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Abstract:
Law schools are in a crisis of confidence in the abilities and motivations of their students. Conferences on law school teaching feature presentations such as "The Challenges of Connecting with 21st Century Students." Journal articles lament "The Happy Charade" that constitutes the learning and motivation of law students today. Professor Maranville of the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") Section on Teaching Methods summarized these sentiments:

"Many law students are so bored by the second year that their attendance, preparation, and participation decline precipitously; by graduation they have lost much of the passion for justice and the enthusiasm for helping other people that were their strongest initial motivations for wanting to become lawyers. And even in the first year, when most students remain engaged, many fail to learn even the black-letter law at a level that faculty consider satisfactory."

Proposed solutions to these widespread concerns often focus on changing curriculum, teaching methods, or materials.

To improve learning in law schools, however, faculty may need a change of mind. A basic principle of good teaching is that of maintaining high expectations: "Expect more and you will get [more]." Nearly a century of research has established that teachers' expectations of their students can become self-fulfilling prophecies: high expectations are correlated with high achievement, low expectations with low achievement. Moreover, once expectations are established, they tend to be self-sustaining for both students and teachers.

This Article explores the research on expectation effects in education and offers suggestions for putting the research into practice. This Article also suggests that faculty can improve legal education by critically examining their assumptions and attitudes. Finally, this Article addresses high-expectation teaching methodologies. The Article concludes by addressing concerns about institutional resistance to raising expectations. The conclusion addresses the role of student expectations and teacher evaluations, along with suggestions for addressing the emotional dimensions of teaching and learning.

Expectations, Teaching, Learning, Law school, Legal education, Law student, Law professor, Self-fulfilling prophecies, Achievement, Generational bias, Teaching methodologies, Teacher, Student

Abstract:
For over a decade, legal educators (particularly clinical faculty) have argued for the importance of teaching empathy as a critical component of legal education. Both the Carnegie Report and the Best Practices study have emphasized that legal education's instruction in skills - including lawyer-client relationship skills - requires greater attention. While some might argue that empathy is a skill that cannot be taught outside the context of clinical representation of clients, this simulation problem proceeds from the assumption that empathetic understanding of the client's situation is a skill that can be addressed in a variety of settings. Indeed, if empathy is left unaddressed in the classroom, legal education may further the divide of mind and heart and leave students with a message that what they learn in the classroom is an intellectual exercise of little real relevance to what they will do as an attorney.

Professional responsibility courses are an especially appropriate classroom in which to address empathetic understanding of the client, as a key component in exploring the attorney-client relationship and the attorney's duty of communication. This role play is designed in the context of a bar admission problem. While the problem can be used to explore the substantive standards for admission to practice or the impact of law regarding disabilities on that process, the primary goal of this exercise is to explore how it feels to be a client. By placing the students in the role of a law student bar applicant - a situation that nearly every law student can imagine - the role play makes it easier for students to internalize the feelings and perspectives of the client. The role play includes instructions for attorney and client, documentary evidence, and a research memorandum on applicable law. Also included is an edited version of the actual case which is a basis for the problem.

Legal education, Empathy, Lawyer-client, Attorney-client, Relationship skills, Professional responsibility, Communication, Carnegie, Best Practices

Abstract:
Family law practice has undergone dynamic structural changes in recent years. Efforts to reduce, rather than exacerbate, conflict in divorce and custody disputes have resulted in the restructuring of court systems, increased use of alternatives to litigation, new forms of practice emphasizing collaborative negotiation and interdisciplinary cooperation. Whether working with a client in litigation of a custody action or arranging a consensual stepparent adoption, all attorneys working with families planning or undergoing transitions are challenged by the emotional aspects of representing families.

Thus, for attorneys practicing family law, competence must reach beyond what are commonly considered to be the hallmarks of quality: knowledge and skill in legal doctrine and processes. Rather, attorneys must be especially knowledgeable and skilled in dealing with human emotions. If attorneys ignore the demands of the affective and psychological aspects of family representation, both the client and attorney may suffer.

This article examines the level of competence in family law practice today. We first examine why the demands of competent practice are in many respects unique in family law practice. We then consider whether today's family law attorneys are meeting those competency challenges. We believe that competence problems in family law practice often flow from caring problems. Some competence problems are the result of caring too little - either society and the legal system as a whole caring too little about families and their legal needs or individual attorneys caring too little about the non-legal needs of their clients. We then suggest that attorneys must develop strong listening and counseling skills and knowledge if they are to competently represent their clients. Other risks to competency may come from caring too much, causing attorneys to suffer the loss of independent professional judgment and presenting the risks of vicarious trauma. We conclude that attorneys must learn to protect themselves from these risks just as diligently as they protect themselves from missing deadlines or failing to know the law. Only by striking the balance of care in family law practice can attorneys have a long, successful career serving the needs of families.

Competence, competency, family law, children, child, conflict, divorce, custody, alternatives to litigation, collaborative negotiation, interdisciplinary, human emotions, family representation, caring, listening, counseling, best interests, guardian ad litem, professional conduct, ethics, malpractic

Abstract:
Collaborative law practice represents the newest development in alternative dispute resolution in family law practice. At present, few mechanisms are in place to regulate or standardize collaborative practice. There are an astounding variety of agreements that are called "collaborative law" between individual clients and attorneys, between clients themselves or between all clients and all attorneys many of which may be inconsistent with emerging collaborative norms in the family law bar. Little formal regulation of the ethical aspects of these agreements exists. Three states (California, North Carolina and Texas) have statutes regulating collaborative practice and the National Conference of commissioners of Uniform State Laws has created a Drafting Committee on a Collaborative Law Act. While there are no reported cases, ethical analysis of collaborative law has been provided by state and ABA ethics opinions.

This article analyzes some of the issues raised by these ethics opinions and regulations including competence, limited scope representation agreements, client communication, informed consent and withdrawal terms. It explores the balance between these agreements and what some would consider "zealous advocacy" and whether the four-way disqualification agreement presents an unethical conflict of interest. It closes with an examination of the proposals for a collaborative law communications privilege.

Collaborative law, Alternative dispute resolution, Family law, Professional responsibility, Ethical practice of law, Limited scope representation, Withdrawal from representation, Client communication, Informed consent, Zealous advocacy, Four-way disqualification agreement, Communication privilege

Abstract:
In judging pedagogical issues, most law professors favor their own experiences as students:the best way to teach is the way they were taught. I suspect that I am no different in this respect. Unlike most faculty, however, I was taught without the grading game playing a central role in my education. My undergraduate education was at a small, public, interdisciplinary, liberal arts college, with no departments, no majors, no curricular requirements to speak of, no tests and, most critically, no grades. I loved my education. It stays with me today. I attribute that retention and enthusiasm to the learning environment of my college. And I attribute that environment largely to the absence of competitive grading structures.

I went on to a law school that worked diligently to avoid a competitive atmosphere - there was no ranking, many academic rewards were distributed without a primary reliance on grades, and diversity of student opinion and background were cherished. I finished my student career by obtaining my masters in law at a law school with no rankings, and the most generalized grading system one can find in the United States:pass, fail, honors. I believe that the de-emphasis of grades and ranking in my educational background encouraged, for most students, creativity of thought, academic integrity, intellectual enthusiasm, and deep learning.

Naturally, then, I will argue here that law schools rely too much on grading systems (as opposed to evaluation systems); that requiring norm-referenced grading undermines an effective learning environment; and that ranking is wholly counterproductive in a program designed to prepare individuals to serve justice. I begin with the question:why grades? I conclude that the primary reasons for our reporting of grades are not educational but economic:we grade because we need to sort our students for the marketplace. Part two of the article then examines the arguments and assumptions supporting institutionalized grading norms as a basis for that sorting. Part three explores what the choice to rate and rank students reveals about the values law schools prefer and the values that are discounted. The final section of the article provides some thoughts on change and resistance. For those readers who agree with the thesis that the grading practices of most law schools have profound negative effects, what reforms - institutionally or personally - can mediate these effects?

Competition, competitive, curve, law school, grades, grading, grading system, ranking, class rank, pass, fail, grading norms

Abstract:
Modern procedural rules have eased a litigant's task in many respects. The development of a unitary action and procedure for civil suits has eliminated many troublesome questions of the boundaries of law and equity. Liberal standards for pleadings and amendments have reduced the number of lawsuits lost because of technicalities. Yet, doctrines with their roots in earlier systems of procedure continue to provide malpractice traps for the unwary. One such doctrine is election of remedies. A variety of choices, often made very early in a dispute, may result in a party having elected to advance only one legal theory, develop one set of facts, or pursue one remedy, to the exclusion of all other theories, facts, or remedies. The basic concept of the doctrine of election is that a party shall not be permitted to insist at different times upon the truth of two inconsistent and repugnant positions, according to the promptings of his own interest.

The doctrine of election of remedies is difficult to understand for two reasons. First, it is a stand-in for a number of other preclusionary rules, including estoppel, waiver and res judicata. Second, the doctrine has contradictory requirements depending on the preclusionary rule for which it is a substitute. For example, one common approach defines election of remedies as the selection of one of several inconsistent remedies or existing modes of procedure and relief allowed by law on the same state of facts. However, another approach to election of remedies shifts the focus from inconsistency in remedies to inconsistency in facts. Yet both these approaches have been advanced separately as the doctrine of election of remedies. The law would be much clearer if the doctrine were simply abolished. However, as the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District recently commented: The doctrine of election of remedies may well be an anachronism existing in the time when a party may plead inconsistent claims or facts. Absent further direction from our Supreme Court, however, we [must] apply that doctrine. This is not a new criticism; legal authors have advocated abolishment of the rules for years.

Despite this criticism from both within and without, the Missouri courts do still apply the doctrine(s) of election of remedies. The Missouri Supreme Court has attempted in recent years to sort out the variants of the doctrine and clarify their content. However, as long as the cryptic term election of remedies remains in the lexicon, confusion is likely.

Accordingly, this article is designed to sort out the varying principles and applications of the rule. The article begins with an examination of the varying meanings of inconsistency when applied to the requirement that a plaintiff elect between inconsistent claims upon submission to the jury. This area of election of remedies is perhaps the most confusing and one in which the courts are least apt to articulate the underlying justifications for the rule. The second aspect of election of remedies to be examined is the use of the doctrine as a substitute for estoppel or waiver. Finally, the article examines situations in which prior litigation will constitute an election of remedies.

Election of Remedies, remedies, Missouri, preclusionary rules, civil procedure, inconsistent claims, estoppel, waiver, theoretical inconsistency, factual inconsistency, res judicata, judicial administration

Abstract:
In a world in which legal work is becoming increasingly diversified and specialized, lawyers have one common bond: law school. Despite curricular experimentation, the law school experience is stubbornly uniform for students at law schools across the country. Regardless of their year of study or the diversity of their class schedules or teachers' styles, law students will still face a process that has a similar effect upon them. Law school is stressful.

Students, perceiving the educational process to be the cause of this stress, often act instinctively to protect themselves through "fight or flight" reactions. Students fight education and educators in ways ranging from hostility and ridicule to passive aggression, and they see themselves as "beating the system" or "refusing to play the game." Students flee as well, dropping out entirely or continuing their enrollment while "playing dead in school.

Not only are many of these defense mechanisms counterproductive to one's education, but they can teach unintended lessons about oneself, the law, and lawyers. For example, after three years of battle with law school, "fighting" students often are left dispirited about learning and cynical about the law, the legal profession, and most especially law school. Likewise, among students who flee the school or who allow themselves to be swept along without taking risks or making much of an effort, few graduate with the necessary courage and self-knowledge to exercise independent professional judgment. Faculty members have a professional responsibility to address their students' fear and loathing. There is much that can and should be done to improve the psychological climate of law schools. We need to find the proper way of helping students test their mettle than allowing them to burn out.

Fear and loathing, Fight or flight, Law, Lawyers, Law school, Legal education, Law students, Law faculty, Faculty, Professional responsibility, Stress, Cognitive coping, Emotional, Curriculum, Humanizing legal education

Abstract:
While the humanizing legal education community has been recognized as an official section of the American Association of Law Schools; has an active listserv with student, scholar and attorney members; and has hosted international conferences such as this one; there is no clear definition of "humanizing legal education." In this essay, I suggest three principles that underlie the scholarship of those who seek to humanize legal education and then ask some hard questions about the economics of legal education that challenge our ability to meet any of these principles.

First - Do No Harm. Scholars devoted to humanizing legal education might consider the language we choose: what is it to "humanize" something?

Second - Teach Students Not Just Subjects. Certainly doing no harm - creating positive, supportive learning environments - is the starting point in valuing our students. We must do more, however, than merely remove negatives if we are to place the highest priority on the humans we are educating.

Third - Peace and Justice. A third value found threaded throughout all of the humanizing literature is more about explicit values education.

The call to humanize legal education is part of a much larger call to humanize the profession by recapturing the essence of professional values - peacemaking, problem solving, and justice work. Both the public and attorneys themselves are increasingly disillusioned about lawyers and the law. The answer to humanizing legal education and legal practice lies in rekindling professional values of peacemaking and service. To truly humanize legal education we must step out of the classroom and hallways and advocate on behalf of our students. We must step into the admissions and financial aid offices and take into account the values of investing in our students. We must step into the state houses to advocate on behalf of law, lawyers, and legal education. Lastly and at a minimum, we must be sure our students understand the finances of law school and the profession and have the courage to tell that truth without fear of its impact on our own economic circumstances.

Legal education, Law school, Humanizing, Learning environment, Teaching, Students, Values, Professionalism, Economics

Abstract:
Representing children in dependency, adoption or guardianship proceedings requires attention to a variety of interests. Children need a voice: an adviser and an advocate whose judgment is unclouded by conflicting interests. Courts need information that the adult parties to the proceedings may not easily discover or willingly provide. The families and social services agencies need monitors and mediators. The attorney guardian ad litem (GAL) is often called upon to meet all these needs. During the past decade, much effort has been devoted to developing standards of competence and attention to the unique and critical demands of child representation.

While states and the federal government have recognized the need, many have been unwilling to commit the resources to truly meet the full range of interests. The result is a system that creates pressures for and tolerance of mediocre or passive representation, or what one judge has referred to as a “potted plant” theory of representation of child clients. Evaluative reports of appointed counsel indicate that competence has been a significant concern in representation of children.

This essay explores the dimensions of the problem of competence and diligence in children’s representation. First, the practical realities of poor funding and heavy caseloads are described and the ethical obligations of attorneys in these circumstances are explored. Second, the article examines the standards and scope of training requirements being adopted by the states and contrasts these standards to the actual demands of child representation. Finally, the article explores the confused role definitions of attorneys in child welfare representation. The article suggests why that confusion persists and how it may cause attorneys to minimize some of their responsibilities in these cases. The article concludes with some practical suggestions for attorneys in these roles to minimize the pressures toward incomplete representation.

Children, Child, Advocacy, Representation, Dependency, Adoption, Guardianship, Guardian ad litem, Standards, Child welfare, Family Law, Professional Responsibility, Ethics

Abstract:
Laws governing relations between spouses have undergone profound changes that continue to revolutionize the standards and procedures for dissolutions of marriage. The most dramatic changes in divorce law have come from the advent of no-fault divorce, the decline in spousal maintenance awards, and the abolition of inter-spousal tort immunity. Ongoing changes include movements to integrate family courts as a separate judicial system and to incorporate alternative dispute resolution into that system.

These transformations have been based in part on changes in how society views divorce and, on the way the legal system views the family. As a result, more couples can divorce quickly, inexpensively, and with a minimum of rancor. Despite these dramatic changes, however, a number of divorces still occur the old fashioned way - with an extended, adversarial fight over fault and financial distribution. One question facing the legal system in this climate is the extent to which divorce should be the last battle - bloody, wide-ranging, but final - or simply the first step in an ongoing war. An important issue in resolving this question is the extent to which a spouse may or must join in a divorce action any tort claims he or she may have against the other spouse.

Rather than viewing interspousal torts claimants as economic game players, this article notes that the vast majority of tort claimants are abused spouses and assumes that these claimants are making their litigation choices during divorce as emotional, even irrational, actors. This assumption requires different responses when deciding whether tort claims must or may be joined with divorce actions.

This article addresses that policy question by surveying the current state of the law regarding the effects of claim preclusion (res judicata) in a divorce proceeding. Some history of the role of fault in judicial resolution of spousal disputes is examined. The three major approaches to joinder of tort claims are identified and critiqued. This article posits that, on a policy basis, family court judges should have the discretion to allow, but not to require, joinder of tort claims in divorce proceedings. This responds to the needs of the litigants may be emotionally unable or unwilling to bring tort actions during the tumultuous and dangerous time of divorce. For those litigants who do wish to resolve all issues at once, however, this approach allows for that efficiency.

Divorce, Dissolution of marriage, Fault, No-fault, Claim preclusion, Res judicata, Marital asset, Interspousal litigation, Interspousal tort immunity, Joinder, Tort action

Abstract:
The attorney's obligation to provide pro bono service is part of the regulatory language of every state's professional regulation. Most states have adopted some version of the American Bar Association's Model Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1. The language is hortatory, directing but not mandating that attorneys provide free or reduced-cost service to persons of limited means. The title emphasizes that pro bono services are voluntary, and the operative word throughout is should, not shall. The use of this language nd the notes accompanying the rule confirm that the rule is not meant to be a basis for discipline. Likewise the oath taken by attorneys in many states includes the affirmation to never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed.

If a court appoints an attorney to provide this representation, aspirational goal becomes enforceable obligation. Thus, Model Rule 6.2 on appointed representation is written in mandatory terms and provides that attorneys shall not seek to avoid appointment unless good cause exists for excuse. Indeed, the rule's language (seek to avoid) suggests that even maneuvers short of outright refusal - such as artificial conflicts of interest or efforts to remove one's name from appointments lists - could violate the rule as well. Technically the state disciplinary authority could sanction attorneys for violating this rule. As a practical matter, however, trial courts enforce the duty to accept an appointments through contempt actions rather than referral for discipline.

This article will explore how one legal community has implemented this mandatory obligation to accept appointed representation. Many fine articles have explored the history of the obligation to provide appointed representation or the constitutional limits of that obligation. I will do no more than cite to the former and state the conclusions of the latter. Likewise, this article will not address the representation of indigent criminal defendants and the myriad issues peculiar to that field. Rather, the focus of this article is on the practice of appointing private attorneys to represent indigent clients in civil cases, particularly family court cases. The article first will review the range of cases in which the right to an attorney exists. It will then describe the models for providing these attorneys. Finally, the article will evaluate the constitutional, practical and political implications of an inclusive appointment and buy-out system.

pro-bono service, Model Rule of Professional Conduct, juvenile, child, minor, dependency action, appointed representation, family court, right to counsel, 6th amendment, sixth amendment, civil action, parens patriae, Guardian Ad Litem, buy out system

Abstract:
The fast pace of modern law practice increasingly presents clients in situations that demand immediate attention and solution. Unlike medicine, however, the legal profession does not yet consider itself as having an emergency specialty. Yet, observation of today's law practice readily reveals that the analogy is accurate. The pressure of today's rapidly changing business climate, the complexity of legal regulations and relationships and the widening application of law to address a host of problems, all contribute to an increasing need for an immediate, available legal response: "emergency lawyering."

Situations in which attorneys respond to emergencies provide a window on priorities and standards for competence, candor, fairness and service. The emergency perspective affords insight into those areas of a practice that an attorney may not have satisfactorily cultivated and suggests means of improving legal services for clients in crisis. This model of legal services challenges and illuminates the legal profession's attitude toward the overall delivery of legal services.

This article constructs a general theory of emergency legal practice, defining emergency law practice and addressing the ethical, professional, and legal implications of this "emergency" perspective on the lawyering process.

This article suggests that the prevalence of legal emergencies in the day-to-day practice of many attorneys requires attention to this aspect of legal practice as a specialized form of lawyering. By doing so, attorneys can develop this aspect of their practice and serve a significant need of clients in an efficient and effective manner rather than shunning emergencies.

Perhaps the most fundamental concern in developing adequate emergency response has been the assumption that legal representation in an emergency places an attorney at an increased risk of sanction or liability. In particular, the standards for adequate preparation in emergencies are addressed. The article suggests means for attorneys to structure their practices to prepare in advance to provide quality emergency lawyering. The article concludes with some of the "triage" issues in emergency representation by the profession as a whole. The need for emergency representation reaches its zenith when crisis, limited resources and high risks combine with the need for free or reduced fee representation. This class of cases highlights issues of the attorney's and the profession's duty to make legal services available.

Emergency lawyering, Legal emergencies, Lawyering process, Law office, Law practice, Criminal law, Corporate law, Business practice, Family law, Client crises, Ethics, Professional responsibility, Duty of competence, Model Rules, Malpractice, Ineffective

Abstract:
Attorneys for the poor are being asked to serve more clients for less money and with more restrictions than ever. These restrictions on amounts and uses of funds influence the attorney's independent professional judgment. Determining when that influence is inappropriate becomes a difficult practical and ethical issue. Is this issue resolved if one simply re-conceptualizes the role of the entities and individuals involved? What if the government becomes the client and the individual receiving legal services becomes something other than a client? Such a change in characterization has in fact occurred. Even in the face of massive cutbacks on other federal support, the governmental role in child support enforcement has swelled. Accompanying this growth has been an increasing focus on the ethical issues presented by this representation. When the attorneys enforcing private child support orders are employed by the state, identifying the client becomes a critical ethical task. From the client's perspective, the role of the attorney appears little different than the role of other legal services attorneys. The government is simply a third-party funder similar to insurance companies whose attorneys represent both insurer and insured. Under either of these views, the attorney would owe a duty to the parent as client.

Nearly all states have statutes that specifically exclude the custodial parent as a client. These statutes seemingly resolve the issue of dual representation or third-party interference with the lawyer-client relationship. New issues arise regarding the attorney's duty to be forthright with the recipients of legal services about the nature of the relationship - but there is little question about the scope of representation or limitations on that scope.

Could this same re-characterization occur in other areas of government funding of legal services? Would such a re-characterization truly solve the ethical dilemmas presented by government restrictions on attorney representation? This article provides some background on the role of child support enforcement attorneys; explores the reasons for characterizing the parent as client and the issues such a characterization raises; and examines statutes that deem the state to be the sole client in these actions and will consider their philosophy, legality, and effectiveness.

Child support, Child support enforcement, CSE, IV-D Program, Legal services, Client identity, Attorney-client, Custodial parent, Non-custodial parent, Legal ethics, Professional responsibility

Abstract:
This article provides an exhaustive review of landlord liability and the trend toward broadening landlord liability for criminal activity on rental property. In particular, it reviews laws penalizing landlords through forfeiture of such property and considers the philosophical shift that has accompanied these legal developments. The article rejects the assumption that increased liability standards provide incentives for increased control by landlords for several reasons. First, from the landlord's perspective, the utility of these standards is doubtful. Practical enforcement methods would encourage landlords to violate other standards designed to protect tenants from discrimination, invasion of privacy and negligent maintenance. Further, the increased costs of heightened regulation is likely to reduce the availability of quality, affordable rental housing.

Second, from legal and societal perspectives, the assumption that these increased standards provide effective incentives entails costs in itself. While the new standards may increase the acceptability of hidden, private enforcement costs, little evidence suggests that they will actually decrease crime. Moreover, while these reactive standards create an image of effective crime control, they distract the community from more effective uses of tort, nuisance and criminal laws in the prevention of crime. While these standards seem to enhance important community involvement, the growth of community is an organic process which must be facilitated through nurturing, not intimidation or threats.

Landlord, Tenant, Tort, Nuisance, Crime, Liability, Premises liability, Duty of care, Forfeiture

Abstract:
The trend toward greater liability to one's opponents in litigation is but one example of the overall diffusion of attorney responsibility. This may represent either greater animosity aimed at attorneys or broader liability across the board in society. Other explanations include a diffusion of attorney roles with a corresponding trend toward unifying standards of liability for a broad range of service professionals, as well as a pluralization of the attorney client relationship. Primarily, however, the trend toward greater responsibility to nonclients represents a crumbling of the overriding fidelity to a partisan adversary ethic. To the extent this trend is present in the core of the adversary system its extension to non-litigation fields of practice seems even more likely.

Broader liability may be a result of or an incentive for change in legal culture. Even if standards of liability do not encourage attorneys to balance their adversarial zeal on behalf of clients with some concern for fairness toward third parties, the culture of the law may be changing to an extent which will encourage this change. The number of individuals and entities that are opting out of litigation, or who are forced by law to pursue less adversarial methods of dispute resolution, indicate that the overriding ethic of adversarial partisanship is beginning to be balanced with concerns toward more cooperative transactional and dispute resolution methods. The increasing popularity of mediation for a broad range of dispute resolution and the significant debate over the proper role of attorneys in this field is but one indication of this trend.

Professional responsibility, Liability, Attorney client, Third parties, Alternative dispute resolution, Mediation, Diversification, Nonclient, Rule 11, Model Rules

Abstract:
This article is based on the premise that custody evaluations cannot and should not be a substitute for the socio-legal judgment of the best interests of the child. Recognizing that clinical humility and judicial vigilance may not be sufficient to restrain the misuse of psychological evaluation, the authors offer three structural changes that would provide a more appropriate use of the skills and talents custody evaluators bring to legal decisions: using custody evaluators in the less adversarial setting of preparing parenting plans; revising the procedures by which custody evaluations are elicited in litigation; and, adopting the approximation standard for child custody determinations.

Legends, Law, Science, Scientific Method, Reason, Inquiry, Values, Jurisprudence, Storytelling, Legal theory