• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
Many investors purchase mutual funds through intermediated channels, paying brokers or financial advisors for fund selection and advice. This paper attempts to quantify the benefits that investors enjoy in exchange for the costs of these services. We study broker-sold and direct-sold funds from 1996 to 2004, and fail to find that brokers deliver substantial tangible benefits. Relative to direct-sold funds, broker-sold funds deliver lower risk-adjusted returns, even before subtracting distribution costs. These results hold across fund objectives, with the exception of foreign equity funds. Further, broker-sold funds exhibit no more skill at aggregate-level asset allocation than do funds sold through the direct channel. Our results are consistent either with substantial non-tangible benefits delivered by the broker-distributed sector or with conflicts of interest between brokers and their clients.

mutual funds, distribution channels

Abstract:
We directly estimate annual trading costs for a sample of equity mutual funds and find that these costs are large and exhibit substantial cross sectional variation. Trading costs average 0.78% of fund assets per year and have an inter-quartile range of 0.59%. Trading costs, like expense ratios, are negatively related to fund returns and we find no evidence that on average trading costs are recovered in higher gross fund returns. We find that our direct estimates of trading costs have more explanatory power for fund returns than turnover. Finally, trading costs are associated with investment objectives. However, variation in trading costs within investment objectives is greater than the variation across objectives.

Abstract:
Mutual funds price their shares using last-trade prices of their underlying assets. Because last-trade prices are often stale, this practice results in fund share prices (NAVs) whose daily changes are predictable. We show that the predictability is pervasive and economically significant in domestic equity and foreign equity funds, which comprise more than $4 trillion in assets. Easily implemented trading strategies yield Sharpe ratios that are almost an order of magnitude higher than comparable buy-and-hold strategies. We demonstrate that a simple methodology designed to update assets' last trade prices eliminates most of this predictability.

Abstract:
We directly estimate annual trading costs for a sample of equity mutual funds and find that these costs are large and exhibit substantial cross sectional variation. Trading costs average 0.78% of fund assets per year and have an inter-quartile range of 0.59%. Trading costs, like expense ratios, are negatively related to fund returns and we find no evidence that on average trading costs are recovered in higher gross fund returns. We find that our direct estimates of trading costs have more explanatory power for fund returns than turnover. Finally, trading costs are associated with investment objectives. However, variation in trading costs within investment objectives is greater than the variation across objectives.

Abstract:
We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post-offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behavior by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable.

Abstract:
Managers choose to spend corporate resources to purchase directors' and officers' liability insurance, which protects directors and officers from personal financial liability in lawsuits brought against the firm and its directors and officers. We investigate whether the amount of D&O insurance coverage chosen by managers of IPO firms, and the cost of that insurance, is related to post-IPO abnormal stock price performance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information in bringing their companies public when the expected offering price exceeds managers' private valuation estimate, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post-offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the 3-year post-IPO stock price performance and the amount of insurance coverage in place at the IPO date. We also analyze the pricing of D&O insurance by the insurers. Insurers charge more for insurance purchases that are larger than would be predicted by observable business risk proxies. However, insurers pool all abnormal insurance purchases together in that they do not distinguish between those who buy abnormally large insurance based on anticipated poor performance and those who buy extra insurance for other reasons (e.g., abnormally high risk aversion). Insurers do, however, appear to charge more to firms that buy more insurance and are subsequently sued, indicating that insurers are able to identify and price abnormal litigation risk. We argue that, similar to insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal the private information of managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable.

Abstract:
Many investors purchase mutual funds through intermediated channels, paying brokers or financial advisors for fund selection and advice. This article attempts to quantify the benefits that investors enjoy in exchange for the costs of these services. We study broker-sold and direct-sold funds from 1996 to 2004, and fail to find that brokers deliver substantial tangible benefits. Relative to direct-sold funds, broker-sold funds deliver lower risk-adjusted returns, even before subtracting distribution costs. These results hold across fund objectives, with the exception of foreign equity funds. Further, broker-sold funds exhibit no more skill at aggregate-level asset allocation than do funds sold through the direct channel. Our results are consistent with two hypotheses: that brokers deliver substantial intangible benefits that we do not observe and that there are material conflicts of interest between brokers and their clients.

G2, G11, G24

Abstract:
Fama (1977) and Miller (1977) predict that one minus the corporate tax rate will equate the after-tax yield from a taxable bond to the tax-exempt yield. This prediction is not rejected for short maturity tax-exempt and taxable bonds. However, at long maturities the yields on tax-exempt bonds are higher than predicted by the theory. A popular explanation for this empirical fact is that municipal bonds bear more default risk than comparable taxable bonds. A sample of municipal bonds that are secured by irrevocable escrows of U.S. Treasury securities is used to examine the relation between taxable and tax-exempt yields. The results show that default-free tax-exempt yields display the same tendency to be too high relative to the Fama and Miller prediction. This fact implies that differential default risk does not explain relatively high yields on long-term tax-exempt bonds. This paper also documents a curious fact. U.S. Government secured municipal bonds have higher yields than comparable maturity AAA rated municipal bonds that are not secured by U.S. Treasury bonds.

Abstract:
Fama (1977) and Miller (1977) predict, that one minus the corporate tax rate will equate after-tax yields from comparable taxable and tax-exempt bonds. Empirical evidence show that long-term tax-exempt yields are higher than the theory predicts. Two popular explanations for this empirical puzzle are that, relative to taxable bonds, municipal bonds bear more default risk and include costly call options. I study U.S. government secured municipal bond yields that are effectively default-free and non-callable. These municipal yields display the same tendency to be too high. I conclude that differential default risk and call options do not explain the muni puzzle.