• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
This essay surveys the body of research that asks how the efficiency of corporate investment is influenced by problems of asymmetric information and agency. I organize the material around two basic questions. First, does the external capital market channel the right amount of money to each firm? That is, does the market get across-firm allocations right, so that the marginal return to investment in firm i is the same as the marginal return to investment in firm j? Second, do internal capital markets channel the right amount of money to individual projects within firms? That is, does the internal capital budgeting process get within-firm allocations right, so that the marginal return to investment in firm i's division A is the same as the marginal return to investment in firm i's division B? In addition to discussing the theoretical and empirical work that bears most directly on these questions, the essay also briefly sketches some of the implications of this work for broader issues in both macroeconomics and the theory of the firm.

Abstract:
This essay surveys the body of research that asks how the efficiency of corporate investment is influenced by problems of asymmetric information and agency. I organize the material around two basic questions. First, does the external capital market channel the right amount of money to each firm? That is, does the market get across-firm allocations right, so that the marginal return to investment in firm i is the same as the marginal return to investment in firm j? Second, do internal capital markets channel the right amount of money to individual projects within firms? That is, does the internal capital budgeting process get within-firm allocations right, so that the marginal return to investment in firm i's division A is the same as the marginal return to investment in firm i's division B? In addition to discussing the theoretical and empirical work that bears most directly on these questions, the essay also briefly sketches some of the implications of this work for broader issues in both macroeconomics and the theory of the firm.

corporate investment, financing constraints, internal capital markets

Abstract:
This paper is an investigation into the determinants of asymmetries in stock returns. We develop a series of cross-sectional regression specifications which attempt to forecast skewness in the daily returns of individual stocks. Negative skewness is most pronounced in stocks that have experienced: 1) an increase in trading volume relative to trend over the prior six months; and 2) positive returns over the prior thirty-six months. The first finding is consistent with the model of Hong and Stein (1999), which predicts that negative asymmetries are more likely to occur when there are large differences of opinion among investors. The latter finding fits with a number of theories, most notably Blanchard and Watson's (1982) rendition of stock-price bubbles. Analogous results also obtain when we attempt to forecast the skewness of the aggregate stock market, though our statistical power in this case is limited.

Abstract:
This paper is an investigation into the determinants of asymmetries in stock returns. We develop a series of cross-sectional regression specifications which attempt to forecast skewness in the daily returns of individual stocks. Negative skewness is most pronounced in stocks that have experienced: 1) an increase in trading volume relative to trend over the prior six months; and 2) positive returns over the prior thirty-six months. The first finding is consistent with the model of Hong and Stein (1999), which predicts that negative asymmetries are more likely to occur when there are large differences of opinion among investors. The latter finding fits with a number of theories, most notably Blanchard and Watson's (1982) rendition of stock-price bubbles. Analogous results also obtain when we attempt to forecast the skewness of the aggregate stock market, though our statistical power in this case is limited.

Abstract:
We build a model that helps to explain why increases in liquidity - such as lower bid-ask spreads, a lower price impact of trade, or higher turnover - predict lower subsequent returns in both firm-level and aggregate data. The model features a class of irrational investors, who underreact to the information contained in order flow, thereby boosting liquidity. In the presence of short-sales constraints, high liquidity is a symptom of the fact that the market is dominated by these irrational investors, and hence is overvalued. This theory can also explain how managers might successfully time the market for seasoned equity offerings, by simply following a rule of thumb that involves issuing when the SEO market is particularly liquid. Empirically, we find that: i) aggregate measures of equity issuance and share turnover are highly correlated; yet ii) in a multiple regression, both have incremental predictive power for future equal-weighted market returns.

Liquidity, Investor Sentiment, Market Timing, Corporate Finance, Behavioral Finance

Abstract:
We build a model that helps to explain why increases in liquidity - such as lower bid-ask spreads, a lower price impact of trade, or higher turnover - predict lower subsequent returns in both firm-level and aggregate data. The model features a class of irrational investors, who underreact to the information contained in order flow, thereby boosting liquidity. In the presence of short-sales constraints, high liquidity is a symptom of the fact that the market is dominated by these irrational investors, and hence is overvalued. This theory can also explain how managers might successfully time the market for seasoned equity offerings, by simply following a rule of thumb that involves issuing when the SEO market is particularly liquid. Empirically, we find that: i) aggregate measures of equity issuance and share turnover are highly correlated; yet ii) in a multiple regression, both have incremental predictive power for future equal-weighted market returns.

Abstract:
We build a model that helps explain why increases in liquidity - such as lower bid-ask spreads, a lower price impact of trade, or higher share turnover - predict lower subsequent returns in both firm-level and aggregate data. The model features a class of irrational investors, who underreact to the information contained in order flow, thereby boosting liquidity. In the presence of short-sales constraints, unusually high liquidity is a symptom of the fact that the market is currently dominated by these irrational investors, and hence is overvalued. This theory can also explain how managers might successfully time the market for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), by simply following a rule of thumb that involves issuing when the SEO market is particularly liquid. Empirically, we find that: i) aggregate measures of equity issuance and share turnover are highly correlated; yet ii) in a multiple regression, both have incremental predictive power for future equal-weighted market returns.

Abstract:
We use a simple model of corporate investment to determine when investment will be sensitive to non-fundamental movements in stock prices. The key cross-sectional prediction of the model is that stock prices will have a stronger impact on the investment of firms that are "equity dependent" - firms that need external equity to finance their marginal investments. Using an index of equity dependence based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we find strong support for this prediction. In particular, firms that rank in the top quintile of the KZ index have investment that is two-and-a-half times as sensitive to stock prices as firms in the bottom quintile. We also verify several other predictions of the model.

Abstract:
We use a simple model to outline the conditions under which corporate investment is sensitive to non-fundamental movements in stock prices. The key prediction is that stock prices have a stronger impact on the investment of "equity dependent" firms - firms that need external equity to finance marginal investments. Using an index of equity dependence based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales [1997], we find support for this hypothesis. In particular, firms that rank in the top quintile of the KZ index have investment that is almost three times as sensitive to stock prices as firms in the bottom quintile.

Abstract:
We use a simple model of corporate investment to determine when investment will be sensitive to non-fundamental movements in stock prices. The key cross-sectional prediction of the model is that stock prices will have a stronger impact on the investment of firms that are 'equity dependent' - firms that need external equity to finance their marginal investments. Using an index of equity dependence based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we find strong support for this prediction. In particular, firms that rank in the top quintile of the KZ index have investment that is almost three times as sensitive to stock prices as firms in the bottom quintile. We also verify several other predictions of the model.

Abstract:
We use a simple model to outline the conditions under which corporate investment is sensitive to non-fundamental movements in stock prices. The key prediction is that stock prices have a stronger impact on the investment of "equity dependent" firms - firms that need external equity to finance marginal investments. Using an index of equity dependence based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales [1997], we find support for this hypothesis. In particular, firms that rank in the top quintile of the KZ index have investment that is almost three times as sensitive to stock prices as firms in the bottom quintile.

Investment, Behavioral Finance

Abstract:
We develop a model of stock prices in which there are both differences of opinion among investors as well as short-sales constraints. The key insight that emerges is that breadth of ownership is a valuation indicator. When breadth is low i.e., when few investors have long positions in the stock this signals that the short-sales constraint is binding tightly, implying that prices are high relative to fundamentals and that expected returns are therefore low. Thus reductions (increases) in breadth should forecast lower (higher) returns. Using quarterly data on mutual fund holdings over the period 1979-1998, we find evidence supportive of this prediction: stocks whose change in breadth in the prior quarter places them in the lowest decile of the sample underperform those in the top change-in-breadth decile by 6.38% in the first twelve months after portfolio formation. After adjusting for size, book-to-market and momentum, the corresponding figure is 4.95%.

Abstract:
We develop a model of stock prices in which there are both differences of opinion among investors as well as short-sales constraints. The key insight that emerges is that breadth of ownership is a valuation indicator. When breadth is low - i.e., when few investors have long positions in the stock - this signals that the short-sales constraint is binding tightly, implying that prices are high relative to fundamentals and that expected returns are therefore low. Thus reductions (increases) in breadth should forecast lower (higher) returns. Using quarterly data on mutual fund holdings over the period 1979-1998, we find evidence supportive of this predictions: stocks whose change in breadth in the prior quarter places them in the lowest decile of the sample underperform those in the top change-in-breadth decile by 6.38% in the first twelve months after portfolio formation. After adjusting for size, book-to-market and momentum, the corresponding figure is 4.95%.

Abstract:
In this paper, we present the results of our efforts to develop an estimate of cashflow-at-risk--which we label C-FaR--for non-fiancial firms. C-FaR measures the risk of unforeseen shortfall in a company's operating cashflows over some horizon in the future, conditional on information available today; e.g., one can speak of quarter-ahead C-FaR, or year-ahead C-FaR. In contrast to the "bottom-up" approach used by financial institutions to estimate Value-at-Risk (VaR), our method approaches things from the "top down", looking directly at the ultimate item of interest, overall company cashflows. In order to have enough data to make meaningful statements for any given target company, we use a sophisticated benchmarking technique to identify its closest comparables. In particular, we search for the other companies in the Compustat universe that most closely resemble our target company on four dimensions: 1) market cap; 2) profitability; 3) industry risk; and 4) stock-price volatility. This comparables methodology allows us to estimate C-FaR probability distributions for any company using relatively large numbers of observations on cashflow shocks. Our results indicate substantial differences in cashflow riskiness for companies with different characteristics.

Abstract:
Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations may do better than large organizations in activities that require the processing of soft information. We explore this idea in the context of bank lending to small firms, an activity that is typically thought of as relying heavily on soft information. We find that large banks are less willing than small banks to lend to informationally 'difficult' credits, such as firms that do not keep formal financial records. Moreover, controlling for the endogeneity of bank-firm matching, large banks lend at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their borrowers, have shorter and less exclusive relationships, and do not alleviate credit constraints as effectively. All of this is consistent with small banks being better able to collect and act on soft information than large banks.

Abstract:
Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations may do better than large organizations in activities that require the processing of soft information. We explore this idea in the context of bank lending to small firms, an activity that is typically thought of as relying heavily on soft information. We find that large banks are less willing than small banks to lend to informationally "difficult" credits, such as firms that do not keep formal financial records. Moreover, controlling for the endogeneity of bank-firm matching, large banks lend at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their borrowers, have shorter and less exclusive relationships, and do not alleviate credit constraints as effectively. All of this is consistent with small banks being better able to collect and act on soft information than large banks.

Functional form, organizational structure, distance, banking, soft information, hard information

Abstract:
This paper addresses the following question: what ties together the traditional commercial banking activities of deposit-taking and lending? We begin by observing that since banks often lend via commitments, or credit lines, their lending and deposit-taking may be two manifestations of the same primitive function: the provision of liquidity on demand. After all, once the decision to extend a line of credit has been made, it is really nothing more than a checking account with overdraft privileges. This observation leads us to argue that there will naturally be synergies between the two activities, to the extent that both require banks to hold large volumes of liquid assets (cash and securities) on their balance sheets: if deposit withdrawals and commitment takedowns are imperfectly correlated, the two activities can share any deadweight costs of holding the liquid assets. We develop this idea with a simple model, and then use a variety of data to test the model's empirical implications.

Abstract:
This paper addresses the following question: what ties together the traditional commercial banking activities of deposit-taking and lending? We begin by observing that since banks often lend via commitments, or credit lines, their lending and deposit-taking may be two manifestations of the same primitive function: the provision of liquidity on demand. After all, once the decision to extend a line of credit has been made, it is really nothing more than a checking account with overdraft privileges. This observation leads us to argue that there will naturally be synergies between the two activities, to the extent that both require banks to hold large volumes of liquid assets (cash and securities) on their balance sheets: if deposit withdrawals and commitment takedowns are imperfectly correlated, the two activities can share any deadweight costs of holding the liquid assets. We develop this idea with a simple model, and then use a variety of data to test the model's empirical implications.

Abstract:
We develop a theory of stock-market crashes based on differences of opinion among investors. Because of short-sales constraints, bearish investors do not initially participate in the market and their information is not revealed in prices. However, if other, previously-bullish investors have a change of heart and bail out of market, the originally-more-bearish group may become the marginal "support buyers", and hence more will be learned about their signals. Thus accumulated hidden information tends to come out during market declines. The model helps explain a variety of stylized facts, including: 1) large movements in prices unaccompanied by significant news about fundamentals; 2) negative skewness in the distribution of market returns; and 3) increased correlation among stocks in a falling market. In addition, the model makes a distinctive out-of-sample prediction: that negative skewness will be most pronounced conditional on high trading volume.

Abstract:
We develop a theory of stock-market crashes based on differences of opinion among investors. Because of short-sales constraints, bearish investors do not initially participate in the market and their information is not revealed in prices. However, if other, previously-bullish investors have a change of heart and bail out of the market, the originally-more-bearish group may become the marginal "support buyers", and hence more will be learned about their signals. Thus accumulated hidden information tends to come out during market declines. The model helps explain a variety of stylized facts, including: 1) large movements in prices unaccompanied by significant news about fundamentals; 2) negative skewness in the distribution of market returns; and 3) increased correlation among stocks in a falling market. In addition, the model makes a distinctive out-of-sample prediction, that negative skewness will be most pronounced conditional on high trading volume.

Abstract:
This paper assesses different organizational forms in terms of their ability to generate information about investment projects and allocate capital to these projects efficiently. A decentralized approach with small, single-manager firms is most likely to be attractive when information about individual projects is soft' and cannot be credibly transmitted. Moreover, holding fixed firm size, soft information also favors flatter organizations with fewer layers of management. In contrast, large hierarchical firms with multiple layers of management are at a comparative advantage when information can be costlessly hardened' and passed along within the hierarchy. As a concrete application of the theory, the paper discusses the consequences of consolidation in the banking industry. It has been documented that when large banks acquire small banks, there is a pronounced decline in lending to small businesses. To the extent that small-business lending relies heavily on soft information, this is exactly what the theory would lead one to expect.

Abstract:
This paper assesses different organizational forms in terms of their ability to generate information about investment projects and allocate capital to these projects efficiently. A decentralized approach - with small, single-manager firms - is most likely to be attractive when information about individual projects is "soft" and cannot be credibly transmitted. Moreover, holding fixed firm size, soft information also favors flatter organizations with fewer layers of management. In contrast, large hierarchical firms with multiple layers of management are at a comparative advantage when information can be costlessly "hardened" and passed along within the hierarchy. As a concrete application of the theory, the paper discusses the consequences of consolidation in the banking industry. It has been documented that when large banks acquire small banks, there is a pronounced decline in lending to small businesses. To the extent that small-business lending relies heavily on soft information, this is exactly what the theory would lead one to expect.

Abstract:
We examine some basic data on the evolution of aggregate short interest, both during the dot-com era, and at other times in history. Total short interest moves in a countercyclical fashion. For example, short interest in NASDAQ stocks actually declines as the NASDAQ index approaches its peak. Moreover, this decline does not seem to reflect a substitution away from outright short-selling and towards put options, as the ratio of put-to-call volume displays the same countercyclical tendency. The evidence suggests that: i) arbitrageurs are reluctant to bet against aggregate mispricings; and ii) short-selling does not play a particularly helpful role in stabilizing the overall stock market.

Abstract:
We examine some basic data on the evolution of aggregate short interest, both during the dot-com era, and at other times in history. Total short interest moves in a countercyclical fashion. For example, short interest in NASDAQ stocks actually declines as the NASDAQ index approaches its peak. Moreover, this decline does not seem to reflect a substitution away from outright short-selling and towards put options, as the ratio of put-to-call volume displays the same countercyclical tendency. The evidence suggests that: i) arbitrageurs are reluctant to bet against aggregate mispricings; and ii) short-selling does not play a particularly helpful role in stabilizing the overall stock market.

Abstract:
We study the implications of learning in an environment where the true model of the world is a multivariate one, but where agents update only over the class of simple univariate models. If a particular simple model does a poor job of forecasting over a period of time, it is eventually discarded in favor of an alternative yet equally simple model that would have done better over the same period. This theory makes several distinctive predictions, which, for concreteness, we develop in a stock-market setting. For example, starting with symmetric and homoskedastic fundamentals, the theory yields forecastable variation in the size of the value/glamour differential, in volatility, and in the skewness of returns. Some of these features mirror familiar accounts of stock-price bubbles.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We postulate that agents make forecasts using overly simplified models of the world - i.e., models that only embody a subset of available information. We then go on to study the implications of learning in this environment. Our key premise is that learning is based on a model-selection criterion. Thus if a particular simple model does a poor job of forecasting over a period of time, it is eventually discarded in favor of an alternative, yet equally simple model that would have done better over the same period. This theory makes several distinctive predictions, which, for concreteness, we develop in a stock-market setting. For example, starting with symmetric and homoskedastic fundamentals, the theory yields forecastable variation in the size of the value/glamour differential, in volatility, and in the skewness of returns. Some of these features mirror familiar accounts of stock-price bubbles.

Abstract:
In this paper, we use city-level data to analyze the relationship between homeowner borrowing patterns and house-price dynamics. Our principal finding is that in cities where homeowners are more leveraged--i.e., have higher loan-to-value ratios--house prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks, such as changes in per-capita income. This finding is consistent with recent theories which emphasize the role of collateralized borrowing in shaping the behavior of asset prices.

Abstract:
We use city-level data to analyze the relationship between homeowner borrowing patterns and house-price dynamics. Our principal finding is that in cities where a greater fraction of homeowners are highly leveraged-- i.e., have high loan-to-value ratios--house prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks, such as changes in per-capita income. This finding is consistent with recent theories that emphasize the role of borrowing in shaping the behavior of asset prices.

Abstract:
We use city-level data to analyze the relationship between homeowner borrowing patterns and house-price dynamics. Our principal finding is that in cities where a greater fraction of homeowners are highly leveraged--i.e., have high loan-to-value ratios--house prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks, such as changes in per-capita income. This finding is consistent with recent theories which emphasize the role of borrowing in shaping the behavior of asset prices.

Abstract:
A mutual-fund manager is more likely to hold (or buy, or sell) a particular stock in any quarter if other managers in the same city are holding (or buying, or selling) that same stock. This pattern shows up even when controlling for the distance between the fund manager and the stock in question, so it is distinct from a local-preference effect. It is also robust to a variety of controls for investment styles. These results can be interpreted in terms of an epidemic model in which investors spread information about stocks to one another by word of mouth.

Abstract:
We investigate the idea that stock-market participation is influenced by social interaction. We build a simple model in which any given "social" investor finds it more attractive to invest in the market when the participation rate among his peers is higher. The model predicts higher participation rates among social investors than among "non-socials". It also admits the possibility of multiple social equilibria. We then test the theory using data from the Health and Retirement Study. Social households-defined as those who interact with their neighbors, or who attend church-are indeed substantially more likely to invest in the stock market than non-social households, controlling for other factors like wealth, race, education and risk tolerance. Moreover, consistent with a peer-effects story, the impact of sociability is stronger in states where stock-market participation rates are higher.

Stock market participation, social interaction, peer effects, word of mouth learning, consumption externalities

Abstract:
The majority of asset-management intermediaries (e.g., mutual funds, hedge funds) are structured on an open-end basis, even though it appears that the open-end form can be a serious impediment to arbitrage. I argue that the equilibrium degree of open-ending in an economy can be excessive from the point of view of investors. When funds compete for investors' dollars, they may engage in a counterproductive race towards the open-end form, even though this form leaves them ill-suited to undertaking certain types of arbitrage trades. One implication of the analysis is that, even absent short-sales constraints or other frictions, economically large mispricings can coexist with rational, competitive arbitrageurs who earn small excess returns.

Abstract:
The majority of asset-management intermediaries (e.g., mutual funds, hedge funds) are structured on an open-end basis, even though it appears that the open-end form can be a serious impediment to arbitrage. I argue that the equilibrium degree of open-ending in an economy can be excessive from the point of view of investors. When funds compete for investors' dollars, they may engage in a counterproductive race towards the open-end form, even though this form leaves them ill-suited to undertaking certain types of arbitrage trades. One implication of the analysis is that, even absent short-sales constraints or other frictions, economically large mispricings can coexist with rational, competitive arbitrageurs who earn small excess returns.

Money management, arbitrage, market efficiency

Abstract:
We document that net equity issuance is considerably more sensitive to aggregate stock returns and Q's than to firm-level stock returns and Q's. Very similar patterns also emerge when we look at merger activity. In light of earlier work (Campbell 1991, Vuolteenaho 2002) which finds that aggregate stock returns are less informative about future cashflows than are firm-level stock returns--and thus, potentially more strongly influenced by investor sentiment--these results suggest that both equity issuance and mergers are to a significant extent driven by market-timing considerations, as opposed to by purely fundamental factors.

Abstract:
We document that net equity issuance is considerably more sensitive to aggregate stock returns and Q's than to firm-level stock returns and Q's. Very similar patterns also emerge when we look at merger activity. In light of earlier work (Campbell 1991, Vuolteenaho 2002) which finds that aggregate stock returns are less informative about future cashflows than are firm-level stock returns - and thus, potentially more strongly influenced by investor sentiment - these results suggest that both equity issuance and mergers are to a significant extent driven by market-timing considerations, as opposed to by purely fundamental factors.

Investor sentiment, equity issues, mergers

Abstract:
We argue that inertial behavior on the part of investors can have significant consequences for corporate financial policy. One implication of investor inertia is that it improves the terms for the acquiring firm in a stock-for-stock merger, because acquirer shares are placed in the hands of investors, who, independent of their beliefs, do not resell these shares on the open market. In the presence of a downward-sloping demand curve, this leads to a reduction in price pressure and, hence, to cheaper equity financing. We develop a simple model to illustrate this idea and present supporting empirical evidence.

mergers, inertia, equity issuance

Abstract:
We explore the consequences for corporate financial policy that arise when investors exhibit inertial behavior. One implication of investor inertia is that, all else equal, a firm pursuing a strategy of equity-financed growth will prefer a stock-for-stock merger to greenfield investment financed with an SEO. With a merger, acquirer stock is placed in the hands of investors, who, because of inertia, do not resell it all on the open market. If there is downward-sloping demand for acquirer shares, this leads to less price pressure than an SEO, and cheaper equity financing as a result. We develop a simple model to illustrate this idea, and present supporting empirical evidence. Both individual and institutional investors tend to hang on to shares granted them in mergers, with this tendency being much stronger for individuals. Consistent with the model and with this cross-sectional pattern in inertia, acquirers targeting firms with high institutional ownership experience more negative announcement effects and greater announcement volume. Moreover, the results are strongest when the overlap in target and acquirer institutional ownership is low and when the demand curve for the acquirer's shares appears to be steep.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We argue that inertial behavior on the part of investors can have significant consequences for corporate financial policy. One implication of investor inertia is that it improves the terms for the acquiring firm in a stock-for-stock merger, because acquirer shares are placed in the hands of investors, who, independent of their beliefs, do not resell these shares on the open market. In the presence of a downward-sloping demand curve, this leads to a reduction in price pressure and, hence, to cheaper equity financing. We develop a simple model to illustrate this idea and present supporting empirical evidence.

Inertia, mergers, equity issuance

Abstract:
We develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private-sector research. Our model assumes full protection of intellectual property rights at all stages of the development process, and hence does not rely on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research. Instead, we focus on control-rights considerations, and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus. By serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests, academia can be indispensable for early-stage research. At the same time, the private sector's ability to direct scientists towards higher-payoff activities makes it more attractive for later-stage research.

Abstract:
We develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private-sector research. Our model assumes full protection of intellectual property rights at all stages of the development process, and hence does not rely on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research. Instead, we focus on control-rights considerations, and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus. By serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests, academia can be indispensable for early-stage research. At the same time, the private sector's ability to direct scientists towards higher-payoff activities makes it more attractive for later-stage research.

Abstract:
We develop a multi-tasking model in which a firm can devote its efforts either to increasing sales growth, or to improving per-unit profit margins by, e.g., cutting costs. If the firm's manager is concerned with the current stock price, she will tend to favor the growth strategy at those times when the stock market is paying more attention to performance on the growth dimension. Conversely, it can be rational for the stock market to weight observed growth measures more heavily when it is known that the firm is following a growth strategy. This two-way feedback between firms' business strategies and the market's pricing rule can lead to purely intrinsic fluctuations in sales and output, creating excess volatility in these real variables even in the absence of any external source of shocks.

Abstract:
We develop a multi-tasking model in which a firm can devote its efforts either to increasing sales growth, or to improving per-unit profit margins by, e.g., cutting costs. If the firm's manager is concerned with the current stock price, she will tend to favor the growth strategy at those times when the stock market is paying more attention to performance on the growth dimension. Conversely, it can be rational for the stock market to weight observed growth measures more heavily when it is known that the firm is following a growth strategy. This two-way feedback between firms' business strategies and the market's pricing rule can lead to purely intrinsic fluctuations in sales and output, creating excess volatility in these real variables even in the absence of any external source of shocks.

Stock market, catering, volatility

Abstract:
Theory suggests that, in the presence of local bias, the price of a stock should be decreasing in the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms in its region to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in its region. We test this proposition using data on U.S. Census regions and states, and find clear-cut support for it. Most of the variation in the ratio of interest comes from differences across regions in aggregate book value per capita. Regions with low population density--e.g., the Deep South--are home to relatively few firms per capita, which leads to higher stock prices via an "only-game-in-town" effect. This effect is especially pronounced for smaller, less visible firms, where the impact of location on stock prices is roughly 12 percent.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
Theory suggests that, in the presence of local bias, the price of a stock should be decreasing in the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms in its region to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in its region. We test this proposition using data on U.S. Census regions and states, and find clear-cut support for it. Most of the variation in the ratio of interest comes from differences across regions in aggregate book value per capita. Regions with low population density - e.g., the Deep South - are home to relatively few firms per capita, which leads to higher stock prices via an "only-game-in-town" effect. This effect is especially pronounced for smaller, less visible firms, where the impact of location on stock prices is roughly 12 percent.

Abstract:
This paper argues that corporations may use convertible bonds as an indirect (albeit possibly risky) method for getting equity into their capital structures in situations where adverse selection problems make a conventional stock issue unattractive. Unlike other theories of convertible bond issuance, the model of this paper highlights: 1) the importance of call provisions on convertibles; and 2) the significance of costs of financial distress to the Information content of a convertible issue.

Abstract:
I develop a model of bilateral conversations in which players may honestly exchange ideas with their competitors. The key to incentive compatibility is a strong form of complementarity in the information structure: a player can only generate a useful new insight on a given topic if he has access to his counterpart's previous thoughts on the topic. I then embed this model into a linear social network in which player A first can have a conversation with player B, then player B can have a conversation with player C, and so on. I show that relatively underdeveloped ideas can travel long distances over the network and thus be shared by many agents. More valuable ideas, by contrast, tend to remain localized among small groups of agents.

Abstract:
I develop a model of bilateral conversations in which players may honestly exchange ideas with their competitors. The key to incentive compatibility is a strong form of complementarity in the information structure: a player can only generate a useful new insight on a given topic if he has access to his counterpart's previous thoughts on the topic. I then embed this model into a linear social network in which player A first can have a conversation with player B, then player B can have a conversation with player C, and so on. I show that relatively underdeveloped ideas can travel long distances over the network and thus be shared by many agents. More valuable ideas, by contrast, tend to remain localized among small groups of agents.

information transmission, social networks

Abstract:
This paper develops a general framework for analyzing corporate risk management policies. We begin by observing that if external sources of finance are more costly to corporations than internally generated funds, there will typically be a benefit to hedging: hedging adds value to the extent that it helps ensure that a corporation has sufficient internal funds available to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. We then argue that this simple observation has wide-ranging implications for the design of risk management strategies. We delineate how these strategies should depend on such factors as shocks to investment and financing opportunities. We also discuss exchange-rate hedging strategies for multinationals, as well as strategies involving "nonlinear" instruments like options.

Abstract:
We assume that the instantaneous riskless rate reverts towards a central tendency which in turn, is changing stochastically over time. As a result, current short-term rates are not" sufficient to predict future short-term rates movements, as would be the case if the central" tendency was constant. However, since longer-maturity bond prices incorporate information" about the central tendency, longer-maturity bond yields can be used to predict future short-term" rate movements. We develop a two-factor model of the term-structure which implies that a" linear combination of any two rates can be used as a proxy for the central tendency. Based on" this central-tendency proxy, we estimate a model of the one-month rate which performs better" than models which assume the central tendency to be constant.

Abstract:
We develop a framework for analyzing the capital allocation and capital structure decisions facing financial institutions such as banks. Our model incorporates two key features: i) value-maximizing banks have a well-founded concern with risk management; and ii) not all the risks they face can be frictionlessly hedged in the capital market. This approach allows us to show how bank-level risk management considerations should factor into the pricing of those risks that cannot be easily hedged. We examine several applications, including the evaluation of proprietary trading operations, and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions.

Abstract:
We develop a framework for analyzing the capital allocation and capital structure decisions facing financial institutions such as banks. Our model incorporates two key features: i) value-maximizing banks have a well-founded concern with risk management; and ii) not all the risks they face can be frictionlessly hedged in the capital market. This approach allows us to show how bank-level risk management considerations should factor into the pricing of those risks that cannot be easily hedged. We examine several applications, including: the evaluation of proprietary trading operations; and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives portfolios.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:

Standard models of informed speculation suggest that traders try to learn information that others do not have. This result implicitly relies on the assumption that speculators have long horizons, i.e, can hold the asset forever. By contrast, we show that if speculators have short horizons, they may herd on the same information, trying to learn what other informed traders also know. There can be multiple herding equilibria, and herding speculators may even choose to study information that is completely unrelated to fundamentals. These equilibria are informationally inefficient.

Abstract:
This paper addresses the following basic capital budgeting question: Suppose that cross-sectional differences in stock returns can be predicted based on variables other than beta (e.g., book-to- market), and that this predictability reflects market irrationality rather than compensation for fundamental risk. In this setting, how should companies determine hurdle rates? I show how factors such as managerial time horizons and financial constraints affect the optimal hurdle rate. Under some circumstances, beta can be useful as a capital budgeting tool, even if it is of no use in predicting stock returns.

Abstract:
This article addresses the following basic capital budgeting question: Suppose that cross-sectional differences in stock returns can be predicted based on variables other than beta (e.g., book-to-market), and that this predictability reflects market irrationality rather than compensation for fundamental risk. In this setting, how should companies determine hurdle rates? I show how factors such as managerial time horizons and financial constraints affect the optimal hurdle rate. Under some circumstances, beta can be useful as a capital budgeting tool, even if it is of no use in predicting stock returns.

Abstract:
We develop a model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. In an effort to stop rent-seeking, corporate headquarters will be effectively forced into paying bribes to some division managers. And because headquarters is itself an agent of outside investors, the bribes may take the form not of cash, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is a kind of socialism' in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker divisions tend to get subsidized by stronger ones.

Abstract:
This paper surveys recent work that relates to the "lending" view of monetary policy transmission. It has three main goals: 1) to explain why it is important to distinguish between the lending and "money" views of policy transmission; 2) to outline the microeconomic conditions that are needed to generate a lending channel; and 3) to review the empirical evidence that bears on the lending view.

Abstract:
A number of theories have been proposed to explain the medium-term momentum in stock returns identified by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). We test one such theory--based on the gradual-information-diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1997)--and establish three key results. First, once one moves past the very smallest stocks (where thin market-making capacity appears to be an issue) the profitability of momentum strategies declines sharply with firm size. Second, holding size fixed, momentum strategies work particularly well among stocks which have low analyst coverage. Finally, there is a strong asymmetry: the effect of analyst coverage is much more pronounced for stocks that are past losers than for stocks that are past winners. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firm-specific information, especially negative information, diffuses only gradually across the investing public.

Abstract:
This paper explores the question of whether hedge funds engage in front-running strategies that exploit the predictable trades of others. One potential opportunity for front-running arises when distressed mutual funds - those suffering large outflows of assets under management - are forced to sell stocks they own. We document two pieces of evidence that are consistent with hedge funds taking advantage of this opportunity. First, in the time series, the average returns of long/short equity hedge funds are significantly higher in those months when a larger fraction of the mutual-fund sector is in distress. Second, at the individual stock level, short interest rises in advance of sales by distressed mutual funds.

Abstract:
This paper examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce resources to competing projects in an internal capital market. Unlike a bank lender, headquarters has control rights that give it both the authority and the incentive to engage in 'winner-picking' -- the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another. By doing a good job in the winner-picking dimension, headquarters can create value even when its own relationship with the outside capital market is fraught with agency problems and it therefore cannot help at all to relax overall firm- wide credit constraints. One implication of the model developed here is that internal capital markets may function more efficiently when companies choose relatively focused strategies.

Abstract:
This paper examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce resources to competing projects in an internal capital market. Unlike a bank, headquarters has control rights that enable it to engage in "winner-picking"- -the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another. By doing a good job in the winner-picking dimension, headquarters can create value even when it cannot help at all to relax overall firm-wide credit constraints. The model implies that internal capital markets may sometimes function more efficiently when headquarters oversees a small and focused set of projects.

Abstract:
This paper develops a model of bank asset and liability management, based on the idea that information problems make it difficult for banks to raise funds with instruments other than insured deposits. The model can be used to address the question of how monetary policy works. One effect it captures is that when the Fed reduces reserves, this tightens banks' financing constraints and thereby leads to a cutback in bank lending -- this is the 'bank lending channel' in action. However, in addition to providing a specific set of microfoundations for the lending channel, the model also yields a novel account of how monetary policy affects bond-market interest rates.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
A mutual-fund manager is more likely to hold (or buy, or sell) a particular stock in any quarter if other managers in the same city are holding (or buying, or selling) that same stock. This pattern shows up even when controlling for the distance between the fund manager and the stock in question, so it is distinct from a local-preference effect. It is also robust to a variety of controls for investment styles. These results can be interpreted in terms of an epidemic model in which investors spread information about stocks to one another by word of mouth.

Abstract:
In an effort to shed new light on the monetary transmission mechanism, we create a panel data set that includes quarterly observations of every insured commercial bank in the United States over the period 1976-1993. Our key cross-sectional finding is that the impact of monetary policy on lending behavior is significantly more pronounced for banks with less liquid balance sheets -- i.e., banks with lower ratios of cash and securities to assets. Moreover, this result is entirely attributable to the smaller banks in our sample, those in the bottom 95% of the size distribution. Among other things, our findings provide strong support for the existence of a lending channel

Abstract:
We investigate the idea that stock-market participation is influenced by social interaction. We build a simple model in which any given 'social' investor finds it more attractive to invest in the market when the participation rate among his peers is higher. The model predicts higher participation rates among social investors than among 'non-socials'. It also admits the possibility of multiple social equilibria. We then test the theory using data from the Health and Retirement Study. Social households - defined as those who interact with their neighbors, or who attend church - are indeed substantially more likely to invest in the stock market than non-social households, controlling for other factors like wealth, race, education and risk tolerance. Moreover, consistent with a peer-effects story, the impact of sociability is stronger in states where stock-market participation rates are higher.

Abstract:
This paper uses disaggregated data on bank balance sheets to provide a test of the lending view of monetary policy transmission. We argue that if the lending view is correct, one should expect the loan and security portfolios of large and small banks to respond differentially to a contraction in monetary policy. We first develop this point with a theoretical model; we then test to see if the model's predictions are borne out in the data.

Abstract:
We argue that time-series variation in the maturity of aggregate corporate debt issues arises because firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the large supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself with relatively more short-term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long-term debt, and vice-versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: i) in periods when the ratio of government debt to total debt is higher; and ii) by firms with stronger balance sheets. Our theory provides a new perspective on the apparent ability of firms to exploit bond-market return predictability with their financing choices.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
We compare different indexation schemes in terms of their ability to facilitate forgiveness and reduce the investment disincentives associated with the large LDC debt overhang. Indexing to an endogenous variable (e.g., a country`s output) has a negative moral hazard effect on investment, This problem does not arise when payments are linked to an exogenous variable such as commodity prices. Nonetheless, indexing payments to output may be useful when debtors know more about their willingness to invest than lenders. We also reach new conclusions about the desirability of default penalties under asymmetric information.

Abstract:
What ties together the traditional commercial banking activities of deposit-taking and lending? We argue that since banks often lend via commitments, their lending and deposit-taking may be two manifestations of one primitive function: the provision of liquidity on demand. There will be synergies between the two activities to the extent that both require banks to hold large balances of liquid assets: If deposit withdrawals and commitment takedowns are imperfectly correlated, the two activities can share the costs of the liquid-asset stockpile. We develop this idea with a simple model, and use a variety of data to test the model empirically.

Abstract:
This paper develops a model of repeated innovation with knowledge spillovers. The model's novel feature is that firms complete on two dimensions: 1)product quality or cost, where one firm's innovation ultimately spills over to other firms; and 2) distribution costs, where there are no spillovers across firms and where incumbent firms' existing customer bases give them a competitive advantage over would- be entrants. Customer bases have two important consequences: 1) they can in some circumstances dramatically reduce the long-run average level of innovation; 2) they lead to endogenous bunching, or waves, in innovative activity.

Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: "letter stock" or classified stock; conglomerate discount; financial restructuring.

CASE SETTING: 1991, steel industry, oil industry. 

This case focuses on USX Corporation's 1991 decision to undertake a novel restructuring technique that has since come to be known as "targeted stock". This technique, devised by Lehman Brothers, is a descendant of the "letter stock" introduced by GM in its 1984 acquisition of EDS. It involves dividing USX equity into two "targeted" classes, reflecting the individual performance of its steel and energy-related operations. What is unusual about this deal is that unlike either a complete divestiture or a partial spinoff, no new corporate entity is created. That is, both the Steel and Marathon stocks are claims on the same corporation.Loosely speaking, the aim from USX's perspective seems to be to avoid some of the costs of remaining a conglomerate, while maintaining some of the benefits. While the USX case is the first example of targeted stock, several other companies have since used the technique, including Pittston, Ralston Purina, Fletcher Challenge, Seagull Energy, and Genzyme.Many of the key concepts in this case revolve around the strengths and weaknesses of the conglomerate form of organization, and the motivations for restructuring conglomerates. Related issues include the existence of a "conglomerate discount" in the stock market; the contrast between how internal and external capital markets allocate funds to projects; the distinction between the cashflow rights on securities, and their control rights; and the design of a sensible voting mechanism across the two classes of stock.One could use this case near the end of an advanced course in corporate finance, after the students have already been exposed to some of the important concepts associated with asymmetric information in investment and financing decisions; agency problems; and control rights and governance structures.