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Abstract:
Against all odds, the euro turned out to be a weak currency. We argue that this outcome can readily be explained by the policy mix that was chosen at the onset of the period: tight fiscal policies following the convergence mechanism that was imposed by the Maastricht treaty and loose monetary policy that resulted from the convergence of interest rates to the lower point of the spectrum. We investigate this outcome empirically and show that the euro's weakness can be understood as the result of an excess supply in the zone, which is channelled abroad in the usual 'beggar thy neighbour' way. We also outline how an optimal policy mix could be set in the future and discuss a suggestion that has been made by Alessandra Casella on the proper way to determine the fiscal deficit of the zone.

Euro, policy coordination

Abstract:
We analyze the effect of trade spillovers and of international coordination on currency crises. To do this, we present a model that builds on two separate literatures: the literature on international monetary cooperation on the one hand, and the literature on currency crises, or more precisely on the "escape clause" approach of fixed exchange rate systems on the other hand. We show that the more important trade spillovers the more likely self-fulfilling speculative crises are and the larger the set of multiple equilibria. Coordination decreases the possibility of simultaneous self-fulfilling speculative crises in the region and reduces the set of multiple equilibria. However, regional coordination, even though welfare improving, makes countries more dependent on other countries' fundamentals so that it may induce more contagion: a negative shock in one country of the region increases the possibility of a currency crisis in the region because it reduces the feasibility of coordination.