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Abstract:
The primary goal of this study is to evaluate the ability of the Cross-Sectional Jones Model and the Cross-Sectional Modified Jones Model to detect earnings management vis-a-vis their time-series counterparts by examining the association between discretionary accruals and audit qualifications. These two cross-sectional models have not been formally evaluated by prior research, and their use may offer certain advantages to investors and researchers over their time-series counterparts. A sample of 173 distinct firms with qualified audit reports and a matched-pair control sample with clean audit reports are used. Only the two cross-sectional models are consistently able to detect earnings management. One limitation of this study is that its findings merely indicate the superiority of the cross-sectional models vis-a-vis their time-series counterparts in an audit qualification setting, not validate either the former or the latter.

Discretionary-accruals models; Earnings management; Audit qualification; Big Six auditors

Abstract:
The primary objective of this study is to evaluate empirically the ability of two cross-sectional models, the Cross-Sectional Jones Model and the Cross-Sectional Modified Jones Model, to detect earnings management vis-a-vis their time-series counterparts. The motivation follows because these two cross-sectional models have not been formally evaluated by prior research, and because their use offers substantial advantages to investors and researchers over their time-series counterparts. A secondary objective is to assess the robustness of findings of prior studies assessing discretionary-accruals models using our new sample and research method, which controls for potential research confounds. The evaluation involves examining the association between discretionary accruals and audit qualifications, using a sample of 166 distinct firms with qualified audit reports and a matched-pair control sample with clean audit reports. An association between large discretionary accruals generated by a model and an audit qualification provides evidence on the ability of the model to detect earnings management. Results from univariate tests that do not control for potential research confounds show that all models, except the DeAngelo Model, are consistently successful in discriminating between firms that manage earnings. Once potential research confounds are controlled, however, only the two cross-sectional models are able to detect earnings management. This last result, which highlights the importance of controlling for research confounds in earnings management studies using carefully selected samples, implies that the cross-sectional models are superior to their time-series counterparts. This finding is particularly important for future earnings management research because using a cross-sectional model rather than its time-series counterpart should result in a larger sample size that is less subject to a survivorship bias, and will also allow examining samples of firms with short history.

Discretionary-accruals models; Earnings management; Audit qualifications; Big Six auditors.

Abstract:
The paper studies the manner by which earnings expectations are met, measures the rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations (MBE) formed just prior to the release of quarterly earnings, and tests alternative explanations for this reward. The evidence supports the claims that the MBE phenomenon has become more widespread in recent years and that the pattern by which MBE is obtained is consistent with both earnings management and expectation management. More importantly, the evidence shows that after controlling for the overall earnings performance in the quarter, firms that manage to meet or beat their earnings expectations enjoy an average quarterlyreturn that is higher by almost 3% than their peers that fail to do so. While investors appear to discount MBE cases that are likely to result from expectation or earnings management, the premium in these cases is still significant. Finally, the results are consistent with an economic explanation forthe premium placed on earnings surprises, namely that MBE are informative of the firm s future performance.

Earnings expectations, analysts, forecasts, expectation management, earnings management, losses

Abstract:
This paper finds that firms that meet or beat current analysts' earnings expectations (MBE) enjoy a higher return over the quarter than firms with similar quarterly earnings forecast errors that fail to meet these expectations. Further, such a premium to MBE, although somewhat smaller, exists in cases where MBE is likely to have been achieved through earnings or expectations management. The findings also indicate that the premium to MBE is a leading indicator of future performance. This premium and its predictive ability are only marginally affected by whether the MBE is genuine or the result of earnings or expectations management.

earnings expectations, analysts' forecasts, expectation management, earnings management, losses

Abstract:
The paper studies the manner by which earnings expectations are met, measures the rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations (MBE) formed just prior to the release of quarterly earnings, and tests alternative explanations for this reward. The evidence supports the claims that the MBE phenomenon has become more widespread in recent years and that the pattern by which MBE is obtained is consistent with both earnings management and expectation management. More importantly, the evidence shows that after controlling for the overall earnings performance in the quarter, firms that manage to meet or beat their earnings expectations enjoy an average quarterly return that is higher by almost 3% than their peers that fail to do so. While investors appear to discount MBE cases that are likely to result from expectation or earnings management, the premium in these cases is still significant. Finally, the results are consistent with an economic explanation for the premium placed on earnings surprises, namely that MBE are informative of the firm's future performance.

Earnings expectations, analysts' forecasts, expectation management, earnings management, losses

Abstract:
n recent years, German companies report consolidated financial statements under German GAAP, U.S. GAAP, or International Accounting Standards (IAS). Market observers, researchers, and regulators have argued that financial statements prepared under the shareholder (or investor) model, such as U.S. GAAP or IAS, provide better information than financial statements prepared under the stakeholder model (German GAAP). They further have argued that U.S. GAAP is more rigorously defined and, therefore, provides superior information to IAS. We investigate comparative value relevance, measured as the slope coefficient of the returns/earnings regression. Our results are consistent with expectations. Within our sample of German companies traded on German stock exchanges, value relevance of U.S. GAAP based earnings is higher than that of IAS based earnings, which in turn is more value relevant than earnings produced under German GAAP. A major contribution of this research is that, unlike prior research, we measure stock returns for all sample firms in the German stock market only, and therefore are not reliant on the perhaps strong assumption underlying prior studies of similarity of pricing across markets domiciled in different countries.

value relevance, international accounting standards, German accounting standards, U.S. GAAP, accounting earnings

Abstract:
In recent years, German companies report consolidated financial statements under German GAAP, U.S. GAAP, or International Accounting Standards (IAS). Market observers, researchers, and regulators have argued that financial statements prepared under the shareholder (or investor) model, such as U.S. GAAP or IAS, provide better information than financial statements prepared under the stakeholder model (German GAAP). They further have argued that U.S. GAAP is more rigorously defined and, therefore, provides superior information to IAS. We investigate comparative value relevance, measured as the slope coefficient of the returns/earnings regression. Our results are consistent with expectations. Within our sample of German companies traded on German stock exchanges, value relevance of U.S. GAAP based earnings is higher than that of IAS based earnings, which in turn is more value relevant than earnings produced under German GAAP. A major contribution of this research is that, unlike prior research, we measure stock returns for all sample firms in the German stock market only, and therefore are not reliant on the perhaps strong assumption underlying prior studies of similarity of pricing across markets domiciled in different countries.

value relevance, international accounting standards, German accounting standards, U.S. GAAP, accounting earnings

Abstract:
We empirically investigate valuations of Internet firms at various stages of the initial public offering (IPO) from two perspectives. First, we examine the association between the valuation of Internet IPOs and a set of financial and nonfinancial variables, which prior anecdotal or empirical evidence suggests may serve as value drivers. Second, we document differences in IPO valuations between Internet and non-Internet firms as well as across different stages in the IPO processi.e., initial prospectus price, final offer price, and first trading day pricewithin each set of firms. Our primary two conclusions are as follows. First, there are noticeable differences between valuations of Internet and non-Internet firms, especially at the prospectus and final IPO stage. Specifically, the valuation of non-Internet firms generally follows the conventional wisdom regarding valuation: positive earnings and cash flows are priced, while negative earnings and negative cash flows are not. The valuation of Internet firms, however, departs from conventional wisdom, with earnings not being priced, and negative cash flows being priced perhaps because they are viewed as investments. This difference between the two classes of firms may be expected, given the age and unique nature of the Internet industry. Second, there are significant differences between the initial valuation of firms at the prospectus and IPO stage and their valuation by the stock market at the end of the first trading day. For non-Internet firms, the difference is largely ascribed to the relative offering size. For Internet firms, however, the differences are with respect to positive cash flows, sales growth, R&D, and high-risk warnings, in addition to the relative offering size.

Analyst forecasts, bias, optimism, pessimism, underreaction, reporting bias, selection bias

Abstract:
The release of the full set of financial statements in Form 10-Q provides investors with the data necessary to estimate the discretionary portion of earnings, thereby allowing them to better assess the integrity of reported quarterly earnings. We thus expect a negative association between unexpected discretionary accruals estimated using 10-Q disclosures and stock returns around 10-Q filing dates. Consistent with our expectations, we document a negative association between unexpected discretionary accruals and cumulative abnormal returns over a short window around the 10-Q filing date. Furthermore, this association varies systematically with investor sophistication. Finally, results from portfolio tests indicate that this association is economically as well as statistically significant. One interpretation of our findings is that accruals management has substantial valuation consequences, which are quickly impounded into stock prices.

Abstract:
This paper investigates the decision by top-level executives of more than 1,200 public corporations to exercise large stock option awards in the period 1992-2001. We hypothesize and find that abnormally large option exercises predict stock return future performance. We then hypothesize that this predictive ability represents private information about disappointing earnings in the post-exercise period. Consistent with this hypothesis we find that abnormally positive earnings performance in the pre-exercise period turns to disappointing earnings performance in the post-exercise period, and that this pattern comes as a surprise to even sophisticated market participants (financial analysts). We also hypothesize and find that the disappointing earnings in the post-exercise period represent a reversal of inflated earnings in the pre-exercise period. Collectively, these findings suggest that the private information used by top-level executives to time abnormally large exercises follows from earnings management so as to increase the cash payout of exercises.

Executive compensation, Incentives, Stock option exercises, Earnings management

Abstract:
This paper asks two questions. First, has the prevalence of expectations management to meet/beat analyst expectations changed in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 accounting scandals and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)? Second, has the mix among the three mechanisms used for meeting earnings targets: accrual earnings management, real earnings management, and earnings expectations management shifted in the Post-SOX Period? We document that the propensity to meet/beat analyst expectations has declined significantly in the Post-SOX Period. Our primary findings explain this pattern. In particular, we find a decline in the use of expectations management and accrual management, and no change in real earnings management in the Post-SOX Period relative to the preceding seven-year period. Our results are robust to controlling for varying macro economic conditions. These findings contribute to the academic literature, investors, and regulators.

Earnings expectations, Analysts' forecasts, Expectations management, Earnings management, Real Earnings Management, Sarbanes Oxley

Abstract:
In this paper, we assess the degree to which ERCs reported in the literature may be attenuated due to measurement errors in the proxies for the earnings expected by the market. We use the cross-sectional dispersion of analyst forecasts as a variable to calibrate the measurement error inherent in these proxies. We explore whether forecast dispersion is inversely related to the magnitude of ERCs, and whether ERCs approach their theoretical values as the dispersion decreases sufficiently.

Abstract:
Prior research generally finds that firms underreport option expense by managing assumptions underlying option valuation (e.g. they shorten the expected option lives), but it fails to document management of a key assumption, the one concerning expected stock-price volatility. Using a new methodology, we address two questions: (1) To what extent do companies follow the guidance in FAS 123 and use forward looking information in addition to the readily available historical volatility in estimating expected volatility? (2) What determines the cross-sectional variation in the reliance on forward looking information? We find that firms use both historical and forward-looking information in deriving expected volatility. We also find, however, that the reliance on forward-looking information is limited to situations where this reliance results in reduced expected volatility and thus smaller option expense. We interpret this finding as managers opportunistically use the discretion in estimating expected volatility afforded by FAS 123. In support of this interpretation, we also find that managerial incentives play a key role in this opportunism.

Executive Stock Options, Forward-looking Information, SFAS No. 123, Call option, Implied Volatility

Abstract:
This paper asks two questions. First, has the prevalence of expectations management tomeet/beat analyst expectations changed in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 accountingscandals and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)? Second, has the mixamong the three mechanisms used for meeting earnings targets: accrual earningsmanagement, real earnings management, and earnings expectations management shiftedin the Post-SOX Period? We document that the propensity to meet/beat analystexpectations has declined significantly in the Post-SOX Period. Our primary findingsexplain this pattern. In particular, we find a decline in the use of expectationsmanagement and accrual management, and no change in real earnings management in thePost-SOX Period relative to the preceding seven-year period. Our results are robust tocontrolling for varying macro economic conditions. These findings contribute to theacademic literature, investors, and regulators.

Abstract:
This paper asks two questions. First, has the prevalence of expectations management tomeet/beat analyst expectations changed in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 accountingscandals and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)? Second, has the mixamong the three mechanisms used for meeting earnings targets: accrual earningsmanagement, real earnings management, and earnings expectations management shiftedin the Post-SOX Period? We document that the propensity to meet/beat analyst expectations has declined significantly in the Post-SOX Period. Our primary findings explain this pattern. In particular, we find a decline in the use of expectations management and accrual management, and no change in real earnings management in the Post-SOX Period relative to the preceding seven-year period. Our results are robust to controlling for varying macro economic conditions. These findings contribute to the academic literature, investors, and regulators.

Abstract:
This paper investigates the decision by top-level executives of more than 1,200public corporations to exercise large stock option awards in the period 1992-2001. Wehypothesize and find that abnormally large option exercises predict stock return futureperformance. We then hypothesize that this predictive ability represents private information about disappointing earnings in the post-exercise period. Consistent with this hypothesis we find that abnormally positive earnings performance in the pre-exercise period turns to disappointingearnings performance in the post-exercise period, and that this pattern comes as a surprise to even sophisticated market participants (financial analysts). We also hypothesize and find that the disappointing earnings in the post-exercise period represent a reversal of inflated earnings in the pre-exercise period. Collectively, these findings suggest that the private information used by top-level executives to time abnormally large exercises follows from earnings management so as to increase the cash payout of exercises.

Executive compensation, Incentives, Stock option exercises, Earnings management

Abstract:
We document a market failure to fully respond to loss/profit quarterly announcements. The annualized post portfolio formation return spread between two portfolios formed on extreme losses and extreme profits is approximately 21 percent. This loss/profit anomaly is incremental to previously documented accounting-related anomalies, and is robust to alternative risk adjustments, distress risk, firm size, short sales constraints, transaction costs, and sample periods. In an effort to explain this finding, we show that this mispricing is related to differences between conditional and unconditional probabilities of losses/profits, as if stock prices do not fully reflect conditional probabilities in a timely fashion.

Loss/profit mispricing, loss/profit predictability, accounting losses/profits, post earnings announcement drift, earnings-based anomalies

Abstract:
Prior research generally finds that firms underreport option expense by managingassumptions underlying option valuation (e.g. they shorten the expected option lives), but it fails to document management of a key assumption, the one concerning expected stock-price volatility. Using a new methodology, we address two questions: (1) To what extent do companies follow the guidance in FAS 123 and use forward looking information in addition to the readily available historical volatility in estimating expected volatility? (2) What determinesthe cross-sectional variation in the reliance on forward looking information? We find that firms use both historical and forward-looking information in deriving expected volatility. We also find, however, that the reliance on forward-looking information is limited to situations where this reliance results in reduced expected volatility and thus smaller option expense. We interpret this finding as managers opportunistically use the discretion in estimating expected volatility afforded by FAS 123. In support of this interpretation, we also find that managerial incentivesplay a key role in this opportunism.

executive stock options, forward-looking information, SFAS No. 123, implied volatility

Abstract:
This study assesses the impact of exchange rate variability on the riskiness of U.S. multinational firms by examining the relation between exchange rate variability and stock return volatility and by decomposing this relation into components of systematic and diversifiable risk. Focusing on two periods around the 1973 switch from fixed to floating exchange rates, we find a significant increase in the volatility of U.S. multinational monthly stock returns corresponding to the period of increased exchange rate variability. This increase in stock return volatility is also significant relative to the increase in stock return volatility for firms in three control samples. Using a single factor market model, we show this increase in total volatility led to a significant increase in market risk (beta) for the multinational firms relative to the control samples between the two periods. Collectively, these results suggest that the increase in exchange rate variability after 1973 was perceived by investors to be associated with an increase in the riskiness of cash flows of multinational firms that required compensation in terms of higher expected returns.

Abstract:
We address two research questions in this study. First, is there a change in the prevalence of expectations management to meet or beat analysts' earnings expectations in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 accounting scandals and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)? Second, did the mix among the three mechanisms used for meeting or beating analysts' earnings expectations: accrual-based earnings management, real earnings management, and expectations management change in the Post-SOX Period? We hypothesize and provide empirical evidence that the observed drop in the frequency of just meeting/beating analysts' earnings expectations is associated with both (1) a decline in the use of downward expectations management and upward accrual-based earnings management in the Post-SOX period relative to the preceding seven-year period and (2) an increase in upward real earnings management activities.

Earnings management, Real Earnings Management, Expectations Management, The Sarbanes Oxley Act

Abstract:
This study tests whether the observed patterns in stock returns after quarterly earnings announcements are related to the proportion of firm shares held by institutional investors, a variable used by prior research to proxy for investor sophistication. Our findings show that the institutional holdings variable is negatively correlated with the observed post-announcement abnormal returns. Our findings also show that traditional proxies for transaction costs (i.e., trading volume, stock price) as well as firm size have little incremental power to explain post announcement abnormal returns when institutional holdings is an explanatory variable. If institutional ownership is a valid proxy for investor sophistication, these findings suggest that the trading activity of unsophisticated investors underlies the predictability of stock returns after earnings announcements. However, tests evaluating the validity of institutional holdings as a proxy for investor sophistication yield only mixed results. This calls for caution in interpreting our findings.

Abstract:
Is it plausible that important corporate events such as write-offs, averaging around 20% of firms? market values, are associated with stock-price responses of less than 1%? We investigate this question by observing a lengthy period before and after the announcement date. We find, as suggested by previous studies, that price declines precede write-off announcements. We find what has not been found before: abnormal returns continue to decline after the announcement by as much as 21% annually for a two-year period. This significant stock-price underperformance is also observed around subsequent earnings announcements, and is robust to various risk-adjustment techniques. Our findings are important on two counts: they (1) suggest that disclosure standards may not be sufficient to allow market agents to understand the economic consequences of the write-offs, and (2) reveal a substantial mispricing, which is inconsistent with market efficiency.

Abstract:
The accounting method in SFAS No. 8 for restatement of a foreign operation's financial statements denominated in a foreign currency into the parent's currency equivalents for inclusion in the parent company's financial statements was several criticized by market participants and managers. Its replacements, SFAS No. 52, represented an attempt to improve on the methods of SFAS No. 8. This study examines two questions: Did SFAS No. 8 produce relevant information for valuing US multinational firms, and are the results reported under SFAS No. 52 more valuation-relevant than those reported under SFAS No. 8? Valuation relevance is studied because the FASB has stated that relevance is an important criterion for choosing among alternative accounting methods. Considered collectively, the results suggest that the rules in SFAS No. 8 produced a poor accounting measure for valuing US multinational firms, and that the introduction of SFAS No. 52 has resulted in a significant improvement in the valuation relevance of the accounting numbers associated with the restatement of a foreign operation's financial statements. However, this improvement applies only to the subset of firms that designated a foreign currency as their functional currency (i.e., switched to the current-rate method) and not to firms that designated the dollar as their functional currency (i.e., as if they still reported under SFAS No. 8).

Abstract:
This paper presents an empirical exploration of the relation between abnormal stock returns of U.S. firms with inter-national activities and fluctuations in the U.S. dollar. Consistent with previous research, we fail to find a signifi-cant correlation between abnormal returns of our sample firms and changes in the dollar. We investigate the possibility that this failure is due to mispricing. The main results are: 1) lagged changes in the dollar are a significant variable in explaining current abnormal returns of our sample firms suggesting that mispricing is occurring, and 2) this exchange-rate exposure effect weakens over time suggesting that investors learn about the mispricing over time. In addition, a simple trading strategy based upon lagged changes in the dollar generates abnormal returns that are economically as well as statistically significant. Corroborating evidence is also provided. One interpretation of these results is that investors do not use all freely available information--in particular, past changes in the dollar and the past inter-actions between dollar changes and firm performance, assets and liabilities--to predict changes in firm value. More specifically, by the end of the fiscal quarter investors observe the change in the value of the dollar over this period and have observed the impacts of past dollar changes on firm performance, assets and liabilities. Based upon this information, investor should be able to form an unbiased expectation about the economic impact of the recent change in the dollar on firm performance, assets, and liabilities, and incorporate this effect into firm value by that time. However, at the end of the fiscal quarter, investors system- atically under-estimate this impact (or perhaps even overlook it entirely). This under-estimation is corrected only when additional information that relates to the impact of the past change in the dollar on firm performance, assets, and liabilities is disclosed in the future.

Abstract:
This study assesses the impact of exchange rate variability on the riskiness of U.S. multinational firms by examining the relation between exchange rate variability and stock return volatility and by decomposing this relation into components of systematic and diversifiable risk. Focusing on two periods around the 1973 switch from fixed to floating exchange rates, we find a significant increase in the volatility of U.S. multinational monthly stock returns corresponding to the period of increased exchange rate variability. This increase in stock return volatility is also significant relative to the increased volatility of stock return for firms in three control samples. Using a single factor market model, tests indicate a significant increase in market risk (Beta) for the multinational firms relative to the control samples between the two periods. Examination of this increase in market risk for multinational firms indicates that it represents an increase in asset risk, not financial risk. Collectively, these results suggest that the increase in exchange rate variability after 1973 was perceived by investors to be associated with an increase in the riskiness of cash flows of multinational firms that required compensation in terms of higher expected returns.

Abstract:
This study further explores a structural break in the relation between stock returns of firms with foreign currency positions and lagged exchange rate changes (exchange rate exposure effect) documented in Bartov and Bodnar (l994). We examine whether changes in the financial accounting reporting of foreign currency positions from SFAS No. 52 might have improved investors' ability to characterize firms' economic exchange rate exposures, and thus the impact of exchange rate movements on firm value. Our findings indicate that only firms reporting using the dollar as the functional currency (i.e., those reporting as if they were still under SFAS No. 8) retain a significant relation between the lagged change in the dollar and firm value in the post-SFAS No. 52 period. For firms reporting using the foreign currency as the functional currency (i.e., those who switched to the new translation method) the significant lagged relation disappears. This is consistent with the use of a foreign currency as the functional currency under SFAS No. 52 facilitating valuation of U.S. firms with foreign operations.

Abstract:
Rendleman Jones and Latane (1987) and Bernard and Thomas (1990) report evidence supporting their hypothesis that investors use a "naive" seasonal random walk model in forming expectations of quarterly earnings. Using the Bernard and Thomas (1990) data we show that the market acts as if it: (1) does not use a seasonal random walk model; (2) does incorporate past earnings changes in forming expectations; (3) does use the correct signs in exploiting serial correlation in seasonally-differenced quarterly earnings; but (4) underestimates the magnitude of the serial correlation. This evidence remains anomalous in the sense that it is consistent with neither the theory of efficient markets nor the "naive expectation model" hypothesis nor "behaviorial finance" theories.

Abstract:
The accounting method in SFAS No. 8 for restatement of a foreign operation's financial statements denominated in a foreign currency into the parent's currency equivalents for inclusion in the parent company's financial statements was several criticized by market participants and managers. Its replacements, SFAS No. 52, represented an attempt to improve on the methods of SFAS No. 8. This study examines two questions: Did SFAS No. 8 produce relevant information for valuing US multinational firms, and are the results reported under SFAS No. 52 more valuation-relevant than those reported under SFAS No. 8? Valuation relevance is studied because the FASB has stated that relevance is an important criterion for choosing among alternative accounting methods. Considered collectively, the results suggest that the rules in SFAS No. 8 produced a poor accounting measure for valuing US multinational firms, and that the introduction of SFAS No. 52 has resulted in a significant improvement in the valuation relevance of the accounting numbers associated with the restatement of a foreign operation's financial statements. However, this improvement applies only to the subset of firms that designated a foreign currency as their functional currency (i.e.., switched to the current-rate method) and not to firms that designated the dollar as their functional currency (i.e., as if they still reported under SFAS No. 8).

Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether and in what way adopting firms benefited from the pattern documented by Balsam et al. (1995) of reporting owners' equity increasing (decreasing) effects of mandated accounting changes in the income statement (balance sheet directly). If the market pays adequate attention to effects of accounting changes only when they are reported in the income statement and if managers wish to maximize firm value then the cost of adopting a new pronouncement is reduced when negative effects are reported directly on the balance sheet bypassing the income statement. We test this explanation on a sample of firms adopting major promulgations of the FASB over a seventeen year period from 1973 the year of FASB inception through the end of 1989. Consistent with our hypothesis we document significantly positive correlation between abnormal returns for a twelve month period around the end of the fiscal year in which the adoption of the mandated accounting change occurred and the income effects of mandated accounting changes when the adoption effects are reported in the income statement. Conversely we fail to find association between these twelve month abnormal returns and the effects of mandated accounting changes when the latter bypass the income statement and are reported directly in the balance sheet as a prior year adjustment to owners' equity.These results support the explanation that one reason that the FASB systematically deviates from APB No. 20 -- by not using the catch-up method for reporting the effects of mandated accounting changes -- is to reduce adopting firms' costs of implementation. They do so by allowing adopting firms to "bury" owners' equity decreasing effects in the owners' equity section of the balance sheet and thereby avoid any stock price decreases. An alternate explanation is that FASB does a good job by requiring only value relevant disclosure be reported in the income statement. This explanation however is doubtful because the amounts bypassing the income statement are predominately negative and because the underlying adoption effects whether reported in the income statement or in balance sheet directly have the same economic consequences.