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Abstract:
We investigate the role of information in affecting a firm's cost of capital. Using a multi-asset rational expectations model, we show that differences in the composition of information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, with investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information. This higher return arises because informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio weights to incorporate new information, and uninformed investors are thus disadvantaged. The model demonstrates how in equilibrium the quantity and quality of information affect asset prices, resulting in cross-sectional differences in firms' required returns. We show how a firm can influence its cost of capital by choosing features like accounting treatments, financial analyst coverage, and market microstructure.

Abstract:
The study argues that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, as well as for claimants on the banks' cash flows, such as investors and depositors. The authors support the general principle that fiduciary duties should be owed exclusively to shareholders. However, in the special case of banks, they contend that the scope of the fiduciary duties and obligations of officers and directors should be broadened to include creditors. In particular, the authors call on bank directors to take solvency risk explicitly and systematically into account when making decisions or else face personal liability for failure to do so.

corporate governance, commercial banks, fiduciary duties

Abstract:
In this research we investigate the role of information-based trading in affecting asset returns. Our premise is that in a dynamic market asset prices are continually adjusting to new information. This evolution dictates that the process by which asset prices become informationally efficient cannot be separated from the process generating asset returns. Using the structure of a sequential trade market microstructure model, we derive an explicit measure of the probability of information-based trading for an individual stock, and we estimate this measure using high-frequency data for NYSE-listed stocks for the period 1983-1998. The resulting estimates are a time-series of individual stock probabilities of information-based trading for a very large cross section of stocks. We investigate whether these information probabilities affect asset returns by incorporating our estimates into a Fama-French [1992] asset pricing framework. Our main result is that information does affect asset prices: stocks with higher probabilities of information-based trading require higher rates of return. Indeed, we find that a difference of 10 percentage points in the probability of information-based trading between two stocks leads to a difference in their expected returns of 2.5% per year. We interpret our results as providing strong support for the premise that information affects asset pricing fundamentals.

Abstract:
We examine the potential profits of trading on a measure of private information (PIN) in a stock. A zero-investment portfolio which is size neutral, but long in high PIN stocks and short in low PIN stocks earns a significant abnormal return. The Fama-French and momentum factors do not explain this return. However, significant covariation in returns exists among high PIN stocks and among low PIN stocks, suggesting that PIN might proxy for an underlying factor. We create a PIN factor as the monthly return on the zero-investment portfolio above and show that it has some success in explaining returns to independent PIN-size portfolios.

Abstract:
We propose a dynamic model of trade and estimate the model on 16 actively traded stocks on the New York Stock Exchange over 15 years of transaction data. We investigate (1) how the arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades vary over time, (2) how they interact with each other, and (3) what the implications are of the trade dynamics on the securities price processes such as market liquidity, depth, and volatility.

In particular, we extend the model of Easley and O'Hara (1992) to allow the arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades to be time-varying and forecastable. We specify a generalized autoregressive bivariate process for (1) the arrival rates of trades and (2) the logarithm of the arrival rates. Calibration results indicate that the two specifications exhibit similar performance. They both point to some common features of the trade dynamics. First, the arrival rates of both informed and uninformed trades are highly persistent. Heavy trading is more likely to be followed by heavy trading. Second, uninformed traders tend to follow their own type but to avoid the informed traders. Uninformed traders refrain from entering the market after a day with many informed traders. Informed traders, on the other hand, are not as responsive to the arrival of uninformed traders. Finally, while the arrival rates of both types of traders increase over time, it is mainly the increase in the arrival of uninformed traders that contributes to the surge in trading activities.

Given the forecasted arrival rates, we investigate the correlation between the arrival rates of trades and trade composition on market volatility and liquidity. First, we find that the forecasted arrival rates of both types of trades are positively correlated with intra-day volatility measures such as the absolute returns on daily open-close and high-low. Hence, potentially we could use the forecasted arrival rates to enhance the forecasting of daily volatilities. Second, under our model structure, the opening bid-ask spread, a measure of market liquidity, is proportional to the relative proportion of informed trades and the significance of the information event. We find that the proportion of informed trades is negatively correlated with the total number of trades. As the number of trades increases over time, the relative proportion of informed trades increases and hence, assuming relative time stability on the significance of information events, the opening bid-ask spread becomes narrower and the market becomes more liquid. Finally, we compute the price impact curve of consecutive buy orders and report the half life of the price impact as a measure of market depth. The difference in mean half life across stocks indicates their difference in market depth. The positive correlation between the half life and total trades indicates that the market is deeper in presence of more trades.

Abstract:
We construct a comprehensive measure of overall investment banking competitiveness for follow-on offerings that aggregates the various dimensions of competition such as fees, pricing accuracy, analyst recommendations, distributional abilities, market making prowess, debt offering capabilities, and overall reputation. The measure allows us to incorporate trade-offs that investment banks may use in competing for new or established clients. We find that firms who seek a higher reputation underwriter face relatively non-competitive markets. In contrast, firms who switch to similar-quality underwriters enjoy more intense competition among investment banks which manifests in lower fees and more optimistic recommendations. Investment banks do compete vigorously for some clients, with the level of competition related to the likelihood of gaining or losing clients. Finally, investment banks not performing up to market norms are more likely to be dropped in the follow-on offering.

Investment banking, equity offerings, underwriting, analyst recommendations, market making

Abstract:
Since 1995 more than 7300 firms have delisted from U.S. stock markets, with almost half of these being involuntary. This paper examines the law and finance of the delisting process. We examine economic rationales for delisting, the legal rules that define it, and the causes of delisting. Using a sample of NYSE firms delisted in 2002, we examine the effects of their delisting and subsequent trading on the Pink Sheets. We find huge costs to delisting, with percentage spreads tripling, volatility doubling, but volume remarkably high. We also show that delisting is applied inconsistently, with some firms trading for months after failing the listing requirements. We argue that the current delisting process is flawed, and we provide some alternatives.

Abstract:
In this paper, we investigate the effects of information asymmetry across equity investor groups as an explanation for the capital structure decisions of the firm. We test empirically whether differences in information across outside investors have any bearing on the leverage ratios of firms and on their choice of financing instrument when raising external capital. We use the probability of information-based trading (PIN) estimated using trade based data to test our theory. We find that firms with higher information risk (extrinsic information asymmetry across groups of investors) measured using PIN have higher market leverage. Extrinsic information asymmetry also seems to play a significant role in the firm's decision to issue debt or equity when raising capital, with high PIN firms more likely to issue debt. Comparing firms that issued debt and repurchased equity in the same year (increased leverage) with those that issued equity and repurchased debt in the same year (decreased leverage), we find firms with higher extrinsic information asymmetry are more likely to increase their leverage. These results strongly support the hypothesis that information risk affects capital structure after controlling for information asymmetry between firm managers and outside investors.

Capital Structure, Information Asymmetry, Market Microstructure, Information Risk

Abstract:
This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. Our market setting includes salient features of electronic limit order markets, as well as informed traders and liquidity traders. We focus on the strategies of the traders, and how these are affected by trader type, characteristics of the market, and characteristics of the asset. We find that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. Our main result is that liquidity provision shifts as trading progresses, with informed traders increasingly providing liquidity in markets. The change in the behavior of the informed traders seems to be in response to the dynamic adjustment of prices to information; they take (provide) liquidity when the value of their information is high (low). Thus, a market-making role emerges endogenously in our electronic markets and is ultimately adopted by the traders who are least subject to adverse selection when placing limit orders.

Market microstructure, experimental economics, experiments, electronic markets, limit order book, liquidity, continuous auctions, limit orders, trading strategies, informed traders, information asymmetry

Abstract:
In the current credit crisis there is little or no trade in a variety of financial assets, even though bids and asks exist for many of these assets. We develop a model in which this illiquidity arises from uncertainty, and we argue that this new form of illiquidity makes bid and ask prices unsuitable as metrics for establishing fair value for these assets. We show how the extreme uncertainty that traders currently face can be characterized by incomplete preferences over portfolios, and we use Bewley's [2002] model of decision making under uncertainty to derive equilibrium quotes and the non-existence of trade at these quotes. Having established the origin of the quotes, and why the market freezes, we are then able to use our approach to suggest alternatives for valuing assets in illiquid markets.

liquidity, uncertainty, subprime crisis, fair value accounting

Abstract:
In this paper we analyze the demutualization of exchanges. Over the last 5 years nineteen stock markets had privatized, and consequently changed their governance structure. The most important finding is that exchange privatizations appear to be value-enhancing changes.

Abstract:
Much of the blame for the current financial crisis is attributable to problems in the subprime mortgage market. In this Article we argue that changes in the nature of the mortgage contract make it both legally plausible and normatively desirable that subprime mortgages brokers be treated as securities broker-dealers for the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Modern subprime mortgages are, in large part, investments that contain imbedded options, and are not subject to any alternative comprehensive regulatory regime. Thus, they should qualify as "notes" under the Securities Act definition and the Supreme Court's Reves test, and expose their brokers to Rule 10b-5 oversight. In the alternative, we argue that the emergence of securitization as the primary process by which mortgages are financed provides a second, independent analytical basis for our theory that subprime mortgage financings should be subject to securities law: Mortgage financings qualify for the protections of rules such as SEC Rule 10b-5 because they occur "in connection with the purchase or sale of a security," namely, the mortgage-backed security that is created and funded on the basis of the cash flows from the mortgagors' payments on their subprime mortgages.

Were the SEC to take control of subprime mortgages brokers, rules that forbid the sale of financial instruments to any person unless investing in those instruments is appropriate (suitable) to the investment needs and risk tolerance of that investor would come into play, oversight that would have avoided or greatly mitigated the current crisis. In describing what suitability would do for the mortgage market, we make a novel distinction between "product" and "transaction form" suitability in our analysis of the suitability rules. We argue that transaction form suitability is the appropriate legal theory to use when pursuing people who have unscrupulously sold subprime mortgages to unsophisticated investors. In closing, we discuss reasons why we believe the SEC has not tried to exert this authority to date, and address the likely result of a legal challenge in the event the SEC were to adopt our proposal by rule.

securities law, subprime, reves test, crisis, mortgage

Abstract:
We use a laboratory market to investigate the behavior of noise traders and their impact on the market. Our experiment features informed traders (who possess fundamental information), liquidity traders (who have to trade for exogenous reasons), and noise traders (who do not possess fundamental information and have no exogenous reasons to trade). We find differences in behavior between liquidity traders and noise traders, justifying their separate treatment. We find that noise traders exert some positive effects on market liquidity: volume and depths are higher and spreads are lower. We provide evidence suggesting that the main effect of the liquidity-enhancing trading strategies of the noise traders is to weaken price reversals (decreasing the temporary price impact of market orders) rather than to reduce the permanent price impact of trades (as liquidity traders supposedly do in market microstructure models with information asymmetry). We find that noise traders adversely affect the informational efficiency of the market, but only when the extent of adverse selection is large (i.e., when informed traders have very valuable private information). Finally, we examine how trader behavior and certain market quality measures are affected by a transaction tax. Although such taxes do reduce noise trader activity, they take a toll on informed trading as well. As a result, while taxes reduce volume, they do not affect spreads and price impact measures, and have at most a weak effect on the informational efficiency of prices.

noise traders, liquidity traders, informed traders, experiments, experimental markets, market microstructure, informational efficiency, liquidity, transaction tax, Tobin tax

Abstract:
Among the clearest rules in U.S. securities law is the duty that brokers have to "seek the best execution that is reasonably available for its customers' orders." The problem with the current orientation of the policy discussion on best execution is that it has focused on the narrow, yet unanswerable, question of which venue provides traders with "best execution." For example, it makes no sense to employ the same, or even a similar, legal definition of the duty of best execution for large institutional traders and for small retail traders. In this article, we examine the alternative institutions most likely to generate optimal rules regarding best execution.

Brokers, best execution, traders, securities law

Abstract:
Equity markets world-wide have seen a proliferation of trading venues and the consequent fragmentation of order flow. In this paper, we examine how fragmentation of trading is affecting the quality of trading in U.S. markets. We propose using newly-available TRF (trade reporting facilities) volumes to proxy for fragmentation levels in individual stocks, and we use a matched sample to compare execution quality and efficiency of stocks with more and less fragmented trading. We find that market fragmentation generally reduces transactions costs and increases execution speeds. Fragmentation does increase short-term volatility, but prices are more efficient in that they are closer to being a random walk. Our results that fragmentation does not appear to harm market quality have important implications for regulatory policy.

market fragmentation, market quality, microstructure

Abstract:
This paper investigates the linkage of microstructure, accounting, and asset pricing. We determine the relationship between firm characteristics as captured by accounting and market data and a firm's probability of private information-based trade (PIN) as estimated from trade data. This allows us to determine what types of firms have high information risk. We then use these data to create an instrument for PIN, the PPIN, which we can estimate from firm-specific data. We show that PPINs have explanatory power for the cross-section of asset returns in long sample tests. We also investigate whether information risk vitiates the influence of other variables on asset returns. Our results provide strong support for information risk affecting asset returns, and suggest that PIN weakens, but does not remove, the role of size in asset returns.

Abstract:
In this research we investigate the behavior of noise traders and their impact on the market. We do this in an experimental market setting that allows us to determine not only how noise traders fare in a competitive asset market with other traders, but also how the equilibrium changes if a securities transactions tax ("Tobin tax") is imposed. We find that noise traders lose money on average: they do not engage in extensive liquidity provision, and their attempt to make money by trend chasing is unsuccessful as they lose most in securities whose prices experience large moves. Noise traders adversely affect the informational efficiency of the market: they drive prices away from fundamental values, and the further away the market gets from the true value, the stronger this effect becomes. With a securities transaction tax, noise traders submit fewer orders and lose less money in those securities that exhibit large price movements. The tax is associated with a decrease in market trading volume, but informational efficiency remains essentially unchanged and liquidity (as measured by the price impact of trades) actually improves. We find no significant effect, however, on market volatility, suggesting that at least this rationale for a securities transaction tax is not supported by our data.

Abstract:
This paper considers the basic issue of the optimal microstructure for trading financial assets. I propose a framework for addressing optimality that draws on the functions that markets perform. These functions include liquidity, price discovery, and the reduction of uncertainty. Because the characteristics of financial assets and their investors differ, I show that their optimal microstructure may differ as well. I illustrate these points by analysing the evolution of corporate and municipal bond trading in the USA. The paper also discusses the particularly important role that microstructure plays for developing financial markets.

Abstract:
This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in anelectronic limit order market. Our market setting includes salient features of electronic markets, as well as informed traders and liquidity traders. We focus on the strategies of the traders, andhow these are affected by trader type, characteristics of the market, and characteristics of the asset. We find that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. We also find that liquidity provision shifts over time, with informed traders increasingly providingliquidity in markets. This evolution is consistent with the risk advantage informed traders have in placing limit orders. Thus, a market making role emerges endogenously in our electronic markets.

Abstract:
We use a laboratory market to investigate the behavior of traders who lack informational advantages and have no exogenous reason to trade. We find that these uninformed traders behave largely as irrational contrarian “noise traders,” trading against recent price movements to their own detriment. The uninformed traders provide some benefits to the market: increasing market volume and depth, while reducing bid-ask spreads and the temporary price impact of trades. However, their noise trading also diminishes the ability of market prices to adjust to new information. A securities transaction tax reduces uninformed trader activity, but it reduces informed trader activity by approximately the same amount; as a result, the tax does not alter the impact of noise trading on the informational efficiency of the market.

D03, G12, G14

Abstract:
We investigate the implications of ambiguity aversion for performance and regulation of markets. In our model, agents’ decision making may incorporate both risk and ambiguity, and we demonstrate that nonparticipation arises from the rational decision by some traders to avoid ambiguity. In equilibrium, these participation decisions affect the equilibrium risk premium, and distort market performance when viewed from the perspective of traditional asset pricing models. We demonstrate how regulation, particularly regulation of unlikely events, can moderate the effects of ambiguity, thereby increasing participation and generating welfare gains. Our analysis demonstrates how legal systems affect participation in financial markets through their influence on ambiguity.

G1, G2, D8

Abstract:
We propose a dynamic econometric microstructure model of trading, and we investigate how the dynamics of trades and trade composition interact with the evolution of market liquidity, market depth, and order flow. We estimate a bivariate generalized autoregressive intensity process for the arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades for 16 actively traded stocks over 15 years of transaction data. Our results show that both informed and uninformed trades are highly persistent, but that the uninformed arrival forecasts respond negatively to past forecasts of the informed intensity. Our estimation generates daily conditional arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades, which we use to construct forecasts of the probability of information-based trade (PIN). These forecasts are used in turn to forecast market liquidity as measured by bid-ask spreads and the price impact of orders. We observe that PINs vary across assets and over time, and most importantly that they are correlated across assets. Our analysis shows that one principal component explains much of the daily variation in PINs and that this systemic liquidity factor may be important for asset pricing. We also find that PINs tend to rise before earnings announcement days and decline afterwards.

C51, C53, G10, G12, G14, Arrival rates, informed trades, uninformed trades, autoregressive process, market depth, liquidity

Abstract:
Bubbles are a topic of great importance and great controversy. This paper discusses alternative perspectives on the economic meaning and origin of bubbles. Drawing on historical approaches to bubbles, this article sets out a taxonomy of approaches used to explain the nature of bubbles. The paper also considers issues connected with the scientific thinking surrounding bubbles.

Abstract:
This paper examines the implications of market microstructure for asset pricing. I argue that asset pricing ignores the central fact that asset prices evolve in markets. Markets provide liquidity and price discovery, and I argue that asset pricing models need to be recast in broader terms to incorporate the transactions costs of liquidity and the risks of price discovery. I argue that symmetric information-based asset pricing models do not work because they assume that the underlying problems of liquidity and price discovery have been solved. I develop an asymmetric information asset pricing model that incorporates these effects.

Abstract:
Market microstructure research has provided important insights into the operation and behavior of securities markets and into the intra-day behavior of asset prices. What has not yet been established is how market microstructure affects economic behavior more generally. This article focuses on the quest for the link between microstructure and economic meaning. It looks at several areas where microstructure should matter, and it suggests ways for looking for such a linkage. The article attempts to define what we know and don't know regarding microstructure effects, as well as suggesting a research agenda of what we ought to know.

Abstract:
Extending an empirical technique developed in Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara (1996, 1997a), we examine different hypotheses about stock splits. In line with the trading range hypothesis, we find that stock splits attract uninformed traders. However, we also find that informed trading increases, resulting in no appreciable change in the information content of trades. Therefore, we do not find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that stock splits reduce information asymmetries. The optimal tick size hypothesis predicts that stock splits attract limit order trading and this enhances the execution quality of trades. While we find an increase in the number of executed limit orders, their effect is overshadowed by the increase in the costs of executing market orders due to the larger percentage spreads. On balance, the uninformed investors' overall trading costs rise after stock splits.

Stock splits, market microstructure, information asymmetry, optimal tick size, trading range

Abstract:
Researchers are increasingly using data from the Nasdaq market to examine pricing behavior, market design, and other microstructure phenomena. The validity of any study that classifies trades as buys or sells depends on the accuracy of the classification method. Using a Nasdaq proprietary data set that identifies trade direction, we examine the validity of several trade classification algorithms. We find that the quote rule, the tick rule, and the Lee and Ready (1991) rule correctly classify 76.4%, 77.66%, and 81.05% of the trades, respectively. However, all classification rules have only a very limited success in classifying trades executed inside the quotes, introducing a bias in the accuracy of classifying large trades, trades during high volume periods, and ECN trades. We also find that extant algorithms do a mediocre job when used for calculating effective spreads. For Nasdaq trades, we propose a new and simple classification algorithm that improves over extant algorithms.

Abstract:
This paper investigates whether transparent markets can survive when faced with direct competition from less transparent markets. We first construct a game-theoretic model in which in equilibrium the low-transparency dealers capture early order flow, and use the resulting informational advantage to quote narrower spreads and earn more profits than their more transparent competitors. We then conduct a laboratory experiment that tests and supports all of these predictions. A second experiment shows that most dealers choose to be of lower transparency when they are allowed to do so. However, the informational advantage of low-transparency decreases as there are more such dealers, while the high-transparency dealers get increasing benefit from informed traders who attempt to broadcast deceptive trades. As a result, a small number of transparent dealers persist in our markets.

Market microstructure, experimental economics, stock market competition

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the effects of market value accounting (MVA) on loan maturity. The author shows that in the presence of asymmetric information MVA introduces a bias into asset valuation against longer-term illiquid assets. This bias increases interest rates for long-maturity loans and induces a shift to short-term self-liquidating loans. With the liquidity production of banks curtailed, borrowers may face "excessive" liquidation. The desirability of MVA applied to loans is thus questionable.

Abstract:
This study uses laboratory experiments to determine the effects of trade and quote disclosure on market efficiency, bid-ask spreads and trader welfare. We show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices, but also increases opening bid-ask spreads, apparently by reducing market makers' incentives to compete for order flow. As a result, trade disclosure benefits market makers at the expense of liquidity traders and informed traders. We find that quote disclosure has no discernible effects on market performance. Overall, our results demonstrate that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria and on trader and market maker welfare.

Abstract:
Emergence of new financial markets has led to fragmentation of order flows, leading to reduced liquidity in any particular market. Some markets are alleged to compete by focusing on "cream-skimming" of uninformed trades, leaving informed trades to established markets. We develop a test of this hypothesis, using a model of the stochastic process of trades. We use trade flow data for a sample of stocks on NYSE and an alternative site to estimate the information content of trades by trade site. The model is fit by maximum likelihood. We find differences in the information content of trades across sites. The difference is consistent with cream-skimming.

Abstract:
This paper investigates the informational role of transactions volume in options markets. We develop an asymmetric information model in which informed traders may trade in option or equity markets. We show conditions under which informed traders trade options, and we investigate the implications of this for the linkage between markets. Our model predicts an important informational role for the volume of particular types of option trades. We empirically test our model's hypotheses with intra-day option data. Our main empirical result is that negative and positive option volumes contain information about future stock prices.

Abstract:
This paper reviews and analyzes the legal and economic aspects of the duty of best execution. Although a well-established principle of securities trading, we show that the dual problems of definition and enforcement make best execution both unwieldy and unworkable as a mandated legal duty. We examine the impact of several market practices on best execution, in particular payment for order flow, preferencing and internalization practices, and price improvement and order execution protocols. We suggest three possible directions for the future rule and interpretation of the duty of best execution.

Abstract:
This paper investigates whether differences in information- based trading can explain observed differences in spreads for active and infrequently traded stocks. Using a new empirical technique, we estimate the risk of information- based trading for a sample of NYSE listed stocks. We use the information in trade data to determine how frequently new information occurs, the composition of trading when it does, and the depth of the market for different volume-decile stocks. Our most important empirical result is that the probability of information-based trading is lower for high volume stocks. Using regressions, we provide evidence of the economic importance of information-based trading on spreads.

Abstract:
Infrequently traded stocks tend to have higher bid-askspreads than frequently traded stocks. We use a new empirical technique to investigate the risk of information- based trading in active versus inactive stocks. We estimate the stochastic process of trades by maximum likelihood. Using a sample of NYSE stocks, we find that actively traded stocks have a much greater rate of uninformed trade. This suggests that the larger spreads are due at least in part to the higher risks associated with making a market in infrequently traded stocks.