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Abstract:
Using various statistical procedures, estimates about the size of the shadow economy in 110 developing, transition and OECD countries are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (in percent of official GDP) over 1999-2000 in developing countries is 41%, in transition countries 38% and in OECD countries 18.0%. An increasing burden of taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulatory activities are the driving forces for the growth and size of the shadow economy. If the shadow economy increases by one percent the annual growth rate of the "official" GDP of a developing country (of a industrialized and/or transition country) decreases by 0.6% (increases by 0.8 and 1.0 respectively).

shadow economy, interaction of the shadow economy with the official one, tax burden

Abstract:
Using the currency demand and DYMIMIC approaches estimates are presented about the size of the shadow economy in 22 Transition and 21 OECD countries. Over 2001/2002 in 21 OECD countries is the average size of the shadow economy (in percent of official GDP) 16.7% of "official" GDP and of 22 Transition countries 38.0%. The average size of the shadow economy labor force (in percent of the population of working age) of the year 1998/99 in 7 OECD-countries is 15.3% and in 22 Transition countries is 30.2%. An increasing burden of taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulatory activities are the driving forces for the growth and size of the shadow economy (labor force).

Shadow Economy, Transition Economies, Tax and Social Security Burden, Government Regulation

Abstract:
Using the DYMIMIC approach, estimates of the shadow economy in 145 developing, transition, developed OECD countries, South Pacific islands and still communist countries are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (in percent of official GDP) over 2002/2003 in developing countries is 39.1%, in transition countries 40.1%, in OECD countries 16.3%, South Pacific islands 33.4% and 4 remaining Communist countries 21.8%. An increasing burden of taxation, high unemployment and low official GDP growth are the driving forces of the shadow economy.

shadow economy, tax burden, government regulation, DYMIMIC method

Abstract:
Estimations of the size and development of the shadow economy for 145 countries, including developing, transition and highly developed OECD economies over the period 1999 to 2003 are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (as a percent of "official" GDP) in 2002/03 in 96 developing countries is 38.7%, in 25 transition countries 40.1%, in 21 OECD countries 16.3% and in 3 Communist countries 22.3%. An increased burden of taxation and social security contributions, combined with labor market regulation, are the driving forces of the shadow economy. Furthermore, the results show that the shadow economy reduces corruption in high-income countries, but increases corruption in low income countries. Finally, the various estimation methods are discussed and critically evaluated.

shadow economy of 145 countries, tax burden, tax moral, quality of state institutions, regulation, DYMIMIC and other estimation methods

Abstract:
Estimations of the size and development of the shadow economy for 145 countries, including developing, transition and highly developed OECD economies over the period 1999 to 2003 are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (as a percent of official GDP) in 2002/03 in 96 developing countries is 38.7%, in 25 transition countries 40.1%, in 21 OECD countries 16.3% and in 3 Communist countries 22.3%. An increased burden of taxation and social security contributions, combined with a labor market regulation are the driving forces of the shadow economy. Furthermore, the results show that the shadow economy reduces corruption in high income countries, but increases corruption in low income countries. Finally, the various estimation methods are discussed and critically evaluated.

shadow economy of 145 countries, tax burden, tax morale, quality of state

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a cross-section of 120 countries and a panel of 70 countries for the period 1994-2002. Our results show that the shadow economy reduces corruption in high income countries, but increases corruption in low income countries. We also find that stricter regulations increase both corruption and the shadow economy.

corruption, shadow economy, regulation, tax burden

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a crosssection of 120 countries and a panel of 70 countries for the period 1994-2002. Our results show that the shadow economy reduces corruption in high income countries, but increases corruption in low income countries. We also find that stricter regulations increase both corruption and the shadow economy.

corruption, shadow economy, regulation, tax burden

Abstract:
Using various methods (currency demand, physical input (electricity) method, model approach), which are discussed and criticized, estimates of the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing, transition and OECD-countries are presented. The average size of a shadow economy varies from 12 percent of GDP for OECD, to 23 percent for transition and to 39 percent for developing countries. An increasing burden of taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulatory activities are the driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in OECD-countries. According to some findings, a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official GDP growth, and a positive impact of corruption on the size of the shadow economy can be found.

Abstract:
In the past there was hardly any use of economic instruments in environmental policy, mainly command and control measures were used. More recently, ecological taxes as well as tradable permits became more popular and voluntary agreements have been implemented. Using the Public Choice approach we ask for the reasons of this wider acceptance of economic instruments. We conclude that the use of market based instruments in environmental policy has not increased very much and their impact on the actual situation is still rather low, but there is hope of at least some increase in the future.

Environmental Policy, Ecological Taxes, Tradable Permits, Voluntary Agreements, Voting Behaviour, Public Bureaucracy, Interest Groups

Abstract:
After giving a short literature review, the paper tries a quantification of the volume of money laundering activities, with the help of a DYMIMIC estimation procedure for the years 1995 to 2006 for 20 highly developed OECD countries. The volume of laundered money was 273 billions USD in the year 1995 for these 20 OECD countries and increased to 603 billions USD in 2006. The overall turnover in organized crime had a value of 595 billion USD in 2001 and increased to 790 billion USD in 2006. These figures are very preliminary but give a clear indication how important money laundering and the turnover of organized crime is nowadays.

Definition and stages of money laundering, volume of money laundering

Abstract:
The latest empirical results of the size of the shadow economy in 18 OECD countries are presented, using the currency demand approach to calculate the shadow economy over time. The results indicate a strong increase in the size of the shadow economy, over the period 1960 to 1998 and for 15 of the 18 investigated OECD-countries the size of the shadow economy is more than 13% of the GNP for the year 1998. Also an analysis is given about the size of influences of major causes (direct and indirect tax burden and government regulation) on the shadow economy for Austria.

Abstract:
Using various methods (currency demand, physical input (electricity) measure, model approach), which are discussed and criticized, estimates about the size of 67 developing, transition and OECD countries are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (in % of GDP) over 1989-93 in developing countries is 39.2%, in transition countries 23.2% and in OECD countries 14.2%. An increasing burden of taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulatory activities are the driving forces for the size of the shadow economy. According to some findings, a growing shadow economy has a negative impact on official GDP growth, however, a positive impact of corruption on the size of the shadow economy can be found, i.e. the bigger the corruption, the larger is the shadow economy.

Abstract:
This paper analyses how governance or institutional quality and tax morale affect the shadow economy, using an international country panel and also within country data. The literature strongly emphasizes the quantitative importance of these factors to understand the level and changes of shadow economy. However, the limited number of investigations use cross-sectional country data with a relatively small number of observations, and hardly any paper has investigated tax morale and provides evidence using within country data. Using more than 25 proxies that measure governance and institutional quality we find strong support that its increase leads to a smaller shadow economy. Moreover, an increase in tax morale reduces the size of the shadow economy.

shadow economy, tax morale, governance quality, government intervention, corruption

Abstract:
The issues of privatization (and sometimes deregulation) have been reviewed in a large body of literature on the various aspects of privatization, which has emphasized the potential efficiency gains. Hence, the goal of this paper is two-fold: First to provide some theoretical reasoning as to why privatization is both useful as well as profitable for an economy and, second, to empirically present the extent of privatization in Austria and other European Union countries. Therefore, the reasons that make privatization necessary are elaborated. Then the specific pattern of privatization proceeds for Austria relative to other EU and OECD countries is presented. Moreover, some important idiosyncratic extensions for the Austrian case are elaborated. We argue that in the Austrian case, any discussion of privatization cannot be reduced to observing cash flows, the employment performance and the stock-exchange ratings of the privatized formerly state-owned enterprises. Since polito-economic aspects relating to income distribution and ideology play an important role in explaining the way, the extent, the speed and the economic effects of privatization, they have to be considered as well.

Austria, partisan approach, privatization, state-owned enterprises, public choice.

Abstract:
This paper analyses how tax morale and countries' institutional quality affect the shadow economy, controlling in a multivariate analysis for a variety of potential factors. The literature strongly emphasizes the quantitative importance of these factors to understand the size and development of the shadow economy. Relatively new data sources that have become available offer an exceptional opportunity to shed more light on a topic that is attracting increasing attention. We find strong support for the assertion that a higher tax morale and a higher institutional quality lead to a smaller shadow economy.

shadow economy, tax morale, institutional quality, government intervention, corruption

Abstract:
What determines citizens' satisfaction with the "constitution in operation"? We make two contributions towards an answer to this important policy question. First, we place stronger emphasis than existing studies on quantitative interpretations of the importance of different factors. We use scenario analysis to show that a consensual system generally promotes satisfaction, but affects different types of citizens differently. Second, we focus on informal institutions and rules of the game in European societies. Corporatism and group membership as a measure of social capital are good for satisfaction, and people who live in countries with a high degree of income inequality tend to be less satisfied. The findings for trust and for the rule of law are ambiguous.

Satisfaction with Democracy, Political Economy, Institutions

Abstract:
Using various methods estimates about the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing, transition and OECD countries are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (in percent of GDP) over 1989-93 in developing countries is 39%, in transition countries 23% and in OECD countries 12%. An increasing burden of taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulatory activities are the driving forces for the growth and size of the shadow economy. According to some findings, a growing shadow economy has a negative impact on official GDP growth, however, this result is not robust, other studies show the opposite effect.

Abstract:
This paper empirically investigates the differences in the motives of raising privatisation proceeds for a panel of EU countries from 1990 to 2000. More specifically, we test whether privatisations can be mainly interpreted (a) as ingredients of a larger reform package of economic liberalisation in formerly overregulated economies, (b) as a reaction to an increasing macroeconomic problem pressure and (c) as a means to foster growth and increase tax income and relax the fiscal stance with an eye on the demands by integration of economic and financial markets. Whereas we are able to corroborate claim (a) only partly, we gain consistent evidence in favour of claims (b) and (c).

European Union, panel analysis, partisan theory, privatisation proceeds,

Abstract:
Considerable evidence suggests that enforcement efforts cannot fully explain the high degree of tax compliance. To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance several researchers have argued that citizens' attitudes toward paying taxes defined as tax morale helps to explain the high degree of tax compliance. However, most studies have treated tax morale as a black box without discussing which factors shape it. Additionally, the tax compliance literature provides little empirical research that investigates attitudes toward paying taxes in Europe. Thus, this paper is unique in its examination of citizen tax morale within three multicultural European countries, Switzerland, Belgium and Spain, a choice that allows far more detailed examination of the impact of culture and institutions using datasets from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey.

tax morale, tax compliance, tax evasion, culture

Abstract:
This paper presents the first MIMIC (multiple indicator multiple causes) model estimate of the size and development of the shadow economy and of do-it-yourself (DIY) activities in Germany from 1970 to 2005. By 2005, they reached a level of about 17% and 4.94%. While the shadow economy has regularly increased over the years, DIY activities - though quite sizeable - have remained more or less constant since the early 1990s. The driving forces for the shadow economy are regulation and tax burden whereas for DIY activities, the level of unemployment is the main factor.

shadow economy, do-it-yourself activities, tax burden, regulation, domestic currency in circulation, unemployment, MIMIC models

Abstract:
This paper presents estimates of the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing, transition, and OECD countries, which are derived by combining figures from different estimation methods. We describe and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the different estimation methods. We find that the growth of the shadow economy — which is now remarkably large in the 76 countries — is strongly related to increasing burdens of taxation and social security contributions, as well as to the extent of state regulatory activities. Rising corruption also has a clearly positive impact on the growth of the shadow economy.

Abstract:
By using official time series of the Italian evaded VAT base (Ministry of Finance) for the period 1980-2004 we investigate empirically the long-run characteristics of tax evasion and the relationship with the tax burden. We focus on three important issues not analyzed so far. First, using different measures of aggregate economic activity as reference variables in estimating the average tax burden, we investigate the size and dynamics of the over-burden traceable back to tax evasion. Second, exploiting cointegration techniques, we quantify the elasticity between tax evasion and the average tax rate in Italy. We then comment on the complex dynamic interaction between tax burden and tax evasion, to ascertain whether in the Italian experience there is evidence for any “vicious circle” between them.

Tax evasion, VAT evasion, Effective Tax Rate, Apparent Tax Rate, VECM

Abstract:
By using official time series of the Italian evaded VAT base (Ministry of Finance) for the period 1980-2004 we investigate empirically the long-run characteristics of tax evasion and the relationship with the tax burden. We focus on three important issues not analyzed so far. First, using different measures of aggregate economic activity as reference variables in estimating the average tax burden, we investigate the size and dynamics of the over-burden traceable back to tax evasion. Second, exploiting cointegration techniques, we quantify the elasticity between tax evasion and the average tax rate in Italy. We then comment on the complex dynamic interaction between tax burden and tax evasion, to ascertain whether in the Italian experience there is evidence for any "vicious circle" between them.

tax evasion, VAT evasion, effective tax rate, apparent tax rate, VECM

Abstract:
This paper assesses the relationship between institutions, output, and productivity, when official output is corrected for the size of the shadow economy. Our results confirm the usual positive impact of institutional quality on official output and total factor productivity, and its negative impact on the size of the underground economy. However, once output is corrected for the shadow economy, the relationship between institutions and output becomes weaker. The impact of institutions on total ("corrected") factor productivity even becomes insignificant. Differences in corrected output must then be attributed to differences in factor endowments. These results survive several tests for robustness.

shadow economy, income, aggregate productivity, development accounting

Abstract:
In the context of emission trading it seems to be taken as given that people's preferences can be ignored with respect to the whole process of fixing emission targets and allocating emission permits to polluters. With this paper we want to reopen the debate on how citizens can be involved in this process. We try to show how citizen preferences can be included in the process of pollution control through emission trading. We propose an emission trading system where all emission permits are initially allocated to households who are then allowed to sell them in the permit market or to withhold (at least some of) them in order to reduce total pollution. This proposal tries to overcome the fundamental disadvantage of traditional permit systems which neglect consumer preferences by solely distributing emission permits to producers / polluters. In our system the property right to nature is re-allocated to the households who obtain the opportunity of reducing actual emissions according to their personal preferences by withholding a part or all of the emission permits allotted to them. Such a change in environmental policy would mark a return to the traditional principles of consumer sovereignty by involving households (at least partially) in the social abatement decision process instead of excluding them. Another advantage of admitting households to the TEP market as sellers or buyers of permits is that this increases the number of agents in the permit market and thus significantly reduces the possibilities of strategic market manipulations.

Environmental policy, tradable emission permits, climate policy, consumer sovereignty

Abstract:
The analysis of economic loss attributed to the shadow economy has attracted much attention in recent years by both academics and policy makers. Often, multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) models are applied to time series data estimating the size and development of the shadow economy for a particular country. This type of model derives information about the relationship between cause and indicator variables and a latent variable, here the shadow economy, from covariance structures. As most macroeconomic variables do not satisfy stationarity, long run information is lost when employing first differences. Arguably, this shortcoming is rooted in the lack of an appropriate MIMIC model which considers cointegration among variables. This paper develops a MIMIC model which estimates the cointegration equilibrium relationship and the error correction short run dynamics, thereby retaining information for the long run. Using France as our example, we demonstrate that this approach allows researchers to obtain more accurate estimates about the size and development of the shadow economy.

shadow economy, tax burden, regulation, unemployment, cointegration, error correction models, MIMIC models

Abstract:
We construct a panel of satisfaction with democracy (SWD) and economic, institutional, and environmental variables for 1990-2001 for fifteen European countries. In this sample, controlling for a number of factors, we find that average SWD is higher where (1) there exists an energy/CO2 tax, where (2) government expenditures on the environment are higher, where (3) certain environmental regulations like packaging rules are in place, and (4) where the government puts in place environmental offices or other official bodies charged with addressing environmental concerns. We also find that, on the environmental quality side, (5) more cars on the roads, (6) less unleaded fuel, and (7) higher pesticide use intensity all decrease SWD.

satisfaction with democracy, environment

Abstract:
The relationship between corruption and the shadow economy is not clear. Theoretically, they either substitute or complement each other - exhibiting either a negative or positive relationship. This paper - using a structural equation model with two latent variables - extracts information on various dimensions of corruption and the shadow economy to contribute to the debate on their relationship. It presents empirical evidence of a positive relationship between the shadow economy and corruption. The results show that the shadow economy influences corruption more than corruption influences the shadow economy.

shadow economy, corruption, SEM models

Abstract:
Recent empirical growth literature suggests that cultural factors play a decisive role in economic development, while empirical evidence for their impact on government activity remains scant. In this paper, we conjecture based on Weber's Protestant Ethics that Protestant values such as self-reliance and austerity should affect both the size and scope of governments. More specifically, we hypothesize that smaller government budgets should be observable in more Protestant jurisdictions. Using a panel of sub-federal expenditure in 26 Swiss cantons from 1980-1998 we find supporting evidence, observing that the share of Protestants in the cantonal residential population exerts a spending dampening impact. Our results suggest that cultural factors should not be omitted from future public finance analyzes.

Protestantism, Culture, Government Spending, Public Finance

Abstract:
Recent empirical growth literature suggests that cultural factors play a decisive role in economic development, while empirical evidence for their impact on government activity remains scant. In this paper, we conjecture based on Weber's Protestant Ethics that 'Protestant values' such as self-reliance and austerity should affect both the size and scope of governments. More specifically, we hypothesize that smaller government budgets should be observable in more Protestant jurisdictions. Using a panel of sub-federal expenditure in 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 we find supporting evidence, observing that the share of Protestants in the cantonal residential population exerts a spending dampening impact. Our results suggest that cultural factors should not be omitted from future public finance analyses.

Protestantism, Culture, Government Spending, Public Finance

Abstract:
While there is an extensive literature on tax evasion a further aspect of cheating on the state, namely benefit fraud, has gained relatively modest attention in the economic literature. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We explore differences between benefit fraud and tax evasion due to differing social norms. We define the concepts of benefit morale and tax morale as the motivation to abstain from cheating on the state via these two offenses. Our multilevel analysis, based on a large micro data set of respondents from 29 OECD member countries, shows that benefit morale and tax morale have different determinants at an individual-level and respond differently to fiscal policy measures.

tax, subsidies, tax evasion, benefit fraud, welfare fraud, tax morale, benefit morale, social norms, multilevel analysis

Abstract:
Legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits to overrepresented states. The present paper analyses empirically the distribution of fiscal transfers in Germany's intergovernmental transfer system over the period 1970-2002. It can be shown that overrepresented states in the upper house receive disproportionate shares of transfers, while malapportionment in the lower house does not seem to matter. We also find empirical evidence that overrepresentation became more important over time.

legislative bargaining, overrepresentation, fiscal transfer system, Germany

Abstract:
Central bank independence (CBI) is a very important precondition for price stability. However, the empirical evidence for a correlation between both is relatively weak. In this paper, this weakness is countered with a) an extended measure of monetary commitment, which includes well-known criteria for CBI and external criteria such as convertibility and exchange rate regimes and b) the argument that monetary commitment can grant price stability best if it is backed by an adequate assignment of economic policy. An empirical assessment with data from four decades confirms the crucial role of monetary commitment for price stability.

central bank independence, price stability, monetary commitment

Abstract:
This paper assesses the relationship between institutions, output, and productivity, when official output is corrected for the size of the shadow economy. Our results confirm the usual positive impact of institutional quality on official output and total factor productivity, and its negative impact on the size of the underground economy. However, once output is corrected for the shadow economy, the relationship between institutions and output becomes weaker. The impact of institutions on total ("corrected") factor productivity even becomes insignificant. Differences in corrected output must then be attributed to differences in factor endowments. These results survive several tests for robustness.

shadow economy, income, aggregate productivity, development accounting

Abstract:
Does the supply of a welfare state create its own demand? Many economic scholars studying welfare arrangements refer to Say's law and insinuate a self-destructive welfare state. However, little is known about the empirical validity of these assumptions and hypotheses. We study the dynamic effect of different welfare arrangements on benefit fraud. In particular, we analyze the impact of the welfare state on the respective social norm, i.e. benefit morale. It turns out that a high level of public social expenditures and a high unemployment rate are associated with a small positive (or no) immediate impact on benefit morale, which however is crowded out by adverse medium and long run effects.

welfare state, social norms, benefit fraud, benefit morale

Abstract:
The analysis of economic loss attributed to the shadow economy has attracted much attention in recent years by both academics and policy makers. Often, multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) models are applied to time series data estimating the size and development of the shadow economy for a particular country. This type of model derives information about the relationship between cause and indicator variables and a latent variable, here the shadow economy, from covariance structures. As most macroeconomic variables do not satisfy stationarity, long run information is lost when employing first differences. Arguably, this shortcoming is rooted in the lack of an appropriate MIMIC model which considers cointegration among variables. This paper develops a MIMIC model which estimates the cointegration equilibrium relationship and the error correction short run dynamics, thereby retaining information for the long run. Using France as our example, we demonstrate that this approach allows researchers to obtain more accurate estimates about the size and development of the shadow economy.

shadow economy, tax burden, regulation, unemployment, cointegration, error correction models, MIMIC models

Abstract:
Does the supply of a welfare state create its own demand? Many economic scholars studying welfare arrangements refer to Say's law and insinuate a self-destructive welfare state. However, little is known about the empirical validity of these assumptions and hypotheses. We study the dynamic effect of different welfare arrangements on benefit fraud. In particular, we analyze the impact of the welfare state on the respective social norm, i.e. benefit morale. It turns out that a high level of public social expenditures and a high unemployment rate are associated with a small positive (or no) immediate impact on benefit morale, which however is crowded out by adverse medium and long run effects.

welfare state, social norms, benefit fraud, benefit morale

Abstract:
In order to guarantee a further successful functioning of the enlarged European Union, a Federal European Constitution is proposed. Six basic elements of a future European federal constitution are developed: the European commission should be turned into a European government and the European legislation should consist of a two chamber system with full responsibility over all federal items. Three further key elements are the subsidiarity principle, federalism and the secession right, which are best suited to limiting the domain of the central European authority to which certain tasks are given, such as defense, foreign and environmental policy. Another important feature is direct democracy, which provides the possibility for European voters to participate actively in the political decision making, to break political and interest group cartels, and to prevent an unwanted shifting of responsibilities from EU member states to the European federal level.

Abstract:
Despite continuous government attempts to increase taxpayer compliance, the shadow economy continues to offer a way for taxpayers to evade their taxpaying obligations. The consequences are clear: policy-makers have increasingly imperfect knowledge about the state of economic affairs as shadow economy activity expands. We provide the first known estimates of the shadow economy for 17 Asia-Pacific countries. We show that, not only have these activities grown over the last ten years, but countries with relatively thin taxpayer compliance initiatives experience the greatest shadow economy activity.

Abstract:
Using modern methods for analyzing multi-level data, we find that, by and large, citizens of OECD countries are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country if more environmental policies are in place and if environmental quality is higher. We also document that parents care about carbon dioxide emissions more than non-parents and that those with a high willingness to pay for environmental quality deplore intervention through government policies.

satisfaction with democracy, environmental economics and policy, collective action problems

Abstract:
This paper finds an empirical evidence that al Qaeda behaves as a contest organizer rewarding a prize to candidate extremist groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each other to prove their commitment and ability. Hence to maximize their own probability of winning the prize, each group (maximizes its effort). In particular, in the presence of costless information each candidate group can observe the results of attacks of other groups. Therefore, each group tries to make attacks at least equally destructive as the foregoing attacks. The testable implication is that: the number of victims of terrorist attacks is associated with the number of victims of past attacks. Resulting evidence confirms the hypothesis. However, results show that al Qaeda-style jihadist terrorist activity depends also upon grievance for poverty and socio-economic conditions.

terrorism, al Qaeda, contest theory, tournament, information

Abstract:
This paper analyses how institutional factors affect satisfaction with democracy (SWD). It employs a panel of observations from Eurobarometers in the time span 1990-2000, and thus is one of the first studies to consider the longitudinal dimension of the driving forces of SWD. We find that high-quality institutions like the rule of law, well-functioning regulation, low corruption, and other institutions that improve resource allocation have a positive effect on average satisfaction with democracy.

Satisfaction with democracy, political economy, institutions