Selected Entire List   Bernard, Mark   Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics  P.O. Box 6501  Sveavagen 65  S-113 83 Stockholm  Sweden  email address   SSRN's personal information usage policy Authors: If anything on this page requires updating or correction, please go to your SSRN User HeadQuarters and make the change.

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. Bernard, Mark's Scholarly Papers Click on the title of any column to sort the table by that column. Aggregate Statistics Total Downloads 49 Total Citations 0 Papers (1) Authors Date Downloads  (Rank) Citations ACTIONS:    Email Selected Abstracts    Export Selected Bibliographic Info    VIEW: Selected   Selected   Selected      Original List  Original List     All Versions  Hide All Versions     All Abstracts  Hide All Abstracts     Legend Legend close   eDocument is available from the SSRN eLibrary for free eDocument is available for a fee 1.   The Subgroup Problem: When Can Binding Voting on Extractions from a Common Resource Pool Overcome the Tragedy of the Commons? | Show Abstract Hide Abstract | Download | Working Paper Series Bernard, Mark Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics Dreber, Anna Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics Strimling, Pontus Stockholm University - Center for the Study of Cultural Evolution Eriksson, Kimmo Stockholm University - Center for the Study of Cultural Evolution Posted: 24 Mar 11 Last Revised: 10 Apr 13 49 (202,005)   common pool resource, voting, polycentricity, subgroups, cooperation Records 1 - 1 of 1 matches [ 1 ]

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