• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
In this chapter for a comprehensive volume on political economy, the authors survey key work in the positive political theory tradition and its impact on the study of law and judicial politics. They consider, in particular, the influence of positive political theory on the study of statutory interpretation, administrative law, and judicial independence. This chapter draws upon the recent literature and aims, as well, to synthesize into some discernible themes a broad body of work within the positive political theory framework.

positive political theory, statutory interpretation, administrative law, judicial independence

Abstract:
Several prominent scholars use results from social choice theory to conclude that legislative intent is meaningless. We disagree. We support our argument by showing that the conclusions in question are based on misapplications of the theory. Some of the conclusions in question are based on Kenneth Arrow's famous possibility theorem. We identify a substantial chasm between what Arrow proves and what others claim in his name. Other conclusions come from a failure to realize that applying social choice theory to questions of legislative intent entails accepting assumptions such as legislators are omniscient and legislators have infinite resources for changing law and policy. We demonstrate that adding more realistic assumptions to models of social choice theory yields very different theoretical results - including ones that allow meaningful inferences about legislative intent. In all of the cases we describe, important aspects of social choice theory were lost in the translation from abstract formalisms to real political and legal domains. When properly understood, social choice theory is insufficient to negate legislative intent.

Statutory interpretation, legislative intent, general possibility theorem, game theory

Abstract:
To address the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie choices made after receiving information from an anonymous individual, reaction times (Experiment 1) and event-related brain potentials (Experiment 2) were recorded as participants played 3 variants of the Coin Toss game. In this game, participants guess the outcomes of unseen coin tosses after a person in another room (dubbed "the reporter") observes the coin toss outcomes and then sends reports (which may or may not be truthful) to participants about whether the coins landed on heads or tails. Participants knew that the reporter's interests either were aligned with their own (Common Interests), opposed to their own (Conflicting Interests), or opposed to their own but that the reporter was penalized every time he or she sent a false report about the coin toss outcome (Penalty for Lying). In the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions, participants followed the reporter's reports over 90% of the time, in contrast to less than 59% of the time in the Conflicting Interests condition. Reaction time results indicated that participants took similar amounts of time to respond in the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions and that they were reliably faster than in the Conflicting Interests condition. Event-related potentials (ERPs) timelocked to the reporter's reports revealed a larger P2, P3, and LPC response in the Common Interests condition than in the other two, suggesting that participants' brains processed the reporter's reports differently in the Common Interests condition, relative to the other two conditions. Results suggest that even when people behave as if they trust information, they consider communicative efforts of individuals whose interests are aligned with their own to be slightly more informative than those of individuals who are made trustworthy by an institution, such as a penalty for lying.

trust, communication, game theory, social neuroscience, institution, learning, P3, lying, penalty, experiment, ERP, EEG, brain, cognition

Abstract:
City, county and municipal ballot propositions are often used to raise funds for new infrastructure projects. We discuss three challenges facing the use the initiative and referendum process to fund local infrastructure projects; these problems suggest that we cannot be confident that voters have been able to make decisions that best serve their interests. We do not conclude that such difficulties are necessarily fatal to the use of direct democracy, but our analysis has consequences for the regulatory structure that shapes this process in cities, counties and special districts.

First, public agencies can make take-it-or-leave-it offers to voter. Voters do not have the ability to amend a bond proposal to move it closer to their preferences; they face a binary choice between either the status quo or the particular bond on the ballot. This type of decision making confers substantial power on the agenda setter and may result in an outcome that does not match the preferences of the median voter. This may be exacerbated by low voter turnout that characterizes many purely local elections where bond measures are decided.

Second, several common social choice problems can arise when sophisticated political actors manipulate the initiative agenda. One of the most pernicious of the problems they identify is that of sequential elimination agendas. The core problem with sequential elimination agendas is that they do not allow citizens to directly compare all of the alternatives and, therefore, do not allow them to make tradeoffs among their options. The typical problems created by sequential elimination agendas, suffered by state-level initiatives as well as local ballot propositions, are further compounded by two related aspects of local bond measures: limits on bond capacity created by state law, bond rating agencies or voters' (un)willingness to be taxed; and the presence of overlapping governmental authorities that can each propose bond measures to voters. The race for tax revenue can create a situation where bonds cannot be passed when they are needed; instead, funding is already allocated to unneeded or unwanted projects that were approved at an earlier election (i.e., earlier in the agenda).

Third, we find that voters can be faced with an information environment that precludes their making reasoned choices at the ballot box. For voters to make a reasoned choice that can improve their welfare, they must have correct beliefs about the consequences of their vote. Occasionally, voters may be able to identify the consequences of their vote on the basis of personal knowledge and experience, but they usually lack such information. In that case, voters must be able to learn from someone else - a knowledgeable, trustworthy endorser. They can then cast a reasoned vote, not depending on their own encyclopedic knowledge of a policy or their independent assessment of the merits of the argument, but using reliable cues provided by a knowledgeable, trusted endorser. In a series of case studies from Los Angeles and San Francisco, we find very mixed information environments for local bond measures, some which may allow voters to learn about the consequences of their decisions through trustworthy endorsements, and others where those important voting cues are few or nonexistent.

Abstract:
In this paper, we address a question that is hotly debated in the legal literature: How should judges interpret statutes? By way of an answer, we begin with two premises: 1) statutory interpretation is a quest by judges to determine what statutes mean, and 2) statutes are communications from a constitutionally-authorized legislature to those who are obligated to implement, enforce, or follow the law. We then argue that scientific propositions about human communication can help judges to determine what a statute's authors meant when they chose to include (or not to include) particular words in a piece of legislation. Specifically, we draw upon well-known communication theories, which emphasize that successful inference about meaning requires that the manner in which a communication is decoded relate to aspects of its manufacture in particular ways. What this insight suggests for scholars of statutory interpretation (and for judges interpreting statutes) is that discerning the meaning of any piece of legislation requires an understanding of the ways that such legislation was manufactured throughout the legislative process. This insight also provides important clues about the kinds of informational sources that can be useful to those who want to clarify the meaning of a statute.

statutory interpretation, communication, legislation, statute, intentionalism

Abstract:
In this paper, we discuss and debunk the four most common critiques of the rational choice research program (which we prefer to call Positive Political Theory) by explaining and advocating its foundations: the rationality assumption, component analysis (abstraction), strategic behavior, and theory building, in turn. We argue that the rationality assumption and component analysis, properly understood, can be seen to underlie all social science, despite the protestations of critics. We then discuss the two ways that PPT most clearly contributes to political science (i.e., what distinguishes it from other research programs), namely the introduction of strategic behavior (people do not just act; they interact) and PPT's more careful attention to the theory-building step within the scientific method. We explain the roles of theory-building and of empirical "testing," respectively, in scientific inquiry, and the criteria by which theories should and should not be judged.

rational choice, positive political theory, rationality assumption, strategic behavior, theory-building

Abstract:
The promise of deliberation in small-group settings is a key theme in the modern political theory of public decisionmaking. Scholars of various stripes have insisted that social welfare can be enhanced - indeed, considerably enhanced - by procedures that are discursive and deliberative. This hypothesis has seldom, however, been tested empirically. More often than not, the case for deliberation as a means for welfare-enhancement is defended on purely theoretical grounds. Frequently, the argument rests on exclusively normative assertions, such as the view that collections of individuals in should communicate candidly with one another in order to increase the information available within the group and to expand the feasible set of desirable policies. On other occasions, scholars advance the argument that deliberation will occur and will improve social welfare. These latter arguments, we show, rest on dubious empirical bases. Through experiments, we raise doubts about the empirical case for deliberation. And, in the end, we question whether any of the theories and results that support deliberation as an element in a fruitful decisionmaking process can be separated from "expertise" systems, systems more characteristic of the modern administrative state.

deliberation, cemocratic decisionmaking, experimental

Abstract:
The 'Rule of Law' is a venerable concept, but, on closer inspection, is a complex admixture of positive assumptions, occasionally wishful thinking, and inchoate political and legal theory. While enormous investment has been made in rule of law reformism throughout the world, advocates of transplanting American-style legal and political institutions to developed and developing countries in the world are often unclear about what they are transplanting and why they are ambitiously doing so. Scholars clearly have more work to do in understanding the rule of law and designing institutions to realize the objectives for which this grand project is intended.

In this paper, we revisit the concept of the rule of law in order to help unpack the theoretical and operational assumptions underlying scholarship and reform efforts. We do so from the perspective of legal and positive political theory; and we interrogate various institutional devices (such as constitutionalism and the independent judiciary) in order to shed light on how the construct of the rule of law is being put into service on behalf of cross-national reform initiatives.

rule of law

Abstract:
Focuses on the theory of political control and government agency discretion in the United States. Process of policy execution; Definition of agency discretion; Roles of players in determination of policy.

delegation, agency loss, congress, bureaucracy

Abstract:
Professors Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. McCubbins and Daniel B. Rodriguez assert that judges need not search for the legislature's actual intent in order to interpret a statute. Instead, judges should ask what statutes mean. Because legislatures are collectivities, it makes little sense to try to discern their actual intent. Rather, the authors borrow from cognitive science and philosophy, both of which emphasize that humans regularly impute intentions to collectivities to figure out the meaning of their actions. The authors then argue that judges should concern themselves with this metaphorical intent when interpreting statutes. In this way, the focus of the statutory interpretation debate should shift from intent to meaning, and judges should properly turn to trustworthy extrinsic aids to inform their interpretations of statutes.

statutory interpretation

Abstract:
In the modern debate over statutory interpretation, scholars frequently talk past one another, arguing for one or another interpretive approach on the basis of competing, and frequently undertheorized, conceptions of legislative supremacy and political theory. For example, so-called new textualists insist that the plain meaning approach is compelled by the U.S. Constitution and rule of law values; by contrast, theorists counseling a more dynamic approach often reject the premise of legislative supremacy that is supposed by the textualist view. A key element missing, therefore, from the modern statutory interpretation debate is a conspicuous articulation of the positive and empirical premises underlying the normative theory of interpretation; and, in particular, an unclear portrait of the theory of lawmaking supporting the theory of interpretation.

In this paper, we consider statutory interpretation from the perspective of positive political theory (PPT) looking, first, at the best framework for understanding the relationship between duly authorized lawmakers and the judge/interpreters. We build upon the modern literature of communication theory to support the familiar view that a statute is best understood as an act of communication by the legislature to an audience. PPT helps us to draw various lessons for modern interpretation debates from this assumption. We consider several of these lessons in our paper, and we focus especially on the hoary debate over the use and utility of legislative history in construing ambiguous statutory language.

statutory interpretation, positive political theory, political economy of legislation

Abstract:
In this article, we consider the impact of positive political theory on legislative interpretation and, in particular, the debate over interpretive canons. Our vehicle for this consideration is the appropriations canon. By virtue of this canon, courts construe narrowly legislative changes to statutes made through the appropriations process. We consider the underlying logic and rationale of this canon - essentially, that the appropriations process is unrepresentative and insufficiently deliberative - and use this analysis to investigate, more broadly, the processes of canonical construction in the modern statutory interpretation jurisprudence. Canonical construction, we argue, must be attentive to the equilibrium effects of judicial approaches and, moreover, it must be based upon a normatively compelling theory of lawmaking and the legislative process. The appropriations canon fails both of these tests; and, in its structure, it reveals some of the weaknesses of the contemporary reliance on canons to illuminate statutory meaning.

positive politcal theory, legislative interpretation, legislative canons, appropriations process, statutory interpretation

Abstract:
Many scholars debate whether a competition between experts in legal, political, or economic contexts elicits truthful information and, in turn, enables people to make informed decisions. Thus, we analyze experimentally the conditions under which competition between experts induces the experts to make truthful statements and enables jurors listening to these statements to improve their decisions. Our results demonstrate that, contrary to game theoretic predictions and contrary to critics of our adversarial legal system, competition induces enough truth-telling to allow jurors to improve their decisions. Then, when we impose additional institutions (such as penalties for lying or the threat of verification) upon the competing experts, we observe even larger improvements in the experts’ propensity to tell the truth and in jurors’ decisions. We find similar improvements when the competing experts are permitted to exchange reasons for why their statements may be correct.

competition, expert testimony, juror, adversarial legal system, decision making, institution, trust

Abstract:
The institutions that define the sequence of delegations that democracy entails have systematic effects on public policy. Democratic states that systematically provide public goods are typically seen as having three characteristics: they are decisive; they have the administrative capacity to implement whatever decisions they make; and they are only responsive to broad public interests. We investigate the two primary ways in which democratic states are said to fail in this regard: through an inability to decide or to pursue a consistent policy; and through the excessive influence of interest groups, which reduces public policy to an allocation of pork and a chase after rents. The first is a problem of state indecisiveness, the latter a defect in the nature of accountability, with too much responsiveness to special interests and too little responsiveness to general interests.

More specifically, we argue that political actors' incentives are significantly influenced by the rules regulating electoral competition, while their capabilities are determined jointly by their electoral success and the constitutionally stipulated powers of the various governmental posts that are at stake (either directly or indirectly) in elections. Different combinations of capabilities and incentives--Are governmental powers separated, with different actors controlling different institutional veto points? Are governmental powers unified in a single post or body, with a single actor controlling that post or body?--systematically affect the degree to which the state can act decisively and the degree to which it is responsive to broad public as opposed to narrow special interests.

Economic Policy, institutions, policy outcomes, incentives, capabilities, veto players, public goods

Abstract:
The initiative process was created originally to enable citizens to enact public policy directly and in so doing to overturn the dominion of interest groups and of state and local party machines. In recent years, initiatives have been thought to serve as a check on legislative authority and to provide the people with a means to pressure the legislature into adopting more public regarding policies. Indeed, the general consensus emerging from the most recent academic research is that, at their worst, initiatives are benign, while at their best, they serve to further the interests of electoral majorities.

A few scholars, however, have found reason to pause in their celebration of the initiative, finding shortcomings in its process, its outcomes, or both. In this paper we argue that initiatives will only infrequently improve the public's welfare. We begin with a survey of the basic social choice and public choice critiques of the initiative process. We argue that, despite recent rigorous scholarly attention as to the effects of initiatives, we find little reason yet to reject the social and public choice criticisms of policy making via direct democracy. We then offer a series of anecdotes about the rise of crypto-initiatives, which are initiatives that use direct democracy as an instrument to achieve non-policy related goals. Finally, we conclude that the problems inherent in the initiative process are being magnified by the increase in crypto-initiatives and the rise of the crypto-political machines, the new 527 PACs, that sponsor them. Increasingly, the public welfare may be only an incidental consideration in the sponsorship, passage and implementation of initiatives. This in turns implies that we consider anew limiting or amending the initiative process.

initiatives, public policy, legislative authority, policymaking, social choice, public choice, direct democracy, crypto-intiatives, political machines, political action committee

Abstract:
We test the public policy impact of court decisions relative to Congress and the executive by examining the FDA's proposals to regulate tobacco products. To measure impact we utilize an event study methodology that measures how a court decision affects the returns of selected publicly traded firms. This approach allows us to sort out the decisiveness of court decisions that occur in the shadow of the executive and congressional power, as well as to sort out the power of judges within the judicial hierarchy. We find that courts, including District Courts, have the ability to affect significantly the expected profits of firms.

regulation, political economy, food and drug

Abstract:
Networks can affect a group's ability to solve a coordination problem. We utilize laboratory experiments to study the conditions under which groups of subjects can solve coordination games. We investigate a variety of different network structures, and we also investigate coordination games with symmetric and asymmetric payoffs. Our results show that network connections facilitate coordination in both symmetric and asymmetric games. Most significantly, we find that increases in the number of network connections encourage coordination even when payoffs are highly asymmetric. These results shed light on the conditions that may facilitate coordination in real-world networks.

networks, coordinatinon, experiments, human behavior

Abstract:
We investigate the extent to which legislators can use institutional design to adapt the the challenges presented by the complexity of policy making. In so doing, we produce new and more general conclusions about the consequences of institutional design for democratic decision-making and conclude that, in general, democracy can work.

institutional design, law-making, policy making, democracy, bureaucracy, acountability

Abstract:
Many scholars propose deliberation as a remedy for our uninformed citizenry. Specifically, scholars emphasize that exposing citizens to the views of competing experts and then letting them discuss those views will help citizens to learn about politics and make informed decisions. In this paper, we analyze experimentally the conditions under which competition between experts induces the experts to make truthful statements and enables citizens to improve their decisions. Our results demonstrate that, contrary to our theoretical predictions, competition induces enough truth-telling to allow subjects to achieve modest improvements in their decisions. Then, when we impose even weak institutions (such as small penalties for lying or slim chances of verification) upon the competing experts, we observe dramatic improvements in both the experts' propensity to tell the truth and in subjects' decisions. We find similar improvements when the competing experts are permitted to exchange reasons for why their statements may be correct. Thus, both institutions and the exchange of reasons help competition between experts to function more effectively.

deliberation, learning, competition, experts, experiment, competence

Abstract:
This essay defends the view that committee government is best thought of as a decentralized form of party government over a wide range of congressional history. We stress the following points. First, consistent with the notion of conditional party government, more homogeneous majority parties have systematically undertaken larger substantive agendas. Second, throughout all periods of congressional history from the end of Reconstruction to the present, the majority party has maintained a secure grip on the floor agenda. Third, the extremely low rates at which the majority party loses, when it attempts to prevent either the appearance of a bill on the floor agenda or a bill's final passage, has important consequences for how we understand phenomena such as the Conservative Coalition. Fourth, the majority's ability to keep things off the floor agenda has important policy implications.

party government, congress, legislative agenda, congressional history

Abstract:
The following analysis is an attempt to better understand the processes and implications of agenda control within the U.S. Senate. In particular, we study the extent to which the Senate majority party exercises negative agenda control—the ability to prevent bills that the party dislikes from being approved by the Senate. We look at Senate originated bills and executive nominations that make it to the chamber floor for a final passage vote. The cartel agenda model presented by Cox and McCubbins (2001) provides the theoretical framework for our analysis (henceforth, we refer to this as the "cartel model"). We extend this model to the Senate, and perform tests similar to those presented in Cox and McCubbins' study of the lower House.

Senate, Agenda control, congress, cartel agenda model, parties

Abstract:
Legislatures around the world first delegate some of their policy making authority to experts and then accept their delegates' proposals without question or amendment. Many scholars see this combination of events as evidence that complexity lead elected representatives to lose control of the actions of government. While we agree that complexity and delegation can render legislatures powerless, we argue that legislators around the world can, and do, overcome these politically damaging forces. Specifically, we use a model of legislative behavior to show how both institutional characteristics and conditions that allow people to learn from others provide legislators with the faculty to protect their interests. We conclude that certain structural characteristics, such as those found in the United States Congress, allow ordinary legislators to exert considerable control over the actions of government and that other characteristics, such as those found in Britain and Japan, render most legislators relatively powerless.

legislatures, policy making, delegation, information, legislative decision making

Abstract:
Many scholars lament the increasing complexity of jury trials and question whether the testimony of competing experts helps unsophisticated jurors to make informed decisions. In this paper, we analyze experimentally the effects that the testimony of competing experts has on 1) sophisticated versus unsophisticated subjects' decisions and 2) subjects' decisions on difficult versus easy problems. Our results demonstrate that competing expert testimony, by itself, does not help unsophisticated subjects to behave as though they are sophisticated, nor does it help subjects make comparable decisions on difficult and easy problems. When we impose additional institutions (such as penalties for lying or a threat of verification) upon the competing experts, we observe such dramatic improvements in unsophisticated subjects' decisions that the gap between their decisions and those of sophisticated subjects closes. We find similar results when the competing experts exchange reasons for why their statements may be correct. However, these additional institutions and the experts' exchange of reasons are much less effective at closing the gap between subjects' decisions on difficult versus easy problems.

institution, expert, testimony, competition, jury, sophistication, adversarial, legal, trust

Abstract:
We argue that two problems weaken the claims of those who link corruption and the exploitation of natural resources. The first is conceptual. Studies that use national level indicators of corruption fail to note that corruption comes in many forms, at multiple levels, and may or may not affect resource use. Without a clear causal model of the mechanism by which corruption affects resources, one should treat with caution any estimated relationship between corruption and the state of natural resources. The second problem is methodological: Simple models linking corruption measures and natural resource use typically do not account for other important causes and control variables pivotal to the relationship between humans and natural resources. By way of illustration of these two general concerns, we demonstrate that the findings of a well known recent study that posits a link between corruption and decreases in forests, elephants, and rhinoceros are fragile to simple conceptual and methodological refinements.

Conservation policy, governance, corruption, elephants, forests, politics, environmental policy, biodiversity

Abstract:
Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to change unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investments governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible.

Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatory policies are based upon two political factors: regulatory predictability and regime stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory process, in which prices and levels of service are set, is not arbitrary. If the condition of regulatory predictability holds, then investors can forecast their returns over time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. If there is regime stability, then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the government regulates the industry- the most extreme type of change being the denial of property rights, or expropriation. We argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are, in turn, important determinants of regulatory predictability: agenda control, reversionary regulatory policy, and veto gates. Moreover, regime stability is also, in part, a function of these three characteristics. We examine our theory of political risk and regulatory commitment by comparing the cases of Argentine and Chilean electricity investment and regulation.

Utility regulation, Hold-up problem, political risk, regulatory commitment, regulatory predictability, Argentina, Chile

Abstract:
We find strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly zero, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20% on all final passage votes. Second, we find that, controlling for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree-conversion bills and budget bills that on ordinary bills - consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case.

Italy, Chamber of Deputies, Agenda Control, Roll Rates, Legislatures

Abstract:
In this article we explore the proposition that all majority governments in systems allowing joint tenure of legislative and executive posts constitute what we call parliamentary agenda cartels. We define what an agenda cartel is, describe how to detect cartels empirically, and provide background information on Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. We then provide evidence on the structure of veto power in Brazil and test the cartel thesis. We show that Brazil has experienced only one true majority government, that of Cardoso, since the promulgation of the newly democratic constitution in October 1988. Moreover, it is only under Cardoso that an agenda cartel formed.

agenda control, Camara dos Deputados, legislatures, legislative agenda, Brazil

Abstract:
Modern democracy requires delegation. One common problem with delegation is that principals and agents often have conflicting interests. A second common problem is that principals lack information about their agents. Many scholars conclude that these problems cause delegation to become abdication. We reject this conclusion and introduce a theory of delegation that supports a different conclusion. The theory clarifies when interest conflicts and information problems do (and do not) turn delegation into abdication. We conclude by arguing that remedies for common delegation problems can be embedded in the design of electoral, legislative, and bureaucratic
institutions. The culmination of our efforts is a simple, but general, statement about when citizens and legislators can (and cannot) control their agents.

delegation, abdication, principal-agent problem, information problems

Abstract:
In this paper we provide evidence from Japan that bears on a general theory of agenda power in legislatures. We look in particular at two questions: (1) How large is the government's agenda (i.e., how many bills does it seek to push through to enactment), as a function of opposition institutional power (control of upper house and lower house committee chairs)? (2) How controversial is the government's agenda— i.e., how many bills do opposition parties oppose—again as a function of opposition institutional power? Our results, based on analyses of the period 1977-96, show that the controversialness of the government's agenda in Japan declines when the opposition controls more lower-house committee chairs. Controversialness also declines—substantially—when the opposition holds a majority in the upper house. However, the size of the government's agenda, at least by our crude measure, is unaffected by changes in these two institutional features.

Japan, House of Representatives, agenda control, legislative agenda, legislatures

Abstract:
Before the "reapportionment revolution," decades of precedent held that the legislative district boundaries were not justiciable, no matter how little the districts reflected population distributions. In Baker v. Carr, a majority of justices declared for the first time that courts could indeed address these disparities. This Article evaluates the impact of these decisions on legislative politics and policymaking. We examine three indicators of change. In the first, we test the impact of two key reapportionment cases, Reynolds v. Sims and Wesberry v. Sanders, on policies favoring rural and urban interests (using event study methodology). Our analysis shows that these decisions shifted the benefits of public policy toward urban interests and away from rural interests. The second effect of reapportionment that we study is the relationship of Southern Democrats to the rest of the Democratic Party in the U.S. House of Representatives and in the U.S. Senate. In our third test, we examine the political changes wrought by a similar set of cases affecting the California legislature.

courts, congress, public policy, law, impact, reapportionment, elections

Abstract:
We empirically evaluate hypotheses following from the view that the motion to recommit in the U.S. House of Representatives empowers the minority party to affect policy. We show that these predictions are at sharp odds with observed behavior, suggesting that the motion to recommit does not undermine the majority party as has been argued.

motion to recommit, House of Representatives, Congress, Rules, majority party, minority party

Abstract:
In the face of voter-imposed tax limitations, local governments have adopted ever-more complex financial mechanisms to balance their budgets. Increasingly, municipalities in California have made use of special assessments to finance local infrastructure improvements and other vital government services. These assessments bill property owners for public goods and services in proportion to the "special benefits" that they receive. Because benefit assessments are constitutionally distinct from taxes, the growth in assessment financing has come partly as a direct response to increased constraints on the ability of local governments to raise general taxes. Our contention is that this growth should prove cause for concern due to the unusual combination of social choice pathologies to which special assessments fall vulnerable. Field interviews with public officials and the consultants they call on to help create these assessments suggest that special assessments can indeed pose special democratic problems.

Special benefit assessments, municipal finance, Proposition 13, agenda control, gerrymandering

Abstract:
In this Article, we focus on two complaints about initiatives that can be addressed through a new legal framework. First, some have argued that the policy choices made through direct democracy are often not socially optimal, and the processes through which initiatives are passed may make welfare-reducing decisions inevitable. Second, initiatives, once enacted, often fail to be implemented by government officials. In response to these two problems, we propose a new comprehensive framework of postqualification reforms that keeps both the spirit and intent of the initiative process: the Dual Path Initiative Process with a Citizens' Initiative Implementation Oversight Commission.

First, the Dual Path Initiative Framework includes three distinct stages for each initiative. The first stage occurs when only a brief description of the proposal, providing the purpose of the initiative and the general outline of the solution to be adopted, is circulated for signatures. This process is designed to gauge public support for the general objective of the proposal's backers. When sufficient signatures have been obtained and the process moves to the second stage, the proponents and legislature have the opportunity to draft legislative or constitutional language to submit to the people for a vote. During this second stage, lawmakers and ballot measure proponents can negotiate so that a compromise can be passed as a statute through the traditional legislative process or a mutually acceptable constitutional amendment can be submitted for a vote. Even if there is no agreement reached, this period provides flexibility so that drafting errors can be identified, likely consequences of the new policy can be assessed, and language can be revised. At the end of this time, if the proponents of change are not satisfied with the legislature's response, they can submit to the people a detailed proposal designed to advance the purpose of the originally-qualified brief policy. The third stage occurs after a popular initiative is enacted through a vote of the people. Popular constitutional initiatives will expire after ten years and must be re-enacted; popular statutory initiatives will also be less durable because the legislature may, after a period of time, amend or repeal any such initiative.

Second, we propose a Citizens' Initiative Implementation Oversight Commission (CIIOC) to ensure that enacted initiatives are faithfully implemented by state and local officials, who might otherwise work to obstruct or delay ballot measures they opposed. The CIIOC will include a representative named by each successful popular initiative, and it will have the ability to conduct hearings, produce reports, participate in administrative proceedings, and even pursue litigation. A statewide citizens' oversight commission is a novel reform, not currently used by any state.

Abstract:
Can voters stop governments from spending too much through the enactment of tax and expenditure limits (TELs), or do these laws become dead letters? We examine the effectiveness of TELs - one of the most frequent uses of the initiative process across the country - by viewing them as an attempted solution to a principal-agent problem. Voters are principals who want to constrain the spending habits of their agents, elected officials. Drawing on the lessons of the principal-agent literature yields two insights that structure our study. First, in order to evaluate the effects of TELs, we collect data that provides a comprehensive look at state finances for all 50 states. Our research design departs from much of the recent literature. Rather than simply analyzing state spending levels, we look at changes in combined state and local expenditures, money raised through charges and fees, state debt levels, and state credit ratings. We conduct time series analyses within states that change their fiscal institutions, rather than cross-sectional analyses across states with different rules and fiscal trends. We perform a pre-test by observing a state's fiscal behavior prior to the enactment of a TEL and a post-test by taking observations in the years after the treatment was applied. This allows us to isolate the effect of a TEL while holding other state characteristics constant, thus avoiding the endogeneity problem encountered by much of the previous literature. Our analysis includes an evaluation of whether or not TELs changed state finances as well as a more nuanced consideration of the scale of any such changes. Second, in order to predict which if any TELs will be most effective, we focus less on the letter of the law than on the conditions of its passage. While previous works emphasize the importance of specific legal provisions, we hypothesize that a TEL's success will be determined by the method through which it was passed, the preferences of the lawmakers that it attempts to bind, and the ease of amending the state's constitution.

tax and expenditure limits, state politics, initiative, referenda, state budget, taxation

Abstract:
Can voters stop state governments from spending at high rates through the enactment of tax and expenditure limits (TELs), or do these laws become dead letters? We draw upon the principal-agent literature to theorize that TELs - one of the most frequent uses of the initiative process across the country - may be circumvented by the sorts of elected officials who would inspire their passage.

In order to investigate our claim, we conduct an event study. First, we test for the effectiveness of TELs across states using a differences-in-differences model. Second, we dissect our treatment variable using different legal provisions of the limits to test whether there is a uniform effect across different types of TELs. Finally, we compare state fiscal patterns before and after adoption on a state-by-state basis. Using this simple approach and other methods, we show that TELs are largely ineffective, and that state officials can circumvent them by raising money through fees or borrowing. Our finding is consistent with recent studies showing that policies passed through direct democracy can often be thwarted by the politicians charged with implementing them.

tax and expenditure limits, initiatives, referenda, agency problems, state politics

Abstract:
The public policy benefits that parties deliver are allocated by democratic procedures that devolve ultimately to majority rule. Majority-rule decision make, however, does not lead to consistent policy choices; it is unstable. In this paper, we argue that institutions - and thereby policy coalitions - can be stabilized by extra-legislative organization. The rules of the Democratic Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives dictate that a requirement for continued membership is support on the floor of the Caucus decisions for a variety of key structural matters. Because membership in the majority party's caucus is valuable, it constitutes a bond, the posting of which stabilizes the structure of the House, and hence the policy decisions made in the House. We examine the rules of the House Democratic Caucus and find that they do in fact contain the essential elements of an effective, extralegislative bonding mechanism.

Political Parties, stability, instability, party government, House of Representatives, Congress, party caucus

Abstract:
Citizens use the initiative process to make new laws. Many winning initiatives, however, are altered or ignored after Election Day. We examine why this is, paying particular attention to several widely-ignored properties of the post-election phase of the initiative process. One such property is the fact that initiative implementation can require numerous governmental actors to comply with an initiative's policy instructions. Knowing such properties, the question then becomes: When do governmental actors comply with winning initiatives? We clarify when compliance is full, partial, or not at all. Our findings provide a template for scholars and observers to better distinguish cases where governmental actors' policy preferences replace initiative content as a determinant of a winning initiative's policy impact from cases where an initiative's content affects policy despite powerful opponents' objections. Our work implies that the consequences of this form of democracy are more predictable, but less direct, than often presumed.

initiative process, elections, direct democracy, voting, referenda, initiatives

Abstract:
We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties' (and not government parties') roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties skyrocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 percent leftward under a leftist government.

Germany, Parliament, Bundestag, agenda control, legislative agenda, legislatures

Abstract:
We investigate the extent to which possessions of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regaurding regular annual appropriations legislation. The most important implication of our analysis is that the influence the veto conveys is asymmetrical: it allows the president to restrain Congress when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than Congress does; it does not provide him an effective means of extracting higher appropriations from Congress when he prefers to spend more than it does. This asymmetry derives from constitutional limitations veto, in combination with the presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level contained appropriations process (fenno, 1966). We find strong support for this proposition in a regression presidential requests upon congressional appropriations decisions.

Abstract:
Investigates the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding annual appropriations legislation in the United States. Spatial model of the appropriations process; Basic sequence of actions which constitute the annual funding process; Congressional limitations on the veto; Presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level in the appropriations process.

Congress, President, Veto, appropriations, expenditures

Abstract:
While much is known about citizens' decisions to trust others, much less is known about the cognitive mechanisms underlying these decisions. Thus, we analyze both the behavior and brain activity associated with these decisions by replicating well known experiments on trust with electroencephalograph (EEG) and timed-response technology. Although our behavioral results are consistent with previous research, our EEG results reveal something about trust that we do not learn from observing subjects' decisions and reaction times. Specifically, they demonstrate that subjects process information differently when it comes from someone who is trustworthy by virtue of sharing common interests versus someone who is made trustworthy by an external institution. This processing difference exists even though subjects are equally likely to base their decisions upon the statements of these two trustworthy individuals, and even though they take the same amount of time to make their decisions. Given these differences between subjects' behavior and brain activity, it appears that recording EEGs adds a new dimension to our understanding of subjects' decisions to trust the statements of others.

trust, institution, decision, EEG, neuroscience, experiment, reaction time, cognition

Abstract:
We analyze whether and when polls help citizens to improve their decisions. Specifically, we use experiments to investigate 1) whether and when citizens are willing to obtain polls and 2) whether and when polls help citizens to make better choices than they would have made on their own. We find that citizens are more likely to obtain polls when the decisions they must make are difficult and when they are unsophisticated. Ironically, when the decisions are difficult, the pollees are also uninformed and, therefore, do not provide useful information. We also find that when polls indicate the welfare-improving choice, citizens are able to improve their decisions. However, when polls indicate a choice that will make citizens worse off, citizens make worse decisions than they would have made on their own. These results hold regardless of whether the majority in favor of one option over the other is small or large.

poll, sophistication, voter, decision-making, heuristic, cue, experiment, majority, trust

Abstract:
For 38 years, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) maintained single-party control over the Japanese government. This lack of partisan turnover in government has frustrated attempts to explain Japanese government policy changes using political variables. In this paper, we look for intraparty changes that may have led to changes in Japanese budgetary policy. Using a simple model of agenda-setting, we hypothesize that changes in which intraparty factions "control" the LDP affect the party's decisions over spending priorities systematically. This runs contrary to the received wisdom in the voluminous literature on LDP factions, which asserts that factions, whatever their raison d'être, do not exhibit different policy preferences. We find that strong correlations do exist between which factions comprise the agenda-setting party "mainstream" and how the government allocates spending across pork-barrel and public goods items.

Liberal Democratic Party, Japan, budgetary policy, public goods, pork-barrel

Abstract:
Examines the consequences of the one man, one vote rule in congress, the courts and public policy. Analysis of the court-ordered congressional redistricting in the United States House of Representatives based on the one man, one vote rule; Policy changes attributable to the one man, one vote rule.

congress, courts, public policy, one man, one vote, redistricting

Abstract:
Rational choice models are commonly used in political science. However, many experimental results find humans do not behave as we would predict from simple rational choice models. In this paper we report on the result of experiments in which subjects both play a standard trust game and make predictions about other players in an experiment, thereby revealing information about how they expect others to behave in the experiment. We find that conditional on their beliefs, subjects play quite rationally in these games. The results suggest we need to understand individuals’ beliefs and knowledge when we model behavior in experimental and empirical settings.

Abstract:
This report suggests and justifies a simple approach to arms competitions, wherein arms competitions are viewed as disaggregated competition between pairs of weapons systems for executing mutually incompatible policy goals. This approach is derived from a decision theoretic model of armament choice, in which military decision makers make trade-offs between alternative strategies of weapons deployment to achieve national foreign policy objectives. Data representing a cross section of the U.S. and USSR military arsenals are employed in a quasi first-difference two-stage least squared analysis to provide evidence for the propositions of the model and this approach.

arms, arms competition, armament choice, foreign policy, United States, USSR

Abstract:
A hoary question in political science is what are political preferences and where do they come from? We argue that when people face multidimensional choices they must construct their preferences to cohere with their choice before they can make a decision. One implication of this theory is that individuals who can construct coherent preferences will be able to make their vote choice sooner. We make use of the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study to test this hypothesis and with it the theory of preference construction. With these data, we utilize Optimal Classification to derive our treatment variable: respondents’ level of preference coherence as measured by how well the OC algorithm classifies their responses to attitudinal survey questions. We then examine decision time in an ordered probit framework to generate our results. The findings offer significant support for our theory and have broad implications for the study of individual-level political decision-making.

preference formation, preference construction, voting, scaling

Abstract:
Survey research shows that voters know embarrassingly little about politics. Some scholars believe this finding demonstrates that democracy does not work. Politics is too remote and too complex for most voters to follow accurately and consistently. Others argue that voters do not need much information to make political decisions. Neither strand of research places political knowledge into context. We rectify this oversight by asking the following: How does voters’ knowledge about politics compare to their knowledge about things with which they have far more immediate, frequent, and intimate encounters? To answer our question, we use survey data collected during the 2008 presidential election to place political and consumer knowledge on a comparable scale. We find that voters know at least as much about politics as they know about everyday consumer and financial products. These results raise an important analytical question: If ill-informed individuals can make reasoned choices as consumers or investors, should we worry about those same individuals’ choices as voters?

political behavior, voter competence, political knowledge, consumer knowledge

Abstract:
Congressional scholars have frequently reported dramatic shifts in the mood of Congress federal spending. In seeking to explain these fluctuations in congressional moods, we develop and estimate an "electoral connection" model of the congressional appropriations process. In this appropriations decisions are seen to be the product of the responses of reelection-seeking members of Congress to the key political and economic variables in their environment. Analyses of appropriationsfor thirty-seven federal agaencies between fiscal yearsd 1948 and 1979 provided broad support for our hypotheses. First, Congress has been more generous in awarding appropriations during election years than nonelection years. Appropriations are also influenced by prevailing economic conditions. Higher unemployment leads to higher levels of appropriations, especially for public works agencies. Conversely, Congress has responded to high rates of inflation by holding down appropriations. And in other areas of public policy, parties matter: the larger the percentage of Democrats in the House of Representatives, the more funds agencies were appropriated. The strong emperical support garned by our electoral connection model thus adds some much needed balance to the conventional incrementalist view of federal government spending.

Abstract:
In this essay we model appropriations decisions as products of a bilateral bargaining game between reelection-minded president and Congress. The findings bear out the expectaion that the two sides jointly puruse a strategy of accomodation. In awarding appropriations, Congress takes into account the president's preferences embodied in the OMB's budget requests; these requests in turn reflected expectations of congressional action. The evidence also reveals that several important exogenous political and economic variables influence bith executive and legislative appropriations decisions.

Abstract:
While the delegation of policy-making authority from legislators to bureaucrats is ubiquitous in modern democracies, there is considerable disagreement about the consequences of this type of delegation. Some scholars point to the fact that bureaucrats tend to have policy-relevant expertise, assume that bureaucrats will use their expertise to systematically mislead legislators, and conclude that delegation and abdication are equivalent. Other scholars point to the extensive use of legislative oversight, assume that oversight is sufficient to abate the problems associated with bureaucratic expertise, and conclude that delegation produces more effective governance. We depart from previous scholarship by developing models of delegation and oversight that allow us to derive, rather than assume, conditions under which legislators can adapt successfully to bureaucratic expertise. With these conditions in hand, we identify conditions under which delegation to the bureaucracy produces more effective governance and conditions under which delegation and abdication are equivalent.

Abstract:
For a decade after the passage of the Second New Deal, political leaders and many important interest groups fiercely debated what procedural requirements, if any, should be imposed on the new regulatory agencies. This debate led eventually to the passage of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) of 1946. The purpose of this paper is to explain the significance of the various procedural requirements that were considered, and to develop and test a political theory of why some proposals were passed while others were rejected, and why a decade transpired before legislation could succeed. Although the APA typically is seen as a codification of individual rights in a system or procedural due process, we argue that to answer these questions requires understanding the policy consequences of alternative procedural reforms. Thus, we develop and test a political theory, based on the views of legislators about the proper role of the federal government in regulating business, that seeks to explain patterns of support and opposition to legislative reforms. We conclude that the dominant factor explaining these patterns is support for New Deal regulatory policy, and that the primary explanation for the failure of administrative reform proposals before World War II but their success later was the desire of New Deal Democrats to "hard wire" the policies of the New Deal against an expected Republican, anti-New Deal political tide in the late 1940s.