 1986 to 11.2% in 1998. We also find that the private sector rewards formal education more than the public and, in terms of gender, although in 1986 women had greater returns to schooling than men, by 1998 this difference had been eliminated.

Human capital, transition economics, Hungary

Abstract:
Why do workers change occupations? This paper investigates occupational mobility and its determinants following a large unexpected shock (communism's collapse in 1989.) Our calculations show that from 1989 to 1995 between 35 and 50 percent of Estonian workers changed occupations (classified at one- and four-digits, respectively). Among the main determinants of occupational mobility we find firm tenure, labour market experience and returns to alternative occupations. We investigate the role of gender and ethnicity and find strong results for the former, with mobility mainly driven by push factors for males (returns to current occupations) and by pull factors for females (returns to alternative occupations).

occupational mobility, human capital, transition economies

Abstract:
An alleged achievement of socialism was gender equality in the labour market. Has its collapse shattered this accomplishment? The theoretical literature and attendant empirical evidence are inconclusive. Using data for 2.9 million wage earners in Hungary, we find that the male/female difference in log wages declined from 0.31 to 0.19 between 1986 and 1998 and that this is largely explained by a matching decline in 'Oaxaca's discrimination,' suggesting extraordinary improvement of women's relative situation. Further, we find that variation over time in the wage gaps is associated with public and large firms having progressively smaller gaps than their counterparts.

Hungary, transition, discrimination, gender, wage gap, education

Abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that the stocks of human capital were one of the few positive legacies from communism. However, if factories under communism were so inefficient, why would the education system not have been? Using the education production function approach and new data on educational inputs and outcomes from 1960 to 1989, we find evidence suggesting that the official human capital stocks figures were 'over-estimated' during the communist period. In other words, we find that the official human capital stock numbers are significantly higher than those predicted not only in relation to countries at similar levels of development, but also on the basis of educational systems with comparable features and efficiency levels.

Education, human capital, transition economies

Abstract:
This paper investigates the effects of financial development and political instability on economic growth in a power-ARCH framework with data for Argentina from 1896 to 2000. Our findings suggest that (i) informal or unanticipated political instability (e.g., guerrilla warfare) has a direct negative impact on growth; (ii) formal or anticipated instability (e.g., cabinet changes) has an indirect (through volatility) impact on growth; (iii) the effect of financial development is positive and, surprisingly, not via volatility; (iv) the informal instability effects are much larger in the short- than in the long-run; and (v) the impact of financial development on economic growth is negative in the short- but positive in the long-run.

economic growth, financial development, political instability, power-ARCH, volatility

Abstract:
This paper uses a unique data set of Latin American paintings auctioned by Sotheby's between 1995 and 2002 to investigate several puzzles from the recent auctions literature. Our results suggest that: (i) the reputation of an artist and the provenance of the artwork, often omitted variables in previous studies, seem to be more important determinants of the sale price of a painting than more standard factors, such as medium and size, (ii) the opinion of art experts seems to be of limited use in predicting whether or not an artwork sells at auction, (iii) there is little supporting evidence for the widespread notion that the best or more expensive artworks tend to generate above average returns (the masterpiece effect), although (iv) there is strong evidence in our data for the declining price anomaly or afternoon effect (that is, when heterogeneous products sold sequentially follow a decreasing pattern of prices.)

Abstract:
How does the relationship between earnings and schooling change with the introduction of comprehensive economic reform? This article sheds light on this question using a unique data set and procedure to reduce sample-selection bias. The evidence is from consistently coded, nonretrospective data for about 4 million Hungarian wage earners. Returns to skill increased 75 percent from 1986 to 2004 (that is, during the period stretching from communism to full membership in the European Union). The winners were those with a college or university education and those employed in the services sector (which here excludes those in public services). The reform losers were those in construction and agriculture, those with only a primary or vocational education (who experienced a decline in returns to their education), and younger workers who acquired most of their education after the main reforms were in place.

I20, J20, J24, J31, O15, O52, P20

Abstract:
This paper uses a unique data set of Latin American paintings auctioned by Sotheby's between 1995 and 2002 to investigate several puzzles from the recent auctions literature. Our results suggest that: (1) the reputation of an artist and the provenance of the artwork, omitted variables in most previous studies, seem to be more important determinants of the sale price of a painting than standard factors, such as medium and size, (2) the opinion of art experts seems to be of limited use in predicting whether or not an artwork sells at auction, (3) there is little supporting evidence for the widespread notion that the best or more expensive artworks tend to generate above average returns (the "masterpiece effect"), although (4) there is strong evidence in our data for the declining price anomaly, or "afternoon effect."

art auctions, declining price anomaly, Latin American art, masterpiece effect

Abstract:
What is the relationship between economic growth and its volatility? Does political instability affect growth directly or indirectly, through volatility? This paper tries to answer such questions using a power-ARCH framework with annual time series data for Argentina from 1896 to 2000. We show that while assassinations and strikes (what we call "informal" political instability) have a direct negative effect on economic growth, "formal" political instability (constitutional and legislative changes) has an indirect (through volatility) negative impact. We also find preliminary support for the idea that while the effects of "formal" instability are stronger in the long-run, those of "informal" instability are stronger in the short-run.

economic growth, political instability, power-ARCH, volatility

Abstract:
Why are socially beneficial reforms not implemented? One simple answer to this question (which has received little attention in the literature) is that this may be caused by generalised uncertainty about the effectiveness of reforms. If agents are unsure about whether a proposed reform will work, it will be less likely to be adopted. Despite the numerous benefits economists assign to structural reforms, the empirical literature has thus far failed to establish a positive and significant effect of reforms on economic performance. We collect data from 43 econometric studies (for more than 300 coefficients on the effects of reform on growth) and show that approximately one third of these coefficients is positive and significant, another third is negative and significant, and the final third is not statistically significant different from zero. In trying to understand this remarkable variation, we find that the measurement of reform and controlling for institutions and initial conditions are main factors in decreasing the probability of reporting a significant and positive effect of reform on growth.

Economic growth, structural reform

Abstract:
What are the main barriers to firm entry and exit in developing countries and how do they differ from barriers to firm operation and growth? How important is the institutional and regulatory framework in this respect? This paper examines such questions using case-study evidence from the Brazilian textiles and electronics industries. We find that not only these institutional barriers are high in Brazil but also that they seem to have risen since the early 1990s, and that their effects vary across sectors. We also provide evidence from a survey we carried out in 2005 suggesting that institutions are more important as barriers to entry than as barriers to firm operation and growth.

Firm entry, Firm exit, Brazil, Institutions

Abstract:
An unstable macroeconomic environment is often regarded as detrimental to economic growth. Among the sources contributing to such instability, much of the blame has been assigned to political issues. This paper empirically tests for a causal and negative long-run relation between political instability and economic growth but finds no evidence of such a relationship. Sensitivity analysis indicates that there is a contemporaneous negative relationship but also that, in the long run and ignoring institutional factors, the group of African countries plays the determining role.

Economic growth; Political instability; Granger causality

Abstract:
The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of foreign direct investment inflows in the transition economies between 1990 and 1998. The paper brings two innovations. One is the attention to the effect of agglomeration, an issue that has been highlighted recently in the works of Economic Geography. The second innovation is that we look at all transition countries instead of focusing on, for instance, EU candidates. We find that the main determinants of FDI in transition are agglomeration, the quality of the bureaucracy and the quality of infrastructure. We also find an important difference between CEE and CIS countries. The agglomeration effect is greater for CIS countries than in non-CIS countries. For non-CIS countries, education, infrastructure, and quality of bureaucracy are the main attractors. For CIS countries, availability of cheap labor and sufficient infrastructure, and abundance of natural resources are the main factors influencing FDI flows. Also, the further away from Germany, the more FDI CIS countries receive.

Abstract:
Although the theoretical literature has identified a large number of sizeable benefits from foreign direct investment (FDI), the empirical literature has been unable to establish a significant unconditional positive impact of FDI inflows on the rates of economic growth of host countries. One reason for this difficulty is that theory equates FDI to technology transferred, while in most countries and regions of the world FDI encompasses an array of arrangements that goes well beyond pure technology transfer. This paper tests for these effects in a set of countries in which FDI is purer technology transferred: the 25 Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union transition countries between 1990 and 1998. Our main finding is that, in this appropriate setting, FDI has the direct and significant impact on economic growth theory predicts.

Abstract:
The transition from centrally planned to market economy entails a massive process of occupational change that has been largely neglected in the literature. This paper fills this void by providing a detailed description of this process and by investigating its determinants and consequences. Using data from a representative survey of Estonian workers from 1989 to 1995, we estimate that between 35 and 50% of all employed workers changed occupation in this short period of time. Further, we find that the bulk of these occupational switches occurred in the early years of the transition. As for the determinants of occupational change, we find that the main factors lowering the probability of an employed worker changing occupation are gender (female) and longer potential experience and job tenure. Surprisingly, (present or future) returns to current and alternative occupations do not play a systematic role in explaining the probability of switching. Regarding the impact of occupational change, we find that the private costs of occupational mobility have outweighed the benefits (occupational mobility restrains wage growth).

Occupational Mobility, Human Capital, Transition Economies.

Abstract:
There are two strands in the empirical literature on economic growth in transition economies. One focuses on the impact of reforms, while the other emphasizes sustainability issues and the growth prospects these economies face. The most common strategy, in the latter, has been to use coefficients from growth regressions, on large samples of developing countries, and impose them on transition economies' data to obtain projected growth rates. We refer to it as the BLR approach (because it uses specifications from Barro, and Levine and Renelt). We claim that the reported growth rates are suspiciously similar, painting an overly optimistic picture and yielding few policy lessons. We thus assemble a new data set that focuses exclusively on transition economies and re-estimate the BLR equations. Our main findings are that government expenditures have been positively associated and human capital has been negatively associated with output growth. These results contrast sharply with the assumptions and findings from the BLR approach, questioning its might and challenging our understanding of the transition process in its key dimension.