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Abstract:
Between 1973 and 1986, Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit published three influential but controversial books on the best interests of the child that had an enormous impact on state decisions to intervene in family life and direct the placement of children. During the same period, children in child welfare proceedings were increasingly represented by lawyers or guardians ad litem whose advocacy included understanding and interpreting the meaning of best interests. This article begins by tracing a conversation of sorts that occurs between the authors and other scholars and practitioners as their ideas begin to influence decision-making in child protective and custody proceedings. It then turns to the central issue of how the books provide important lessons to child advocates about the indeterminacy of a best interest standard, the centrality of family integrity, and the need for all professionals working with children to define their decision-making roles clearly but narrowly. The article concludes that if these books had been written today, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit would embrace a child-directed role for lawyers as the sole practice paradigm which fully engages the child advocate in the right practices they proscribe: distinguishing between personal values and professional knowledge; remaining true to their assigned role as counsel within strict legal boundaries; and resisting taking on the roles of other professionals in the case. These right practices, in turn, limit the indeterminacy of the best interest standard by limiting the freedom of the lawyer to decide what is best.

best interests of the child, child advocacy, family integrity, child welfare

Abstract:
Problem-solving courts, created at the end of the 20th century, make court-based solutions central to addressing significant societal problems, such as substance abuse and its impact on criminal activity and family functioning. Yet, lessons gleaned from over 100 years of family court history suggest that court-based solutions to intractable social problems have rarely been effective. This article asks three questions of the problem-solving court movement: What problem are we trying to solve? Is the court the best place to solve the problem? What are the consequences of giving authority to a court for solving the problem? Answering those questions through the lens of specific examples from family court - the original problem-solving court - leads to the conclusion that neither the structural issues that courts face, such as overwhelming numbers of cases, nor the momentous societal issues that problem-solving courts have recently begun to shoulder, can be adequately addressed through court-based solutions. The factors that allegedly distinguish new problem-solving courts from earlier exemplars, especially the family court, are both less unique and less successful than they have been portrayed by problem-solving court enthusiasts. These factors alone fail to justify the expansion of problem-solving courts without further evidence of their effectiveness. Moreover, the potential dangers inherent in problem-solving courts are not theoretical. By examining illustrative examples from the history of the family court, the dangers become clearly apparent.

family court, status offenses, problem-solving courts, court reform, drug courts, judges

Abstract:
This article examines the national Model Family Court reform movement, analyzing whether the movement imitates previous attempts to improve the court through administrative and procedural reorganization, or whether the substantive foundation of the movement (whose first principles combine family unification with child safety) coupled with key structural modifications can transform the existing Family Court. The model court movement requires the judge to take a significant leadership role in restructuring court procedures and crafting and monitoring individual case resolutions. The author asks whether this new process would add value to the lives of the families involved. By examining New York court reform as well as preliminary information about the progress of model courts nationwide, a number of conclusions about the current reform effort are drawn. First, the organization of the model courts builds on a process of cooperation and collaboration that enhances the participation of both professionals and litigants. Second, the monitoring component can produce sufficient information for the court to limit its intervention into the family without increasing the risk to child safety. As a result, the overall number of cases that need court attention could be reduced and the court would be able to use its resources more effectively. The potential for transformation, however, has so far been limited by a dominant focus on administrative and procedural reform and a paucity of attention centered on preserving family integrity by utilizing the model court's unique design. Unless the model courts take the next step to fully integrate their substantive mandate into the new procedural framework, a family court paradigm that can add value to the lives of the families it serves will not be created.

Abstract:
A two-day conference, 'Family Court in New York City in the 21st Century: What Are Its Role and Responsibilities?' was co-hosted by the Justice Center of the New York County Lawyers' Association (NYCLA) and Columbia Law School in October 2006. The conference recommendations and working group reports as well as articles and replies are contained in a symposium issue of the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, for which this foreword was written. The foreword highlights the central concerns explored during the conference and the pervasive theme of accountability that emerged. Based on this theme, the foreword suggests a number of ways to reconceptualize our approach to family court reform.

family court, court reform

Abstract:
Family Court reform efforts in recent years have expanded the court’s jurisdiction and supervisory authority while heralding the Family Court judge as the leader of a team of professionals who are solving the problems that bring families to court. This article challenges that reform paradigm by asking a series of questions about the way in which we talk about – rather than analyze – this court reform movement: What do we say about the reform work we do, and to what degree is what we say accurate? How does the way in which we talk about Family Court reform implicate our analysis of what we are achieving? How does our place or role within the system affect our perceptions of reform? What limits our willingness and ability to apply rigorous evaluative techniques to determine whether we are reaching our goals? And if we are failing, can we acknowledge failure and learn from it? These questions are answered by uncovering the predominant use of stories and conventional justifications to support current court reform efforts rather than erecting a vigorous accountability system grounded in systemic knowledge to substantiate the reform choices funded by federal agencies and encouraged by prominent judicial and bar organizations. The article concludes that these efforts have not yet been proven to be effective and thus worth adopting more broadly. Unless court reformers are willing to hold themselves accountable for their efforts and to analyze critically whether goals are being accomplished, we cannot determine whether the problem-solving paradigm is adding value to families’ lives or whether an improved due process paradigm continues to offer the best opportunity for fairness and justice when court intervention is necessary.

Family Court, Court Reform, Problem-Solving, Judiciary