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Kathryn E. Spier's
Scholarly Papers
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Total Downloads
1,652 |
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1.
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Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts
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Richard R. W. Brooks Yale University - Law School Claudia M. Landeo Northwestern University - School of Law Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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14 Jun 04
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08 Sep 09
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399 ( 19,277) |
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Richard R. W. Brooks Yale University - Law School Claudia M. Landeo Northwestern University - School of Law Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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17 Apr 09
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08 Sep 09
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74
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Abstract:
The operating agreements of many business ventures include clauses to facilitate the exit of joint owners. In so-called Texas Shootouts, one owner names a single buy-sell price and the other owner is compelled to either buy or sell shares at that named price. Despite their prevalence in real-world contracts, Texas Shootouts are rarely triggered. In our theoretical framework, sole ownership is more efficient than joint ownership. Negotiations are frustrated, however, by the presence of asymmetric information. In equilibrium, owners eschew buy-sell offers in favor of simple offers to buy or to sell shares and bargaining failures arise. Experimental data support these findings.
Exit Mechanisms for Joint Ownership Ventures, Texas Shootout Clauses, Buy-Sell Mechanisms, Shotgun Provisions, Russian Roulette Agreements, Put-Call Options, Cake-Cutting Rule, Bargaining with Common Values, Experiments, Ultimatum Exchange Environments with Endogenous Offer Types
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Richard R. W. Brooks Yale University - Law School Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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14 Jun 04
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17 Apr 09
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325
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Many partnership contracts (and other joint-venture agreements) include so-called "Texas Shootout Clauses" to govern future breakups. In a Texas Shootout, one partner names a single buy-sell price and the other partner has the option to buy or sell at that price. While the prior literature has considered the allocative efficiency of the Texas Shootout, this paper focuses on the incentives of private parties to make these offers to begin with. We consider a model where sole ownership is more efficient than joint ownership. Although both partners are equally capable, one has private information about the common value of the asset. When given the choice, they avoid making buy-sell offers because these offers give away bargaining surplus (the partners are "gun shy"). Instead, they often (but not always) prefer to make simple offers to buy or simple offers to sell and bargaining failures arise. Texas Shootout contracts that assign trigger rights - where one party can force the other to name a price - increase efficiency and are jointly desirable.
Partnerships, breakup, buy-sell provisions, Texas shootout, common values, bargaining failure
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2.
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Eric A. Posner University of Chicago - Law School Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School Adrian Vermeule Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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05 Jun 09
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17 Sep 09
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333 (24,220)
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The maxim “divide and conquer” (divide et impera) is invoked frequently in law, history, and politics, but often in a loose or undertheorized way. We suggest that the maxim is a placeholder for a complex of ideas related by a family resemblance, but differing in their details, mechanisms and implications. We provide an analytic taxonomy of divide and conquer mechanisms in the settings of a Stag Hunt Game and an indefinitely-repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. A number of applications are considered, including labor law, bankruptcy, constitutional design and the separation of powers, imperialism and race relations, international law, litigation and settlement, and antitrust law. Conditions under which divide and conquer strategies reduce or enhance social welfare, and techniques that policy makers can use to combat divide and conquer tactics, are also discussed.
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3.
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The Use of 'Most-Favored-Nation' Clauses in Settlement of Litigation
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Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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05 Nov 01
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04 Dec 03
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210 ( 40,578) |
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Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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26 Feb 03
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17 May 03
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Many settlement contracts in litigation involving multiple plaintiffs (or multiple defendants) include "most-favored-nation" (MFN) clauses. If an early settlement includes an MFN and the defendant settles later with another plaintiff for more money, the early settlers receive these terms too. If the defendant knows the aggregate distribution of expected awards but cannot discriminate among the privately informed plaintiffs, then MFNs avoid costly delay. Plaintiffs with weak cases settle early rather than on the courthouse steps. The effects of MFNs on the settlement terms, plaintiffs' welfare, litigation rates, and the defendant's ex ante incentives are considered and alternative explanations are explored.
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Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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05 Nov 01
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04 Dec 03
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210
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Many settlement agreements in lawsuits involving either multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants include so-called "most-favored-nation" clauses. If a defendant facing multiple claims, for example, settles with some plaintiffs early and settles with additional plaintiffs later for a greater amount, then the early settlers will receive the more favorable terms as well. These MFN provisions have been prominent in the recent MP3.com case, as well as tobacco litigation, class actions, and many antitrust lawsuits. This paper considers a defendant who is facing a large group of heterogeneous plaintiffs. Each plaintiff has private information about the (expected) award that he or she will receive should the case go to trial. MFN clauses are valuable because they commit the defendant not to raise his offer over time. This has two important effects. First, holding overall settlement rate fixed, MFNs encourage earlier settlement. Second, depending upon the distribution of plaintiff types, MFNs can either increase or decrease the overall settlement rate. Social welfare implications are discussed, and alternative theories, including the strategic use of MFNs to extract value from future plaintiffs, are explored.
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4.
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Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities
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Claudia M. Landeo Northwestern University - School of Law Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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Posted:
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21 Nov 07
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09 Sep 09
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167 ( 51,046) |
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Claudia M. Landeo Northwestern University - School of Law Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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22 Jun 08
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18 Jul 08
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This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude.
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Claudia M. Landeo Northwestern University - School of Law Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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21 Nov 07
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09 Sep 09
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166
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This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude.
Bargaining with Externalities, Contracting with Externalities, Experiments, Exclusive Dealing, Antitrust, Discrimination, Endogenous Payoffs, Communication, Coordination Games, Equilibrium Selection
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5.
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Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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09 Nov 07
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06 Sep 09
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138 (61,013)
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A manufacturer learns a product’s risks after it has been sold and distributed to consumers. When held strictly liable for product-related injuries, the manufacturer offers to repurchase the product when the risk exceeds a threshold. Consumers accept the offer when their private valuations of consumption are smaller than the buyback price. The manufacturer’s private incentives to stage a buyback are insufficient, the buyback price offered is too low, and the continued product usage by consumers is excessive. The ability of the manufacturer to repurchase the product ex post reduces the incentive to design safer products ex ante. A negligence rule, the “post-sale duty to warn,” implements the social welfare benchmark.
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6.
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Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation
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Xinyu Hua Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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Posted:
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14 Jun 04
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14 Aug 09
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106 ( 75,640) |
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Xinyu Hua Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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19 Dec 04
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14 Aug 09
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The information created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. Suppose a long-lived plaintiff is suing a defendant for damages sustained in an accident. The plaintiff may suffer similar damages in future accidents involving different defendants. Potential injurers update their beliefs after observing the first case and subsequently fine-tune their precautions to avoid accidents. The joint incentive of the plaintiff and the first defendant to create public information through litigation is too small. The optimal liability rule trades off providing future injurers with incentives to take precautions and providing the plaintiff with incentives to create information.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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Xinyu Hua Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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14 Jun 04
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19 Dec 04
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88
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The information that is created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. When economic agents learn about risks, they can fine-tune their future behaviors to mitigate these risks. Specifically, suppose that an injured plaintiff sues a defendant for damages sustained in an accident. In the future, the plaintiff may be harmed in similar accidents involving different defendants. The first lawsuit creates valuable information that the future defendants can use to fine-tune their investments in accident prevention. If the plaintiff and the first defendant are symmetrically uninformed about the true damages, their private incentive to litigate the first case is too small. If the plaintiff and the first defendant are asymmetrically informed, then the incentive to litigate the first case may be too large. The optimal liability rule trades off the need to provide defendants with incentives to take precautions and to provide the plaintiff with incentives to create valuable public information through litigation.
Litigation, Settlement, Externalities, Information, Liability, Incentives
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7.
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Yeon-Koo Che Columbia University Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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19 Oct 07
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18 Dec 07
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96 (81,276)
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This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single defendant and N plaintiffs when there are Fixed costs of litigation. When making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the plaintiffs, the defendant adopts a divide and conquer strategy. Plaintiffs settle their claims for less than they are jointly worth. The problem is worse when N is larger, the offers are sequential, and the plaintiffs make offers instead. Although divide and conquer strategies dilute the defendant's incentives, they increase the settlement rate and reduce litigation spending. Plaintiffs can raise their joint payoff through transfer payments, voting rules, and covenants not to accept discriminatory offers.
litigation, settlement, class actions, bargaining, divide and conquer, contracting with externalities
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8.
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Yeon-Koo Che Columbia University Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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14 Jul 08
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25 Jul 08
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75 (95,821)
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A liquidity-constrained entrepreneur needs to raise capital to finance a business activity that may cause injuries to third parties - the tort victims. Taking the level of borrowing as fixed, the entrepreneur finances the activity with senior (secured) debt in order to shield assets from the tort victims in bankruptcy. Interestingly, senior debt serves the interests of society more broadly: it creates better incentives for the entrepreneur to take precautions than either junior debt or outside equity. Unfortunately, the entrepreneur will raise a socially excessive amount of senior debt. Giving tort victims priority over senior debt holders in bankruptcy prevents over-leveraging but leads to suboptimal incentives. Lender liability exacerbates the incentive problem even further. A Limited Seniority Rule, where the firm may issue senior debt up to an exogenous limit after which any further borrowing is treated as junior to the tort claim, dominates these alternatives. Shareholder liability, mandatory liability insurance and punitive damages are also discussed.
the judgment-proof problem, strategic judgment proofing, capital structure, subordination, lender liability, limited seniority, shareholder liability
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9.
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Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School James D. Dana Jr. Northeastern University - Department of Economics
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01 Oct 09
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19 Oct 09
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50 (118,849)
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By bundling experience goods, a manufacturer can more easily maintain a reputation for high quality over time. Formally, we extend Klein and Lefler's (1981) repeated moral hazard model of product quality to consider multi-product firms and imperfect private learning by consumers. When consumers are small, receive imperfect private signals of product quality, and have heterogeneous preferences over available products, then purchasing multiple products from the same firm makes consumers more effective monitors of the firm's behavior. These consumers observe more signals of firm behavior and detect shirking with a higher probability, which creates stronger incentives for the firm to produce high quality products. By constraining all of the firm's consumers to use more effective monitoring and punishment strategies, bundling creates an even stronger incentive for a multi-product firm to produce high quality products. The impact of bundling on incentives is even greater when consumers cannot identify which of the goods is responsible for poor overall product performance.
experience goods, product quality, reputation
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Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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07 Jun 02
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18 Nov 05
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23 (158,762)
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This paper considers settlement negotiations between one defendant and two plaintiffs when the defendant's assets are limited. Bargaining externalities exist: the acceptance of a settlement offer by one plaintiff may either increase or decrease the other plaintiff's expected payoff at trial. Negotiations fail when the two plaintiffs bargain independently of one another and their payoffs at trial are sufficiently correlated. Collective bargaining, where the plaintiffs accept offers that are in their mutual interest, leads to higher private and social welfare. For intermediate degrees of correlation, collective bargaining shifts bargaining surplus from the plaintiffs to the defendant. For low degrees of correlation, collective bargaining shifts surplus from the defendant to the plaintiffs. (Risk dominance is used to refine the set of equilibria in this last case.) The desirability of plaintiff opt-outs, limited-fund class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), and Chapter 11 bankruptcy law are discussed.
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11.
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Richard R. W. Brooks Yale University - Law School Claudia M. Landeo Northwestern University - School of Law Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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10 Jul 09
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Last Revised:
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15 Sep 09
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19 (170,094)
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Abstract:
The operating agreements of many business ventures include clauses to facilitate the exit of joint owners. In so-called Texas Shootouts, one owner names a single buy-sell price and the other owner is compelled to either buy or sell shares at that named price. Despite their prevalence in real-world contracts, Texas Shootouts are rarely triggered. In our theoretical framework, sole ownership is more efficient than joint ownership. Negotiations are frustrated, however, by the presence of asymmetric information. In equilibrium, owners eschew buy-sell offers in favor of simple offers to buy or to sell shares and bargaining failures arise. Experimental data support these findings.
Exit Mechanisms for Joint Ownership Ventures, Texas Shootout Clauses, Buy-Sell Mechanisms, Shotgun Provisions, Russian Roulette Agreements, Put-Call Options, Cake-Cutting Rule, Bargaining with Common Values, Experiments, Ultimatum Exchange Environments with Endogenous Offer Types
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12.
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Bruce L. Hay Harvard Law School Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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20 Dec 04
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14 Aug 09
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18 (172,894)
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Should the manufacturer of a product be held legally responsible when a consumer, while using the product, harms someone else? We show that if consumers have deep pockets then manufacturer liability is not economically efficient. It is more efficient for the consumers themselves to bear responsibility for the harms that they cause. If homogeneous consumers have limited assets, then the most efficient rule is "residual-manufacturer liability" where the manufacturer pays the shortfall in damages not paid by the consumer. Residual-manufacturer liability distorts the market quantity when consumers' willingness to pay is correlated with their propensity to cause harm. It distorts product safety when consumers differ in their wealth levels. In both cases, consumer-only liability may be more efficient.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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Steven Shavell Harvard Law School Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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25 Apr 98
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08 May 00
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15 (181,535)
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This paper explores the power of threats in the absence of binding commitment. The threatener cannot commit to carrying out the threat if the victim refuses payment, and cannot commit to not carrying out the threat if payment is made. If exercising the threat is costly to the threatener, then the threat cannot succeed in extracting money from the victim. If exercising the threat would benefit the threatener, however, then the threat's success depends upon whether the threat may be repeated. In the equilibrium of a finite-period game, the threat is carried out and the victim makes no payments. In an infinite-horizon game, however, it is an equilibrium for the victim to make a stream of payments over time. The expectation of future payments keeps the threatener from exercising the threat.
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14.
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Yeon-Koo Che Columbia University Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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21 Jul 08
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14 Jul 09
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3 (211,708)
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Abstract:
A liquidity-constrained entrepreneur needs to raise capital to finance a business activity that may cause injuries to third parties -- the tort victims. Taking the level of borrowing as fixed, the entrepreneur finances the activity with senior (secured) debt in order to shield assets from the tort victims in bankruptcy. Interestingly, senior debt serves the interests of society more broadly: it creates better incentives for the entrepreneur to take precautions than either junior debt or outside equity. Unfortunately, the entrepreneur will raise a socially excessive amount of senior debt. Giving tort victims priority over senior debtholders in bankruptcy prevents over-leveraging but leads to suboptimal incentives. Lender liability exacerbates the incentive problem even further. A Limited Seniority Rule, where the firm may issue senior debt up to an exogenous limit after which any further borrowing is treated as junior to the tort claim, dominates these alternatives. Shareholder liability, mandatory liability insurance and punitive damages are also discussed.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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Kathryn E. Spier Harvard University - Harvard Law School
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10 May 00
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29 Feb 08
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
An injurer undertakes precautions to reduce both the probability and the severity of an accident. The damages that the victim suffers are privately observed, and will be verified at a cost if the case is litigated. While finely tuned damage awards induce the injurer to take appropriate precautions ex ante, they increase the probability that the litigants will disagree about the case, and thereby aggravate the settlement process. Flat damage awards reduce the level of costly litigation, but lead to underinvestment in precautions. We show that when the litigation costs are small the optimal award is finely tuned to the actual damages, and when litigation costs are large the optimal award is a flat penalty. Applications to scheduled damages and workers' compensation are discussed.
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