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Abstract: This paper reports on the latest update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project, covering 212 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2006: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. This latest set of aggregate indicators, are based on hundreds of specific and disaggregated individual variables measuring various dimensions of governance, taken from 33 data sources provided by 30 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents worldwide. We also explicitly report the margins of error accompanying each country estimate. These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring governance using any kind of data. We find that even after taking margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-country comparisons as well as monitoring progress over time. In less than a decade, a substantial number of countries exhibit statistically significant improvements in at least one dimension of governance, while other countries exhibit deterioration in some dimensions.
governance, indicators, voice, accountability, corruption, rule of law, government, margins of error, millennium challenge account, political stability, transparency
Abstract: This paper reports on the latest update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project, covering 212 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2007: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The latest aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of specific and disaggregated individual variables measuring various dimensions of governance, taken from 35 data sources provided by 32 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents worldwide. We also explicitly report the margins of error accompanying each country estimate. These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring governance using any kind of data. We also briefly describe the evolution of the WGI since its inception, and show that the margins of error on the aggregate governance indicators have declined over the years, even though they still remain non-trivial. We find that even after taking margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-country comparisons as well as monitoring progress over time. In less than a decade, a substantial number of countries exhibit statistically significant improvements in at least one dimension of governance, while other countries exhibit deterioration in some dimensions.
Governance, corruption, rule of law, indicators, voice
Abstract: This paper reports on the 2009 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project, covering 212 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2008: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of specific and disaggregated individual variables measuring various dimensions of governance, taken from 35 data sources provided by 33 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents worldwide. We also explicitly report the margins of error accompanying each country estimate. These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring governance using any kind of data. We find that even after taking margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-country comparisons as well as monitoring progress over time.
Abstract: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi present estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different organizations. The authors assign these individual measures of governance to categories capturing key dimensions of governance and use an unobserved components model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods. They present the point estimates of the dimensions of governance as well as the margins of errors for each country for the four periods. The governance indicators reported here are an update and expansion of previous research work on indicators initiated in 1998 (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999a, b and 2002). The authors also address various methodological issues, including the interpretation and use of the data given the estimated margins of errors. This paper - a joint product of the Global Governance Department, World Bank Institute, and Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to generate and analyze worldwide governance indicators, and to assess the causes and consequences of governance.
Abstract: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi present the newly updated estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 209 countries and territories for five time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations. The authors assign these individual measures of governance to categories capturing key dimensions of governance, and use an unobserved component model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods. They present the point estimates of the dimensions of governance as well as the margins of error for each country for the four periods. These margins of error are not unique to perceptions-based measures of governance, but are an important feature of all efforts to measure governance, including objective indicators. In fact, the authors provide examples of how individual objective measures provide an incomplete picture of even the quite particular dimensions of governance that they are intended to measure. The paper also analyzes in some detail changes over time in our estimates of governance; provide a framework for assessing the statistical significance of changes in governance; and suggest a simple rule of thumb for identifying statistically significant changes in country governance over time. The ability to identify significant changes in governance over time is much higher for our aggregate indicators than for any individual indicator. While they find that the quality of governance in a number of countries has changed significantly (in both directions), the authors also provide evidence suggesting that there are no trends, for better or worse, in global averages of governance. Finally, the authors interpret the strong observed correlation between income and governance, and argue against recent efforts to apply a discount to governance performance in low income countries.
Abstract: In a decade of transition, fear of a leviathan state is giving way to increased focus on oligarchs who "capture the state." In the capture economy, the policy and legal environment is shaped to the captor firm`s huge advantage, at the expense of the rest of the enterprise sector. This has major implications for policy. The main challenge of the transition has been to redefine how the state interacts with firms, but little attention has been paid to the flip side of the relationship: how firms influence the state-especially how they exert influence on and collude with public officials to extract advantages. Some firms in transition economies have been able to shape the rules of the game to their own advantage, at considerable social cost, creating what Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann call a "capture economy" in many countries. In the capture economy, public officials and politicians privately sell underprovided public goods and a range of rent-generating advantages "a la carte" to individual firms. The authors empirically investigate the dynamics of the capture economy on the basis of new firm-level data from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which permits the unbundling of corruption into meaningful and measurable components. They contrast state capture (firms shaping and affecting formulation of the rules of the game through private payments to public officials and politicians) with influence (doing the same without recourse to payments) and with administrative corruption ("petty" forms of bribery in connection with the implementation of laws, rules, and regulations). They develop economywide measures for these phenomena, which are then subject to empirical measurement utilizing the BEEPS data. State capture, influence, and administrative corruption are all shown to have distinct causes and consequences. Large incumbent firms with formal ties to the state tend to inherit influence as a legacy of the past and tend to enjoy more secure property and contractual rights and higher growth rates. To compete against these influential incumbents, new entrants turn to state capture as a strategic choice-not as a substitute for innovation but to compensate for weaknesses in the legal and regulatory framework. When the state underprovides the public goods needed for entry and competition, "captor" firms purchase directly from the state such private benefits as secure property rights and removal of obstacles to improved performance-but only in a capture economy. Consistent with empirical findings in previous research on petty corruption, administrative corruption-unlike both capture and influence-is not associated with specific benefits for the firm. The focus of reform should be shifted toward channeling firms' strategies in the direction of more legitimate forms of influence, involving societal "voice," transparency reform, political accountability, and economic competition. Where state capture has distorted reform to create (or preserve) monopolistic structures supported by powerful political interests, the challenge is particularly daunting. This paper - a product of the Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division, World Bank Institute; the Public Sector Group, Europe and Central Asia Region; and the Office of the Chief Economist, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development - is part of an empirical project on governance in transition. For an electronic version of this paper and related research papers and governance data, visit www.worldbank/wbi/governance/. The authors may be contacted at jhellman@worldbank.org or dkaufmann@worldbank.org.
Abstract: Six new aggregate measures capturing various dimensions of governance provide new evidence of a strong causal relationship from better governance to better development outcomes. In a cross-section of more than 150 countries, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton provide new empirical evidence of a strong causal relationship from better governance to better development outcomes. They base their analysis on a new database containing more than 300 governance indicators compiled from a variety of sources. They provide a detailed description of each of these indicators and sources. Using an unobserved components methodology (described in the companion paper by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, Aggregating Governance Indicators, Policy Research Working Paper 2195), they then construct six aggregate indicators corresponding to six basic governance concepts: voice and accountability, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and graft. As measured by these indicators, governance matters for development outcomes. This paper - a joint product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group; and Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to study the causes and consequences of governance for development. The authors may be contacted at dkaufmann@worldbank.org, akraay@worldbank.org, or pzoidolobaton@worldbank.org.
Abstract: The authors report on the latest version of the worldwide governance indicators, covering 213 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance from 1996 until end-2005: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The latest indicators are based on hundreds of variables and reflect the views of thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents and experts worldwide. Although global averages of governance display no marked trends during 1996-2005, nearly one-third of countries exhibit significant changes [for better or for worse]on at least one dimension of governance. Three new features distinguish this update. (1) The authors have moved to annual reporting of governance estimates. This update includes new governance estimates for 2003 and 2005, as well as minor backward revisions to biannual historical data for 1996-2004. (2) The authors are, for the first time, publishing the individual measures of governance from virtually every data source underlying the aggregate governance indicators. The ready availability of the individual data sources underlying the aggregate governance indicators is aimed at further enhancing the transparency of the methodology and of the resulting aggregate indicators, as well as helping data users and policymakers identify specific governance challenges in individual countries. (3) The authors present new evidence on the reliability of expert assessments of governance which, alongside survey responses, form part of the aggregate measures of governance.
Governance Indicators, National Governance, Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance, Statistical&Mathematical Sciences, Scientific Research & Science Parks
Abstract: Updated governance indicators report estimates of six dimensions of governance for 175 countries in 2000-01. They can be compared with those constructed for 1997-98. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton construct aggregate governance indicators for six dimensions of governance, covering 175 countries in 2000-01. They apply the methodology developed in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton ("Aggregating Governance Indicators," Policy Research Working Paper 2195, and "Governance Matters," Policy Research Working Paper 2196, October 1999) to newly available data to arrive at governance indicators comparable with those constructed for 1997-98. The data is presented in the appendix, and accessible through an interactive Web-interface at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2001.htm. This paper - a joint product of the Development Research Group and the Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to develop and analyze governance research indicators and trends worldwide. For access to the data and related papers, visit http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters2001.htm. The authors may be contacted at dkaufmann@worldbank.org or akraay@worldbank.org.
Abstract: It is well known that there is a strong positive correlation between per capita incomes and the quality of governance across countries. Kaufmann and Kraay propose an empirical strategy that allows separation of this correlation into (1) a strong positive causal effect running from better governance to higher per capita incomes, and, perhaps surprisingly at first, (2) a weak and even negative causal effect running in the opposite direction from per capita incomes to governance. The first result confirms existing evidence on the importance of good governance for economic development. The second result is new and suggests the absence of a "virtuous circle" in which higher incomes lead to further improvements in governance. This motivates the authors' choice of title, "Growth Without Governance." They document this evidence using a newly updated set of worldwide governance-indicators covering 175 countries for the period 2000-01, and use the results to interpret the relationship between incomes and governance focusing on the Latin America and Caribbean region—within a worldwide empirical context. Finally, the authors speculate about the potential importance of elite influence and state capture in accounting for the surprising negative effects of per capita incomes on governance, present some evidence on such capture in some Latin American countries, and suggest priorities for actions to improve governance when such pernicious elite influence shapes public policy. This paper - a joint product of the World Bank Institute and the Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to generate and analyze worldwide governance indicators, assessing the manifestations and consequences of governance.
Abstract: Traditionally, national governance and corruption challenges have been seen as: i) particularly daunting in the poorer countries, with the richer world viewed as exemplary; ii) anchored within a legalistic framework and focused on formal institutions, iii) a challenge within public sectors, and, iv) divorced from global governance or security issues - seen as separate fields. Through an empirical approach based on the analysis of the 2004 survey of enterprises by the World Economic Forum, we challenge these notions and portray a more complex reality. We suggest that the undue emphasis on narrow legalism has obscured more subtle yet costly manifestations of misgovernance, which afflict rich countries as well. Emphasis is also given to measurement and analysis of misgovernance when the rules of the game have been captured by the elite through undue influence. We construct a new set of ethics indices, encompassing forms of (legal) corruption not subject to measurement in conventional (illegal) corruption indicators. It is found that manifestations of legal corruption may be more prevalent than illegal forms, such as outright bribery, and particularly so in richer countries. Further, we find that governance constraints, and corruption in particular, is a key determinant of a country's global competitiveness. These findings challenge traditional notions of what constitutes the country's 'investment climate', and who shapes it. It is also found that illegal forms of corruption continue to be prevalent in the interaction between transnationals of the rich world and the public sectors in many emerging countries. Finally, we suggest an empirical link between governance and security issues.
Corruption, governance, security, development, ethics, indicators
Abstract: In recent years, the growing interest of academics and policymakers in governance has been reflected in the proliferation cross-country indices measuring various aspects of governance. In this paper we explain how a simple variant of an unobserved components model can be used to combine the information from these different sources into aggregate governance indicators. The main advantage of this method is that it allows us to quantify the precision of the both individual sources of governance data as well as the aggregate governance indicators. We will illustrate the methodology by constructing aggregate indicators of bureaucratic quality, rule of law, and graft, for a large sample of 160 countries. Although these aggregate governance indicators are more informative about the level of governance than any individual indicator, the standard errors associated with estimates of governance are still large relative to the units in which governance is measured.
Abstract: Recent studies have focussed on the characteristics and policies of the state to explain the extent and causes of corruption, with little attention paid to the role played by firms. Consequently, the links between corporate governance and national governance have been unexplored. This paper summarises the results of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) across 20 transition economies, providing an assessment of governance and corruption from the perspective of firms. The BEEPS is part of the global World Business Environment Survey being carried out by the World Bank. The survey design permits an in-depth empirical analysis of governance and corruption, unbundling governance into its component dimensions. This allows a more detailed quantitative assessment of corruption, a more nuanced understanding of the causes of the problem and as a result a stronger foundation for policy advice. Particular attention is paid to 'state capture' by parts of the corporate sector (i.e. the propensity of firms to shape the underlying 'rules of the game' including 'purchase' of legislation and court decisions). The survey also provides measures of other dimensions of 'grand corruption', such as that related to public procurement. Typically, cross-country surveys suffer from a potential bias if firms have a tendency to systematically over- or under-estimate the extent of problems in their own country. We implement a simple method for evaluating the extent of this 'country perception bias' and find little evidence pointing to such bias in the BEEPS.
Governance, corruption, state capture, transition economies
Abstract: We review key issues in worldwide governance and present the latest findings related to empirical measurement in this field. We focus on key governance components, such as rule of law, voice and accountability, corruption control, and state capture by region and for selected countries. The recent evidence suggests a rather sobering picture: Scant progress in improving rule of law and governance, controlling corruption, and improving institutional quality worldwide is apparent, with clear variance across countries. Further, the empirical analysis points to the private sector as influencing public governance, thereby challenging traditional notions of the functioning of politicians, public policy and the public sector, and the key determinants of the investment climate. These argue for revisiting conventional approaches to promote institutional reform. In particular, we challenge the effectiveness of passing laws by fiat, creating new public institutions and anti-corruption 'campaigns', as well as traditional approaches to public sector management and legal/judiciary reform (often 'Western' transplants) in many emerging markets. We argue instead for greater external accountability, with a larger role for i) transparency mechanisms; ii) empirically-based monitoring tools; and, iii) 'voice' and incentive-driven approaches to provide checks and balances on traditional public institutions, empower non-traditional stakeholders, ameliorate state capture, and level the unequal 'influence' playing field. This calls for deeper examination of the private-public governance nexus and we make specific recommendations regarding governance strategies for the next phase.
governance, empirical analysis, corruption, rule of law, accountability, state capture, public policy, public sector management, transparency, indicators
Abstract: In this sample of 49 Latin American, OECD, and transition economies, it is the ineffective and discretionary administration of tax and regulatory regimes--not higher tax rates alone--as well as corruption, that increases the size of the unofficial economy. And countries with a larger unofficial economy tend to grow more slowly. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) found that, in post-communist economies, the unofficial economy's share of GDP is determined by the extent of control rights held by bureaucrats and politicians. Exploring in detail the role of taxation and bribery, and using data from an expanded data set of 49 Latin American, OECD, and transition economies, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of GDP where there is great bureaucratic inefficiency and discretion, and where firms experience a greater tax and regulatory burden, as well as more bribery and corruption. The unofficial economy is also much larger where there is less state revenue and where the rule of law is weak. They also find that countries with a larger unofficial economy tend to grow more slowly. Thus, this framework suggests an additional channel whereby corruption and ineffective regulatory and tax administration can result in lower growth: the unofficial economy. Wealthy OECD economies and some Eastern European economies find themselves in the "good equilibrium" of relatively low regulatory and tax burden (not necessarily low statutory tax rates), sizable revenue mobilization, good rule of law and control of corruption, and a small unofficial economy. Several countries in Latin America and the former Soviet Union exhibit characteristics consistent with a "bad equilibrium": the discretionary application of heavy regulatory and tax burdens, the weak rule of law, heavy bribery, and an active unofficial economy. In this large country sample (unlike in the earlier framework for transition economies only), the authors find that it is the ineffective and discretionary application of regulatory and tax regimes in many countries--not higher tax rates by itself--that increase the size of the unofficial economy. The tax burden reported by firms appears to be more a function of regulatory and bureaucratic inefficiency and discretion rather than of tax rates alone. This paper - a product of the Governance, Regulation, and Finance Group, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to improve our understanding of institutional issues and their effects on development and of building a major new database on institutional indicators.
Abstract: The study of transparency is increasingly a more topical, broadly relevant, but also more under-researched enterprise. The Asian financial crisis has highlighted not only the welfare consequences of financial sector transparency, sparking a series of yet unresolved debates, but has also linked this relatively narrow problem to the broader context of transparency in governance. Its significance has broadened geographically as well as across different sectors. It has been observed that curtailment of transparency, often on scanty pretexts, is commonplace even in the highly developed countries. This suggests a broad and possibly radical reform agenda. Departing from the urgency of these observations, this paper reviews the existing literature on transparency in finance and governance, indicates remaining knowledge gaps, and offers some hypothesis on the mutual significance of the two issues.
financial liberalization, transparency, corruption, governance, banking crisis, asymmetric information, local investors, shocks, bad loans, emerging markets
Abstract: A number of popular notions and outright myths on governance and corruption are addressed in this chapter. We distinguish clearly between governance and anti-corruption, while probing the links between both notions. In so doing we challenge the conventional definition of corruption as being too narrow, legalistic and unduly focused on the public sector, while underplaying the role of the private sector. We then challenge the notion that governance and corruption cannot be measured, showcasing the latest worldwide governance indicators, measuring six dimensions of governance and cover over 200 countries, based on multiple sources, including the EOS. Thanks to these governance indicators and related datasets, it has been possible to study the extent to which governance and anticorruption matters. Consistent with the adage that 'sunlight is the best disinfectant', the potential gains of embarking on a transparency reform strategy is given particular prominence in this chapter, and a detailed 12-point 'scorecard' for countries to rate themselves in terms of the implementation of concrete transparency measures is presented. The chapter then concludes with a call for a global compact on governance and anti-corruption, where the G-8 and other rich countries, the multinationals, IFIs, civil society and the government leadership in the emerging economies share responsibility in making concerted progress.
corruption, transparency, governance
Abstract: Based on the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) of firms in transition countries, which unbundles corruption to measure different types of corrupt transactions and provide detailed information on the characteristics and performance of firms, we find that: i) corruption reduces FDI inflows and attracts lower quality investment in terms of governance standards; ii) in misgoverned settings, FDI firms may magnify the problems of state capture and procurement kickbacks, while paying a lower overall bribe burden than domestic firms; iii) FDI firms undertake those forms of corruption that suit their comparative advantages, generating substantial gains for them and challenging the premise that they are coerced, which makes it difficult to develop effective constraints on such behavior; and, iv) transnational legal restrictions to prevent bribery had not led to higher standards of corporate conduct among foreign investors by the year 2000. Rather than being construed as a case against foreign investment; we argue that state capture is created and maintained through restrictions on competition and entry in strategic sectors. Thus, enhancing competition by attracting a wider, more diverse set of FDI firms is critical to the broader strategic framework of fighting state capture and corruption.
foreign direct investment, FDI, kickbacks, state capture, bribery, corporate governance, corruption, governance, transition economies
Abstract: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, reporting estimates of six dimensions of governance for over 200 countries between 1996 and 2005, have become widely used among policymakers and academics. They have also attracted some explicit written criticisms. In this short paper the authors synthesize 11 critiques offered by four recent papers. They then refute them as either conceptually incorrect or empirically unsubstantiated.
Governance Indicators, National Governance, Statistical & Mathematical Sciences, Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance, Public Sector Corruption & Anticorruption Measures
Abstract: This paper develops a proxy measure of the inequality of influence on the basis of survey evidence from 2002 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted among 6,500 firms in 27 transition countries. We refer to the resulting inequality as crony bias in the political system that can be measured at both the firm and country level. We examine the impact of crony bias at both the firm and country levels on three indicators of institutional subversion: 1) perceptions of and interaction with courts; 2) security of property rights; 3) tax compliance; and 4) bribery. We find a consistent pattern in which the inequality of influence has a strongly negative impact on assessments of public institutions that ultimately affects the behavior of firms towards those institutions. Crony bias at both the firm and the country levels is associated with a significantly more negative assessment of the fairness and impartiality of courts and the enforceability of court decisions. Further, firms that report crony bias are significantly less likely to use courts to resolve business disputes. Such firms are shown to have less secure property rights than more influential firms. We also find that crony bias is associated with lower levels of tax compliance and significantly higher levels of bribery. The evidence suggests that the inequality of influence not only damages the credibility of institutions among weak firms, but affects the likelihood that they will use and provide tax resources to support such institutions. By withholding tax revenues, paying bribes, and avoiding courts, these firms ensure that such state institutions are likely to remain weak and subject to capture by the more influential. The inequality of influence thus appears to generate a self-reinforcing dynamic in which institutions are subverted further strengthening the underlying political and economic inequalities.
transition economies, crony bias, bribery, corruption, governance, tax compliance, courts, property rights, public institutions
Abstract: Across 69 countries, higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity. Entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. Dodging the Grabbing Hand in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total GDP. As a result, corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates.
Abstract: Lack of transparency increases the probability of a banking crisis following financial liberalization. In a country where government policy is not transparent, banks may tend to increase credit above the optimal level. Mehrez and Kaufmann investigate how transparency affects the probability of a financial crisis. They construct a model in which banks cannot distinguish between aggregate shocks and government policy, on the one hand, and firms' quality, on the other. Banks may therefore overestimate firms' returns and increase credit above the level that would be optimal given the firms' returns. Once banks discover their large exposure, they are likely to roll over loans rather than declare their losses. This delays the crisis but increases its magnitude. The empirical evidence, based on data for 56 countries in 1977-97, supports this theoretical model. The authors find that lack of transparency increases the probability of a crisis following financial liberalization. This implies that countries should focus on increasing transparency of economic activity and government policy, as well as increasing transparency in the financial sector, particularly during a period of transition such as financial liberalization. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to research governance and transparency and apply the findings in learning and operational programs. (For details, visit www.worldbank.org/wbi/gac.) The authors may be contacted at gmehrez@worldbank.org or dkaufmann@worldbank.org.
Abstract: This chapter summarizes the salient results of the World Business Environment Survey (WBES). It shows that important dimensions of the climate for business operation and investment can be measured, analyzed, and compared across countries, and that governance is key to the business environment and investment climate. The survey findings suggest that key policy, institutional, and governance indicators affect the growth of a firm's sales and investment and the extent to which firms operate in the unofficial economy. Further, the paper provides empirical support for some commonly held notions, while challenging others. It suggests a link between taxation, financing, and corruption on the one hand, and growth and investment on the other, and it highlights the costs to economies where the state is captured by a narrow set of private interests.
Business Environment , Survey, Business Constraints, Private Sector Development, Investment Climate, Governance, Corruption, Capture
Abstract: We challenge the conventional definition of corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain, making a distinction between legal and illegal forms of corruption, and paying more attention to corporate patterns of corruption (which also affect public corruption). We undertake to identify general determinants of the pattern of legal and illegal corruption worldwide, and present a model where both corruption (modeled explicitly in the context of allocations) and the political equilibrium are endogenous. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified as a function of basic parameters, namely initial conditions (assets/productivity), equality, and fundamental political accountability. These equilibria are: i) an illegal corruption equilibrium, where the political elite does not face binding incentives; ii) a legal corruption equilibrium, where the political elite is obliged to incur on a cost to deceive the population; and iii) a no-corruption equilibrium, where the population cannot be deceived. An integral empirical test of the model is performed, using a broad range of variables and sources. Its core variables, namely regarding legal corruption (and other manifestations of corporate corruption) come from an original survey developed with the World Economic Forum (in the Executive Opinion Survey 2004 of the Global Competitiveness Report). The empirical results generally validate the model and explanations. Some salient implications emerge.
Corruption, Lobbying, Influence, Political Economy
Abstract: Drawing on an in-depth governance micro-survey of public officials within a country, we address empirically the question of the relative importance of the various determinants of governance. We investigate the causes of poor governance, and show that commonly made inferences about policy based on simple correlation can be highly misleading, because the high correlation between the various governance (and public sector management) determinants, as well as the endogeneity in these variables. We find that undue emphasis may have been given in previous work to a number of conventional public sector management variables (such as civil servant wages, internal enforcement of rules, autonomy of agency by fiat, etc.), while undermining the priority due to more 'external' (to public sector management) variables, such as external voice, transparency, and politicization. The latter set of 'voice'-related variables has larger affect on the quality of service and corruption than the more traditional public sector management type of variables. Further work drawing in depth on country-specific surveys in other settings is warranted to ascertain with more confidence whether a shift towards more prominence to transparency and 'voice'-type of variables is needed, backstopping the results for Bolivia in this paper.
Governance, corruption, public officials, policy, public sector management
Abstract: We contribute to the field of urban governance and globalization through an empirically-based exploration of determinants of performance of cities. We construct a preliminary worldwide database for cities, containing variables and indicators of globalization (at the country and city level), city governance, city performance (access and quality of service delivery), as well as other relevant city characteristics. This city database, encompassing hundreds of cities worldwide, integrates existing data with new data gathered for this research project. We present a very simple conceptual framework and a set of hypotheses, and then test them econometrically. The findings suggest that good governance and globalization (at both the country as well as at the city level) do matter for city-level performance in terms of access and quality of delivery of infrastructure services. We also find that globalization and good city governance are significantly related with each other. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that there are particular and complex interactions between technology choices, governance and city performance, as well as evidence of a non-linear relationship between city size and performance. We conclude pointing to the need for expanding the database and the econometric framework, as well as to more general future research directions and policy implications emerging from this initial empirical investigation in the field of governance and the city.
Governance, city governance, expirical exploration, global determinants, urban, performance
Abstract: Major conceptual contributions of a number of Nobel-laureates in putting forth a framework linking the citizenry's right to know and access to information with development, have already had a major influence in various fields. However, implementation of transparency-related reforms on the ground remains checkered around the globe. Further, in contrast with other dimensions of governance - such as rule of law and regulatory burden - there is a gap between the extent of the conceptual contributions in the transparency field and the progress on its measurement and empirical analysis, which has been wanting. And there has been an absence of writings which decompose (or 'unbundle') the generic notion of transparency into specific components, so to provide tools useful for policy advise and interventions. Our paper is a contribution attempting to partly fill these empirical and policy-related gaps. We review the existing literature, present various definitions of transparency, provide an initial empirical framework towards worldwide indicators on various dimensions of transparency, suggest some initial empirical results, and address concrete policy and institutional innovations related to transparency reforms. We contribute to empirics by undertaking an initial construction of a transparency index for 194 countries based on over twenty 20 independent sources. An Unobserved Component Model (UCM) was used to generate the country ratings and the margins of error. The indices comprise an aggregate transparency index with two sub-components: economic/institutional transparency, and political transparency. The results emphasize variance. First, the preliminary evidence based on these initial indicators suggests enormous variation across countries in the extent of transparency. Exemplary transparency is not the exclusive domain of a particular region, and there are transparency-related challenges in countries in each region and income categories. Further, there is significant within-country variation, with large differences in performance between economic/institutional and political dimensions of transparency. Mindful of the challenges in inferring causality, we also find that transparency is associated with better socio-economic and human development indicators, as well as with higher competitiveness and lower corruption. We suggest that much progress can be attained without requiring inordinate amount of resources, since transparency reforms can be substantial net 'savers' of public resources, and often can serve as a more efficient and less financially costly substitute to creating additional regulations and/or regulatory or governance bodies. We emphasize that different types of transparency reforms are warranted for different stages of political-economic development, and that much more prominence ought to be given to transparency reforms as a core component of second-generation institutional reforms. We provide a number of concrete examples of specific transparency-related reforms within a strategic framework, as well as a brief country illustration - the case of Chile.
Governance, transparency, accountability
Abstract: This paper investigates whether resident enterprise managers have an informational advantage about the countries where they work. We test this informational advantage hypothesis by using a unique dataset, the Global Competitiveness Survey. The findings suggest that local managers do have valuable information about the country where they reside. Local managers' responses improve conventional estimates of future volatility and changes in the exchange rate, which are based on economic fundamentals. These findings provide support to the theories that claim that asymmetric information is present in international financial markets and is important to understand financial crises.
Expectations, asymmetric information, local investors, financial crises, exchange rates fluctuations, prediction, survey
Abstract: Markets have had limited success predicting crises and might do better by drawing on private information available to resident enterprise managers, who seem to know better than markets about future movements in exchange rates. Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Schmukler investigate whether resident enterprise managers have an informational advantage about the countries in which they work. They propose a method for extracting information available to resident managers but unknown to investors and forecasters. They test their hypothesis of informational advantage using a unique data set, the Global Competitiveness Survey. The survey asks local managers about their outlook for the country in which they reside. They find that local managers do have useful private information. Local managers` responses improve on conventional forecasts of future volatility and changes in the exchange rate, which are based on economic fundamentals or interest rate differentials. They find that the local business community perceived in advance the recent crises in the Republic of Korea, Russia, and Thailand, but not those in Indonesia and Malaysia. Markets have had limited success predicting crises and might do better by drawing on private information available to resident enterprise managers, who seem to know better than markets about future movements in exchange rates. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to understand the roles of transparency and governance. The authors may be contacted at dkaufmann@worldbank.org, mehrezg@gunet.georgetown.edu, or sschmukler@worldbank.org.
Abstract: Progress in measuring governance is assessed using a simple framework that distinguishes between indicators that measure formal rules and indicators that measure the practical application or outcomes of these rules. The analysis calls attention to the strengths and weaknesses of both types of indicators as well as the complementarities between them. It distinguishes between the views of experts and the results of surveys and assesses the merits of aggregate as opposed to individual governance indicators. Some simple principles are identified to guide the use and refinement of existing governance indicators and the development of future indicators. These include transparently disclosing and accounting for the margins of error in all indicators, drawing from a diversity of indicators and exploiting complementarities among them, submitting all indicators to rigorous public and academic scrutiny, and being realistic in expectations of future indicators.
H1, O17
Abstract: Scholars, policymakers, aid donors, and aid recipients acknowledge the importance of good governance for development. This understanding has spurred an intense interest in more refined, nuanced, and policy-relevant indicators of governance. In this paper we review progress to date in the area of measuring governance, using a simple framework of analysis focusing on two key questions: (i) what do we measure? and, (ii) whose views do we rely on? For the former question, we distinguish between indicators measuring formal laws or rules 'on the books', and indicators that measure the practical application or outcomes of these rules 'on the ground', calling attention to the strengths and weaknesses of both types of indicators as well as the complementarities between them. For the latter question, we distinguish between experts and survey respondents on whose views governance assessments are based, again highlighting their advantages, disadvantages, and complementarities. We also review the merits of aggregate as opposed to individual governance indicators. We conclude with some simple principles to guide the refinement of existing governance indicators and the development of future indicators. We emphasize the need to: transparently disclose and account for the margins of error in all indicators; draw from a diversity of indicators and exploit complementarities among them; submit all indicators to rigorous public and academic scrutiny; and, in light of the lessons of over a decade of existing indicators, to be realistic in the expectations of future indicators.
Governance Indicators, National Governance, Public Sector Corruption & Anticorruption Measures, Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance, Banks & Banking Reform
Abstract: When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery tax. This paper explores the price and quantity components of the relationship between governance and service delivery using micro-level survey data. The authors construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. For some basic services, low-income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones do; that is, the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are substitute private providers, low-income users appear to be discouraged more often and not to seek basic services. Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice - acting as a regressive tax and discouraging access to basic services. The paper explores the characteristics of households seeking public services. Higher education and age are associated with higher probability of being discouraged. Trust in state institutions decreases the probability of being discouraged, while knowledge of mechanisms to report corruption and extent of social network increase it, suggesting that households may rely on substitutes through networks. The study complements the household analysis with supply-side analysis based on data from public officials, and constructs agency-level measures for access to public services and institutional factors. Econometric results suggest that corruption reduces the supply of services, while voice mechanisms and clarity of the public agency's mission increase it.
Governance Indicators, Public Sector Corruption & Anticorruption Measures, National Governance, Public Sector Management and Reform, Public Sector Economics & Finance
Abstract: Poor governance can affect greatly public service delivery, both directly through higher price, and indirectly through lower quality or quantity available. When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes significantly more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service needed due to the higher price imposed by the bribery "tax." In this paper we explore both the price and the quantity components of the relationship between governance and services delivery using micro-level survey data: the bribery "tax" itself (which a priori may be regressive or progressive), as well as the "discouraged user effect" of such tax. To do this, we construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. In analyzing the costs borne by users to obtain public services, we find that for certain basic services low income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones, i.e., the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are few substitute private providers and thus a low price elasticity of the demand for public services for any income category, as in the case of basic services, low income users appear to be discouraged more often than not to seek such a basic service than wealthier ones. Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice over, first by acting as a regressive tax, and then as a discriminating mechanism for access to basic services. We then explore the household's characteristics when attempting to obtain a public service. The analysis suggests that higher education and age are associated with a higher probability of not seeking a public service. Trust in state institutions also influences the user's behavior and decreases the probability of being discouraged. Further, knowledge of the mechanisms to report corruption and extent of social network increase the probability to be a discouraged user of public services, suggesting that the household may rely on substitutes through the network. Finally, we complement the household level demand-side analysis with a supply-side analysis based on the responses from the survey of public officials, and construct agency-level measures for both access to public services and institutional factors. Econometric results suggest that corruption reduces the supply of services, while voice mechanisms and clarity of the public agency's mission increases it.
Governance, Institutions, Public Service Delivery, Corruption
Abstract: Aid works best when it is directed to countries with relatively good institutions and policies. But how should good governance be measured, and how can aid allocation rules be designed in light of the strengths and weaknesses of existing measures? We address in brief a number of methadological and applied challenges, motivated by the U.S. government's recent proposal to allocate resources from the new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), although the issues and recommendations apply more broadly. Among others, we discuss the implications of margins of error in governance data, the difficulties in measuring trends, and the need to complement existing cross-country indicators with in-depth country diagnostics.
Millennium Challenge Account, MCA, Aid Effectiveness, Aid Allocation, Governance Indicators, Governance Data, Corruption
Abstract: This paper is based on the governance chapter contributions to the 2003/04 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). Building from the 2002/03 chapter contribution to the GCR, it argues that governance continues to be at a crossroad, its underperformance being evident in most regions and across many countries. This ('governance policy gap') contrasts with the strides that have been made in many countries in improving macro-economic policies for well over a decade. Based on a worldwide survey of enterprises carried out for the GCR, we find that firms from emerging economies single out corruption and excessive bureaucracy among the top constraints to their business operations, while excessive bureaucracy and the tax regime are identified as top constraints by the respondent firms from the OECD. Many countries currently have levels of governance that are insufficient to support their income levels and/or growth path, namely they experience a 'governance deficit', which we suggest it can be quantified. We also carry out a simple empirical exploration of the validity of legal-historical origins in determining governance performance in emerging economies nowadays, and provide a brief synthesis of findings on inequality of influence (by vested interests), and governance at the city level.
Governance, Competitiveness, Corruption, Business Survey, Influence,
Abstract: The growth of the unofficial economy in the post-socialist economies of much of Eurasia suggests that economic reform should be accelerated - that even bolder stabilization, liberalization, and privatization efforts are called for. Incorporating the unofficial economy into the overall analysis also leads to different implications for tax policy and social protection. Kaufmann and Kaliberda challenge the conventional view of how post-socialist economies function by incorporating the unofficial economy into an analysis of the full economy. Then they advance a simple framework for understanding the evolution of the unofficial economy, and the links between both economies, highlighting the main characteristics of unofficialdom, contrasting conventional notions of informal or shadow economies, and focusing on what determines the decision to cross over from one segment of the economy to the other. The empirical evidence, based on both microsurveys and top-down (macro-electricity consumption) comparative country methodology, suggests the usefulness of the framework. Integrating the unofficial economy into the analysis of the whole economy sheds a different light on interpretations of national income, of sectoral trends (such as trade, services, and exports), and of labor markets and household patterns, often leading to a different interpretation. Over a third of economic activity in the former Soviet countries was estimated to occur in the unofficial economy by the mid-1990s; in Central and Eastern Europe, the average is close to one-quarter. Intra-regional variations are great: in some countries 10 to 15 percent of economic activity is unofficial, and in some more than half of it. The growth of unofficial activity in most post-socialist countries, and its mitigating effect on the decline in official output during the early stages of the transition, have been marked. The initial empirical results seem to support hypothetical explanations of what determines the dynamics of the unofficial economy. Kaufmann and Kaliberda emphasize the speedy liberalization of markets, macro stability, and a stable and moderate tax regime. Although widespread, most unofficialdom in the region is found to be relatively shallow - subject to reversal by appropriate economic policies. The framework and evidence presented have implications for measurement, forecasting, and policymaking - calling for even faster liberalization and privatization than already advocated. And the lessons in social protection and taxation policy differ from conventional advice. This paper - a product of Country Department IV, Europe and Central Asia -was presented as a draft at the Odessa conference on Economic Transition in the Newly Independent States, August 1995, and will be published in Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, edited by B. Kaminsky (M. E. Sharpe, 1996).
Abstract: We are increasingly cognizant of the limits to large cross-country empirical studies in trying to understand in-depth a particular country reality, in ways useful for advice. At the same time, merely relying on a single country account at a particular point in time ignores the historical and comparative cross-country perspective. Worse, an in-depth investigation of a single issue within a country begs the question of whether such particular issue may be fundamental for the country's growth and development relative to other determinants, or not. Further, drawbacks exist from excessive reliance on narrow empirical approaches, or on mere qualitative narrative. Consequently, the approach undertaken here for the case of Bolivia is of an integrated nature, combining the following strands: i) an historical perspective from the twin standpoints of the evolution of the enterprise and government sectors over the past half century; ii) an in-depth review of the literature on explanations of Bolivia's performance; iii) an empirical analysis of the country's enterprise sector performance on the basis of a detailed firm-level survey conducted recently in 80 countries, and, iv) an empirical analysis of Bolivia's public agencies based on a survey of public officials in Bolivia working in over 100 institutions. To provide an additional element of comparability, we also utilize cross-country governance indicators.
Governance, corruption, indicators, firms, Bolivia
Abstract: In this paper we survey the common explanations of barter in transition economies and expose them to detailed survey data on 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997. The evidence does not support the notion that soft budget constraints, lack of restructuring, or that the virtual economy are the driving forces behind barter. Further, tax avoidance is only weakly associated with the incidence of barter in Ukraine. We then explore an alternative explanation of barter as a mechanism to address transitional challenges where capital markets and economic institutions are poorly developed. First, barter helps to maintain production by creating a deal-specific collateral which softens the liquidity squeeze in the economy when credit enforcement is prohibitively costly. Second, barter helps to maintain production by preventing firms being exploited by their input suppliers when the suppliers' bargaining position is very strong due to high costs of switching suppliers. Thus, in the absence of trust and functioning capital markets barter is a self-enforcing response to imperfect input and financial markets in the former Soviet Union. The paper concludes by discussing potential long-term costs of barter arrangements, and by suggesting particular pitfalls of expansionary monetary policy in barter economies such as Ukraine and Russia.
contract enforcement in transition, banking failure, trade credit, virtual economy, arrears
Abstract: There is a strong statistical link between a country's civil liberties and the performance of its aid-financed govern-ment investment projects. But type of political regime (whether authoritarian or democratic) and the status of more purely political liberties do not appear to significantly affect project performance. Using data from the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department, Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett examine the link between the performance of Bank-financed projects and various indicators of country governance. They find that: ° There is a strong statistical, and possibly causal, link between civil liberties and project performance. After controlling for a variety of determinants of project performance, they find that in countries with the best civil liberties records projects have an economic rate of return between 8 and 22 percentage points higher than the rate of return in countries with the worst civil liberties. (The average rate of return in the sample is 16 percent.) ° The type of political regime (whether authoritarian or democratic) and the status of more purely political liberties do not appear to significantly affect project performance. This paper - a product of the Poverty and Human Resources Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the donor and country determinants of aid effectiveness. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Bank Project Effectiveness and Country Policy Environment (RPO 679-49).
Abstract: This paper proposes three principles for users and producers of governance indicators that both summarize the challenges in measurement and suggest ways forward: (1) all governance indicators have measurement error, (2) there are no silver bullets, and (3) the links from governance to development outcomes are complex. An overarching message is that alternative governance indicators should be viewed as complements rather than substitutes.
Governance, Corruption, Indicators
Abstract: In a general equilibrium in which bribe-extracting bureaucrats can endogenously choose regulatory burden and delay, the effective (not just nominal) red tape and bribery can be positively correlated across firms. Using data from three worldwide firm surveys, this paper finds evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Firms that pay more in bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats in negotiating regulations. They also face a higher, not lower, cost of capital.
Bribery, corruption, red tape, speed money, grease payment
Abstract: In an environment in which bureaucratic burden and delay are exogenous, an individual firm may find bribes helpful to reduce the effective red tape it faces. The 'efficient grease' hypothesis asserts therefore that corruption can improve economic efficiency and that fighting bribery would be counter-productive. This need not be the case. In a general equilibrium in which regulatory burden and delay can be endogenously chosen by rent-seeking bureaucrats, the effective (not just nominal) red tape and bribery may be positively correlated across firms. Using data from three worldwide firm-level surveys, we examine the relationship between bribe payment, management time wasted with bureaucrats, and cost of capital. Contrary to the 'efficient grease' theory, we find that firms that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations, and face higher, not lower, cost of capital.
Abstract: Is it true that bribery can alleviate red tape for enterprises? Not if bureaucrats can choose the regulatory burden and the red tape delay to extract bribes. The authors' empirical test finds that firms using bribes waste more management time dealing with bureaucrats. The business community can benefit from laws and collective initiatives strengthening its ability to say no to bribery. If bureaucratic burden and delay are exogenous, a firm may find bribes a helpful way to cut through red tape. Indeed, according to the efficient grease hypothesis, corruption can improve economic efficiency, and fighting bribery can be counterproductive. This need not be the case. In a general equilibrium in which regulatory burden and delay can be endogenously chosen by rent-seeking bureaucrats, the effective (not just nominal) red tape and bribery may be positively correlated across firms. Using data from three worldwide firm-level surveys covering thousands of enterprises, Kaufmann and Wei examine the relationship of bribe payments, management time wasted with bureaucrats, and cost of capital. They find that firms that pay more in bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats, negotiating regulations. Firms that bribe also face a higher, not lower, cost of capital. While the international survey data used in the study have some clear advantages, they do not elicit hard numbers from respondents but rather qualitative ratings in an index. The results remain robust, however, even after the authors control for perception bias. The study has important policy implications: the business community as a whole can benefit from international laws that strengthen the ability of firms to credibly commit to no bribery even if an individual firm may find it otherwise optimal to bribe in a corrupt environment. This paper - a joint product of Public Economics, Development Research Group, and Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to understand the effects of corruption on economic development, as well as part of a major empirical effort to gather and analyze data on governance (for further details, visit http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/gac). The authors may be contacted at dkaufmann@worldbank.org or swei@worldbank.org.
Abstract: Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) find that the share of the unofficial economy in GDP is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post-communist economies. Exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the OECD, Latin America, and transition economies, we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of GDP when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker. While these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies, in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy. The problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se, but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption. A high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy.
Abstract: The economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU) escaped communism with a heavy burden. Despite the collapse of central planning, these economies continued to suffer from heavy political control of economic activity, reflected in massive subsidization of state firms, heavy regulation of entry and operations of private firms, as well as punitive taxation by the government and - separately - by its agents (corruption). Such politicization of the economy had to be reduced significantly for small business formation and growth to begin. In recent years, some countries have succeeded in depoliticizing their economies much better than others. As this paper shows, these are the countries that also had the best growth records.
Abstract: A more aggressive move toward exchange-rate unification in Tanzania would have delivered a fiscal bonus by the mid-1980s' and unification of the exchange rate would have reduced monetary growth and inflationary pressures. From a fiscal viewpoint there was no economic rationale for gradualism in exchange-rate unification and delay of a move toward convertibility. Parallel exchange-rate markets have often been dismissed by authorities as a nuisance or as the domain of a small group of economic saboteurs. Using Tanzania as a case study, Kaufmann and O'Connell argue instead that these markets played a central macroeconomic role in the 1970s and 1980s. They provide a rigorous macroeconomic analysis of the parallel foreign-exchange market and its fiscal implications. First, they investigate the evolution of that market in Tanzania from the mid-1960s to 1990. That period stretched from the adoption of exchange controls to macroeconomic collapse and then to subsequent reforms in the mid- to late 1980s. A reduced-form econometric equation (of a Dornbusch stock-flow model type) indicates that both trade and financial portfolio factors were important in determining the parallel premium, with trade determinants dominating in the long run, as theory suggests. Then they investigate the fiscal impact of the parallel exchange-rate premium, an issue emphasized in the literature on exchange-rate unification. They construct a counterfactual simulation of fiscal and balance-of-payments flows under alternative assumptions about the indexing of those flows to the parallel and official exchange rate. They find that a more aggressive move toward exchange-rate unification would have already delivered a fiscal bonus by the mid-1980s. Accordingly, unification of the exchange rate would have reduced monetary growth and inflationary pressures. So, contrary to conventional advice often given in Africa and elsewhere, the case of Tanzania suggests that from a fiscal viewpoint there was no economic rationale for gradualism in exchange-rate unification and delay of a move toward convertibility. This paper - a product of the Development Research Group and the Regulatory Reform and Private Enterprise Division, Economic Development Institute - is part of a larger effort by the Bank to investigate exchange rate regimes. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under research project The Macroeconomic Implications of Foreign Exchange Markets in Developing Countries (RPO 675-30). The paper also appears in M. Kiguel, J. Lizondo, and S. O'Connell, Parallel Exchange Rates in Developing Countries [London and New York, MacMillan and A. Martin].
Abstract: Using economic rates of return from more than 1,200 public and private sector projects implemented in 61 developing countries, the authors analyze determinants of investment productivity. Results from Tobit estimation demonstrate that the degree of countrywide policy distortions - macroeconomic, exchange rate, trade and pricing - critically affects the productivity of investments. Countries with undistorted policies are likely to be unproductive investments. In countries with distorted policies, investments are likely to be unproductive. And within a country, investments become more productive when economic policymaking improves. The productivity of projects in the tradable sectors are also affected (in a nonlinear fashion) by the size of a country's public investment program. The authors discuss possible selection biases in this data set, present tests of robustness, and highlight policy implications. In particular, donor financing for improvements in the policy climate is likely to pay off. A powerful rationale for supporting structual reform is that it raises the productivity of both public and private investments.
Abstract: This article uses a cross-national data set on the performance of government investment projects financed by the World Bank to examine the link between government efficacy and governance. It demonstrates a strong empirical link between civil liberties and the performance of government projects. Even after controlling for other determinants of performance, countries with the strongest civil liberties have projects with an economic rate of return 8-22 percentage points higher than countries with the weakest civil liberties. The strong effect of civil liberties holds true even when controlling for the level of democracy. The interrelationship among civil liberties, civil strife, and project performance suggests that the possible mechanism of causation is from more civil liberties to increased citizen voice to better projects. This result adds to the evidence for the view that increasing citizen voice and public accountability - through both participation and better governance - can lead to greater efficacy in government action.
Abstract: Inter-household transfers in Russia, Ukraine, and Latvia to provide an important supplement to individual incomes. These transfers are as high as in many developing countries. Transfers are from richer to poorer, from older to younger, and to femaleheaded households. We find no evidence that Russia has lower transfers than Ukraine, which has had relatively little reform. The high level of inter-household transfers may help explain why there has been so little social protest in Russia despite the large fall in measured real wages.
Abstract: The justifications for housing subsidy programs in developing countries often rely upon substantial indirect benefits accruing to program participants (in the form of improved health, earning capacity or employment, or non-market activity). The empirical analysis in this paper suggests that such programs may often be justified solely on the basis of direct impacts. The paper presents a methodology for deriving rigorously the direct Hicksian benefits of housing subsidy programs such as "sites-and-services" and "slum upgrading" projects in developing countries. The methodology is used to evaluate the net benefits of a sites and services project typical of recent urban shelter programs sponsored by the World Bank. The results suggest that the direct benefits of such programs may be substantial. In the particular case analyzed, the rate of return approaches 40 percent.
Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between economy-wide policies and the performance of investment projects in education and health sectors. The model highlights the fact that the production of human capital requires an interaction of the demand for and supply of social services, both are related to labor market conditions and macroeconomic policies. A Probit analysis shows that the probability of project failure is positively and significantly associated with indicators of macroeconomic instability and distortion; and negatively associated with the overall dynamism of the economy. Economy-wide policies therefore are crucial for the success of social projects, which underscores the need of linking the lending in the social sectors to the overall policies and reforms.
Abstract: In developing nations cash transfers between households play a role in maintaining poor urban families at income levels sufficient to meet expenditures on basic needs. In our analysis, a social network is seen as redistributing income to those member households who fall below a perceived basic needs threshold. This redistributive mechanism can be though of as the outcome of an implicit social contract whereby households insure themselves against the risk of falling below a perceived basic needs level. Using data from El Salvador, regression estimates which account for transfers received by poor households are found to be consistent with the proposed model.
Abstract: Six dimensions of governance are estimated covering 199 countries and territories for four periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. The indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance drawn from 25 data sources constructed by 18 organizations. These individual measures are assigned to categories capturing key dimensions of governance. An unobserved-components model is used to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods. Point estimates of the dimensions of governance are provided as well as the margins of errors for each country for the four periods. Methodological issues are also addressed, including tests for potential biases, and the interpretation and use of the data, given the estimated margins of errors for the indicators. The data and a Web-based graphical interface are available online at . www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/index.html
Chemical intolerance, environment, environmentalintolerance, hypersensitivity, MCS, multiple chemicalsensitivity, olfaction, unexplained symptoms
Abstract: The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s not only highlighted the welfare consequences of transparency in the financial sector but also linked this relatively narrow problem to the broader context of transparency in governance. It has been observed that objections to transparency, often on flimsy pretexts, are common even in industrialized countries. This article argues that transparency is indispensable to the financial sector and describes its desirable characteristics: access, timeliness, relevance, and quality. The authors emphasize the need to weigh the costs and benefits of a more transparent regulatory policy, and they explore the connection between information imperfections, macroeconomic policy, and questions of risk. The article argues for developing institutional infrastructure, standards, and accounting practices that promote transparency, implementing incentives for disclosure and establishing regulations to minimize the perverse incentives generated by safety net arrangements, such as deposit insurance. Because institutional development is gradual, the authors contend that relatively simple regulations, such as limits on credit expansion, may be the most reasonable option for developing countries. They show that transparency has absolute limits because of the lack of adequate enforcement and argue that adequate enforcement may be predicated on broader reforms in the public sector.
Abstract: Our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden 'unofficial' activity to be much larger in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. A comparison of cross-country averages shows that managers in Russia and Ukraine face higher effective tax rates, worse bureaucratic corruption, greater incidence of mafia protection, and have less faith in the court system. Our firm-level regressions for the three Eastern European countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output.
Corruption, taxation, legal system, unofficial economy
Abstract: Our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden "unofficial" activity to be much larger in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. A comparison of cross-country averages shows that managers in Russia and Ukraine face higher effective tax rates, worse bureaucratic corruption, greater incidence of mafia protection, and have less faith in the court system. Our firm-level regressions for the three Eastern European countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output.
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