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Abstract:
Anomalies are empirical results that seem to be inconsistent with maintained theories of asset-pricing behavior. They indicate either market inefficiency (profit opportunities) or inadequacies in the underlying asset-pricing model. The evidence in this paper shows that the size effect, the value effect, the weekend effect, and the dividend yield effect seem to have weakened or disappeared after the papers that highlighted them were published. At about the same time, practitioners began investment vehicles that implemented the strategies implied by some of these academic papers. The small-firm turn-of-the-year effect became weaker in the years after it was first documented in the academic literature, although there is some evidence that it still exists. Interestingly, however, it does not seem to exist in the portfolio returns of practitioners who focus on small-capitalization firms. All of these findings raise the possibility that anomalies are more apparent than real. The notoriety associated with the findings of unusual evidence tempts authors to further investigate puzzling anomalies and later to try to explain them. But even if the anomalies existed in the sample period in which they were first identified, the activities of practitioners who implement strategies to take advantage of anomalous behavior can cause the anomalies to disappear (as research findings cause the market to become more efficient).

Abstract:
Anomalies are empirical results that seem to be inconsistent with maintained theories of asset-pricing behavior. They indicate either market inefficiency (profit opportunities) or inadequacies in the underlying asset-pricing model.

The evidence in this paper shows that the size effect, the value effect, the weekend effect, and the dividend yield effect seem to have weakened or disappeared after the papers that highlighted them were published. At about the same time, practitioners began investment vehicles that implemented the strategies implied by some of these academic papers.

The small-firm turn-of-the-year effect became weaker in the years after it was first documented in the academic literature, although there is some evidence that it still exists. Interestingly, however, it does not seem to exist in the portfolio returns of practitioners who focus on small-capitalization firms.

All of these findings raise the possibility that anomalies are more apparent than real. The notoriety associated with the findings of unusual evidence tempts authors to further investigate puzzling anomalies and later to try to explain them. But even if the anomalies existed in the sample period in which they were first identified, the activities of practitioners who implement strategies to take advantage of anomalous behavior can cause the anomalies to disappear (as research findings cause the market to become more efficient).

Market Efficiency, Anomaly, Size Effect, Value Effect, Selection Bias, Momentum

Abstract:
Both IPO volume and average initial returns are highly autocorrelated. Further, more companies tend to go public following periods of high initial returns. However, we find that the level of average initial returns at the time of filing contains no information about that company's eventual underpricing. Both the cycles in initial returns and the lead-lag relation between initial returns and IPO volume are predominantly driven by information learned during the registration period. More positive information results in higher initial returns and more companies filing IPOs soon thereafter.

Abstract:
We examine the strong cycles in the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) and in the average initial returns realized by investors who participated in the IPOs. At the aggregate level, initial returns are predictably related to past initial returns and also to future IPO volume from 1960-1997. To understand these patterns, we use firm-level data from 1985-97 to model the initial return. Our results show that aggregate IPO cycles occur because of the time it takes to complete an IPO, the clustering of similar types of IPOs in time, and information spillovers among IPOs.

Abstract:
We examine the strong cycles in the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) and in the average initial returns realized by investors who participated in the IPOs. At the aggregate level, initial returns are predictably related to past initial returns and also to future IPO volume from 1960-1997. To understand these patterns, we use firm-level data from 1985-97 to model the initial return. Our results show that aggregate IPO cycles occur because of the time it takes to complete an IPO, the clustering of similar types of IPOs in time, and information spillovers among IPOs.

IPO, Underpricing, Cycles, Private Information, Learning

Abstract:
By investigating the entire IPO pricing process, beginning when the offering is filed, the paper contributes to the existing literature along four dimensions. First, price updates during the registration period are predictable based on firm and offer-specific characteristics known at the time the offer is filed. Second, price updates reflect market movements prior to the initial filing date as well as during the registration period. Third, positive and negative information learned during the registration period affect the offer price asymmetrically. Finally, public and private information learned during the registration period have different effects on the offer price. While a number of the biases that we uncover are consistent with one or more theories regarding IPOs, many remain a puzzle.

Abstract:
By investigating the entire IPO pricing process, beginning when the offering is filed, the paper contributes to the existing literature along four dimensions. First, price updates during the registration period are predictable based on firm and offer-specific characteristics known at the time the offer is filed. Second, price updates reflect market movements prior to the initial filing date as well as during the registration period. Third, positive and negative information learned during the registration period affect the offer price asymmetrically. Finally, public and private information learned during the registration period have different effects on the offer price. While a number of the biases that we uncover are consistent with one or more theories regarding IPOs, many remain a puzzle.

IPO, Underpricing, Private Information, Learning

Abstract:
Stock volatility has been unusually low since the 1987 stock market crash. The large increase in stock prices since 1987 means that many days during 1996 and 1997 experienced near record changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, even though the volatility of stock returns has not been high by historical standards. I compare volatility of returns to U.S. stock indexes at monthly, daily, and intraday intervals, and I also show the volatility of returns to stock indexes implied by traded options contracts. Finally, I compare the volatility of U.S. stock market returns with the volatility of returns to stock markets in the United Kingdom Australia, and Canada. All of the evidence leads to the conclusion that volatility has been very low in the decade since the 1987 crash. The mini-crash of October 27 to reevaluate the current system of circuit breakers so that they are triggered less easily. Part of the problem is caused by trigger points that are expressed as absolute changes in market indexes.

Abstract:
Stock volatility has been unusually low since the 1987 stock market crash. The large increase in stock prices during since 1987 means that many days during 1996 and 1997 have experienced near record changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, even thought the volatility of stock returns has not been high by historical standards. I compare volatility of returns to U.S. stock indexes at monthly, daily, and intra-daily intervals, and I also show the volatility of returns to stock indexes implied by traded options contracts. Finally, I compare the volatility of U.S. stock market returns with the volatility of returns to stock markets in the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Australia, and Canada. All of the evidence leads to the conclusion that volatility has been very low in the decade since the 1987 crash.

Abstract:
This issue of the Journal of Financial Economics contains the first set of studies in the new Clinical Papers section. The objective of this section is to provide a high-quality professional outlet for scholarly studies of specific cases, events, practices, and specialized applications. By supplying insights about the world, challenging accepted theory, and using unique sources of data, clinical studies stand on their own as an important medium of research. Like the medical literature from which the term 'clinical' is borrowed, these articles will frequently deal with individual situations or small numbers of cases of special interest. The JFE intends to take a leading role in encouraging clinical studies, guided by the confidence that expanding our research agenda and providing an outlet for this work will enliven and enrich professional knowledge. We expect these clinical studies to stimulate new high-quality empirical and theoretical research,

Innovation in financing techniques, deregulation, reregulation, and changes in the organization and conduct of commerce are proceeding at a rapid rate. New products and practices are appearing constantly, and the roles and activities of financial institutions are changing dramatically. New ways to communicate these interesting changes to the scientific community are required because the changes provide tests of leading theories and suggest new problems of theoretical interest. Clinical papers, inspired primarily by actual events, can play an important role in this discovery and communication process and, therefore, in the evolution of the science of finance.

The advantages of specialization imply that different groups of researchers will tend to concentrate on theory, empirical tests, and clinical studies. These three groups complement each other. Theory provides logical discipline and precise hypotheses for both empirical and clinical research. Empirical tests direct theorists by identifying irrelevant models and suggest where clinical research might find counterexamples. Clinical studies help set the agenda for both theory and empirical work. Because of this complementarity and the importance of communication between these groups, the Journal of Financial Economics is committed to publishing all three types of research.

Clinical Papers, case studies, perfect and imperfect markets

Abstract:
This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distinguished from friendly takeovers, empirically, based on accounting and stock performance data. Much has been made of this distinction in both the popular and the academic literature, where gains from hostile takeovers are typically attributed to the value of replacing incumbent managers and the gains from friendly takeovers are typically attributed to strategic synergies. Alternatively, hostility could reflect just a perceptual distinction arising from different patterns of public disclosure, where negotiated outcomes are the rule and transactions tend to be characterized as friendly when bargaining remains undisclosed throughout, and hostile when the public becomes aware of the negotiation before its resolution. Empirical tests show that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms, and that negotiations are publicized earlier in hostile transactions.

Abstract:
This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distinguished from friendly takeovers, empirically, based on accounting and stock performance data. Much has been made of this distinction in both the popular and the academic literature, where gains from hostile takeovers are typically attributed to the value of replacing incumbent managers and the gains from friendly takeovers are typically attributed to strategic synergies. Alternatively, hostility could reflect just a perceptual distinction arising from different patterns of public disclosure, where negotiated outcomes are the rule and transactions tend to be characterized as friendly when bargaining remains undisclosed throughout, and hostile when the public becomes aware of the negotiation before its resolution. Empirical tests show that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms, and that negotiations are publicized earlier in hostile transactions.

Abstract:
The monthly volatility of IPO initial returns is substantial, fluctuates dramatically over time, and is considerably larger during "hot" IPO markets. Consistent with IPO theory, the volatility of initial returns is higher among firms whose value is more difficult to estimate, i.e., among firms with higher information asymmetry. Our findings highlight underwriters' difficulty in valuing companies characterized by high uncertainty, and, as a result, raise serious questions about the efficacy of the traditional firm commitment underwritten IPO process. One implication of our results is that alternate mechanisms, such as auctions, may be beneficial, particularly for firms that value price discovery over the auxiliary services provided by underwriters.

Abstract:
The monthly volatility of IPO initial returns is substantial, fluctuates dramatically over time, and is considerably larger during "hot" IPO markets. Consistent with IPO theory, the volatility of initial returns is higher among firms whose value is more difficult to estimate, i.e., among firms with higher information asymmetry. Our findings highlight underwriters' difficulty in valuing companies characterized by high uncertainty, and, as a result, raise serious questions about the efficacy of the traditional firm commitment underwritten IPO process. One implication of our results is that alternate mechanisms, such as auctions, may be beneficial, particularly for firms that value price discovery over the auxiliary services provided by underwriters.

IPO, Underpricing, Cycles, Information Asymmetry, Conditional Heteroskedasticity, Volatility

Abstract:
This paper examines cycles in the frequency of initial public offerings (IPOs) and their relation to the average initial returns realized by investors who participated in the IPOs. There are strong cycles in the IPO market. We find that initial returns are predictably related to past initial returns and to future IPO volume. This predictability occurs because of the time it takes to complete an IPO. Using data on individual issues, we model the price updates that occur between initial filing and the IPO, as well as the IPO return. We use aggregate U.S. data from 1960-98, and firm-level data from 1985-97.

Abstract:
In a short sale, an investor sells a share of stock he does not own and profits when the price of the stock declines. A peculiar feature of short sales is the apparent increase in the number of shares of stock beneficially held by investors over and above the actual number of shares issued by the corporation. It has previously been noted that this may create problems in the execution of proxy votes. In this paper, we illustrate a related problem in the prosecution of claims of securities fraud. We examine this problem using the recent case of Computer Learning Centers, Inc. (CLC), in which the number of short sales was extremely large.

Plaintiffs in the Computer Learning Centers case proposed a class including all those who purchased CLC common stock from April 30, 1997, to April 6, 1998. Defendants opposed certification of the class, focusing on the large number of short sales and the resulting difficulty in establishing which members of the class actually had standing to sue. The court denied the motion for class certification. Although the court gave plaintiffs leave to amend the class, the case was settled before a new class was identified.

Short Sales, Securities Fraud, Class Certification, 10b-5

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
This paper shows that stock volatility increases during recessions and financial crises from 1834-1987. The evidence reinforces the notion that stock prices are an important business cycle indicator. Using two different statistical models for stock volatility, I show that volatility increases after major financial crises. Moreover, stock volatility decreases and stock prices rise before the Fed increases margin requirements. Thus, there is little reason to believe that public policies can control stock volatility. The evidence supports the observation by Black [1976] that stock volatility increases after stock prices fall.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
The recent volatility of stock prices has caused many people to conclude that investors have become irrational in valuing at least some stocks. This paper investigates the behavior of the volatility of stocks on the Nasdaq, which tend to be smaller companies with more growth options, in relation to the more seasoned issues reflected in the Standard & Poor's 500 portfolio. It also analyzes the relation of the unusual Nasdaq volatility to the hot IPO market in 1998 and 1999. The factor that seems to explain unusual volatility best is technology, not firm size or the immaturity of the firm.

Abstract:
This paper studies the premiums paid in successful tender offers and mergers involving NYSE and Amex-listed target firms from 1975-91 in relation to pre-announcement stock price runups. It has been conventional to measure corporate control premiums including the price runups that occur before the initial formal bid. There has been little evidence on the relation between the pre-bid runup and the post-announcement premium (the premium paid to target stockholders measured from the date of the first bid). Under what circumstances are runups associated with larger total premiums? The evidence in this paper shows that in most cases, the pre-bid runup and the post- announcement premium are uncorrelated (i.e. little or no substitution between the runup and the post-announcement premium), so the runup is an added cost to the bidder. This has important implications for assessing the costs of illegal insider trading based on private information about a potential bid.

Abstract:
In a short sale, an investor sells a share of stock he does not own and profits when the price of the stock declines. A peculiar feature of short sales is the apparent increase in the number of shares of stock beneficially held by investors over and above the actual number of shares issued by the corporation. It has previously been noted that this may create problems in the execution of proxy votes. In this paper we illustrate a related problem in the prosecution of claims of securities fraud. We examine this problem using the recent case of Computer Learning Centers, Inc., (CLC) in which the number of short sales was extremely large. Plaintiffs in the Computer Learning Centers case proposed a class including all those who purchased CLC common stock from April 30, 1997 to April 6, 1998. Defendants opposed certification of the class, focusing on the large number of short sales and the resulting difficulty in establishing which members of the class actually had standing to sue. The court denied the motion for class certification. Although the court gave plaintiffs leave to amend the class, the case was settled before a new class was identified.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
This paper provides large sample evidence that poison pill rights issues, control share laws, and business combination laws have not been used systematically to deter takeovers and are unlikely to have caused the demise of the 1980s market for corporate control, even though 87% of all exchange-listed firms are now covered by one of these antitakeover measures. We show that poison pills and control share laws are reliably associated with higher takeover premiums for selling shareholders, both unconditionally and conditional on a successful takeover, and we provide updated event study evidence for the three- quarters of all poison pills not yet analyzed. Antitakeover measures increase the bargaining position of target firms, but they do not prevent many transactions.

Abstract:
Monthly stock returns from Smith and Cole [1935], Macaulay [1938] and Cowles [1939J are compared and contrasted with the returns to the CRSP value and equal-weighted portfolios of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks. Daily stock returns from Dow Jones [1972] and Standard & Poor's [1986] are compared and contrasted with the returns to the CRSP value and equal-weighted portfolios of NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks. Effects of dividends, nonsynchronous trading and time-averaging are analyzed. Splicing together the best indexes gives monthly data from 1802-1987 (2,227) observations) and daily data from 1885-1987 (28,884 observations.)

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Abstract:
Recent work by Said and Dickey (1984 ,1985) , Phillips (1987), and Phillips and Perron(1988) examines tests for unit roots in the autoregressive part of mixed autoregressive-integrated-moving average (ARIHA) models (tests for stationarity). Monte Carlo experiments show that these unit root tests have different finite sample distributions than the unit root tests developed by Fuller(1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1979, l981) for autoregressive processes. In particular, the tests developed by Philllps (1987) and Phillips and Perron (1988) seem more sensitive to model misspeciflcation than the high order autoregressive approximation suggested by Said and Diekey(1984).

Abstract:
This paper studies the premiums paid in successful tender offers and mergers involving NSE and Amex-listed target firms from 1975-91 in relation to pre-announcement stock price runups. It has been conventinoal to measure corporate control premiums including the price runups that occur prior to the initial formal bid. There has been little evidence on the relation between the pre-bid runup and the post- announcement markup (the increase in the stock price measured from the date of the first bid). Under what circumstances are runups associated with larger total premiums? The evidence in this paper shows that in most cases, the pre-bid runup and the post-announcement markup are uncorrelated (i.e., little or no substitution between the runup and the post-announcement markup), so the runup is an added cost to the bidder. This has important implications for assessing the costs of illegal insider trading based on private information about a potential bid.