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Ross L. Watts's
Scholarly Papers
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27,373 |
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716 |
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1.
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The Relevance of the Value Relevance Literature For Financial Accounting Standard Setting
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Robert W. Holthausen University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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20 Oct 00
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11 Jan 02
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4,104 ( 374) |
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Robert W. Holthausen University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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02 Oct 01
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10 Jan 02
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We evaluate the literature that, for standard-setting purposes, assesses the usefulness of accounting numbers on their stock market value association. For several reasons we conclude the literature provides little insight for standard setting. First, the association criterion has no theory of accounting or standard setting supporting it. Standard setters' descriptions of their objectives and accounting practice are both inconsistent with the criterion. Important forces shaping accounting standards and practice are ignored. Second, many tests in the literature rely on valuation models that omit important factors and many studies do not provide links between valuation model inputs and accounting numbers. Finally, there are a variety of significant econometric issues in the studies.
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Robert W. Holthausen University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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20 Oct 00
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11 Jan 02
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4,104
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174
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Abstract:
We evaluate the literature that, for standard-setting purposes, assesses the usefulness of accounting numbers on their stock market value association. For several reasons we conclude the literature provides little insight for standard setting. First, the association criterion has no theory of accounting or standard setting supporting it. Standard setters' descriptions of their objectives and accounting practice are both inconsistent with the criterion. Important forces shaping accounting standards and practice are ignored. Second, many tests in the literature rely on valuation models that omit important factors and many studies do not provide links between valuation model inputs and accounting numbers. Finally, there are a variety of significant econometric issues in the studies.
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2.
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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20 Jan 03
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06 Jun 03
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4,051 (384)
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92
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This paper examines conservatism in accounting. Conservatism is defined as the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus losses. In its extreme form the definition incorporates the traditional conservatism adage: "anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses." Despite criticism from many quarters, including standard-setters, conservatism appears not only to have survived in accounting for many centuries, but also to have increased in the last 30 years. The paper lays out the various alternative explanations for conservatism: contracting; shareholder litigation; taxation and accounting regulation (e.g., SEC and FASB). It also summarizes the empirical evidence on the existence of conservatism and the extent to which it is consistent with the alternative explanations for conservatism. The evidence is consistent with both the existence of conservatism and its increase in recent years. Contracting and shareholder litigation explanations appear to be important in these results. The evidence on the effect of taxation and regulation is weaker, but is still consistent with those explanations playing a role. Earnings management could also produce some of the evidence on conservatism, but it is unlikely to be the major explanation. The explanations and evidence have important implications for accounting regulators (SEC and FASB). First, the contracting explanation implies that conservatism will exist even in the absence of formal contractual use of financial statements. As long as income and net asset measures have meaning and are used in a way that affects management's welfare, conservatism is likely to be an optimal accounting principle. Absent differential verifiability, financial measures such as income and net assets are likely to be subject to sufficient manipulation to render them meaningless. Second, recent FASB moves to apply rules such as mark-to-market without appropriate concern for verifiability are likely to be disastrous for the FASB and capital markets. Third, attempts to introduce unverifiable estimates of future cash flows into the financial statements are likely to just as disastrous.
Accounting Conservatism, Financial Reporting, Accounting Standard-setting, Contracting, Corporate Governance
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3.
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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06 Jun 03
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29 Jul 03
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3,455 (521)
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184
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Abstract:
This paper is the first in a two part series on conservatism in accounting. Part I examines alternative explanations for conservatism in accounting and their implications for accounting regulators. Part II summarizes the empirical evidence on conservatism, its consistency with alternative explanations and opportunities for future research. The evidence is consistent with conservatism's existence and, in varying degrees, the various explanations. Conservatism is defined as the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus losses. Its extreme form is the traditional conservatism adage: "anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses." Despite criticism, conservatism has survived in accounting for many centuries and appears to have increased in the last 30 years. The alternative explanations for conservatism are contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation, and accounting regulation. The evidence in Part II suggests the contracting and shareholder litigation explanations are most important. Evidence on the effects of taxation and regulation is weaker but consistent with those explanations playing a role. Earnings management could produce some of the evidence on conservatism, but cannot be the prime explanation. The explanations and evidence have important implications for accounting regulators. FASB attempts to ban conservatism in order to achieve "neutrality of information" without understanding the reasons conservatism existed and prospered for so long are likely to fail and produce unintended consequences. Successful elimination of conservatism will change managerial behavior and impose significant costs on investors and the economy in general. Similarly, researchers and regulators who propose the inclusion of capitalized unverifiable future cash flows in financial reports should consider the costs generated by their proposal's effect on managerial behavior.
Accounting Conservatism, Financial Reporting, Accounting Standard-setting, Contracting, Corporate Governance
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4.
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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27 Aug 03
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07 Nov 03
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2,845 (742)
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Abstract:
This paper is Part II in a two part series on conservatism in accounting. Part I examines alternative explanations for conservatism in accounting and their implications for accounting regulators (SEC and FASB). Part II summarizes the empirical evidence on the existence of conservatism, conservatism's increase over time and conservatism's alternative explanations. It also discusses opportunities for future research on conservatism. Conservatism is defined as the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus losses. In its extreme form the definition incorporates the traditional conservatism adage: "anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses." Despite criticism from many quarters, the formal evidence suggests conservatism not only exists in modern day financial reporting, it also suggests conservatism has increased in the last 30 years The empirical literature uses a variety of conservatism measures in time-series and cross-sectional tests of contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation, and accounting regulation explanations for conservatism. The tests' results suggest the importance of all four explanations. Two non-conservatism explanations (earnings management and the abandonment option) cannot individually or jointly explain the observed systematic understatement of net assets that is the hallmark of conservatism. Researchers should note that accounting's effects on managerial behavior play a central role in the evolution of both accounting and financial reporting. Assessing the relevance of an accounting method to financial statement users' decisions requires assessing managers' abilities to use that method to manipulate accounting numbers and commit fraud. The evidence on conservatism suggests asymmetric verifiability is critical to constraining manipulation and fraud.
accounting conservatism, financial reporting, accounting standard-setting, contracting, corporate governance
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Sugata Roychowdhury Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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20 Dec 04
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23 Jan 06
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2,163 (1,211)
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49
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When annual earnings are regressed on annual returns, the returns coefficient is higher when returns are negative. The difference between the coefficients of earnings on positive and negative returns is called asymmetric timeliness of earnings and, in the accounting literature, is used extensively as a conservatism measure. The objective of this paper is to investigate the relation between asymmetric timeliness and the market-to-book ratio (MTB), using a theory of accounting conservatism that reflects the role of accounting as observed in practice. Recent literature has focused on the negative relation between the two measures. Using our theory of conservatism, we predict and observe empirically that the relation between asymmetric timeliness over a period and MTB at the end of the period is positive when asymmetric timeliness is measured cumulatively over long horizons. Our paper further highlights that when asymmetric timeliness is measured over short periods not including the firm's IPO, it is dependent on the composition of equity value at the beginning of that period. This dependence is responsible for the negative association observed between asymmetric timeliness estimated over short periods and MTB at the end of the period. Our theory and empirical results further suggest that asymmetric timeliness is a better measure of total conservatism at a point in time when it is estimated cumulatively over multiple years preceding that time. Overall, our results are consistent with our theory that accounting does not record changes in rents and is asymmetrically timely in recording changes in separable asset values.
Conservatism, asymmetric timeliness, accruals, earnings management, international accounting, executive compensation, debt financing
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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15 Mar 01
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15 Mar 01
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1,936 (1,522)
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In this paper I propose explanations for conservatism in accounting and empirical tests of those explanations. Conservatism is defined as the degree to which profits are anticipated. The concept is hypothesized to have evolved from accounting's contracting role and to have been reinforced and influenced by regulation and increased legal liability. Avoidance of inappropriate distributions to claim holders appears to have been an important contracting reason for conservatism. Testable predictions for cross- sectional variation in conservatism are generated. Empirical tests for discriminating between contracting and regulatory influences are also proposed.
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7.
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The Information Role of Conservatism
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Ryan LaFond Barclays - Barclays Global Investors (BGI) Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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Posted:
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02 Aug 06
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19 Sep 07
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1,894 ( 1,600) |
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Ryan LaFond Barclays - Barclays Global Investors (BGI) Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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19 Sep 07
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19 Sep 07
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In this paper we argue that information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside equity investors generates conservatism in financial statements. Conservatism reduces the manager's incentives and ability to manipulate accounting numbers and so reduces information asymmetry and the deadweight losses that information asymmetry generates. This increases firm and equity values. Our empirical tests are consistent with our proposition that information asymmetry is significantly positively related to conservatism after controlling for other demands for conservatism. Further, our tests are more consistent with our prediction that changes in information asymmetry between equity investors lead changes in conservatism than the FASB's proposition that conservatism produces information asymmetry among equity investors. An important implication is that, if the FASB was successful in meeting their stated goal of eliminating conservatism, they would increase information asymmetry between investors, not reduce it. This outcome is inconsistent with the objectives of the Securities Acts.
Conservatism, Accounting Standards, Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, Securities Litigation
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Ryan LaFond Barclays - Barclays Global Investors (BGI) Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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02 Aug 06
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27 Apr 07
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1,894
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Abstract:
In this paper we argue that information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside equity investors generates conservatism in financial statements. Conservatism reduces the manager's incentives and ability to manipulate accounting numbers and so reduces information asymmetry and the deadweight losses that information asymmetry generates. This increases firm and equity values. Our empirical tests are consistent with our proposition that information asymmetry is significantly positively related to conservatism after controlling for other demands for conservatism. Further, our tests are more consistent with our prediction that changes in information asymmetry between equity investors lead changes in conservatism than the FASB's proposition that conservatism produces information asymmetry among equity investors. An important implication is that, if the FASB was successful in meeting their stated goal of eliminating conservatism, they would increase information asymmetry between investors, not reduce it. This outcome is inconsistent with the objectives of the Securities Acts.
Conservatism, Accounting Standards, Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, Securities Litigation
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Mozaffar Khan MIT Sloan School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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07 Mar 07
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03 Sep 09
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1,662 (2,025)
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We estimate a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism, examine its empirical properties as a metric, and illustrate applications by testing new hypotheses that shed further light on the nature and effects of conservatism. The results are consistent with the measure, C_Score, capturing variation in conservatism and also predicting asymmetric earnings timeliness at horizons of up to three years ahead. Cross-sectional hypothesis tests suggest firms with longer investment cycles, higher idiosyncratic uncertainty and higher information asymmetry have higher accounting conservatism. Event studies suggest increased conservatism is a response to increases in information asymmetry and idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Conservatism, Firm-Year Measure, Properties, Information Asymmetry, Litigation
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Karthik Ramanna Harvard University - Harvard Business School Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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08 Sep 07
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10 Jan 09
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915 (5,752)
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SFAS 142 requires firms to use fair-value estimates to determine goodwill impairments. Watts (2003) and Ramanna (2007) argue the unverifiable nature of those fair-value estimates gives firms discretion to manage impairments. We test this argument in a sample of firms with market indications of impairment (firms with book goodwill and market-to-book ratio below one). We find that the frequency of non-impairment in this sample is about 71%, and that non-impairment is increasing in financial characteristics predicted to be associated with greater unverifiable fair-value-based discretion. To investigate whether non-impairment is associated with managers producing on average better estimates of goodwill than the market, we test whether non-impairment increases in industries with higher average information asymmetries. We fail to find evidence consistent with this proposition.
goodwill impairment, fair-value accounting, SFAS 142
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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03 Feb 06
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10 Mar 06
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821 (6,847)
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This paper was commissioned for the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales Information for Better Capital Markets Conference held on December 19 & 20, 2005. It evaluates the effect of the market on financial reporting recognizing that financial reporting and accounting are only parts of a general reporting, financing and governance equilibrium. That equilibrium is affected by the political process, as well as by capital and other markets. I explain how and why both market and political forces have influenced accounting and financial reporting and provide examples of those influences. Further, I draw implications for accounting standard-setting bodies that desire to change the nature of accounting and financial outcomes. Finally, I predict the effects of the radical standard-setting changes proposed by the FASB and IASB.
Accounting, Standards, Financial reporting, FASB, Conservatism, Corporate governance
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11.
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Shyam Sunder Yale School of Management George J. Benston Emory University - Department of Accounting Douglas R. Carmichael City University of New York - Stan Ross Department of Accountancy Karim Jamal University of Alberta - Department of Accounting & Management Information Systems Theodore E. Christensen Brigham Young University - Marriott School of Management Robert H. Colson Grant Thornton LLP Stephen R. Moehrle University of Missouri at St. Louis - Accounting Area Shivaram Rajgopal University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business Thomas L. Stober University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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11 Oct 07
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29 Nov 07
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770 (7,559)
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Abstract:
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently issued a call for comment on a proposal to accept financial statements prepared in accordance with international financial reporting standards (IFRS) without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. Accounting researchers have attempted to assess the quality of IFRS using different methods and criteria. While we are skeptical of drawing direct conclusions about the SEC's proposal based on this research, there is adequate evidence that both IFRS and U.S. GAAP provide useful information to investors and other users of financial statements. Moreover, we see no conclusive research evidence that financial reports prepared using U.S. GAAP are better than reports prepared using IFRS. The prudent approach when faced with alternatives with no clear difference in quality is to promote competition among them, which supports adopting the SEC's proposal to permit foreign private issuers a choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. Therefore, to help improve U.S. and international GAAP through standards-setting competition, we recommend that the Commission also consider extending the choice of IFRS to U.S. companies, and require all companies to indicate clearly whether they are filing under U.S. GAAP or IFRS. Finally, we recommend that the Commission and its staff investigate and seek feedback on the educational consequences of its proposed actions. This attention will help educators better prepare future professionals to implement these proposed regulatory changes.
Financial Reporting, U.S. GAAP, IFRS, SEC, Reconciliation
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Karthik Ramanna Harvard University - Harvard Business School Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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21 May 08
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23 Mar 09
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608 (10,761)
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SFAS 142 requires managers to estimate reporting unit values to determine goodwill write-offs. Those estimates often use unverifiable discounted-future-cash-flows providing managers with more discretion than historically afforded in financial reporting. Ex post, managers can claim their unit value estimates were not realized due to factors outside their control, claims that are difficult to objectively falsify. In promulgating SFAS 142, standard setters assume managers, on average, use unverifiable discretion to convey private information on future cash flows; in contrast, agency theory predicts managers, on average, use unverifiable discretion opportunistically. We test these alternative hypotheses using a sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impairment. Our evidence, while consistent with agency theory, does not confirm the private information hypothesis.
agency theory, goodwill impairment, fair-value accounting, FASB, SFAS 142
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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21 Jul 06
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21 Jul 06
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605 (10,850)
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51
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An outline for a theory of financial statements is presented. Financial statements are viewed as products of both markets and political processes and the interactions among individuals and groups in these processes. Individuals are assumed to maximize their self-interests. Various hypotheses and data are provided to illustrate the theory. It relies heavily on theories of agency, economic regulation and public choice. At this stage, the theory has great promise in explaining the form and contents of financial statements. The theory contrasts with earlier normative theories of financial statements and offers an explanation for the forms they take.
Financial reporting, accounting theory
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Karim Jamal University of Alberta - Department of Accounting & Management Information Systems Robert H. Colson Grant Thornton LLP Robert J. Bloomfield Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management Theodore E. Christensen Brigham Young University - Marriott School of Management Stephen R. Moehrle University of Missouri at St. Louis - Accounting Area James A. Ohlson affiliation not provided to SSRN Stephen H. Penman Columbia University - Department of Accounting Gary J. Previts Case Western Reserve University - Department of Accountancy Thomas L. Stober University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy Shyam Sunder Yale School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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16 Apr 09
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04 Jun 09
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399 (19,226)
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Abstract:
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a call for comment on a proposal to adopt a Roadmap for potential use of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) by U.S. Companies. We comment on five key issues raised by the SEC proposal. First, we propose that the need for a global regulator is overstated. A global regulator is unlikely to help achieve the stated goals of comparability and consistency of financial reporting on a global basis. We favor allowing U.S. companies to choose use of U.S. GAAP or IFRS rather than mandating one global monopoly set of standards. Second, we agree that the focus on auditing is a very relevant issue that deserves more attention from standard setters. Gains from adopting principles based accounting standards such as IFRS are likely to be realized only if auditors are also principles based. Third, while we have serious concerns about governance and financing mechanisms of IASB, we recommend that all regulatory actions cannot be held to a standstill while structural changes are made to the IASB. Fourth, we are not in favor of requiring reconciliation schedules from U.S. companies using IFRS. We view such reconciliations as being costly and unnecessary. Fifth, we recommend that the SEC pay more explicit attention to the educational and professional judgment consequences of its proposals. This comment was developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the American Accounting Association and does not represent an official position of the American Accounting Association.
U.S. GAAP, IFRS, SEC, Reconciliation, Roadmap
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Robert J. Bloomfield Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management Theodore E. Christensen Brigham Young University - Marriott School of Management Karim Jamal University of Alberta - Department of Accounting & Management Information Systems Stephen R. Moehrle University of Missouri at St. Louis - Accounting Area James A. Ohlson affiliation not provided to SSRN Stephen H. Penman Columbia University - Department of Accounting Gary J. Previts Case Western Reserve University - Department of Accountancy Thomas L. Stober University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy Shyam Sunder Yale School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Robert H. Colson Grant Thornton LLP
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02 Aug 09
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05 Oct 09
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374 (20,905)
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Abstract:
Standard setters and most academics maintain that accounting standards ought to rest on a set of guiding principles stated explicitly in a “conceptual framework.” The FASB and IASB are currently involved in a project to refine conceptual framework documents developed earlier. At this point, it is not clear what their final product will look like; its defining characteristics as well as the substantive content can only be surmised. This paper addresses the issues that FASB and IASB face, including the question of what a conceptual framework should be all about. First, we suggest characteristics that a conceptual framework ought to exhibit. Most of these suggestions are based on our critique of the existing framework and the FASB-IASB work in progress. Second, we present a model framework that meets our criteria. We emphasize up front that this framework is quite explicit. It goes to the heart of what a framework document should do: it places specific restrictions on what constitutes admissible accounting standards. The purpose of our effort is to stimulate broad discussion of alternative approaches to foundational documents and to offer a specific example of such an alternative approach.
FASB, IASB, Conceptual Framework, Accounting Standards, Financial Reporting
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Robert H. Colson Grant Thornton LLP Robert J. Bloomfield Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management Theodore E. Christensen Brigham Young University - Marriott School of Management Karim Jamal University of Alberta - Department of Accounting & Management Information Systems Stephen R. Moehrle University of Missouri at St. Louis - Accounting Area James A. Ohlson affiliation not provided to SSRN Stephen H. Penman Columbia University - Department of Accounting Gary J. Previts Case Western Reserve University - Department of Accountancy Thomas L. Stober University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy Shyam Sunder Yale School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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04 Jul 09
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Last Revised:
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15 Oct 09
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231 (36,821)
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Abstract:
The FASB and the IASB recently issued a joint discussion paper entitled, Preliminary Views on Revenue Recognition in Contracts with Customers. The Boards requested comments on whether their proposed model for revenue recognition would improve the usefulness of the financial statement information for financial decision makers. This paper sets forth the AAA's Financial Accounting Standards Committee's responses to several of the Boards' specific questions. In summary, we support the Boards' proposed comprehensive revenue recognition standard based on the following options: (1) the customer consideration approach (based on initial contract price measurement); (2) no recognition of revenue at contract inception (by assigning the initial contract price to performance obligations); (3) allocation of the transaction price to multiple performance obligations based on the relative stand-alone prices of each performance obligation. We also recommend that the Boards carefully consider the following clarifications as they develop the final exposure draft. The definition of a contract should include the words legally enforceable to describe the contract. A performance obligation must be verifiable. While the transfer of an asset to the customer or the acceptance of a service by the customer normally signals the recognition of revenue, we encourage the Boards to carefully consider situations (like long-term construction or mining) when the completion of intermediate performance obligations could trigger revenue recognition prior to the transfer of title. Absent special consideration of these situations, companies may be forced to re-write contracts in sub-optimal ways in an effort to recognize revenue continuously throughout a long-term construction project or in the process of mining or farming. Consider the difficulties that may arise in allocating the initial transaction price to multiple performance obligation contracts when the individual performance obligations are not normally sold on a stand-alone basis.
Financial Accounting Standards Board, International Accounting Standards Board, Revenue Recognition, Contracts
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Stephen R. Moehrle University of Missouri at St. Louis - Accounting Area Thomas L. Stober University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy Robert J. Bloomfield Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management Theodore E. Christensen Brigham Young University - Marriott School of Management Robert H. Colson Grant Thornton LLP Karim Jamal University of Alberta - Department of Accounting & Management Information Systems James A. Ohlson affiliation not provided to SSRN Stephen H. Penman Columbia University - Department of Accounting Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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24 Jun 09
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27 Aug 09
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196 (43,364)
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Abstract:
The Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB's) and the International Accounting Standard Board's (IASB's) issued a joint Discussion Paper entitled, Preliminary Views on Financial Statement Presentation. The Boards are seeking comments on whether their proposed model for financial statement presentation would improve the usefulness of the financial statement information for financial decision makers. This paper sets forth the AAA's Financial Accounting Standards Committee's summary comments as well as responses to several of the Boards' specific objectives and principles-related questions. Overall, we believe that the model has several appealing qualities, but also has several potential problems. Many of the problems that we discuss related to potential learning impediments for users to adapt to the new presentation format.
Financial Accounting Standards Board, International Accounting Standards Board, Exposure Draft, Financial Statement Presentation
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George J. Benston Emory University - Department of Accounting Theodore E. Christensen Brigham Young University - Marriott School of Management Robert H. Colson Grant Thornton LLP Karim Jamal University of Alberta - Department of Accounting & Management Information Systems Stephen R. Moehrle University of Missouri at St. Louis - Accounting Area Shivaram Rajgopal University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business Thomas L. Stober University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy Shyam Sunder Yale School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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08 Feb 08
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01 Apr 08
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133 (62,754)
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Abstract:
The Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the American Accounting Association (the Committee) is charged with responding to requests for comments from standard-setters on issues related to financial reporting. The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) recently released for public comment, Proposed Changes to Oversight, Structure, and Operations of the FAF, FASB, and GASB (the proposal). Our commentary concerns four issues in the proposal which have the most relevance for accounting standard setting: 1. Reduce the size of the FASB from seven members to five; 2. Retain the FASB simple majority voting requirement; 3. Realign the FASB composition; and 4. Provide the FASB Chair with decision-making authority to set the FASB technical agenda. We disagree with all four of these proposals. The current FASB is set up consistent with a political appointment model rather than a model designed to create an independent standard setting board. The four proposals put forth by the FAF increase the political nature of the FASB, further concentrate decision making power, and make it difficult to get general acceptance of accounting standards. We propose that the FAF move in the opposite direction. In particular, we recommend that the FAF not reduce the FASB size, and adopt a supermajority requirement not a simple voting requirement. If the majority cannot convince other members of the FASB about their views, how can we attain general acceptance of accounting standards in society? We also want a FASB that is open to more diverse views and more democratic. We urge the FAF to increase its engagement with the accounting community instead of becoming more elitist and further concentrating power in the hands of a powerful chairman and a small standard setting board.
FAF, FASB
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19.
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Karim Jamal University of Alberta - Department of Accounting & Management Information Systems Robert J. Bloomfield Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management Theodore E. Christensen Brigham Young University - Marriott School of Management Robert H. Colson Grant Thornton LLP Stephen R. Moehrle University of Missouri at St. Louis - Accounting Area James A. Ohlson affiliation not provided to SSRN Stephen H. Penman Columbia University - Department of Accounting Gary J. Previts Case Western Reserve University - Department of Accountancy Thomas L. Stober University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy Shyam Sunder Yale School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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07 Jul 09
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Last Revised:
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16 Oct 09
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123 (67,424)
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Abstract:
The Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) issued an exposure draft on a proposal to adopt a separate 'Made in Canada' GAAP for private enterprises. This new GAAP is justified as being consistent with the current FASB/IASB conceptual framework, but as being responsive to the different cost/benefit considerations facing private entities vis-à-vis public entities. We viewed this proposal as being innovative and responsive to the differential financial reporting needs of private entities. We proposed that the AcSB should develop a separate conceptual framework to guide the future evolution of this new GAAP and not rely only on cost-benefit considerations. We sketched a preliminary conceptual framework that could be used to develop and justify the type of changes proposed in this exposure draft. We then responded to the specific questions asked in the exposure draft and were very supportive of the concepts proposed. First, we support the proposed GAAP which is based on historical cost with very minimal reliance on fair values. Second, we expressed agreement with the proposal to reduce the amount of required disclosures for private enterprises given their significant economic differences from public companies. Third, we agreed with the proposal to drop provision of significant guidance and especially (ex-post) emerging issues committee interpretations (EIC’s). We are in favour of a principles based GAAP and the provision of detailed authoritative guidance is not conducive to professional judgment. We also suggested a series of transition issues that the AcSB should consider including the mechanism for financing the standard setting board, the need to ensure compatibility between accounting and auditing standards, and a process for adjusting the education system (both in Universities and professional exams) to support this new private enterprise GAAP. This comment was developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the American Accounting Association and does not represent an official position of the American Accounting Association.
accounting standards, private GAAP
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20.
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Douglas R. Carmichael City University of New York - Stan Ross Department of Accountancy Theodore E. Christensen Brigham Young University - Marriott School of Management Robert H. Colson Grant Thornton LLP Karim Jamal University of Alberta - Department of Accounting & Management Information Systems Stephen R. Moehrle University of Missouri at St. Louis - Accounting Area Shivaram Rajgopal University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business Thomas L. Stober University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy Shyam Sunder Yale School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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16 Jan 09
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Last Revised:
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29 Jun 09
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88 (86,191)
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Abstract:
The Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the American Accounting Association (the Committee) is charged with responding to requests for comments from standard-setters on issues related to financial reporting. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recently requested comments on its Preliminary Views on Financial Instruments with Characteristics of Equity (PV). The committee believes that the PV introduces concepts and definitions involving financial statement elements that more properly would be considered at the conceptual framework level. Therefore, the committee respectfully requests that FASB take no further action regarding the proposed standard exposed in the Preliminary Views on Financial Instruments with Characteristics of Equity until the conceptual and definitional issues are resolved at the conceptual framework level.
Financial Reporting, FASB, Financial Instruments, Equity
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21.
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Karim Jamal University of Alberta - Department of Accounting & Management Information Systems Robert J. Bloomfield Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management Theodore E. Christensen Brigham Young University - Marriott School of Management Robert H. Colson Grant Thornton LLP Stephen R. Moehrle University of Missouri at St. Louis - Accounting Area Stephen H. Penman Columbia University - Department of Accounting Gary J. Previts Case Western Reserve University - Department of Accountancy James A. Ohlson affiliation not provided to SSRN Thomas L. Stober University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy Shyam Sunder Yale School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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25 Aug 09
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Last Revised:
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25 Aug 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
The Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) recently issued an exposure draft to adopt separate GAAP for private enterprises. This new GAAP is justified as being consistent with the current FASB/IASB conceptual framework, but is sensitive to the different cost/benefit considerations facing private entities. We view this proposal as being innovative and responsive to the differential reporting needs of private entities. In this article we explain our reasoning and conclusions on several issues raised by the exposure draft starting with a discussion about the need for a separate conceptual framework for private enterprises. We sketch a preliminary conceptual framework that could be used to develop and justify the type of changes proposed in this exposure draft. We then discuss key issues raised in the exposure draft such as reliance on historical cost as the key basis of measurement, the significant reduction in disclosure requirements for private enterprises, and stopping the emerging issues committee from providing implementation guidance (no EIC’s). We also comment on the mechanism for financing the standard setting board, the need to ensure compatibility between accounting and auditing standards, and a process for adjusting the education system to support this new private enterprise GAAP.
Regulatory Competition, Private Enterprises, GAAP
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22.
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Jerold L. Zimmerman University of Rochester - Simon School
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06 Sep 06
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Last Revised:
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07 Mar 07
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This book reviews the theory and methodology underlying the economics-based empirical literature in accounting. An accounting theory theory is an explanation for observed accounting and auditing practices. Such an explanation is necessary for interpretation of empirical associations between variables. The book discusses the role of theory in empirical work. It then reviews accounting theories involved in empirical studies of the use of accounting in capital markets, contracting and the political process and the extent to which the theories are consistent with those studies' evidence. Empirical studies in auditing are also reviewed. The book finishes with a discussion of the role of accounting research and a summary and evaluation of the research up until the mid-1980s.
Accounting theory, capital markets, contracting, political process
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23.
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Jerold L. Zimmerman University of Rochester - Simon School
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06 Sep 06
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Last Revised:
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06 Sep 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This article provides the beginning of a positive theory of accounting by exploring those factors influencing management's attitudes on accounting standards that are likely to affect a firm's cashflows and in turn are affected by accounting standards. These factors are taxes, regulation, management compensation plans, bookkeeping costs and political costs, and they are combined into a model that predicts that large firms that experience reduced earnings due to changed accounting standards favor the change. All other firms oppose the change if the additional bookkeeping costs justify the cost of lobbying. This prediction was tested using the corporate submissions to the FASB's Discussion Memorandum on General Price Level Adjustments. The empirical results are consistent with the theory.
Positive theory, accounting standards, political costs, lobbying
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24.
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Jerold L. Zimmerman University of Rochester - Simon School
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| Posted: |
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06 Sep 06
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Last Revised:
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06 Sep 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This paper addresses the questions of why accounting theories are predominantly normative and why no single theory is generally accepted. Accounting theories are analyzed as economic goods, produced in response to the demand for theories. The nature of the demand is examined, first in an unregulated, then in a regulated economy. Government regulation creates incentives for individuals to lobby on proposed accounting procedures, and accounting theories are useful justifications in the political lobbying. Further, government intervention produces a demand for a variety of theories, because each group affected by an accounting change demands a theory that supports its position. The diversity of positions prevents general agreement on a theory of accounting, and accounting theories are normative because they are used as excuses for political action (i.e., the political process creates demand for theories that prescribe, rather than describe, the world). The implications of the authors' theory for the changes in the accounting literature as a result of major changes in the institutional environment are compared with observed phenomena.
Political process, accounting theory, normative theory, lobbying
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25.
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Jerold L. Zimmerman University of Rochester - Simon School
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| Posted: |
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06 Sep 06
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Last Revised:
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06 Sep 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This paper reviews and critiques the positive accounting literature following the publication of Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1979), The 1978 paper helped generate the positive accounting literature that offers an explanation of accounting practice, suggests the importance of contracting costs, and has led to the discovery of some previously unknown empirical regularities. The 1979 paper produced a methodological debate that has not been very productive. This paper attempts to remove some common misconceptions about methodology that surfaced in that debate. It also suggests ways to improve positive research in accounting choice. The most important of these improvements is tighter links between the theory and the empirical tests. A second suggested improvement is the development of models that recognize the endogeneity among the variables in the regressions. A third improvement is reduction in measurement errors in both the dependent and independent variables in the regressions.
Positive theory, accounting, accounting choice, methodology
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26.
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Patricia M. Dechow University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business S.P. Kothari Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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06 Sep 06
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Last Revised:
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06 Sep 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
A model of earnings, cash flows and accruals is developed assuming a random walk sales process, variable and fixed costs, and that the only accruals are accounts receivable and payable, and inventory. The model implies earnings better predict future operating cash flows than current operating cash flows and the difference varies with the operating cash cycle. Also, the model is used to predict serial and cross-correlations of each firm's series. The implications and predictions are tested on a 1337 firm sample over 1963-1992. Both earnings and cash flow forecast implications and correlation predictions are generally consistent with the data.
Accruals, cash flows, earnings, correlations
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27.
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Jerold L. Zimmerman University of Rochester - Simon School
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| Posted: |
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06 Sep 06
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Last Revised:
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06 Sep 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This paper examines the history of auditing in the U.K. and the U.S. to test whether audits of companies arose as the consequence of governmental regulation or as a voluntary monitoring activity to reduce agency costs and increase firm value. The paper finds that audits existed early in the development of the modern corporation (as early as 1200) and evolved gradually into the type of audit required by the first English companies act (1844). The evidence suggests that the audit's monitoring activity is important, if not crucial, to the formation of firms. The audit's long survival suggests it is a part of the efficient technology for organizing firms. Differences in the timing of the evolution of professional auditors in the U.K. and U.S. prior to legally required auditing appear to reflect differences in the timing of capital market development in the two countries.
Auditing, corporate governance, capital markets, agency costs
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28.
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Clifford W. Smith Jr. Simon School, University of Rochester Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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06 Sep 06
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Last Revised:
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14 Sep 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
We examine explanations for corporate financing-, dividend-, and compensation-policy issues. We document robust empirical relations among corporate policy decisions and various firm characteristics. Our evidence suggests contracting theories are more important in explaining cross-sectional variation in observed financial, dividend, and compensation policies than either tax-based or signaling theories.
Investment opportunity set, financing policy, dividend policy, compensation policy
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29.
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Jerold B. Warner University of Rochester - Simon School Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Karen Hopper Wruck Ohio State University - Fisher College of Business, Department of Finance
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| Posted: |
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06 Sep 06
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Last Revised:
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06 Sep 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This paper studies the association between a firm's stock returns and subsequent top management changes. Consistent with internal monitoring of management, there is an inverse relation between the probability of a management change and a firm's share performance. This relation can result from monitoring by the board, other top managers, or blockholders. However, unless share performance is extremely good or bad, logit models have no predictive ability. No average stock reaction is detected at announcement of a top management change.
Management changes, stock price performance, governance
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30.
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Wayne R. Guay University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department S.P. Kothari Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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05 Jul 98
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Last Revised:
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29 Aug 00
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
GAAP provides management with discretion over accounting accruals. Management might use the discretion to improve earnings as a measure of firm performance, or engage in opportunistic management of discretionary accruals. Empirical research on accrual management requires a model to identify discretionary accruals. We assess the effectiveness of alternative discretionary-accrual models using expected relations between stock returns and earnings components under the performance-measure and opportunistic-management-of-accruals hypotheses. None of the five models examined in the paper is effective in isolating discretionary accruals. We find that the discretionary-accrual models randomly decompose earnings into discretionary and nondiscretionary components.
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31.
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Patricia M. Dechow University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business S.P. Kothari Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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19 Jun 95
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Last Revised:
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24 May 00
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This paper develops a simple integrated model of firm's earnings cash flows and accruals that generates serial and cross-correlation predictions for those series. The model assumes sales follow Erandom walk costs are either variable or fixed and traditional accounting working capital accruals. We use estimates of each firm's contribution margin trade cycle and variance of fixed cost relative to sales variance to predict serial correlations and cross- correlations for each firm's series. The predictions are tested on a 1036 firm sample over the 1963-1992 period. The average actual correlation has the same sign as and similar magnitude to the average predicted correlation for all correlations. The evidence suggests the model is a significant first step towards explaining time series properties of earnings cash flows and accruals.
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32.
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Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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15 May 95
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Last Revised:
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24 May 00
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This paper surveys the positive accounting research literature for a book of readings. It defines the nature and origins of positive research in accounting describes its contribution to practice and investigates reasons for the decline of normative theorizing in accounting. Relatively comprehensive surveys of capital markets research theory of the firm and political process-based research and behavioral science-based research are then presented. Finally future directions of the research are considered. The research surveys include both the empirical and modeling literatures.
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33.
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Thomas Z. Lys Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Ross L. Watts Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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08 May 95
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Last Revised:
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24 May 00
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
In this paper we compare two matched samples of 117 corporations whose auditors are and are not sued, to provide information on lawsuits. Lawsuits tend to be filed against auditors of client firms that have liquidity problems and poor stock price performance. There is little evidence of poorer accounting performance or accounting manipulation in the year in which wrongdoing is alleged to have occurred. The likelihood of a lawsuit against an auditor is greater if the audit report is qualified, the less structured is the audit and the larger the proportion of the auditor's revenues generated by the client. We also use multivariate models to compare the two samples. However, the multivariate analysis' data requirements reduce the number of observations in each sample to 21. Nevertheless, the multivariate analysis also suggests that we can discriminate between the litigation and control firms using the variables that are significant in the univariate analysis.
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