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Abstract:
Recent equity carve-outs in U.S. technology stocks appear to violate a basic premise of financial theory: identical assets have identical prices. In our 1998-2000 sample, holders of a share of company A are expected to receive x shares of company B, but the price of A is less than x times the price of B. A prominent example involves 3Com and Palm. Arbitrage does not eliminate this blatant mispricing due to short-sale constraints, so that B is overpriced but expensive or impossible to sell short. Evidence from options prices shows that shorting costs are extremely high, eliminating exploitable arbitrage opportunities.

Abstract:
Recent equity carve-outs in US technology stocks appear to violate a basic premise of financial theory: identical assets have identical prices. In our 1998-2000 sample, holders of a share of company A are expected to receive x shares of company B, but the price of A is less than x times the price of B. A prominent example involves 3Com and Palm. Arbitrage does not eliminate these blatant mispricing due to short sale constraints, so that B is overpriced but expensive or impossible to sell short. Evidence from options prices shows that shorting costs are extremely high, eliminating exploitable arbitrage opportunities.

Abstract:
Recently equity carve-outs in US technology stocks appear to violate a basic premise of financial theory: identical assets have identical prices. In our 1998-2000 sample, holders of a share of company A are expected to receive x shares of company B, but the price of A is less than x times the price of B. A prominent example involves 3Com and Palm. Arbitrage does not eliminate these blatant mispricing due to short sale constraints, so that B is overpriced but expensive or impossible to sell short. Evidence from options prices shows that shorting costs are extremely high, eliminating exploitable arbitrage opportunities.

Carve-out, mispricing, arbitrage, put-call parity, short-sale constraints

Abstract:
Stocks can be overpriced when short sale constraints bind. We study the costs of short selling equities, 1926 - 1933, using the publicly observable market for borrowing stock. Some stocks are sometimes expensive to short, and it appears that stocks enter the borrowing market when shorting demand is high. We find that stocks that are expensive to short or which enter the borrowing market have high valuations and low subsequent returns, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis. Size-adjusted returns are one to two percent lower per month for new entrants, and despite high costs it is profitable to short them.

mispricing, short selling, short-sale constraints, securities lending.

Abstract:
Does corporate diversification reduce shareholder value? Since firms endogenously choose to diversify, exogenous variation in diversification is necessary in order to draw inferences about the causal effect. We examine changes in the within-firm dispersion of industry investment, or "diversity." We find that exogenous changes in diversity, due to changes in industry investment, are negatively related to firm value. Thus diversification destroys value, consistent with the inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis. This finding is not caused by measurement error. We also find that exogenous changes in industry cash flow diversity are negative related to firm value.

Abstract:
Corporate events, such as new issues and new lists, appear in waves. These waves imply that the market portfolio has a time-varying weight in new lists, and one can decompose the market return into a fixed weight return plus a timing return. Most of the reduction in aggregate market returns caused by holding new lists comes from timing, not from average underperformance. When new lists are a high fraction of the market, subsequent returns for both new and old lists are low. A mean variance optimizing investor holding the market would be better off replacing holdings of new lists with old lists, t-bills, or even currency stuffed in a mattress.

Abstract:
Corporate events, such as new issues and new lists, appear in waves. These waves imply that the market portfolio has a time-varying weight in new lists, and one can decompose the market return into a fixed weight return plus a timing return. Most of the reduction in aggregate market returns caused by holding new lists comes from timing, not from average underperformance. When new lists are a high fraction of the market, subsequent returns for both new and old lists are low. A mean variance optimizing investor holding the market would be better off replacing holdings of new lists with old lists, t-bills, or even currency stuffed in a mattress.

Abstract:
An economic tracking portfolio is a portfolio of assets with returns that track an economic variable. Monthly returns on stocks and bonds are useful in forecasting post-war US output, consumption, labor income, inflation, stock returns, bond returns, and Treasury bill returns. These forecasting relationships define portfolios that track market expectations about future economic variables. Using tracking portfolio returns as instruments for future economic variables substantially raises the estimated sensitivity of asset prices to news about future economic variables. Out-of-sample results show that tracking portfolios are useful in forecasting macroeconomic variables and hedging economic risk.

Abstract:
An economic tracking portfolio is a portfolio of assets with returns that track an economic variable. Monthly returns on stocks and bonds are useful in forecasting post-war U.S. output, consumption, labor income, inflation, stock returns, bond returns, and Treasury bill returns. These forecasting relationships define portfolios that track market expectations about future economic variables. Using tracking portfolio returns as instruments for future economic variables substantially raises the estimated sensitivity of asset prices to news about future economic variables. Out-of-sample results show that tracking portfolios are useful in forecasting macroeconomic variables and hedging economic risk.

Abstract:
We test whether the impact of financial constraints on firm value is observable in asset" returns. We form portfolios of firms based on observable characteristics related to financial" constraints, and test for common covariation in the stock returns of these firms. Using several" different measures of financial constraints, we find that financially constrained firms' stock" returns move together over time. This financial constraint factor in stock returns is related to not well explained by, other empirically identified factors in asset returns. Constrained firms" have remarkably low returns in our sample period of 1968-1995, both unconditionally and in the" context of empirical asset pricing models. Financial constraint returns help explain returns" following initial public offerings and dividend omissions. We find only limited support for the" hypothesis that the relative performance of financially constrained firms reflects monetary" policy, credit conditions, and business cycles.

Abstract:
We test whether the impact of financial constraints on firm value is observable in asset returns. We form portfolios of firms based on observable characteristics related to financial constraints, and test for common variation in the stock returns of these firms. Financially constrained firms' stock returns move together over time. Constrained firms have low returns in our sample of growing manufacturing firms in 1968-1997. We find little evidence that the relative performance of financially constrained firms reflects monetary policy, credit conditions, or business cycles.

Abstract:
We test whether the impact of financial constraints on firm value is observable in asset returns. We form portfolios of firms based on observable characteristics related to financial constraints, and test for common variation in the stock returns of these firms. Financially constrained firms? stock returns move together over time. Constrained firms have low returns in our sample of growing manufacturing firms in 1968-1997. We find little evidence that the relative performance of financially constrained firms reflects monetary policy, credit conditions, or business cycles.

Abstract:
Diversified firms have different values than comparable portfolios of single-segment firms. These value differences must be due to differences in either future cash flows or future returns. Expected security returns on diversified firms vary systematically with relative value. Discount firms have significantly higher subsequent returns than premium firms. Slightly more than half of the cross-sectional variation in excess values is due to variation in expected future cash flows, with the remainder due to variation in expected future returns and to covariation between cash flow and returns.

Abstract:
Diversified firms have different values than comparable portfolios of single-segment firms. These value differences must be due to differences in either future cash flows or future returns. Expected security returns on diversified firms vary systematically with relative value. Discount firms have significantly higher subsequent returns than premium firms. Slightly more than half of the cross-sectional variation in excess values is due to variation in expected future cash flows, with the remainder due to variation in expected future returns and to covariation between cash flows and returns.

Abstract:
I study battles between short sellers and firms. Firms use a variety of methods to impede short selling, including legal threats, investigations, lawsuits, and various technical actions intended to create a short squeeze. These actions create short sale constraints. Consistent with the hypothesis that short sale constraints allow stocks to be overpriced, firms taking anti-shorting actions have in the subsequent year very low abnormal returns of about -2 percent per month.

mispricing, short selling, short-sale constraints

Abstract:
Capital expenditure plans at the beginning of the year, from a US government survey of firms, explain more than three quarters of the variation in real annual aggregate investment growth between 1948 and 1993. The negative correlation of contemporaneous investment and stock returns is explained by the negative correlation of planned investment and subsequent stock returns. Unexpected revisions to aggregate investment (actual minus plan) within a year are essentially unrelated to current stock returns, and positively related to current profits. Revisions to industry investment are positively related to industry-specific stock returns and to aggregate profits.

Abstract:
Capital expenditure plans at the beginning of the year, from a US government survey of firms, explain more than three quarters of the variation in real annual aggregate investment growth between 1948 and 1993. The negative correlation of contemporaneous investment and stock returns is explained by the negative correlation of planned investment and subsequent stock returns. Unexpected revisions to aggregate investment (actual minus plan) within a year are essentially unrelated to current stock returns, and positively related to current profits. Revisions to industry investment are positively related to industry-specific stock returns and to aggregate profits.

Abstract:
We examine some basic data on the evolution of aggregate short interest, both during the dot-com era, and at other times in history. Total short interest moves in a countercyclical fashion. For example, short interest in NASDAQ stocks actually declines as the NASDAQ index approaches its peak. Moreover, this decline does not seem to reflect a substitution away from outright short-selling and towards put options, as the ratio of put-to-call volume displays the same countercyclical tendency. The evidence suggests that: i) arbitrageurs are reluctant to bet against aggregate mispricings; and ii) short-selling does not play a particularly helpful role in stabilizing the overall stock market.

Abstract:
We examine some basic data on the evolution of aggregate short interest, both during the dot-com era, and at other times in history. Total short interest moves in a countercyclical fashion. For example, short interest in NASDAQ stocks actually declines as the NASDAQ index approaches its peak. Moreover, this decline does not seem to reflect a substitution away from outright short-selling and towards put options, as the ratio of put-to-call volume displays the same countercyclical tendency. The evidence suggests that: i) arbitrageurs are reluctant to bet against aggregate mispricings; and ii) short-selling does not play a particularly helpful role in stabilizing the overall stock market.

Abstract:
In this paper, we use city-level data to analyze the relationship between homeowner borrowing patterns and house-price dynamics. Our principal finding is that in cities where homeowners are more leveraged--i.e., have higher loan-to-value ratios--house prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks, such as changes in per-capita income. This finding is consistent with recent theories which emphasize the role of collateralized borrowing in shaping the behavior of asset prices.

Abstract:
We use city-level data to analyze the relationship between homeowner borrowing patterns and house-price dynamics. Our principal finding is that in cities where a greater fraction of homeowners are highly leveraged-- i.e., have high loan-to-value ratios--house prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks, such as changes in per-capita income. This finding is consistent with recent theories that emphasize the role of borrowing in shaping the behavior of asset prices.

Abstract:
We use city-level data to analyze the relationship between homeowner borrowing patterns and house-price dynamics. Our principal finding is that in cities where a greater fraction of homeowners are highly leveraged--i.e., have high loan-to-value ratios--house prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks, such as changes in per-capita income. This finding is consistent with recent theories which emphasize the role of borrowing in shaping the behavior of asset prices.

Abstract:
We document that net equity issuance is considerably more sensitive to aggregate stock returns and Q's than to firm-level stock returns and Q's. Very similar patterns also emerge when we look at merger activity. In light of earlier work (Campbell 1991, Vuolteenaho 2002) which finds that aggregate stock returns are less informative about future cashflows than are firm-level stock returns--and thus, potentially more strongly influenced by investor sentiment--these results suggest that both equity issuance and mergers are to a significant extent driven by market-timing considerations, as opposed to by purely fundamental factors.

Abstract:
We document that net equity issuance is considerably more sensitive to aggregate stock returns and Q's than to firm-level stock returns and Q's. Very similar patterns also emerge when we look at merger activity. In light of earlier work (Campbell 1991, Vuolteenaho 2002) which finds that aggregate stock returns are less informative about future cashflows than are firm-level stock returns - and thus, potentially more strongly influenced by investor sentiment - these results suggest that both equity issuance and mergers are to a significant extent driven by market-timing considerations, as opposed to by purely fundamental factors.

Investor sentiment, equity issues, mergers

Abstract:
We use mutual fund flows as a measure for individual investor sentiment for different stocks, and find that high sentiment predicts low future returns at long horizons. Fund flows are dumb money - by reallocating across different mutual funds, retail investors reduce their wealth in the long run. This dumb money effect is strongly related to the value effect. High sentiment also is associated high corporate issuance, interpretable as companies increasing the supply of shares in response to investor demand.

Abstract:
I study battles between short sellers and firms. Firms use a variety of methods to impede short selling, including legal threats, investigations, lawsuits, and various technical actions intended to create a short squeeze. These actions create short sale constraints. Consistent with the hypothesis that short sale constraints allow stocks to be overpriced, firms taking anti-shorting actions have in the subsequent year very low abnormal returns of about -2 percent per month.

Abstract:
On average, stock prices rise around scheduled earnings announcement dates. We show that this earnings announcement premium is large, robust, and strongly related to the fact that volume surges around announcement dates. Stocks with high past announcement period volume earn the highest announcement premium, suggesting some common underlying cause for both volume and the premium. We show that high premium stocks experience the highest levels of imputed small investor buying, suggesting that the premium is driven by buying by small investors when the announcement catches their attention.

Abstract:
Stocks can be overpriced when short sale constraints bind. We study the costs of short selling equities, 1926-1933, using the publicly observable market for borrowing stock. Some stocks are sometimes expensive to short, and it appears that stocks enter the borrowing market when shorting demand is high. We find that stocks that are expensive to short or which enter the borrowing market have high valuations and low subsequent returns, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis. Size-adjusted returns are one to two percent lower per month for new entrants, and despite high costs it is profitable to short them.

Abstract:
The aggregate dividend payout ratio forecasts aggregate excess returns on both stocks and corporate bonds in post-war US data. Both high corporate profits and high stock prices forecast low excess returns on equities. When the payout ratio is high, expected returns are high. The payout ratio's correlation with business conditions gives it predictive power for returns; it contains information about future stock and bond returns that is not captured by other variables. The payout ratio is useful because it captures the temporary components of earnings. The dynamic relationship between dividends, earnings and stock prices shows that a positive innovation in earnings lowers expected returns in the near future, but raises them thereafter.

Abstract:
Using data from the 1986 oil price decrease, I examine the capital expenditures of non-oil subsidiaries of oil companies. I test the joint hypothesis that 1) a decrease in cash/collateral decreases investment, holding fixed the profitability of investment, and 2) the finance costs of different parts of the same corporation are interdependent. The results support this joint hypothesis: oil companies significantly reduced their non-oil investment compared to the median industry investment. The 1986 decline in investment was concentrated in non-oil units that were subsidized by the rest of the company in 1985.

Abstract:
Using data from the 1986 oil price decrease, I examine the capital expenditures of non-oil subsidiaries of oil companies. I test the joint hypothesis that 1) a decrease in cash/collateral decreases investment, holding fixed the profitability of investment, and 2) the finance costs of different parts of the same corporation are interdependent. The results support this joint hypothesis: oil companies significantly reduced their non-oil investment compared to the median industry investment. The 1986 decline in investment was concentrated in non-oil units that were subsidized by the rest of the company in 1985.

Abstract:
Using data from the 1986 oil price decrease, I examine the capital expenditures of non-oil subsidiaries of oil companies. I test the joint hypothesis that 1) a decrease in cash/collateral decreases investment, holding fixed the profitability of investment, and 2) the finance costs of different parts of the same corporation are interdependent. The results support this joint hypothesis: oil companies significantly reduced their non-oil investment compared to the median industry investment. The 1986 decline in investment was concentrated in non-oil units that were subsidized by the rest of the company in 1985.

Abstract:
We examine the reaction of daily bond prices to the release of government macroeconomic news. These news releases are of interest because they are released on periodic, preannounced dates and because they cause substantial bond market volatility. The news component of volatility is not positively autocorrelated on these dates, since the news is released at a specific moment in time. We find that (1) expected returns on the short end of the bond market are significantly higher on these announcement dates, and (2) the persistence pattern of daily volatility is quite different around these days.

Abstract:
We provide a model of closed-end fund pricing which includes investors who do not form expectations correctly and allows for salient country-specific news to affect this expectation formation process. We use panel data on prices and net asset values of closed- end country funds to examine investor reaction to news that affects fundamentals, and measure the response of the idiosyncratic change in fund prices to the idiosyncratic change in fund asset values. In a typical week, US prices underreact to changes in foreign fundamentals; the (short-run) elasticity of price with respect to asset value is significantly less than one. In weeks with major news (relevant to the specific country) appearing on the front page of The New York Times, prices react much more to fundamentals; the elasticity of price with respect to asset value is closer to one. These results are roughly consistent with the hypothesis that major news events lead some investors who normally lag behind in updating their expectations to temporarily react more quickly.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
In the presence of principal-agent problems, published macroeconomic forecasts by professional economists may not measure expectations. Forecasters may use their forecasts in order to manipulate beliefs about their ability. I test a cross-sectional implication of models of reputation and information-revelation. I find that as forecasters become older and more established, they produce more radical forecasts. Since these more radical forecasts are in general less accurate, ex post forecast accuracy grows significantly worse as forecasters become older and more established. These findings indicate that reputational factors are at work in professional macroeconomic forecasts.

Abstract:
We test whether the time-series positive correlation of inflation and intermarket relative price variability is also present in a cross-section of US cities. We find this correlation to be a robust empirical regularity: cities which have higher than average inflation also have higher than average relative price dispersion, ceteris paribus. This result holds for different periods of time, different classes of goods, and across different time horizons. Our results suggest that at least part of the relationship between inflation and relative price variability cannot be explained by monetary factors.

Abstract:
I count the number of times per month that the word `shortage` appears on the front page of The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times for the period 1969-1994. Using this as a general measure of shortages in the US economy, I test whether shortages help predict inflation. Using a variety of different specifications, I find that this time-series measure of shortages strongly predicts inflation, and contains information not captured by commodity prices, monetary aggregates, interest rates, and other proposed predictors of inflation. This suggests that disequilibrium was an important part of the adjustment of prices to macroeconomic shocks during this period.

Abstract:
We test whether the time-series positive correlation of inflation and intermarket relative price variability is also present in a cross section of U.S. cities. We find this correlation to be a robust empirical regularity: cities that have higher than average inflation also have higher than average relative price dispersion, ceteris paribus. This result holds for different periods of time, for different classes of goods, and across different time horizons. Our results suggest that at least part of the relationship between inflation and relative price variability cannot be explained by monetary factors.