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Abstract:
Many experts believe that gasoline taxes should be increased for a variety of reasons. Their arguments are unpersuasive. Oil is not disappearing, and when it becomes more expensive, market agents will substitute away from gasoline to save money. The link between oil price shocks and recessions, although real in the 1970s, has been much more benign since 1985 because of the termination of price controls. Market actors properly account for energy costs in their purchasing decisions absent government intervention. Pollution taxes, congestion fees, and automobile insurance premiums more closely related to vehicle miles traveled are better remedies for the externalities associated with automobile travel than a simple fuel tax. Gasoline consumption does not necessarily distort American foreign policy, impose military commitments, or empower Islamic terrorist organizations.

State and federal gasoline taxes should be abolished. Local governments should tax gasoline only to the extent necessary to pay for roads when user charges are not feasible. If government feels compelled to more aggressively regulate vehicle tailpipe emissions or access to public roadways, pollution taxes and road user fees are better means of doing so than fuel taxes. Regardless, perfectly internalizing motor vehicle externalities would likely make the economy less efficient - not more - by inducing motorists into even more (economically) inefficient mass transit use.

The arguments advanced against increasing gasoline taxes are applicable to the broader discussion about America's reliance on oil generally. The case for policies designed to discourage oil consumption is nearly as threadbare as the case for increasing the gasoline tax - and for largely the same reasons.

don't increase federal gasoline taxes, jerry taylor, peter van doren, gasoline taxes, fuel taxes, oil, market agents, oil prices, recessions, price controls, pollution taxes, congestion fees, insurance premiums, externalities, gasoline consumption, state policy, federal policy, regulation

Abstract:
Many commentators have argued that if the Federal Reserve had followed a stricter monetary policy earlier this decade when the housing bubble was forming, and if Congress had not deregulated banking but had imposed tighter financial standards, the housing boom and bust - and the subsequent financial crisis and recession - would have been averted. In this paper, we investigate those claims and dispute them. We are skeptical that economists can detect bubbles in real time through technical means with any degree of unanimity. Even if they could, we doubt the Fed would have altered its policy in the early 21st century, and we suspect that political leaders would have exerted considerable pressure to maintain that policy. Concerning regulation, we find that the banking reform of the late 1990s had little effect on the housing boom and bust, and that the many reform ideas currently proposed would have done little or nothing to avert the crisis.

Commentators have also argued that the popularization of financial products such as teaser-rate hybrid loans for subprime homebuyers and credit default swaps for investors is to blame for the financial crisis. We find little evidence for this. Housing data indicate that the majority of subprime hybrid loans that have entered default had not undergone interest rate resets, and the default rate for subprime hybrid loans is not much higher than for subprime fixed rate loans. Concerning swaps, although their introduction may increase financial inflows into risky sectors, their execution through a clearing-house or regulation via other means would not necessarily have avoided the mispricing of risks in underlying contracts. Capital requirements for the credit default swaps that were used to insure mortgage-backed securities would have been low because housing investments were not considered risky.

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, CDS, Credit Default Swap, systemic risk, GLB, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC, Basel I, Basel II, TBTF, Too Big to Fail, Catastrophe Bonds, shadow banking

Abstract:
Environmental policy questions often result in dueling scientific studies. Typically, articles are published in scientific or medical journals that claim exposure to pollution results in increased morbidity or mortality. Critics then respond in scientific or policy journals with claims that the original scientific articles were flawed and do not reflect sound science. But why should those who prefer a cleaner environment have to justify their preferences with scientific evidence? Markets are neutral with respect to preferences. The function of markets is to allow people to pursue their preferences subject to a budget constraint.

Environmental policy, pollution, market solutions, consumer preferences, public goods, policy disputes, environmental regulation, regulation, choice