Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France
Université Paris Dauphine
Nash Implementation, Strategy-proof, Unanimity, Indirect Mechanisms
Hotelling games, pure equilibria, large games, political economy
Approval voting, bargaining, partial honesty, consensual equilibrium
Hotelling games, large games, Poisson games, valence
Nash Implementation, Bayesian Implementation, Robust Implementation, Detail-free, Median rule, Strategy-proofness, Single-Peaked Preferences, Condorcet Winner
Weak dominance, Iterated elimination, Proper equilibrium
Approval voting, Condorcet winner, Voting equilibria, Candidates in The Race
Large Elections, Truth-telling, Incentives
Monotonicity, No-Show Paradox, Participation, Reinforcement, Threshold Scoring Rules
Strategic voting, voting equilibria